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Abstract  
 
This thesis develops a story about Venezuela as an oil state and the way it deploys its policies to 
instrumentalise culture and urban space. It examines the way the Petrostate is imagined in 
speeches, how it manifests physically in space and how it is discursively constructed in adverts. 
By engaging with the work of Henri Lefebvre, Bob Jessop and George Yúdice this thesis sets out 
to challenge the disciplinary compartmentalisation of the analysis of the material and cultural 
effects of oil to demonstrate that within the extractive logic of the Petrostate and the oil industry, 
territory, oil, and culture become indivisible.  Mainly, it explores how the material and immaterial 
flows of oil traverse space, bureaucratic power, and culture. This thesis is particularly concerned 
with investigating the discursive and institutional mechanisms that enabled the Venezuelan state-
owned oil company PDVSA to expand its dominant space over Caracas to effectively reframe 
the city as an urban oil field.  
The thesis develops through four interconnected arguments.  It examines the representations of 
space produced by Petrosocialism through the creation of the new policy instruments of the 
Socialist State Space.  This process opened an institutional and legal breach that enabled PDVSA, 
the state-owned oil company, to enact the Oil Social District as a parallel State Space. 
Consequently, PDVSA’s definition of its corporate headquarters as a centre of oil extraction 
conceptualises Caracas as an oil field absorbed by the Oil Social District to enable PDVSA La 
Estancia (the cultural and social arm of PDVSA) to override municipal authority and embark on 
an ambitious program of public art restoration and urban regeneration. PDVSA La Estancia’s 
actions in the city are justified by its use of farming language that discursively melds oil and 
culture in a symbiotic and cyclical relationship to define their work as ‘oil that harvests culture’. 
Moreover, the advertising campaign ‘we transform oil into a renewable resource for you’ is used 
by PDVSA La Estancia to render oil and culture as equivalent, conceiving culture as ‘renewable 
oil’ as if culture could accumulate in the subsoil waiting to be extracted, exploited and processed 
like a mineral resource. An original contribution of this thesis is to build on Yúdice’s expediency 
of culture as a resource to propose the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit, in which culture is 
inextricable from land, akin to ‘renewable oil’ and tightly controlled by the Petrostate.  
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Introduction 
 
On a routine trip to the nearest PDV petrol station in Caracas, whilst waiting for the tank 
to fill (at £0,08 per litre Venezuela has the cheapest fuel in the world)  I looked up to the fuel 
dispenser and was surprised to see that instead of the usual boring advert for lubricants or motor 
oil, the dispenser featured the nineteenth century white filigree gazebo of El Calvario park. Upon 
closer observation, looming over the scene appeared a Gulliver-like version of an oil worker. I 
got off my car to take a photograph, and noticed that the other dispenser had another similar 
advert with another giant oil worker grazing the multicolour ceramic mural of Avenida 
Libertador (Illustration 1). 
The presence of the giant oil workers in the images signalled that something new was at play in 
the manner in which the oil company has been extending its dominion over the city and its 
cultural symbols.  Within contemporary scholarly work on the politics of culture of Hugo 
Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution (Kozak Rovero 2014; Kozak Rovero 2015; Silva-Ferrer 2014),  
little attention has been paid to PDVSA’s recent interventions in the city, which this thesis 
regards as a clear sign of the increasing power Hugo Chávez  had granted to the national oil 
company. Amid the myriad of recent publications on the cultural representations of oil 
capitalism in pop culture, literature and the visual arts (Barrett & Worden 2014; LeMenager 2014; 
Lord 2014), far less attention has been paid to the spatial dimension of the material cultural 
effects of oil, both as a mineral and as a flow of energy and wealth. Furthermore, recent cultural 
studies of oil have been predominantly focused on European and North American oil producing 
countries, with little focus on the Global South or OPEC countries more specifically. This thesis 
sets out to challenge the disciplinary compartmentalisation of the analysis of the material and 
cultural effects of oil. Tim Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy (2011) marks the point of departure of this 
thesis’s approach to look beyond the attention confined to the allocation of oil money to 
examine the processes through which oil flows are converted  into political and cultural power 
(Mitchell 2011, pp.5–6). The particular case of the Venezuelan Petrostate in the era of 
Petrosocialism serves to develop a reconsideration of the premises behind the cultural analyses 
of oil.  Historically, the formation of modern statecraft and society in Venezuela has been 
inextricable from the oil industry; therefore the influence of oil cannot be confined to a set of 
tropes or circumscribed to punctual interventions of private oil enterprises in the public sphere.   
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Illustration 1. PDV Petrol Station in Chacao, Caracas. Photo by Penelope Plaza, 2014 
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Hugo Chávez altered the relationship between PDVSA and the state by making the state-owned 
oil company subservient to his political project of Petrosocialism, further coalescing oil, state, 
territory and culture.  This thesis examines how in a Petrostate, oil traverses space, bureaucratic 
power and culture.  
To develop these themes, this introductory chapter is divided into three parts. The first part 
sketches the contextual information of this study, situating it within debates around the pervasive 
presence of oil in the formation of the modern state in Venezuela and the shift in the 
relationship between state, territory and oil brought by Hugo Chavez’s Petrosocialism. The 
second part presents the theoretical premises that inform this thesis and identifies the key themes 
that will be developed throughout this investigation. Finally, the third part presents the chapter 
outline, providing an introduction to the discussions and main arguments developed in this 
thesis.  
Narratives of the Venezuelan Petrostate: From Sowing Oil to the New Magical State 
 
It wasn’t until the rise of the oil industry in early twentieth century that Venezuela 
acquired the economic and political resources to consolidate a modern state with a centralised 
bureaucracy, but due to the strong legacy of colonial rule, it dealt with the oil industry in archaic 
terms. Decisions were based on the traditions inherited from the colony as the emerging nation 
declared itself the heir of the property rights of the Spanish Crown over vacant lands and 
ownership over all mines (Pérez Schael 1993, p.39). The property derived from the principle that 
what belonged to no one belonged to the King, so after gaining independence from the Spanish 
Crown, the King was substituted by the new republic (Pérez Schael 1993, p.39). Ergo, the wealth 
extracted directly from the subsoil as rent from the mines became an affirmation of national 
sovereignty since the rent sanctioned the recognition of the Nation’s authority as analogous to 
the King’s. Consequently, Venezuela did not become a rentier state with the rise of the oil 
industry, it was born a rentier state from the moment it became a republic. As the concept of 
sovereignty was built around the notion of property, the rent annulled oil’s materiality as a 
mineral. Furthermore, since Venezuela did not have the resources or the capacity to exploit nor 
produce oil products, revenue came in the form of concessions and royalties. By losing its 
mineral quality, oil was reduced to the ‘fetish’ of rent money that flowed from the soil directly to 
the state’s coffers; oil mattered as money and not as a complex technological reality (Pérez Schael 
1993, p.94). Hence, for the Venezuelan state the only matter to resolve was how and where to 
distribute the rent money and to whom, not how to ‘produce’ it.  
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The state rather than symbolise national glory, came to be viewed as an enormous distributive 
apparatus of oil rent money whose power was increasingly hollowed out by a breach between 
authority and territory. With the exploitation of oil Venezuela inaugurated its modern history as a 
Petrostate, ‘one whose capacity to create consensus and enforce collective decisions rested 
largely on the fate of the international oil market’ (Karl 1997, p.91). A Petrostate is a particular 
form of the rentier state, in which the majority of the state’s revenue comes from abroad 
through oil exports. The concept of  ‘rentier state’ was coined by Iranian economist Hossein 
Mahdavy (Beblawi & Luciani 1987, p.9) to refer to states whose main source of income comes 
from external resources. Rentier states can be traced back to the seventeenth century Spanish 
Empire and its exploitation of the Americas’ vast mineral resources.   
Venezuela’s identity as a nation is closely entangled with oil; as the Petrostate engaged with the 
oil industry Venezuelan society learned to see itself as an oil nation and to regard the state as the 
single representative of a population unified by oil (Coronil 1997, p.84). Moreover, the oil 
industry in Venezuela exercised a pervasive influence on the formation of political and social 
values, promoting and influencing the emergence of a political and social order based on the 
entrepreneurial corporate model of the oil industry (Tinker Salas 2014, pp.12–13).  Moreover, 
Fernando Coronil’s seminal study The Magical State: Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela  
(1997) argues that the Venezuelan state exercised its monopoly over the oil rent dramaturgically,  
enacting collective fantasies of progress by way of spectacular projects of development and 
infrastructure to seize its subjects through the power of marvel rather than with the power of 
reason: ‘the state seizes its subjects by inducing a condition or state being receptive to its illusions 
–a magical state’ (1997, p.5). In a country where the state had historically been very weak, the 
expansion of the oil industry promoted the concentration of power in the presidency, as the 
embodiment of the ‘magical’ powers of oil; the Magical State is personified as a magnanimous 
sorcerer in the figure of the president. As oil wealth increased, so did the State’s capacity to 
construct itself as a national institution by expanding the range of its dominion over society with 
material ‘illusions’ of progress through massive works of infrastructure and a vertiginous process 
of urbanisation achieved in just a few decades.  The flows of oil rent money concentrated in 
Caracas, the capital city, the centre of modern practices that would not distribute evenly to all 
sectors of Venezuelan society as oil created an ‘inflated’ economy that fostered an illusion of 
progress and modernity promoted by the state. 
Illusions of progress notwithstanding, the intellectual class attributed an ephemeral quality to oil 
because unlike agriculture, wealth relied on rent money and not on produce (Pérez Schael 1993, 
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p.95). Novelist, essayist and politician Arturo Uslar Pietri coined the slogan ‘to sow the oil’ in a 
newspaper article published in 1936; he used farming language as a didactic trope to explain how 
the oil windfall should be invested by making a direct reference to the land where riches were 
extracted from, and not to oil as an ephemeral source of wealth and dependency. Uslar Pietri was 
an advocate of taking advantage of the knowledge, technology and financial power of foreign oil 
corporations because he saw great benefits in keeping the country open to foreign capital, and 
using oil capital to invest in economic and social development (Uzcátegui 2010, pp.37–38). Uslar 
Pietri’s slogan ‘to sow the oil’ is at the centre of enduring conflicting views around oil in 
Venezuela. Behind the belief that oil can be ‘sown’ there is a lingering nostalgia about a lost ideal 
agrarian past that created a tension of simultaneous embrace and demonization of the ‘magical’ 
powers of oil, as it has created prosperity and extreme poverty in the same measure.  
Nonetheless, the slogan became the guiding principle of economic policy of subsequent 
governments (Coronil 1997, p.134). Uslar Pietri would revisit the slogan in public debates 
throughout the twentieth century to lament that oil had yet to be sown (Pérez Schael 1993, 
pp.199–205).  
After the crash in oil prices of the 1980s and 1990s sowing oil had become ever more unfeasible. 
Yet, Hugo Chávez revived the use of the slogan to frame the activities of the oil industry under 
his regime. The historical persistence of sowing oil as a guiding principle is conveyed in 
Petrosocialism and carried through the state-owned oil company PDVSA. Chávez baptised his 
third presidential term (2007-2013) as the new era with the expansion of the Bolivarian 
Revolution towards Socialism, as the only alternative for transcending capitalism. He assured that 
his socialist project was unique because it was ‘different to the Scientific Socialism that Karl 
Marx had originally envisioned’ because he was building a Bolivarian, Venezuelan, and oil based 
socialismo petrolero, in other words, Petrosocialism. Petrosocialism broadly defines Hugo Chávez’s 
political and economic project, in which the oil rent is funnelled into the construction of the 
Socialist State. In the midst of an unprecedented steep rise in oil prices, Chávez launched the 
Sowing Oil Plan, a 25 year national oil policy that formed the foundation for the advancement of 
Petrosocialism and the transition towards the Socialist State, which forms the context of this 
thesis investigation. Chávez and PDVSA sought to prove that Petrosocialism would succeed in 
sowing oil where previous regimes had failed. 
Venezuelan historian Margarita Lopez-Maya characterises Chávez’s presidencies as the ‘new 
debut of the magical state’ (2007; Coronil 2011),  identifying close similarities between Chávez’ 
government and the first presidency of Carlos Andres Pérez  in the centralisation of power and 
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the use of the oil rent to completely transform the state (López-Maya 2007). This thesis engages 
with Coronil and López-Maya to define the Chávez regime as the New Magical State: beyond a 
dramaturgical exercise of the monopoly over the oil rent, the close control over PDVSA enabled 
him to summon all the bureaucratic powers of the State in his persona.  But as will be made clear 
throughout this thesis, by delegating to PDVSA many of the functions of the government, he 
paved the way for the Venezuelan oil company to exercise power as a parallel state and 
consolidate its own State Space to absorb the material space of the city, conceptualised as an oil 
field.  
The above discussion lays out the backdrop of the topics this thesis investigates. The spatial 
dimension of the entanglement between the oil industry, bureaucratic power, the city and culture 
under Petrosocialism have not been sufficiently explored. This thesis aims to address this gap by 
examining how the relationship between the Petrostate, the state-owned oil company Petróleos 
de Venezuela S.A., and culture play out in space, focusing primarily on the work of PDVSA La 
Estancia -the social and cultural arm of the state owned oil company- and the construction of 
cultural representations of Petrosocialism in the city of Caracas.  It also examines the use of 
farming language by Hugo Chávez’s and PDVSA to refer to the activities of the oil industry 
(such as the national Sowing Oil Plan), and in particular to the activities of PDVSA La Estancia, 
to suggest a natural renewable cycle of ‘sowing oil’ and ‘harvesting culture’ that informs the 
notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit. Having laid out the historical context of the research, this 
introductory chapter now turns to present the theoretical premises of the thesis. 
Interfaces of State Space, Bureaucratic Power and Culture as a Resource 
 
Three theoretical premises guide this thesis: State Space, Bureaucratic Power and Culture 
as a Resource. The first premise draws on Brenner and Elden’s reading of Lefebvre as a theorist 
of State Space as territory. State Space is understood as land and as a political form of space 
which is historically specific, produced by and associated with the modern state, understandable 
‘only through its relation to the state and processes of statecraft’; accordingly,  there can be no 
state without territory and no territory without a state (Brenner & Elden 2009, pp.362–363). 
Brenner and Elden’s reading of Lefebvre will be useful for this thesis as it provides a way to go 
beyond simplistic perceptions of territory by understanding that any State Space, and by 
extension, any ‘territorially configured social space’ is the consequence of specific historical 
forms of  economic and political interventions of the state. This thesis engages critically with a 
diverse mix of documents and topics,  it utilises  David Harvey’s (Harvey 2006a, pp.281–284) 
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matrix of categories of space as a taxonomy to locate the spatiotemporal category of each 
document (defined and described in detail in chapter one) in order to disentangle the spatial and 
discursive mechanisms that constitute the spatial policies informed by Petrosocialism. Therefore, 
Caracas is defined as the Absolute-Material Space that delimits the geographical boundaries of 
the city and this thesis. The policy instruments of territorial and public administration, 
understood as legal entities of space, encompass the Absolute-Representations of Space shaped 
by the discourses of Petrosocialism. The Law of Hydrocarbons and its Oil Social Districts are 
regarded as oil-industry-based conceptualisations that function as Relative-Representations of 
Space, fixed in time but mutable in terms of the ‘areas of influence’ of the centres of extraction 
of hydrocarbons.  The Relative-Space of Representation category is useful to locate the space 
represented in the adverts of PDVSA La Estancia’s campaign ‘We transform oil into a renewable 
resource for you’.  In the adverts, space is fixed in time but made mutable in perception and 
meaning by how it is framed by the oil industry. Finally, the public art and public spaces restored 
by PDVSA La Estancia in Caracas are located in a Relative-Material Space as they serve as 
markers of the oil company’s appropriation of the Absolute-Material Space of Caracas, 
simultaneously located in two superimposed State Spaces.  
The second premise is Bureaucratic Power. Bob Jessop posits that the state does not exercise 
power, as the power of the state is ‘always conditional and relational’ it is defined as an 
institutional ensemble (Jessop 1990, p.367). Similarly, Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (2008, p.10) 
coincide with Jessop in arguing that the state does not and cannot exercise power; it can only do 
so through the complex network of organisations, institutions and apparatuses that compose it 
(2008, pp.55–56). By the same token, Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce affirm that the state ‘rather 
than a site from which this form of power originates or at which it terminates’  is the site where 
bureaucratic power congregates (Joyce & Bennett 2010, p.2). Hence, when referring to the power 
of the state, it is more accurate to talk about bureaucratic power instead of state power. This 
thesis adopts Bennett and Joyce’s perspective of the state as the site where bureaucratic power 
congregates to explore the contradictory process of transition towards the Socialist State, as it 
entailed the concurrent fragmentation of the existing state apparatus and centralisation of 
bureaucratic power in the figure of President Hugo Chávez. The adoption of the bureaucratic 
power perspective also allows this thesis to integrate the idea of the state as an ‘institution of 
territorial governance with vast powers over the material wellbeing of its people’ (Mukerji 2010, 
p.82) since the modern state is the only agent with the capacity to manage territory on a large 
scale (Lefebvre et al. 2009, p.20). This thesis explores bureaucratic power as it derives from, and 
is subject to, the dominion over State Space as Territory, a crucial notion in a Petrostate as its 
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political and economic power originates from the ownership of the subsoil and the monopoly 
over the oil rent. 
The third premise defines the original contribution of this thesis, the notion of culture-as-
mineral-deposit, which expands on George Yúdice’s expediency of culture as a resource. 
Yúdice’s proposition is that culture has acquired to an extent the same status as natural resources 
as it is close to impossible to find  public statements that do not  instrumentalise art and culture, 
whether to improve social conditions or to foster economic growth (Yúdice 2003, pp.10–11).  
Through an exploration of the relationship between culture, management and power (Bauman 
2004; McGuigan 2003; O’Brien 2014) this thesis engages with PDVSA La Estancia’s use of 
farming language and discursive fabrications to coalesce culture and oil (‘oil that harvests 
culture’) to argue that for an oil company it is close to impossible not to turn to culture as a 
mineral resource, in which culture becomes akin to ‘renewable oil’ . Given that in practice, 
cultural policy is the bureaucratic medium  for the instrumentalisation  of culture as a resource 
(Miller & Yúdice 2002, p.1), this thesis also engages with Jeremy Ahearne’s category of implicit 
cultural policy (2009, p.141) to demonstrate PDVSA La Estancia’s use of the Organic Law of 
Hydrocarbons as a parallel instrument of cultural policy.  
The three theoretical premises described above coalesce into a conceptual lens through the 
substantive chapters of this thesis, which enables to transcend the pitfalls of a 
compartmentalised analysis of the spatial and cultural dimension of oil, as this thesis sets out to 
demonstrate that within a Petrostate, oil inevitably intersects and interweaves State Space, 
Bureaucratic Power and Culture as a Resource. State Space (Territory) condenses the notion of 
land and political space of statecraft, land being crucial to a Petrostate since the subsoil contains 
the deposits of crude oil that forms the basis of its financial and political power. Hence, the 
Bureaucratic Power of the Petrostate and its institutional apparatus relies and depends on the oil 
wealth extracted from the subsoil. Therefore, the manner in which the Petrostate conceives and 
manages culture as a resource is framed within the extractive logic of oil, where culture is 
tantamount to oil as a resource entangled with State Space.  
In this regard, the discussion developed in this thesis contributes to current debates and recent 
scholarly work on the cultural dimension of oil, particularly within the emerging field of Energy 
Humanities. Thus, by building on the relationship between culture, management and power, this 
thesis particular tripartite theoretical lens provides the ideal framework to scrutinise how cultural 
policy and management function in the particular context of the oil industry by addressing the 
relationship between the Petrostate, oil wealth and culture in the development of Petrosocialism 
17 
 
in Venezuela. Looking at the relationship between oil wealth, the Petrostate and culture through 
this particular lens encourages the advancement of an innovative way of understanding the 
spatial and cultural dimensions of oil, and how a certain form of understanding culture is 
privileged by the national oil industry and to what effect it constructs a parallel notion of cultural 
policy making and management.  
Hence, this thesis will also draw on historical studies on the cultural legacy of oil in Venezuela to 
provide a discussion on the interconnections between culture, cultural policy and bureaucratic 
power in the Venezuelan Petrostate. Venezuelan Marxist anthropologist and former oil camp 
dweller Rodolfo Quintero’s  influential essay of 1968 The Culture of Oil: essay on the life styles of social 
groups in Venezuela (2011) (La cultura del petróleo: ensayo sobre estilos de vida de grupos sociales 
en Venezuela), was the first to explore the ‘culture of oil’ in Venezuela. He defined the ‘culture 
of oil’ as a culture of conquest, a foreign force with its own technology, instruments, inventions, 
equipment as well as non-material devices such as language, art and science that obliterates local 
cultures. This thesis revisits Quintero’s contention that the ‘culture of oil’ is sterile, incapable of 
creating art, science or any form of intellectual or cultural production. Also relevant for this 
thesis are Maria Sol Pérez Schael’s study Petróleo, Cultura y Poder en Venezuela (1993) which 
examines the influence of the cultural understanding of oil as a demonic force in shaping 
twentieth century statecraft, Fernando Coronil’s seminal work The Magical State: Nature, Money and 
Modernity in Venezuela (1997) which accounts the ways in which the state’s monopoly over the oil 
economy endowed it with the ‘magical powers’ to transform the nation, and Miguel Tinker Salas’ 
The Enduring Legacy: Oil and Society in Venezuela (2009) that explores the oil camps of transnational 
companies as cultural laboratories that promoted forms of citizenship and ways of life related to 
the global oil industry.  
In summary, this thesis is concerned with investigating the discursive and institutional 
mechanisms that enabled the state-owned oil company to constitute a parallel State Space to 
extend its dominance over the Absolute-Material Space of Caracas, to effectively reframe the city 
as an oil field by discursively construing a notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit that ties culture to 
the land, where the ‘sowing’ of oil can ‘harvest’ culture.  It is also concerned with the intrinsic 
contradictions within the model of Petrosocialism that informs the paradoxical discursive notion 
of ‘renewable oil’ as an illusion of the New Magical State.  
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Chapter outline 
 
To address the debates discussed above, this thesis is comprised of a brief historical 
overview, six substantive chapters and a conclusion. The historical overview provides essential 
contextual information in regards to Hugo Chavez presidencies and his Bolivarian Revolution, 
the shift of role of PDVSA under his government as well as institutional reforms and the 
governance structure of Caracas (e.g. concerning the governance structure in Caracas.  Further 
details on these developments and the manner in which they inform this research will be 
described in detail throughout the substantive chapters.  
Chapter one provides a review of the relevant literature that forms the theoretical 
premises of this thesis, divided into four parts. Part one explores Henri Lefebvre’s and David 
Harvey’s theorisation on space, to develop a discussion on the production of space and State 
Space in order to focus on Lefebvre as a theorist of State Space as territory. Part two develops a 
discussion on state theory and bureaucratic power, to focus in particular on rentier state theory 
in order to define the particular characteristics of the Petrostate.  Part three reviews key literature 
from the field of urban sociology to differentiate the terms city and urban, and their relationship 
with space and culture, to understand the effects of oil capitalism in the production of urban 
society and culture in the context of the Venezuelan Petrostate. Finally, it reviews relevant 
literature on the cultural dimension of oil, as well as the role of oil in and within culture, to 
examine the spatial and cultural representations of Petrosocialism in Caracas. 
Chapter two provides a discussion of the research design, methodology and ethical 
considerations of this thesis. The chapter defines the boundaries of the research to three specific 
settings: political, geographical and institutional. The political setting is defined by Hugo 
Chavez’s second and third presidential terms, in which he launched his model of Petrosocialism 
and the transition towards the Socialist State. The geographical context is the city of Caracas, 
capital of Venezuela and seat of government, a city with long standing discrepancies between its 
legal institutional framework and its territorial organisation. The institutional setting is PDVSA 
La Estancia, the social and cultural arm of the state-owned oil company PDVSA, self-defined as 
an ‘an oasis of culture and knowledge’. It was chosen as a case study representative of the 
fragmented institutional landscape brought by Hugo Chávez’ transition to the Socialist State as 
well as a unique example of a public cultural institution directly owned, managed and funded by 
a state-owned oil company. This thesis adopts a case study approach; PDVSA La Estancia is 
used as a gateway to explore Petrosocialism from a spatial and cultural perspective. The case 
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study is not concerned with PDVSA La Estancia’s internal bureaucracy, its processes of decision 
making, the logistics of the day to day management of public art and public spaces or its 
nationwide programme of cultural events, it is particularly concerned with investigating the 
ideological and institutional circumstances that enabled it to exert authority over the restored 
public art and public spaces in Caracas. The multidisciplinary nature of this thesis required a mix 
of documentary sources such as documentary research and elite interviews as data, and Critical 
Discourse Analysis and Visual Semiotics as methodological approaches. The chapter also 
describes the process of carrying out the research; it highlights the unanticipated ethical 
challenges faced whilst doing fieldwork in Caracas by engaging in a detailed discussion on the 
ethics of doing fieldwork in contexts suffering from extreme political polarisation and urban 
violence.  
Having laid out the literature review and the methodology, the thesis develops through four 
substantive chapters. Chapter three begins with a historical account of the Venezuelan nation 
state in the context of postcolonial state formation in Latin America.  It then develops a 
discussion on the emergence of the modern Venezuelan Petrostate coeval with the arrival of the 
oil industry and corporate practices of foreign oil corporations to illustrate how the Petrostate 
approached oil predominantly as rent money and not as a modern technological reality, which 
marked the emergence of what Fernando Coronil has termed the Magical State. The chapter 
builds on Coronil to characterise Hugo Chávez as the embodiment of the New Magical State and 
PDVSA as the engine of his revolution. Finally, the chapter provides a discussion on the 
historical context of the intersections between oil and culture in Venezuela, focusing in particular 
on the enduring persistence of the ‘sowing oil’ slogan as a driver of policy making.  
Chapter four examines the entanglements between Hugo Chávez’s discourse and the creation of 
new spatial strategies for the Socialist State Space, in the terms defined by Brenner & Elden as 
the mobilisation of bureaucratic power to reorganise sociospatial relations. Discourses, according 
to Fairclough, can exert power because they are regulated, institutionalised and linked to action.  
In the case of Chávez, his discursive exercise of power changed reality through his embodiment 
of the New Magical State, which allowed him to condense the bureaucratic powers of the state in 
his persona. This chapter investigates the Absolute-Representation of Space produced by the 
discourse of Petrosocialism; it argues that Chávez’s embodiment of the New Magical State is the 
lynchpin to his ability to exert Bureaucratic Power through discourse.  The oil windfall that 
characterised the period that concerns this thesis (2007-2013), provided Chávez with the 
resources to completely reform the institutional apparatus and create new policy instruments of 
20 
 
territorial administration that conceptualise the Socialist State Space.  Through the analysis of the 
development of policy instruments created to dismantle the existing spatial strategies of the state 
to lay the foundations of the Socialist State Space. The process of dismantlement of the existing 
institutional apparatus of city governance challenges notions of state space and modernity; this 
chapter demonstrates that the Oil Social Districts, outlined by the Organic Law of 
Hydrocarbons, constitute in practice PDVSA’s parallel State Space, extended over non-oil 
extraction areas like Caracas. It also demonstrates how the process of the abrogation and 
substitution of the existing legal framework of political-administrative territorial management 
was fraught with inconsistencies that created a legal vacuum that diminished State Space 
authority and thus enabled PDVSA La Estancia to use the Social Oil Districts defined by the 
Organic Law of Hydrocarbons to override municipal authority. 
Building on the previous discussion, chapter five traces the entanglement between Chávez’s 
discourse on oil and the speeches of the president of PDVSA Rafael Ramírez, it then proceeds 
to examine elites’ perspectives on the relationship between oil, the state and city planning which 
frames their opinions on the role of the oil industry in urban development, and in particular of 
PDVSA La Estancia. Building on this discussion it proceeds to analyse the speeches of the 
General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia to trace the discursive use of culture that frames the 
actions of the institution in the city, which the chapter argues are based on construing the city as 
an oil field whilst using farming language to conceptualise a symbiotic and cyclical relationship 
between oil, land, and culture by stating that PDVSA La Estancia is ‘oil that harvests culture’.  As 
a self-defined instrument of the Sowing Oil Plan, the act of sowing oil to harvest culture is 
presented as another illusion of the New Magical State: oil ceases to be finite when it is sown to 
bear the fruits of culture. This chapter examines how these discursive constructions enabled 
PDVSA La Estancia to interpret and enact the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons, a legal instrument 
limited to matters of extraction and commercialisation of oil, as a parallel policy instrument of 
territory and an implicit cultural policy. The work of PDVSA La Estancia provides evidence that 
the Oil Social Districts, conceptualised in the Law of Hydrocarbons, are used to supersede the 
authority of the existing State Space conceptualised in the abrogated policy instruments on 
territorial and urban administration.   One of the key arguments of this thesis is that the 
dismantlement of the existing state apparatus created the circumstances that enabled PDVSA La 
Estancia to interpret Article 5 of the Law of Hydrocarbons as an implicit cultural policy, and in 
consequence, construct representational spaces for a petrosocialist notion of culture-as-mineral-
deposit, as evidenced by the adverts analysed in chapter six.  
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Subsequently, chapter six explores the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit advanced through 
PDVSA’s State Space, looking in particular at the advertisement campaign launched by PDVSA 
La Estancia in 2013 titled ‘We transform oil into a renewable resource for you’ through the 
semiotic lens of Charles Peirce semiosis and Roland Barthes’ Mythologies. The analysis of the 
visual and verbal elements draws on George Yúdice’s expediency of culture as a resource to 
argue that PDVSA La Estancia discursively renders oil and culture equivalent by construing 
culture-as-mineral-deposit, as if culture could be extracted, exploited and processed like oil.  It 
evokes a farming cycle that on one hand responds to the discursive strand of ‘renewable oil’ oil 
and on the other, provides a novel dramaturgical act for the New Magical State: culture as 
renewable oil is tied back to the land. Hence, culture-as-mineral-deposit is inextricable from State 
Space, specifically from the Oil Social District as PDVSA’s parallel State Space. If culture can be 
‘harvested’ from the subsoil, then the Petrostate can claim complete ownership and tight control 
over culture as a ‘renewable resource’ as established by the Law of Hydrocarbons. The chapter 
also illustrates how PDVSA La Estancia used the inclusion of a giant oil worker as a visual 
strategy to take possession of the public art and public spaces it restored.  The chapter argues 
that the giant oil worker is an indexical sign of the oil industry, their inclusion and interaction 
with the urban spaces depicted point to a re-signification of the city as an oil field, a clear attempt 
at naturalising a direct and somewhat mechanistic relationship between oil, city and culture. The 
giant oil workers function as a visual metaphor of the Oil Social District, PDVSA’s State Space. 
One of the challenges of this thesis is to demonstrate that within the extractive logic of the oil 
industry, territory and culture become indivisible. 
Finally, the conclusion returns to the discussions developed in the individual chapters and locates 
them within the thesis research questions, its main arguments and the current Venezuelan 
context. It summarises that in a Petrostate, oil ties bureaucratic power and culture to the land 
and its mineral-rich subsoil. It also makes wider points in regards to the oil company’s corporate 
ownership and authority over city space, bolstered by its possession of vast financial resources 
and the fragmentation of the bureaucratic structure of the state’s apparatus. In the particular case 
of PDVSA LA Estancia, the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit that informs their actions in 
the city is personified by the giant oil workers in the adverts to negate the original cultural 
process that created the public art, for they were produced by a state that was considered by 
Hugo Chávez as bourgeois, capitalist and counter-revolutionary.  
This thesis opens with a concise overview of the political and economic context that frames this 
investigation.   
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Brief Historical Context: PDVSA, Hugo Chávez and Petrosocialism  
 
This chapter provides a brief but comprehensive overview of the political and economic 
context that frames this thesis. The chapter is organised chronologically, it begins with the 
creation of PDVSA with the nationalisation of the oil industry in the 1970s, its subsequent 
growth as an oil conglomerate up to its role in advancing Hugo Chavez’s model of 
Petrosocialism, it then provides an account of the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela’s politics, 
from his election as President of Venezuela in 1998 to his death in 2013, after winning the re-
election for a fourth presidential term.  
The state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (PDVSA) was created 
by decree in 1975, to take over the functions and operations of the Corporación Venezolana de 
Petróleo (Venezuelan Corporation of Oil).  President Carlos Andres Perez nationalised the oil 
industry in 1976, just one year after the promulgation of a new law that reserved to the state the 
industry and commerce of hydrocarbons, and the expropriation of the iron and steel industries 
(Bye 1979, p.57). But the nationalisation law was fraught with legal loopholes that still allowed 
foreign companies to operate in the country, and in the following years did little to alter 
PDVSA’s corporate culture “that projected the firm as an international oil conglomerate 
operating in Venezuela” (Tinker Salas 2015, p.148).  Nonetheless, after the nationalisation of the 
oil industry, PDVSA’s corporate efficiency differentiated it from the rest of the public sector. Its 
managers, executives and workforce at large had worked for the international oil corporations, 
adopting  their corporate culture and technocratic practices (Tinker Salas 2009; Wainberg 2004, 
p.4). By late 1980s and early 1990s, PDVSA’s management pursued to transform the state-owned 
oil company into an international conglomerate but it wasn’t until Rafael Caldera’s second 
presidency (1994-1999) that the state-owned oil company consolidated its investment program 
called Apertura Petrolera (Oil Opening) for reopening the industry to foreign capital investment 
and increasing productive capacity, in contradiction of OPEC’s policy of maintaining oil prices 
by limiting production. By exerting control over the main  source of the state’s income, PDVSA 
counted with a larger budget than the government, making it almost completely independent 
from the state that owned it, operating like a ‘prosperous first world company in an 
impoverished third-world nation’ (Maass 2009, p.202).  
PDVSA’s Apertura Petrolera became one of the key campaign issues of the 1998 presidential race 
(Wainberg 2004, p.6), among its most staunch critics was Lieutenant Coronel Hugo Chávez.  
Chávez was imprisoned after the failed coup d’état he led against president Carlos Andrés Pérez 
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on 4 February 1992; he was given a presidential pardon in 1994 by President Rafael Caldera 
which allowed him to launch his political career to run for the 1998 presidential elections as an 
outsider with his own party Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 MBR-200 (Coronil 2000, 
p.36). Chávez criticised PDVSA for functioning like a ‘state within the state’  (Giussepe Ávalo 
2014, p.26; Párraga 2010, p.29); he won the presidential election by a landslide, which marked the 
beginning of a shift in the relationship between the state and PDVSA. 
One of the key promises of the presidential campaign was to reform the constitution through the 
creation of a Constitutional Assembly, which was approved by popular vote in April 1999. A 
second election, in July 1999, selected the individual delegates who would draft the new 
constitution. On August 1999, the Constitutional Assembly voted to grant itself the powers to 
abolish government institutions. A constitutional referendum on December 1999 approved with 
a wide margin the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CRBV) which came 
into effect in 2000 (Tinker Salas 2015, p.137), it is the first constitution approved by popular 
referendum in the history of Venezuela. It displaced the Constitution of 1961 and inaugurated 
the era baptised by Chávez as the Fifth Republic. Among the innovations of the CRBV are the 
change of the name of the country from Republic of Venezuela to Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, the extension of the presidential term from five to six years allowing for consecutive 
re-elections, and the reform of the structure of the government that established a decentralised 
government and granted greater powers to the legislative branch (King 2013, p.379), such as the 
reform of the institutional structure of the capital city, Caracas, which defines de geographical 
setting of this investigation.  
The existing legal and institutional framework of Caracas suffered from weaknesses and 
deficiencies inherited from previous governments that the reforms in the constitution and the 
later actions of Chavez’s government did not remedy; on the contrary they were magnified since 
four different spheres of government coexist and clash within Caracas: national government, 
Miranda State, Metropolitan District, Capital District (Delfino 2001, p.40), the Chief of 
Government of the Capital District and the five municipalities of Libertador, Chacao, Baruta, El 
Hatillo and Sucre (see Diagram 1). This fragmented and dispersed institutional landscape is the 
context of the extension of PDVSA’s Oil Social District over the Metropolitan District, which 
allowed PDVSA La Estancia to displace the authority of municipalities.  
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Diagram 1. Caracas current overlap of governance structures 
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With a new constitution in place, a “mega-election” for every elected official in the country was 
held in July 2000, in which Chavez won the re-election for a second term by a large margin. His 
re-election was followed by reforms in social policy, development models and most importantly, 
oil policies (Parker 2006, p.64) that “sought to complete the nationalization of the oil industry” 
by closing the legal loopholes created by the 1976 law, and exert complete control over PDVSA 
(Tinker Salas 2015, p.149). The economic policies of the first two years of Chávez’s presidency 
focused on increasing oil revenue, strengthening Venezuela’s position inside OPEC, re-
establishing state control over PDVSA and reinstating the policy-making role of the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines (Parker 2006, p.64; Wainberg 2004, p.6).  In November 2001 a new Organic 
Law of Hydrocarbons was promulgated that reduced taxes, increased royalties, and ‘mandated 
state possession of a majority of stocks in all mixed companies engaged in primary activity in the 
oil industry’ (Parker 2006, p.65), strongly rejected by PDVSA’s top management. The events of 
2002 (short lived coup d’état against Chávez in April and a national oil strike/lockout organised 
by the opposition, described in more detail in chapter three) were a turning point in Chávez 
politics, marking the radicalisation of his Bolivarian revolution to embark the nation on a 
transition towards Socialism (Coronil 2011, p.13).  
In 2005 he launched the Plan Siembra Petrolera (Sowing Oil Plan), a 25 year national plan and oil 
policy that formed the foundation for the advancement of Petrosocialism to lay the foundations 
for the transition towards the Socialist State. Chávez further altered the institutional channels of 
the flow of the rent from PDVSA to the state: instead of transferring oil money to the 
government to be redistributed to the ministries that oversaw social programs, PDVSA was put 
in charge of new government programs (Maass 2009, pp.202, 215) effectively establishing 
PDVSA as the key player in advancing Chávez’s nationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist 
model.  Chávez, aware of the diminished capacity of the public sector, believed that ‘an oil 
company would succeed where government ministries might not ’(Maass 2009, p.215).  
The re-election of Hugo Chávez for a third term in 2006 revealed the degree of radicalisation of 
his policies with the creation of the single government party United Socialist Party of Venezuela 
(PSUV) and the launch of the National Project Simón Bolívar First Socialist Plan 2007-2013 
(PPS) along with the Five Motors of the Revolution (Diagram 2). In early 2007 he declared that 
he was building the Socialism of the 21st century (2007b), a Bolivarian socialism supported by the 
oil rent, a socialismo petrolero, in other words, Petrosocialism. Petrosocialism broadly defines a 
political and economic model in which the flow of the oil rent is channelled into the 
construction of a Socialist State and a new socialist society. The transition to the Socialist State 
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was outlined in the First Socialist Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Nation 
2007-2013, which included a five steps strategy named the Five Motors of the Bolivarian 
Revolution, to create the Venezuelan socialist model. Of particular interest for this thesis will be 
the Fourth Motor, the development of the New Geometry of Power proposed as a way to re-
distribute political, social, economic and military powers over the space of the country according 
to the new socialist order (Chávez 2007c, p.67). PDVSA expanded its functions to non-oil-
industry areas to comply with its new socialist sense by creating seven new subsidiaries whose 
services ranged from food distribution to building social housing (Párraga 2010, pp.26–29).  In 
practice, ministries that had traditionally been in charge of social spending were replaced by 
PDVSA (Corrales & Penfold 2011, p.84). 
Hugo Chávez put forward in 2007 a referendum to amend the CRBV, coinciding with the launch 
of Petrosocialism. The amendment was conceived as an instrument for the dismantlement of the 
‘constitutional and legal superstructure’ that had sustained the capitalist mode of production, in 
order to embark on the construction of a socialist society for the twenty-first century. Although 
the reform lost the referendum vote, the legal foundations for the Socialist State had already 
been laid out by the National Assembly in clear breach of the CRBV, with the sanction in 2006 
of the Ley de Consejos Comunales (Law of Communal Councils), reformed and elevated to the 
status of Organic Law in 2009 (Brewer Carías 2011, p.127). In December 2010, a month before 
the newly elected National Assembly took power with a larger representation of the opposition, 
a number of organic laws were swiftly sanctioned (Brewer Carías 2011, p.128) to establish the 
legal framework of the Socialist State.  
The lack of a coherent governance structure for Caracas described earlier was compounded by 
the transition towards the Socialist State, entrenched by the journey from bill to legal vacuum of 
the Organic Law for the Planning and Management of the Organisation of Territory LOPGOT, 
created in 2005 to substitute the laws of Organic Law for the Organisation of Territory of 1983 
and the Organic Law of Urban Planning of 1987, the key spatial policy instruments that shaped 
urban planning and management in Caracas, and the country at large. This process will be 
examined in detail in chapter four (see Diagram 2).  
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Diagram 2. Timeline of key policy instruments that concern this thesis 
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Chávez went for a fourth re-election in the presidential campaign of 2012. Despite strong 
speculations around his poor health (he had been diagnosed with Cancer in 2011) he pushed an 
aggressive campaign to defeat by a slim margin the opposition leader Henrique Capriles 
Radonsky. But Chávez was not able to attend his inauguration in January 2013, as he was still 
recovering from cancer surgery in Cuba. The unexpected death of Hugo Chávez in March 2013 
left the transition towards the Socialist State Space incomplete and orphaned of its leader and 
mastermind. The Vice President Nicolás Maduro became interim president until the new 
presidential elections held in April 2013. The PSUV unanimously appointed Maduro as their 
presidential candidate, who won with an even narrower margin to opposition leader Capriles 
Radonsky.  
This brief account provides concise and comprehensive contextual information crucial to 
understand the historical, political and institutional framework of this investigation. The 
following chapter opens the substantive material of this thesis with a review of the relevant 
literature that forms the theoretical premises of the research.   
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Chapter one: State Space, Bureaucratic Power, City and Culture  
 
Oil has clout as the carrier of progress and political power in Venezuela, a country where 
the emergence of the modern state became inextricable from the arrival of the oil industry. Oil, 
understood primarily as wealth that flows like manna from heaven to the state’s coffers rather 
than a concrete technological reality, made the state more powerful as it exercised a monopoly 
over the oil rent. The windfall of rent money triggered the rapid urbanisation, mass education, 
industrialisation, arts institutions and large scale works of infrastructure. Nonetheless, the spatial 
dimensions of the entanglements between oil, state and culture in Venezuela have been 
understudied.  This chapter establishes the three theoretical premises of the thesis: State Space, 
Bureaucratic Power, and Culture as a Resource.  
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part provides a discussion on Lefebvre’s triad of 
space and David Harvey’s matrix of spatiotemporality followed by a review of Neil Brenner and 
Steve Elden’s reading of Lefebvre as a theorist of State Space as territory. The second part 
develops a review of the literature on state theory, focusing primarily on bureaucratic power and 
rentier state theory to define the particular characteristics of the oil rentier state, the Petrostate. 
Subsequently, part three builds on the discussion on State Space and oil rentier state to examine 
the intersections between the literatures on city, culture and oil. Finally, part four reviews the 
literature on culture as well recent texts from the emerging field of Energy Humanities that 
address the cultural dimension of oil, which provide the theoretical foundations to characterise 
the notion of culture construed within Petrosocialism as culture-as-mineral-deposit.   
Space  
 
With the emergence of modern science, mathematicians and philosophers monopolised 
the conceptualisation of space as an abstract ‘mental thing’ divorced from reality and social life 
(Lefebvre 1991, pp.1–7). This mental space created an abyss between the ‘space of the 
philosophers and the space of people who deal with material things’ (Lefebvre 1991, pp.4–6). 
Mental space became the site of theoretical practice and the reference point of knowledge, space 
viewed as a neutral container of social relations completely detached from social practices.  
Alternatively, Lefebvre proposed that space has an active role in knowledge and in action, 
defining space as a concrete abstraction that involves mental abstraction and physical materiality; 
space becomes a concrete reality through and in social practices.  
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Lefebvre’s thinking on space must be put into the historical context of 1960-70s France and the 
efforts of the French State to reform the practice of urban planning to develop alternatives to 
post-war functionalism. French planning institutions engaged in a process of institutionalisation 
of critique. The introduction of new procedures for the participation of inhabitants politicised  
its operations and stimulated the emergence of critical urban research, including Marxist research 
(Stanek 2011, p.ix). Lefebvre’s critique engaged not just with philosophy, but with sociology, 
architecture and urbanism; the development of his theory of the production of space is an 
extension of his philosophical thinking and his involvement in empirical studies for several 
French institutions as well as his close relationship with French architectural culture which 
included intense exchanges with planners, urbanists and architects (Stanek 2011, pp.vii–ix).  
Through these cross disciplinary engagements Lefebvre developed a qualitative approach 
focused on space as a lived experience, opposed to the abstract space of state planning and post-
war functionalist urbanism; he shifted the focus from things in space to the actual processes of 
its production, the multiple social practices that produce it and the political character of the 
process of the production of space (Stanek 2011, p.ix; Lefebvre 1991, p.37; Elden 2004, p.189). 
For Lefebvre, production carries a wider meaning than the mere economic production of things, 
the term involves the production of society, knowledge and institutions (Elden 2004, p.184). 
Rather than disregarding notions of temporality and history by privileging space, Lefebvre 
advanced the idea that space and time appear and manifest as different but are indivisible (Elden 
2004, pp.185–186). Every society (or Mode of Production in Lefebvre’s terms) has historically 
produced its own particular space. Capital and space are social processes since space is the 
‘general form of social practice in capitalist modernities’ (Stanek 2011, p.xiii). Space is a social 
relationship, inherent to relationships of property and bound to the forces of production 
(Lefebvre 1991, p.85). The representations of the relations of production that contain within 
them power relations also occur in space, in the form of monuments, buildings and works of art 
(Lefebvre 1991, pp.31–33).  
Lefebvre proposed a conceptual triad of interconnected realms for understanding space as a 
social product conformed by Spatial Practice, Representations of Space, and Representational 
Spaces. Spatial Practice (perceived space) embodies the associations and interactions between 
daily life (human actions) and urban reality. It is revealed and deciphered through the routes, 
networks and flows that tie and connect the places of private life, work and leisure; this is an 
impersonal space comprised of the flows of money, transportation, commodities, labour, etc. 
(Lefebvre 1991, p.38). A Spatial Practice entails cohesiveness but not necessarily a logical 
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coherence. Representations of Space (conceived space) tend towards a system of intellectually 
worked verbal signs that belong to the domain of planners, urbanists, politicians, scientists, and 
technocrats (Lefebvre 1991, pp.38–39). It is the Cartesian realm of maps, models, plans, 
blueprints and designs which are formed historically, and informed by the knowledge and 
ideologies that exert a dominant force in the production of space in any society.  
Representational Spaces (lived space) or the experienced space, is the space of human 
subjectivity superimposed to physical space through the use of symbols and images that have 
their point of origin in history. It is the dominated space that ‘imagination seeks to change and 
appropriate’ producing symbolic works (Lefebvre 1991, p.39,41-42). These three categories are 
not hierarchically ordered as they remain in a state of continuous dialectical tension; they 
contribute to the production of space in different ways according to the society -Mode of 
Production- and historical period (Lefebvre 1991, p.46).  
The transition from one mode of production to another results in contradictions within the 
social relations which inevitably transforms and revolutionises space, resulting in the production 
of a new space  (Lefebvre 1991, p.46). Space as a ‘concrete abstraction’ brings together physical, 
mental and social constructions which become material reality through human practice. David 
Harvey draws on Lefebvre to regard space as ‘an active moment within the social process’ 
(2006b, p.77) since capitalism has a very close relation to daily life, which cannot be seen as 
separate from the circulation of capital. If capital produces space in its own image, and 
urbanisation is the physical framework for capital accumulation,  then the study of the evolution 
of a particular city can provide a better understanding of the urban processes of capitalism 
(2006b, pp.80–101).   
Harvey identifies three ways in which space can be understood: Absolute Space, Relative Space, 
and Relational Space (2006a, p.272). Absolute Space is the space of Newton and Descartes, 
usually represented as a pre-existing grid independent of time and matter, it is fixed and 
measurable. As such, it is devoid of contradictions, uncertainties, ambiguities, open to human 
calculation. In geometric terms, it is the space of Euclid, the space of engineering practices and 
cartography. Socially, it is the space of private property and territorial boundaries such as 
administrative units, cities and states.  
Relative Space is the space of Non-Euclidean geometries and Einstein. Relative space is twofold: 
it has multiple geometries whose measurements depend on the frame of reference of the 
observer as Relative Space is impossible to understand without time. Rather than speaking of 
32 
 
space and time as separate, it requires speaking of space-time or spatiotemporality. In Relative 
Space, time is fixed whilst space is mutable according to certain observable rules. This is the 
space of the study of the flows of commodities, money, people, energy, etc. Each ‘flow’ or 
spatiotemporality demands a different framework of understanding, whilst their comparisons can 
reveal issues of political choice as well (Harvey 2006a, p.273).  
Relational Space is closely associated with Leibniz. This notion of space proposes that space 
cannot be isolated from the processes that define it; the relational aspect means that ‘processes 
do not occur in space but define their own spatial frame’ (Harvey 2006a, p.273). Measurement 
and calculability become problematic in Relational Space but Harvey challenges the assumption 
that space-time can only exist if it can be quantified because there are processes within the social, 
cultural, political and mental dimension that, whilst elusive, can only be approached from a 
relational notion of space.   
Harvey argues that space is not just absolute, relative, or relational. He concurs with Lefebvre in 
that space can only be construed through human practices; hence it can become one, two or all 
categories at once depending on the circumstances. Harvey developed a three by three matrix 
that intersects his and Lefebvre’s categories of space in Table 1: 
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 Material space 
(experienced space) 
Representations of space 
(conceptualised space) 
Spaces of representation 
(lived space) 
Absolute 
space 
Walls, bridges, doors, 
stairways, floors, ceilings, 
streets, buildings, cities, 
mountains, continents, 
bodies of water, territorial 
markers, 
physical boundaries and 
barriers, gated 
communities...  
Cadastral and administrative 
maps; Euclidean geometry; 
landscape description; 
metaphors of confinement, 
open space, location, placement 
and positionality; (command 
and control relatively easy) – 
Newton and Descartes 
Feelings of contentment around 
the hearth; sense of security or 
incarceration from enclosure; 
sense of power from ownership, 
command and domination over 
space; fear of others ‘beyond the 
pale’ 
Relative 
space 
(time) 
 
Circulation and flows of 
energy, water, air, 
commodities, peoples, 
information, money, capital; 
accelerations and 
diminutions in the friction 
of distance 
Thematic and topological maps 
(e.g. London tube system); 
non-Euclidean geometries and 
topology; perspectival 
drawings; 
metaphors of situated 
knowledges, of motion, 
mobility, displacement, 
acceleration, time 
space compression and 
distantiation; (command and 
control difficult requiring 
sophisticated techniques) 
Einstein and Riemann 
Anxiety at not getting to class 
on time; thrill of moving into 
the unknown; frustration in a 
traffic jam; tensions or 
exhilarations of time-space 
compression, of speed, of 
motion 
 
Relational 
space 
(time) 
 
Electromagnetic energy 
flows and fields; social 
relations; rental and 
economic potential 
surfaces; pollution 
concentrations; energy 
potentials; sounds, odours 
and sensations wafted on 
the breeze 
Surrealism; existentialism; 
psycho-geographies; 
cyberspace; metaphors of 
internalization of forces and 
powers (command 
and control extremely difficult 
– chaos theory, dialectics, 
internal 
relations, quantum 
mathematics) – Leibniz, 
Whitehead, Deleuze, 
Benjamin 
Visions, fantasies, desires, 
frustrations, memories, dreams, 
phantasms, psychic states (e.g. 
agoraphobia, vertigo, 
claustrophobia) 
 
Table 1 (Harvey 2006a, p.282) 
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Although Harvey acknowledges that the matrix has its limitations (2006a, pp.281–284), it is 
confined in the absolute space of the chart whilst engaging in a representational practice, the 
cross-relations between the categories and the diverse combinations that arise in their 
intersections enables the analysis of complex scenarios where the use of one simple set of 
categories would not be sufficient.  Harvey’s matrix of spatiotemporality underpins the approach 
of this thesis, as it enables to break apart and characterise the entangled spatial dimensions of the 
topics that are the subject of analysis to reveal the spatial intersections between oil, the city, 
policy instruments and the work of PDVSA La Estancia in Caracas, as displayed in Table 2. 
 Material space 
(experienced space) 
Representations of space 
(conceptualised space) 
Spaces of representation 
(lived space) 
 
Absolute 
space 
 
Caracas Policy instruments of territorial 
and public administration –legal 
entity of space- informed by 
the discourses of 
Petrosocialism and the 
transition towards the Socialist 
State. (Bureaucratic Power) 
 
 
 
Relative 
space 
(time) 
 
Public Art and Public 
Spaces intervened by 
PDVSA La Estancia, 
located in two 
superimposed State 
Space(s). 
Law of Hydrocarbons and Oil 
Social Districts.  
(The New Magical State) 
 
The space represented in the 
adverts of the “We transform 
oil…” campaign by PDVSA La 
Estancia.  
(Culture-as-mineral-deposit) 
 
Relational 
space 
(time) 
 
   
Table 2 
The analysis unfolds through chapters four, five and six following the matrix to guide the 
arguments. Caracas is the Absolute-Material Space that defines the geographical boundaries of 
the city and this thesis. Absolute-Representations of Space is the space of the policy instruments 
of territorial and public administration –the legal entities of space- that are shaped by the 
discourses of Petrosocialism, exerting a dominant force in the production of space in the 
transition towards the Socialist State. Chapter four examines how the policy instruments 
conceptualise the political and administrative boundaries of State Space authority as a 
manifestation of the fragmentation of Bureaucratic Power between Hugo Chávez and PDVSA.  
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The public art and public spaces restored by PDVSA La Estancia in Caracas are located in a 
Relative-Material Space as they serve as markers of the territorial appropriation of Caracas’s 
Absolute-Material Space by the oil company, which as chapter five and six argue, speaks of a 
dual occupation as the physical entities of the art works and public spaces that end up located 
simultaneously in two superimposed State Spaces.  
Relative-Representation of Space is the space of the Law of Hydrocarbons and Oil Social 
Districts as oil-industry-based conceptualisation of space, fixed in time but mutable in terms of 
the ‘areas of influence’ of the centres of oil extraction. Chapters five and six investigate how, 
aided by the bureaucratic power of the New Magical State, the Absolute-Material Space of 
Caracas is conceptualised by the oil company as part of the Oil Social Districts by construing the 
headquarters of PDVSA as a centre of oil extraction and distribution of the rent, in which the 
city becomes an extension of the oil field.  
The Relative-Spaces of Representation locates the space represented in the adverts of PDVSA 
La Estancia’s campaign ‘We transform oil into a renewable resource for you’.  The adverts 
function as containers of a ‘lived space’ that synthesises absolute and relative spaces. In the 
adverts, space is fixed in time but made mutable in perception and meaning framed by the oil 
industry. Chapters five and six examine how the human subjectivity of the General Manager of 
PDVSA La Estancia is superimposed to the Absolute-Material Space of Caracas, visually and 
verbally re-imagined and re-presented as an oil field that produces ‘renewable oil’, or what this 
thesis proposes as the notion of  culture-as-mineral-deposit. 
Overall, the scope of this thesis is circumscribed to the intersections between Harvey’s Absolute 
and Relative Space and Lefebvre’s triad of Material Space, Representations of Space and Spaces 
of Representation. Throughout the thesis it becomes clear that the state’s spatial machinations of 
Petrosocialism are ‘hidden’ in the Absolute-Representations of Space of policy instruments, and 
most importantly, concealed in the Relative-Spaces of Representation of the adverts. The 
following section provides a review of Lefebvre’s ideas on the relation between State and space, 
and Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden’s reading of Lefebvre as a theorist of State Space as territory.  
State Space as Territory 
 
Just as Lefebvre construed space as a ‘concrete abstraction’, the state too is a concrete 
abstraction (Elden 2004, p.189). Lefebvre’s notion of ‘abstract space’ defines a ‘sociospatial 
organisation that is at once produced and regulated by the modern state’ (Brenner & Elden 2009, 
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p.358). Lefebvre argues that abstract space is political, its production entails ‘new ways of 
envisioning, conceiving, and representing the spaces within which everyday life, capital 
accumulation, and state action are to unfold’ (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.359) and is inherently 
geographically expansive. As the State ‘engenders social relations in space’ (Lefebvre 2003, 
pp.225–226) abstract space becomes political; political because it is both the product of 
conflicting social practices and the instrument of struggles and conflicts with the State imposing 
its own rationality to the chaotic relationships between social groups. Political, economic and 
social hierarchies are represented spatially. The space created, meant to be political and 
regulatory, is both ‘bureaucratizing’ and ‘bureaucratized’  (Lefebvre 2003, pp.243–245) to 
perpetuate and reproduce relations of domination in three dimensions: ideological (social), 
practical (instruments of action), and tactical-strategic (the subordination of a territory’s 
resources).  
Lefebvre identifies three moments in the relation between Space and the State. First, the 
production of a physical space, the national territory, a space  that can be ‘mapped, modified, 
transformed by the networks, circuits and flows that are established with it’ (Lefebvre 2003, 
p.224) such as transportation, infrastructure, commerce, etc. At the centre of the physical space 
of the State lies the city, the material space where human and political actions manifest. Secondly, 
the production of a social space, which constitutes the state itself, every institution possessing ‘an 
“appropriate” space’ constructed under a minimum of consensus around ‘an (artificial) edifice of 
hierarchically ordered institutions, of laws and conventions upheld by “values” that are 
communicated through the national language’ (Lefebvre 2003, pp.224–225). Third, being a social 
space, the state also composes a mental space that ‘includes the representations of the State that 
people construct’ which is not to be confused with social or physical space (Lefebvre 2003, 
p.225).  
One of the foundations of Lefebvre’s theorisation of the state and the relation between state and 
space is the State Mode of Production (SMP) which comprehends the historical central role of 
the state in the survival and perpetuation of capitalism (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.359). The State 
Mode of Production develops spatial strategies to make capital accumulation and 
commoditisation possible. The State intervenes through ‘diverse organisations and institutions 
devoted to the management and production of space’ (Lefebvre et al. 2009, p.227). The state is 
both the agent and the guiding hand of the production of space; organised through rationality it 
appears homogenous and monotonous allowing the State to intervene and introduce its 
presence, control and surveillance throughout its physical space: ‘Is not the secret of the State, 
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hidden because it is so obvious, to be found in space?’ (Lefebvre et al. 2009, p.228) since only 
the State has the capacity to manage space on a ‘grand scale’. In countries where the State took 
control of energy production, the State continued to install a dominant space ‘extending the 
space demarcated by motorways, canals, and railroads’ (Lefebvre 2003, pp.237–238); by 
controlling  energy production the State also controls the production of political space.  
Although Lefebvre did not explicitly theorise about territory, Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden 
(Brenner & Elden 2009) offer a reading of Lefebvre as a theorist of the state-space-territory 
dimension, or more specifically, of State Space as territory. Their point of departure is John 
Agnew’s  challenge to social scientists to overcome three unquestioned geographical assumptions 
of the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994, p.59): states understood as entities of fixed sovereign space, 
domestic and international realms are neatly separated, and the state as ‘container’ of society. 
Simplistic conceptions of territory, such as defining the state as a fixed entity bound to a timeless 
territorial form put serious intellectual constraints in developing a spatial analysis of the state by 
assuming its territory as a ‘self-evident’ pre-existing dimension  (Agnew 2010, p.779; Brenner & 
Elden 2009, p.356). For Brenner and Elden, the insights of Lefebvre on territory overcome 
Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’, by drawing on three conceptual points of State Space as territory: the 
production of territory, state territorial strategies and the territory effect (Brenner & Elden 2009, 
p.353).  
Brenner and Elden trace Lefebvre’s notion of territory to a key passage in The Production of Space 
(1991) that refers to the semantic, historical and substantive relation between ‘le terroir et le 
territoire’ (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.361), terms that share a common etymology that could be 
more appropriately translated into English as ‘land-as-soil and land-as-territory’ which highlights 
that land does not merely refer to agriculture but also to the resources of the subsoil, and most 
importantly,  to ‘the articulation between the nation-state and its territory’ (Brenner & Elden 
2009, p.362). For Lefebvre, territory and state are mutually constitutive; his notion of State Space 
functions as a synonym of territory, that this thesis adopts (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.365). State 
Space is understood as land and as a historically specific ‘political form of space produced by and 
associated with the modern state’ understandable ‘only through its relation to the state and 
processes of statecraft’; therefore  there can be no state without territory and no territory without 
a state (Brenner & Elden 2009, pp.362–363). Territory is continually produced and reproduced 
by state actions, but at the same time, it shapes and conditions the operations and territorial 
strategies of the state (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.367).  It will become clear throughout this thesis 
that state, space and territory are historically intertwined evidenced in the relationship between 
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oil, land and the bureaucratic power of the Venezuelan Petrostate, particularly in regards to the 
production of the Socialist State Space under the premises of Chavez’s New Geometry of Power 
examined in chapter four.  
Agnew argued that territory is often taken for granted as a pre-given dimension. This is due to 
the ‘territory effect’, the third conceptual point of Lefebvre’s State Space as territory. The 
territory effect naturalises and masks the spatial interventions that are mobilised through 
interventions of the state (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.373). This naturalisation allows the state to 
represent its political manipulation of space as either a purely technical intervention or as pre-
existing features of the physical realm. It is the state that represents the complexities of ‘social 
spaces of modern capitalism as if they were transparent, self-evident and pre-given’ (Brenner & 
Elden 2009, p.372). Brenner and Elden’s reading of Lefebvre is useful for this thesis as it 
provides a way to go beyond simplistic perceptions of territory by understanding that any State 
Space, and by extension, any ‘territorially configured social space’ is the consequence of specific 
historical forms of  economic and political interventions of the state.  
State Space strategies, according to Lefebvre’s analysis on the politics of space discussed 
previously, encompass two meanings. First, the struggle and confrontational interaction between 
the state’s -and capital- attempt to mould space into a rationally manageable abstract entity and 
the concurrent attempt of social forces to defend, produce and extend spaces for everyday life. 
Second, the notion of a ‘spatial policy’ that characterises comprehensive national state systems of 
spatial management developed by modern capitalist urbanisation (Lefebvre et al. 2009, p.367). 
Furthermore, Brenner and Elden suggest that Lefebvre’s analysis of the politics of space focuses 
not just on state’s spatial strategies, but particularly, on State Space strategies: powerful 
instruments for the mobilisation of state power to reorganise ‘sociospatial relations’ (Brenner & 
Elden 2009, p.368).  
The above discussion serves to establish one of the theoretical frameworks of this thesis: State 
Space. David Harvey’s matrix is helpful as it provides the means to develop a taxonomy of the 
spatiotemporal categories of each of the documents this thesis will engage with, as laid out in 
Table 1, in order to deploy Brenner and Elden’s reading of Lefebvre as a theorist of State Space 
as territory. Chapters four and five argue that PDVSA has constructed a parallel State Space that 
absorbed the Material Space of the city into the Oil Social Districts by construing the city as an 
oil field, visually represented in the adverts examined in chapter six, where giant oil workers 
serve to naturalise the territory effect of PDVSA’s parallel State Space.  
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One of the key points of this thesis is to examine the intersections of spatial policies of the 
transition towards the Socialist State and the oil industry’s extension of its dominant space during 
Hugo Chávez second and third presidential terms. The following section engages with theories 
on state formation and bureaucracy, to define the manner in which the Venezuelan Petrostate 
and PDVSA exercise their power as parallel State Space(s).  
Bureaucratic Power 
 
Before the nineteenth century the promulgation of laws, the economy, and assistance for 
the needy had little to do with the State;  it only became the predominant form to refer to 
sovereign authority in the latter half of the eighteenth century as it developed into an impersonal 
and distinct political organisation in charge of the welfare of the people and military defence 
within a clearly defined territory (Miller & Rose 2008, pp.55–56; Jessop 1990, pp.347–348). The 
State as a modern idea involved the distinction between ruler and state apparatus, the State from 
then on coming to signify the whole of society. For Hobbes, sovereignty lied exclusively on the 
State, not on the people, and although he defined the State as an impersonal agent, he also 
affirmed that the State must be represented by a man or an assembly of men whose actions can 
then be attributed to the State (Walter 2008, p.97).  By the nineteenth century the State had 
evolved from limited and centralised apparatuses to an ensemble of ‘institutions and procedures 
of rule over a national territory’ (Miller & Rose 2008, p.56). The nineteenth century marked the 
emergence of modern nation states in Latin America after the struggles to gain independence 
from Spanish colonial rule. The emergence of the modern state in Venezuela is explored in 
chapter three as an early twentieth century phenomenon heavily indebted to the arrival of the oil 
industry (Tinker Salas 2014, p.19), a process in which foreign oil companies and Venezuelan 
statecraft became inextricable.  
Marxists have traditionally condemned the state as an instrument of domination by a powerful 
class (Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987, p.6). Karl Marx defined the state as an ‘economic and political 
instrument of the dominant class’ simultaneously autonomous from the social relations of 
production and parasitically dependent on them, directly involved in the ‘creation and regulation 
of productive forces’ (Lefebvre et al. 2009, p.10). This definition has been expanded by Bob 
Jessop (1990, p.8) who affirms that to develop a definition of the state it is essential to take into 
account the complexity of the articulations between state and non-state institutions ‘in the 
overall reproduction of capital accumulation and political domination’. Stressing that the state 
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should be treated as a set of institutions that cannot exercise power, Jessop proposes a definition 
of the state that encompasses both ‘state discourse and state institutions’: 
‘The core of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions and 
organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively 
binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of their common interest or 
general will. This broad “cluster” definition identifies the state in terms of its generic 
features as a specific form of macro-political organization with a specific type of political 
orientation; it also establishes clear links between the state and political sphere and, 
indeed, the wider society.’ (Jessop 1990, pp.341–342) 
With this definition he aims to emphasise the contradictions in political discourse inherent to any 
study of the state. He clarifies that the state cannot simply be ‘equated with government, law, 
bureaucracy, a coercive apparatus or another political institution’ just as forms of political 
organisation on the macro level cannot be regarded as state-like, considering that fixed national 
boundaries, that is the territory, do not necessarily determine the emergence of state projects 
(Jessop 1990, p.341). Concerning the idea that the state should be regarded as an ensemble of 
institutions, Patrick Dunleavy (1987, p.10)  proposes two broad categories to define the state: 
Functional and Organisational. The Functional category, prominent in Marxist approaches to the 
state, has two strands. One, the state is identified with a range of institutions located outside of 
the public realm in which any sort of organisation whose objectives overlap with functions of the 
state become part of the state. Two, the state is defined by its consequences through institutions 
and patterns of behaviours that stabilise society through social cohesion or social order, thus 
extending the kind of institutions that can be regarded as part of the state.  
The Organisational strategy views the state as an ensemble of institutions. The modern state is a 
particular type of government conformed as a separate set of institutions, with supreme power 
and sovereignty over its territory and all the individuals within it, clearly differentiated from 
society creating distinct public and private realms. The state is the authority of law, formulated 
by state bureaucrats and backed by its monopoly of force, with the capacity of financing its 
activities through the taxation of its citizens. Dunleavy warns that the set of characteristics of the 
Organisational definition cannot be applied to all modern countries equally, because modern 
state structures have evolved and developed differently in different societies influenced by their 
particular historical circumstances. This applies to modern statecraft in Venezuela, which suffers 
from the diminished capacity that characterises most rentier states whose main income comes 
from oil extraction with very little taxation. To further develop the set of ideas useful for this 
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thesis to characterise the State as an ensemble of institutions, further theorists are needed: Michel 
Foucault, Peter Miller, Nikolas Rose, Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce.  
Michel Foucault rejects any attempt to develop a general theory of the state as he believed that 
the state is neither a universal nor an autonomous source of power but a ‘mythical abstraction’  
granted a place within the field of government (Jessop 2007, p.36). Foucault developed an 
alternative analytic of political power called Governmentality, a new term he derived from a play 
on the word government. Governmentality focuses on the rationalities that determine practices 
of government, bringing attention to the mechanisms used to ‘know and govern the wealth, 
health and happiness of populations’ (Miller & Rose 2008, p.54; Walter 2008, p.98). State 
formation from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries onwards has been characterised by the 
‘governmentalization’ of the state (Foucault 1991; Joyce & Bennett 2010; Miller & Rose 2008; 
Walter 2008), a process that refers to the complex clustering of power systems at the level of the 
state; it is a process that the state may drive but often it neither controls nor authors it. This form 
of power is linked to the proliferation of a wide range of apparatuses related to government, the 
means to practice it and the nature of those over whom power is exercised.  
In this line of thought, Jessop posits that the state does not exercise power, it is an institutional 
ensemble as the power of the state is ‘always conditional and relational’ (Jessop 1990, p.367). The 
scope of power rests on ‘the action, reaction and interaction of specific social forces’ situated 
inside and beyond of the institutional ensemble as ‘it is not the state which acts: it is always 
specific sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts of the state system’ (Jessop 
1990, p.367). Similarly, Miller & Rose (2008, p.10) coincide with Jessop in arguing that the state 
does not and cannot exercise power; it can only do so through the complex network of 
organisations, institutions and apparatuses that compose it (2008, pp.55–56). By the same token, 
Bennet and Joyce affirm that the state ‘rather than a site from which this form of power 
originates or at which it terminates’  is the site where bureaucratic power congregates (Joyce & 
Bennett 2010, p.2). Bureaucratic forms of organisation and the powers they summon and 
elaborate take form in many fields, from business to the military; these powers then travel to and 
from the state, clustering, then redeployed and multiplied. Therefore, when referring to the 
power of the state, it is more accurate to talk about Bureaucratic Power instead of state power.  
Institutions, procedures, strategies and tactics allow the state to exercise power over the 
population through a bureaucratic apparatus. Lefebvre (2009, p.12) is critical of this perspective, 
claiming that it dilutes the concept of power, scattering it in every place and in every single form 
of subordination, neglecting that the ‘real’ seat of power lies in the state, in its institutions and 
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constitutions. Nonetheless, the scattering and dilution of state power is one of the topics this 
thesis engages with.  
To further elaborate on the mechanisms that explain the simultaneous process of fragmentation 
and centralisation of bureaucratic power of the state, with the consolidation of PDVSA as a 
parallel state apparatus with its own Parallel State Space examined in chapter four, this thesis also 
engages with the notions of governance conceptualised by R.A.W. Rhodes (2003) and the 
Shadow State as defined by Jennifer Wolch (1990).  
The concept of Governance is useful to understand the fragmentation of the bureaucratic power 
of the state explored in this thesis. R.A.W. Rhodes’ conceptualisation of different modes of 
governance and the ideas of hollowing out the state are useful to understand the process of 
fragmentation and erosion of the bureaucratic power of the Venezuelan Petrostate during the 
transition towards the Socialist State advanced by Hugo Chávez.  
For Rhodes, Governance is not to be used as a synonym for government, instead governance 
‘signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a 
changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed’ (Rhodes 
2003, p.46).  Rhodes identifies six different uses of governance: as the minimal state, as corporate 
governance, as The New Public Management, as 'good governance', as socio-cybernetic system, 
and as self-organizing networks (Rhodes 2003, pp.46–47).  
Governance as the minimal state refers to the redefinition of the ‘extent and form of public 
intervention and the use of markets or quasi-markets to deliver “public” services’ in which the 
size of government is reduced by ‘privatization and cuts in the civil service’ (Rhodes 2003, p.47). 
48) Governance as corporate governance defines 'the system by which organizations are directed 
and controlled' mainly concerned with giving comprehensive direction to the enterprise, by 
controlling the executive actions of management and complying with expectations of 
accountability and regulation by the interests that lay outside the boundaries of the corporation 
(Rhodes 2003, p.48). 48) Governance as The New Public Management (NMT) follows from 
corporate governance in which government is ‘steering’ action  (policy decisions) by structuring 
the market to take over ‘rowing’ functions (delivery of services) (Rhodes 2003, p.48). Good 
Governance is a term advanced by the World Bank to shape its lending policies to Third World 
countries which merges ‘the new public management with advocacy to liberal democracy’ 
(Rhodes 2003, pp.49–50). Governance as socio-cybernetic system refers to a ‘centre-less society’ 
with a polycentric state in which government is no longer the single sovereign authority. The 
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boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors are blurred by interdependence and 
shared goals among the social-political-administrative actors in which none holds the monopoly 
over expertise of information. Here, ‘governance is the result of interactive social-political forms 
of governing’ (Rhodes 2003, pp.50–51). In Governance as self-organising networks, governance 
is about managing networks. The term network is used to describe the '’several interdependent 
actors involved in delivering services’ (Rhodes 2003, p.51) in which public, private and voluntary 
organisations interact to deliver public services. Networks are self-organising, autonomous and 
self-governing; they resist steering to develop their own policies. In this sense, says Rhodes, they 
are an alternative to market and hierarchies (Rhodes 2003, pp.51–52). 
Rhodes synthesises that the meaning of Governance 'refers to self-organizing, interorganizational 
networks', a definition that incorporates elements of all the uses enumerated above, with the 
predominance of the minimal state, socio-cybernetic system and self-organising networks. He 
lists four shared characteristics of governance: interdependence between organisations, 
continuing interactions between network members, game-like interactions rooted in trust and 
regulated by the rules of the game agreed by the participants, a significant degree of autonomy 
from the state (Rhodes 2003, p.53).  The state becomes a collection of inter-organisational 
networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or 
regulate them (Rhodes 2003, p.57). In summary, Governance blurs the distinction between state 
and civil society. 
Rhodes developed his definitions of governance to explain the reforms and changes to British 
government since the 1980s, which he summarised as ‘hollowing out the state’ (2003, p.53). 
Hollowing out the state is characterised by the downsize and fragmentation of the public sector 
through the ‘loss of function by central and local government departments to alternative delivery 
systems’ (Rhodes 2003, pp.53–54). The process of hollowing out leads to fragmentation which 
diminishes the state’s capacity to steer and erodes accountability, in which ultimately the central 
state loses its grip on the rest of its institutional and bureaucratic apparatus.  
In the same vein of characterising the reforms and fragmentation of the state and governance, 
Wolch focuses on the voluntary sector to identify the rise of the Shadow State, defined as  
‘a para-state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector organisations, 
administered outside of traditional democratic politics and charged with major collective 
service responsibilities previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within 
the purvey of state control’ (Wolch 1990, p.xvi). 
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As a para-state apparatus the Shadow State undertakes many of the functions of the welfare 
state, in activities that though not formally part of the state, are ‘enabled, regulated, and 
subsidised’ by the state (Wolch 1990, p.41). Wolch traces the transformation of the voluntary 
sector into a Shadow State apparatus to transformations and changes in the welfare state, made 
possible ‘because of the long-standing institutional interdependence of voluntary organisations 
and the state, which both enables and constrains voluntary action’ (Wolch 1990, p.15). As state 
funding had become increasingly important for voluntary organisations, so did the degree of 
penetration of the state into the organisation, management and goals of voluntary group 
organisation (Wolch 1990, p.15); and as the Shadow State grows, says Wolch, it will develop two 
‘contradictory faces: One represents increased state penetration of many aspects of daily life; the 
other represents a revitalized democracy in state affairs’ (Wolch 1990, p.4). Whilst Rhodes used 
the notion of ‘hollowing out the state’ to describe the changes in British government due to 
privatisation and its loss of functions to European institutions and Wolch looked in particular at 
voluntary organisations in the United Kingdom and the United States, in the case of Venezuela, 
and more specifically the case of the shift in the relationship between the Petrostate and PDVSA 
enforced by Hugo Chavez,  the processes of ‘hollowing out of the state’ and the ‘shadow state’ 
coalesced in the transfer to PDVSA of many of the new government programs and many 
functions of the state such as the provision of social housing, food distribution, and urban 
regeneration in which PDVSA effectively became a parallel state.  
What is useful about this discussion is that by viewing the state as a site where Bureaucratic 
Power congregates, it provides the ideal framework to understand the process of simultaneous 
fragmentation of the state apparatus with the consolidation of PDVSA as a parallel state and the 
centralisation of bureaucratic power in the sole figure of president Hugo Chávez who, as chapter 
three establishes, exercised Bureaucratic Power dramaturgically as the New Magical State, 
drawing on the definition coined by Fernando Coronil.  
The adoption of the Bureaucratic Power perspective allows this thesis to integrate  the idea of 
the state as an ‘institution of territorial governance with vast powers over the material wellbeing 
of its people’ (Mukerji 2010, p.82). The modern state is the only agent with the capacity to 
manage society and territory on a large scale (Lefebvre et al. 2009, p.20). According to Lefebvre, 
only the state possesses exceptional capacities to funnel long term and large scale investments in 
the built environment  as well as the sovereign capability to regulate and plan the uses of such 
investments (Lefebvre et al. 2009, p.20). Hence, State Space encompasses far more than territory 
(Lefebvre et al. 2009, pp.20–21; Lefebvre 2003) given that State Spatial Strategies also shape how 
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industrial development, land use, energy production, transportation and communication 
reproduce inside and beyond the territory. The Bureaucratic Power perspective is particularly 
useful for this thesis, as it will be instrumental in understanding how oil wealth permeates all 
instances of the state, and how the fragmentation of the state apparatus carried out by Hugo 
Chávez serves to explore how the interfaces between oil, space and culture manifest within a 
Petrostate. This chapter now turns to explore rentier state theory in order to develop a 
characterisation of the Bureaucratic Power of the Venezuelan Petrostate.     
Petrostate: Rentier State Theory 
 
The first studies aimed at theorising the impact of externally generated revenues from the 
exploitation of crude oil on statecraft were mostly focused on oil-exporting countries in the 
Middle East. The concept of  ‘rentier state’ was coined by Iranian economist Hossein Mahdavy 
(Beblawi 1987, p.51) to refer to states whose main source of income relies on external rent. 
Rentier states can be traced back to the seventeenth century Spanish Empire and the exploitation 
of the vast mineral resources found in the Americas.   
Nineteenth century economist David Ricardo is credited with introducing the term rent and 
developing the first comprehensive analysis of resource rent. Resource rent should not be 
confused with contract rent. The term resource rent was originally related to the use of land and 
agricultural production, a renewable but scarce resource. The variations of yield of different 
lands would determine the potential of resource rent for each. Rent, as defined by Ricardo, is the 
compensation paid by the farmer to the owner of the land for the use of the original and 
indestructible properties of the soil (Ricardo n.d., para.2.2). The payment of rent is also 
determined by, and varied according to, the investments made in infrastructure by the landlord. 
Ricardo extended this principle to the rent of stone quarries and coal mines, in which the 
compensation is paid to the value of the stone or coal removed from the soil with no connection 
with the ‘original and indestructible powers of the land’ (Ricardo n.d., para.2.2). From quarries 
and coal mines this has been extended to oil, gas, diamonds and other mineral resources 
extracted from the subsoil. In sum, resource rent in Ricardian terms refers to the economic 
return accumulated for its use in production and the payment to landlords for the right to access 
and exploit these resources. Thad Dunning in his book Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth 
and Political Regimes speaks of oil rents in Ricardian terms, defined as ‘the economic return to 
natural resource extraction that exceeds labor and other production costs as well as transport 
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costs and some “normal” return to capital’ (2008, p.39), accrued by the state as landlord in 
exchange to access to resources in the subsoil.  
The term rentier state defines a particular relationship between the state and the economy. The 
rise of the Age of Oil by late-nineteenth century reshaped the landscape of the global economy, 
with new world powers emerging in the course of the twentieth century. Vladimir Lenin 
addressed rentier states in his book Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism published in 1917. 
Lenin regarded the rentier state as the decay of imperialist capitalism in a world ‘divided into a 
handful of usurer states and a vast majority of debtor states’ (1978, p.95). The rentier states he 
referred to were Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the United States, all 
industrial states that had become creditor countries who by way of granting loans to politically 
dependent countries, or former colonies, had deepened their dependency by turning them into 
debtor states. For Lenin, the rentier state is a ‘state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this 
circumstance cannot fail to influence all the socio-political conditions of the countries 
concerned’ (1978, p.96). Nonetheless, the essence of a rentier state according to economist 
Giacomo Luciani lies on the ‘origin of state revenue, not necessarily in its rent-like character’ 
(1987, p.13). But to focus exclusively on the state as independent from the economy is not only 
restrictive but reveals little about the economy producing the state’s income.  
Rentier states share three distinctive features: rent predominates as a source of income but it’s 
not the only one, the origin of the rent is external, and the majority of the population is the 
beneficiary of the distribution of the rent generated by a minority engaged in its production 
(Beblawi & Luciani 1987, p.12).  For this reason, it is more accurate to speak of a ‘rentier 
economy’ in which rent plays a major role in the economy, determining that a rentier economy is 
more likely to generate a rentier state, both inextricably connected to the emergence of a rentier 
mentality that shapes politics and development policies (Beblawi & Luciani 1987, p.12).  
The Petrostate is a particular form of rentier state, in which the majority of the state’s revenue 
comes as oil rent money through exports of oil. Oil rents ‘have a strong and decisive influence 
on the nature of the state’ (Luciani 1987, p.68),  for this reason it is important to look closely at 
the nature and origin of the state’s income: 
‘It is oil exports that play an essential role in this respect even more than oil production 
per se: the state in a country in which a lot of oil is produced but none exported may or 
may not be called rentier, but does not appear to be essentially different from any other 
state whose income depend on domestic sources. (…) If oil is mostly exported and the 
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income of the state is mostly linked to the exportation of oil, then that state is freed from 
its domestic economic base and sustained by the economic base of the countries which 
are importing its oil.’ (Luciani 1987, p.69) 
Luciani introduces two categories of state based on the origin of its revenues: Esoteric States, 
mostly based on domestic revenue and taxation and Exoteric States, whose revenue mostly 
originates from abroad. He develops a parallel categorisation based on the predominant function 
the state plays in regards to its revenues: Allocation State and Production State. Luciani clarifies 
that all states perform some form of allocation, the difference is that in the Production State the 
allocations are limited by the extent in which the domestic economy ‘provides the income which 
is needed to do so’ whereas the Allocation State predominantly distributes ‘the income that it 
receives from the rest of the world’ (Luciani 1987, p.70). A Production State is correlated to an 
Esoteric State, whilst the Allocation State is predominantly an Exoteric State. Drawing on these 
definitions, the Petrostate is a predominantly exoteric allocative state in which ‘revenue derives 
predominantly (more than 40 per cent) from oil or other foreign sources and whose expenditure 
is a substantial share of GDP’ (Luciani 1987, p.70). What is important about this literature is that 
it establishes the characteristics of the rentier state, especially of oil rentier states like Venezuela, 
primordial to understand the effects of oil rentierism on statecraft. A rentier economy not only 
determines the emergence of a rentier state, but also shapes its politics, policy making and the 
relationship between the state and society. From this point onwards this chapter will refer 
exclusively to the Petrostate, the particular type of rentier state that concerns this thesis.  
A Petrostate predominantly spends and does not tax, commonly seen as benefitting everyone. Its 
expenditures, however, are unevenly distributed and irrelevant for political life as there is no 
incentive to reform political institutions because the abundance of rent money allows to increase 
public expenditure to ward off political conflicts (Luciani 1987, pp.7, 70). Furthermore, 
expenditure policies tend to favour the elites, leaving little room for the interests of under-
represented sectors (Luciani 1987, p.76) since oil revenues act as a buffer against political risks by 
keeping taxation low and using patronage to buy consensus (Weyland 2009, p.161). This allows 
political leaders to avoid being ‘forced to diffuse political power through representative and 
democratic institutions’ (Dunning 2008, p.53) since the collection of oil rents does not require 
representative pacts between state and citizens.   
The main priority of a Petrostate is to extract  ‘the maximum potential revenue from the rest of 
the world’ (Luciani 1987, p.71). The predominantly distributive nature of the Petrostate is 
considered a fundamental factor in the tendency towards authoritarianism among most oil 
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producing countries. However, scholars like Thad Dunning (2008) and Tim Mitchell (2011) 
challenge the direct correlation between oil and non-democratic governments, but as Terry Lynn 
Karl (1997), Peter Maas (2009) and Michael Ross (2012) describe, Petrostates do tend to suffer 
from diminished state capacity specially during times of oil booms.  
Dunning’s Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes zooms in on the negative 
relationship between oil rents and taxation. He argues that the tendency towards authoritarianism 
or democracy, or the overall economic orientation of a government (whether liberal or 
interventionist) is independent from the factors that foster the emergence of a Petrostate (2008, 
p.37). The key to decipher the commonalities of Petrostates lie in the ‘presence of rent-
producing natural resources’ which shape the fiscal foundation of the state in similar ways across 
a very diverse set of countries (2008, p.37). To explain the political effects of oil rents, Dunning 
establishes a conceptual simplification of the relationship the Petrostate establishes with oil rents: 
‘it is therefore useful to think of rents as flowing more or less like “manna from heaven” into the 
fiscal coffers of the state, even though this is a radical simplification of the actual process by 
which the state captures rents’ (2008, p.45). Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of 
Oil provides a historical account of the process through which the global networks of the carbon 
industry in the nineteenth century fostered what has been called the Age of Empire and the Age 
of Democratisation, and how the rise of coal created democracy in some regions and colonial 
domination in others (2011, p.18). The development of the oil industry, built over the assembly 
of flows of steam and carbon deepened this difference.  Therefore, Mitchell argues that the 
relationship between the Petrostate and oil rents is far more complex, the attention cannot be 
restricted to the flow of oil money but has to expand to include the process of the production 
and distribution of oil in both domestic and global networks since the political effects of oil are 
the outcome of ‘particular ways of engineering political relations out of flows of money’ (2011, 
p.5). Oil rents tend to displace other sources of income as the foundation of public finance, not 
only because they represent an ‘externally generated windfall’ but also because the revenue 
generated from oil  is less costly and complex than taxation (Dunning 2008, pp.45–46),  
abundant rents diminish the need to tax citizens, and where taxation is present it tends to be 
lower.  The oil industry becomes the predominant fiscal basis of the Petrostate for both 
developed and underdeveloped countries (Dunning 2008, p.49), magnified by the boom and bust 
cycles of the oil market (Karl 1997, pp.44–52) which alter fiscal and bureaucratic structures.  
An account of the political effects of oil is not complete without addressing how the boom and 
bust cycles of the global oil market influence and thwart state policy making, particularly in 
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Venezuela (Karl 1997, pp.5–9). Up until the 1950s it was believed that oil wealth was 
exceptionally beneficial, that it would provide oil producing countries with the necessary 
revenues to invest in development (Ross 2012, p.2,6). However, the international supply of oil 
was controlled by the global oil corporations called the Seven Sisters: Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (now BP); Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California (now Chevron), Texaco (later merged 
with Chevron); Royal Dutch Shell; Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso/Exxon) and Standard Oil 
Company of New York (Mobil now part of ExxonMobil). By the 1960s and 1970s most oil 
producing countries in the Global South embarked on a wave of nationalisation of their oil 
industries, setting up their own state-owned oil companies; this period also saw the rise of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries, OPEC. OPEC radically transformed the 
international oil markets and the scale and volatility of oil revenues from then onwards, creating 
a number of political, economic and social distortions (Ross 2012, p.7) that triggered the 
emergence of a new phenomenon: the oil curse.  
The peculiar properties of oil rents and its effects on the politics and economy of a Petrostate are 
the cornerstone of the oil curse (Ross 2012, p.5). The oil curse determines that economies 
dependent on natural resource extraction are far more likely to endure chronic political and 
economic distortions (Corrales & Penfold 2011, p.71; Ross 2012, p.12). This is due to the nature 
of oil rents: ‘the revenues it bestows on governments are unusually large, do not come from 
taxes, fluctuate unpredictably, and can be easily hidden’ (Ross 2012, p.6). Javier Corrales and 
Michael Penfold’s study Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in 
Venezuela addresses the political legacy of Hugo Chávez to re-examine the oil curse, claiming that 
a direct correlation between fluctuating oil prices and diminished state capacity is an 
oversimplification because ‘the impact of oil in economics and politics often depend on 
institutional factors’ (2011, p.72). They expand on the oil curse to propose the ‘institutional 
resource curse’  to describe  that oil flows through, and interacts with, a series of pre-existing 
institutional configurations that shape the effects of oil at times of boom or bust (Corrales & 
Penfold 2011, pp.72–75). Whether a resource curse materialises is dependent on the interactions 
between the existing institutional apparatus and oil rents. Therefore, they argue that the rise of 
Hugo Chávez to power and his Bolivarian Revolution can only be understood by addressing the 
institutional resource curse perspective (2011, p.72): ‘it was not the price of oil alone that helped 
the regime consolidate power; it was the institutional changes that were made prior to the oil 
boom together with the oil boom that did the trick’ (Corrales & Penfold 2011, p.90), changes 
such as the expansion of PDVSA’s scope of activities to non-oil related areas and the reform of 
the Law of Hydrocarbons. 
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Hugo Chávez’ Petrosocialism was the higher stage of his anti-neoliberal political platform, 
putting in place social policies ‘that clearly contradicted neoliberal orthodoxy’ (Parker 2006, 
p.70). It is important at this point to clarify the intersection between oil capitalism and 
Neoliberalism, to address the contradictions inherent to Petrosocialism that this thesis examines. 
Tim Mitchell argues that oil not only played a key role in shaping the global economy but ‘it also 
shaped the project that would challenge it, and later provide a rival method of governing 
democratic politics: the “market” of neoliberalism’ (2011, p.141). Mitchell,  drawing on Lippman, 
argues that neoliberalism was envisioned by Hayek ‘as an as an alternative project to defeat the 
threat of the left and of populist democracy’ (2011, p.141). David Harvey defines Neoliberalism 
as ‘the elevation of market-based principles and techniques of evaluation to the level of state-
endorsed norms’ in which the role of the state is to provide the appropriate institutional 
frameworks to liberate entrepreneurial freedoms, free markets and free trade; the authority of the 
state relies heavily on economics (Harvey 2005, pp.2, 6–7). Nonetheless, says Harvey, neoliberal 
theory dictates that the State should not venture and its interventions on markets should be kept 
to a minimum since the State cannot ‘possess enough information to second-guess market 
signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state 
interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit’ (Harvey 2005, p.7). As 
neoliberal theorists are suspicious of democracy, they tend to ‘favour governance by experts and 
elites’ preferring governments by executive order over ‘democratic and parliamentary decision 
making’ (Harvey 2005, p.66). Thus, marking a shift from government as ‘state power on its own’ 
to governance as ‘a broader configuration of state and key elements of civil society’ (Harvey 
2005, p.77).  
Conversely, Colin Crouch’s book The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism argues that the financial 
collapse of 2008-2009 that involved the world’s leading banks challenged  the idea that the free 
market provides the best means to satisfy human aspirations over the state and politics (2011, 
p.vii). Crouch also disputes the claim that neoliberalism is devoted to the free market by 
affirming that, in practice, it commits to ‘the dominance of public life by the giant corporation’ 
(2011, p.viii); he further elaborates that the political conflicts that stem from the confrontations 
between the state and the market mask the existence of this ‘third force’ which is ‘more potent 
than either and transforms the workings of both’. Although the Petrostate of the Chávez era can 
hardly be characterised as neoliberal, Harvey’s statement that the boundaries between state and 
corporate power have become very porous can certainly be applied here (Harvey 2005, pp.77–
78). This theorisation is helpful to highlight the discrepancy between Hugo Chávez’s anti-
neoliberal politics and the role of PDVSA. Whilst he publicly criticised PDVSA’s corporate 
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practices, he discursively re-framed PDVSA as a ‘socialist company’ at the service of his 
revolution, and once the oil company was regarded as ‘revolutionary’ he surrendered many of the 
bureaucratic powers of the state to the national oil corporation.  Hugo Chávez, aware of the 
many deficiencies and diminished capacity of the Petrostate,  believed that  ‘an oil company 
would succeed where government ministries might not ’(Maass 2009, p.215).  
What is particularly useful about the literature on oil rentier states is that it lays out a direct 
relationship between flows of oil rent, the Petrostate and the institutional apparatus. Chapter 
four examines how the oil boom that characterised the period that concerns this thesis (2007-
2013) provided Hugo Chávez with the wealth to reform the existing institutional apparatus to 
create new policy instruments of territorial administration that conceptualise the Socialist State 
Space whilst giving more power over the public sphere to PDVSA.   
City, Culture and Oil 
 
The aim of this section is to develop a categorisation to differentiate the terms city and 
urban, and their relationship with space and culture, looking into key literature from the fields of 
urban sociology and geography. For the purpose of this thesis it is important to understand the 
mechanisms and the processes under which cities have emerged, as well as the role oil wealth 
and power have played in urban development and the production of urban society and culture in 
contemporary Venezuela. 
The most evident transformations brought by oil capital in oil producing countries like 
Venezuela are reflected in the building of large infrastructures and negotiations between states 
and oil corporations to secure revenue and capital accumulation. As oil flows it converts into 
‘energy, profits and political power’ (Mitchell 2011, p.6). Oil wealth affects the social order in 
very tangible ways through the radical transformation of the built environment. In understanding 
the relationship between oil and the state, its material effects need to be addressed in order to 
understand the changes in society. The city is the centre of the material effects and the physical 
space of the State, it is the material space where human and political actions manifest (Lefebvre 
2003, pp.252–253). 
It wasn’t until the Industrial Revolution that the city began to be considered a unique form of 
social life; it is for this reason that urban studies is a fairly recent discipline when compared to 
the ancient history of the city (Sennett 1969, p.3). For Marx & Engels what separates the urban 
from the rural is the division and specialisation of physical and spiritual labour. They equated the 
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change from rural to urban with a shift from barbarity to civilization; a shift that remained 
constant in the history of civilization (Marx & Engels 1974, p.55). Rural and urban are also 
differentiated in terms of the source of wealth: land property for the former whilst for the latter, 
capital developed independently from territorial property based only on labour and economic 
exchange. Moreover, the city is above all the domain of intellectual labour, from there all matters 
are governed, economic and ideological power emanates, and the moral and religious fate of the 
nation is decided. The city is also where large crowds gather, it is a place of pleasure and 
satisfaction of needs; it is also the domain where a materialistic interdependence is developed 
constrained to alienated labour, inciting to consumption through the multiplication of products 
(Marx & Engels 1974, p.56; Remy & Voye 1976, pp.245–251). The division of labour modified 
the social organisation of the city creating a new class structure; the bourgeoisie born in the city, 
separate from the proletariat comprised of workers, guilds, and plebes. The internal 
differentiation of the bourgeoisie determined, in turn, the differentiation and hierarchy between 
cities and the prevalence of all cities over the countryside. 
Urban Sociology emerged as a sub-discipline of Sociology in the twentieth century,  with an 
interest in studying the city and its relationship with society and inequality, the nature of 
urbanism as well as the role of the state in urban development and the distribution of urban 
resources  (Stevenson 2013, pp.9–10). Early urban sociologists were mainly concerned with 
formulating an all-encompassing theory that could explain all cities, regardless of their histories, 
geographies and cultures (Stevenson 2013, p.10). These overarching concepts and theories were 
drawn mainly from the study of Western cities, specifically those of the Global North.  
The Chicago School of Urban Sociology was a major influence in urban studies for most of the 
twentieth century. Preoccupied with developing a coherent conceptualisation of the city and 
urban life, The Chicago School defined the city as a biological entity that ‘adapted systematically 
and predictably in response to changes in population, demography and the physical environment’ 
(Stevenson 2013, p.11). It believed that urbanisation as well as technological, social and cultural 
processes were inseparable from modernisation; it was also concerned with the ‘subjective 
factors’ that determined city morphology such as the location of particular ethnic groups in 
certain neighbourhoods, studying residents’ personal tastes and social status, the way urban space 
reflected the residents’ characteristics of its inhabitants, or caused or amplified social problems 
such as violence and crime. The Chicago School believed that empirical research was crucial to 
understand the city and urban culture, establishing both the conceptual parameters and 
methodological approach that would greatly influence urban research over the twentieth century 
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(Stevenson 2013, p.12). According to The Chicago School the only function of the state  was  to 
support ‘social and urban needs’, but it never questioned its role in the processes of urbanisation 
and urbanism (Stevenson 2013, p.11). 
The dominance of The Chicago School was challenged in the 1970s by Marxists, who criticised 
its inability to predict and explain the urban unrests and social crises of the 1960s. Marxists 
viewed the city as a site of conflict, they affirmed that capital shaped the spatial structures of 
cities and was the fundamental cause of social inequality; they emphasised the role of capital 
accumulation and class struggle in the process of urbanisation and the allocation of urban 
resources (Stevenson 2013, pp.12–13; Stevenson 2003, pp.35–36). The Marxist perspective 
marked the emergence of a new urban sociology dominated by two approaches: one 
conceptualised the city as ‘a system comprised of interdependent networks and components’ and 
a ‘localization of social forces’, whilst the other asserted that capitalism ‘created cities that are 
sites of inequality and function to protect capitalism, private property and the accumulation of 
wealth’ (Stevenson 2013, pp.10–13). These two approaches were divided along national lines. On 
one side, French Marxists were concerned with ‘how space is used in the process of social 
reproduction’ and the city as the site of social segregation and inequitable distribution of urban 
resources. On the other side were American urban studies, concerned with studying cities as 
channels for the circulation of capital and labour discipline.  
This thesis will follow the Marxist approach to urban studies which focuses on the way power, 
politics and economics manifest in the city as well as on the role global processes and the state 
play in supporting capitalism through the management of urban populations and urban space 
(Stevenson 2013, p.13). Under the influence of French Marxist philosopher and sociologist 
Henri Lefebvre, Marxist urban sociologists distinguished between the ‘economically determined 
organisation of urban space’ and urbanism ‘as a cultural form of collective self- expression’ 
(Zukin 2006, p.105).  They also viewed the city as a site of conflict where capital shapes the 
spatial structures of cities (Stevenson 2013, pp.12–13; Stevenson 2003, pp.35–36). Henri 
Lefebvre divided the history of cities into three consecutive eras: the agrarian era,  the industrial 
era, and the urban era (Lefebvre 1976, p.65). The urban era had just begun, as it was waiting to 
be explored and constructed, manifested in the process of city dispersion encompassing social 
practices, symbols, and works of culture. Therefore, urban societies were still in the process of 
formation. This understanding veers the discussion towards an ‘epistemology of the urban’ that 
functions as a wider theoretical framework to study the process of total urbanisation of modern 
societies (Stanek 2011, p.xiii). 
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Lefebvre observed that the world was headed towards complete urbanisation, a process deeply 
enmeshed with the survival of capitalism (Stevenson 2013, p.15; Lefebvre 1991, p.4). As the 
capitalist industrial economy grows, the city physically extends its boundaries disseminating its 
‘urban fabric’ through the materialisation of suburbs, industrial complexes, satellite cities; this 
process of urbanisation gradually absorbed or colonised the countryside and its agrarian mode of 
production: ‘a vacation home, a highway, a supermarket in the countryside are all part of the 
urban fabric’ (Lefebvre 1991, p.4). For Lefebvre the city designates a concrete and clearly defined 
object, a built entity, however diffuse its boundaries might be, whilst urban is an abstract concept, a 
social practice inherent to the capitalist mode of production emancipated from the materiality of 
the city and a carrier of modernity and culture (Lefebvre 1976, p.68). The urban then is both 
spatial and temporal: it extends through space and develops over time. In this sense, Manuel 
Castells affirms that no urban world exists outside of modern capitalism, defining urbanism as 
the culture of the city of ‘industrial capitalism and the capitalist state’ (Stevenson 2013, p.14; 
Zukin 2006, p.105).  Along the same lines, geographer David Harvey distinguishes between ‘the 
city as built form’ and the urban ‘as a way of life’, concurring with Lefebvre’s definitions. Harvey 
views cities as ‘landscapes of power’ (Zukin 2006, pp.105–106) in which capital has the power to 
make and remake the urban, opening paths for uneven or contradictory development across 
cities and across the globe.  
The theorisation on the city and the urban are helpful for this thesis; the term urban will be used 
to refer to the social, political and cultural practices of industrialised capitalist societies; the urban 
understood as the immaterial carrier of modernity and culture. City will be used to refer to the 
built form (buildings, infrastructure, roads, networks, etc.) and the geographical expansion it 
occupies, where urban societies settle and conglomerate. The term ‘urban space’ will be used to 
categorise specific and clearly delineated areas of congruence between urban and city, of which 
public space will be a sub-category. The Material Space of the city is where the New Magical 
State mobilises its Bureaucratic Power to re-organise and regulate the political, economic and 
cultural relations of Venezuelan society in order to build the Socialist State Space. 
Whilst Lefebvre and Harvey defined the urban as the carrier of the modern ways of life and 
culture shaped by capitalism, Sharon Zukin defines culture as the ‘habits carried through space 
and time, refined through the interaction with church and state, and asserted as a means of 
differentiation and independence’ (1995, p.263). She also argues that culture is ‘what cities do 
best’ (1995, p.264) as it also refers to the idea of a collective urban lifestyle, a meaningful if 
somewhat ‘conflictual  source of representation’ that encompasses a diverse range of ethnicities, 
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lifestyles and images. The city is where cultural industries are located, where artists and 
performers produce their work, but most importantly, as a built form it contains a visual 
repertoire that becomes a public language  that makes visible the implicit values of a particular 
group (Zukin 1995, p.264). How a city looks and feels is the reflection of the uses of aesthetic 
power and concepts of order and disorder used to dictate what and who should be visible and 
where.  
For Zukin, culture can be understood as the legitimate ways in which a particular group creates 
its own niche in society, encompassing habits carried through time and space, distilled through 
interactions with the state (1995, p.263). Culture can also function as an instrument of spatial and 
social stratification in which every space of the city caters its visual consumption to a specific 
constituency (Zukin 1995, p.36). Urban space is produced in synergy with ‘capital investment 
and cultural meaning’ (Zukin 1995, pp.23–24), elites reconfigure urban space imposing their 
point of view; any change in the reorganisation of urban space manifests in changes of  the visual 
representation of the city. For this reason, says Zukin, it is imprecise to talk about urban culture 
as universal and homogeneous, rather one should ask ‘which culture?, which cities?’ (1995, 
p.264).  
The combination of ‘traditional economic factors of land, labor and capital' (Zukin 1995, p.7) 
determine the built environment of the city as well as the manipulation of the symbolic language 
of exclusion and belonging where culture is often turned into ‘a set of marketable images’ (Zukin 
1995, p.265). This commoditisation of culture functions as a symbolic economy, a feature 
common to all cities, consisting of ‘a continual production of symbols and spaces that frames 
and gives meaning to ethnic competition, racial change and environmental renewal and decay’ 
(1995, p.265). However, in the symbolic economy the identities of places tend to be established 
by their visual delights, unifying the ‘material practices of finance, labor, art, performance, and 
design’ (Zukin 1995, p.9). Culture also functions as an instrument of control, determining 
through images, memories and symbols, who belongs to certain places of the city and who 
doesn’t (Zukin 1995, p.1). Elites view culture as an instrument to ‘restore civility’, they devise 
cultural strategies, magnifying the cultural role of urban institutions to ‘reconstruct the meaning 
of urban spaces to give the appearance of a common public culture’; public culture is defined by 
Zukin as the process of negotiation of images that are commonly accepted by large groups of 
people in which public space plays a fundamental role, as it is the place where strangers come 
together and where the boundaries of urban society are negotiated (1995, pp.10, 270).  
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In this line of thought, Deborah Stevenson notes that beyond the issue of ownership, public 
space should be understood as any ‘shared urban space’, whether publicly or privately owned, 
where  large groups of people congregate for a wide range of purposes and where daily 
encounters with difference takes place (2013, pp.52–53). The creation of a public culture requires 
the manipulation of public space for certain kinds of expected social interactions and creates a 
particular visual representation of the city (Zukin 1995, p.24). This creates tensions around 
cultural politics and the occupation of the city, contradicting the spirit of public culture and 
evidencing the difficulty of conceiving culture as both an elite resource and a democratic good   
(Zukin 1995, p.270). Culture then has an intrinsic political value and can be used to serve 
political purposes. 
To set up a theoretical framework for this thesis that articulates the intersection between oil, city 
and culture, the following section provides a discussion on the relevant literature on the 
intersections between oil, culture and cities in Venezuela, as well as the recent literature from the 
emerging field of energy humanities on the cultural dimension of oil.  
Oil In and Within Culture  
 
This section aims to develop the theoretical premises to examine the relationship 
between culture and oil to examine the spatial and cultural representations of Petrosocialism in 
Caracas. A point of departure is the recently published Oil Culture edited by Ross Barrett and 
Daniel Worden (2014). The book explores the presence of oil in culture, how oil works within 
culture, and how oil has shaped how we imagine contemporary life. It examines a particular 
model of culture that designates ‘a dynamic field of representations and symbolic practices that 
have infused, affirmed, and sustained the material armatures of the oil economy’ and ‘the 
particular modes of everyday life that have developed around oil use in North America and 
Europe since the nineteenth century (and have since become global)’ (Barrett & Worden 2014, 
p.xxiv). The book is regarded by its editors as a contribution towards legitimising the field of ‘oil 
studies’ within the discipline of cultural studies. They note the absence of literature that 
‘addresses oil as a cultural material in everyday experience and aesthetics’ (Barrett & Worden 
2014, p.xx). They set to explore the connections between ‘oil capitalism and cultural 
representation’ drawing on Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle as a theoretical model, to 
argue that the global oil economy is a spectacular system:  
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‘As a material whose utility is largely realized through its own destruction, oil requires 
creative accounts of its worth that depart from its physical form. As a substance that can 
(at least initially) be extracted without much work, moreover, oil encourages fetishistic 
representations of its value as magical property detached from labor.’ (Barrett & Worden 
2014, p.xxiv) 
The majority of the essays in the book focus on the multiple meanings of oil within the cultural 
imagination of the United States, with some essays examining the cultural dimensions of oil in 
Europe and other Petrostates such as Canada, Mexico and Niger. Barrett and Worden speak, for 
example, of a number of literary texts in the United States addressing the cultural and social 
effects of oil (Barrett & Worden 2014, p.xxi), and hint that this may be the case in the rest of the 
world. Actually, in countries like Venezuela there exists a rich production of literary texts that 
document and portray how oil was intertwined with the presence of foreign dominant forces 
such as international oil corporations, viewed as mechanisms of domination that threatened 
national culture and that reshaped economic, social and cultural landscapes. In Venezuela, oil not 
only became the main mode of production and subsistence, it shaped statecraft and society 
formation and influenced every aspect of national life. Since early twentieth century, right at the 
start of its own era of oil, many texts emerged to account and explain the direct social and 
cultural effects of the oil industry in Venezuela.  
The emergence of scholarly work exploring the cultural dimensions of oil capitalism in the 
humanities and in fields such as geography and environmental history between 1990 and 2000s 
coincided with the crises of the oil economy of late twentieth century, which generated new 
interests in understanding how oil became the world’s dominant energy commodity in order to 
develop critical analysis of the symbolic and cultural forms of oil capitalism (Barrett & Worden 
2014, p.xxi; LeMenager 2014; Szeman 2013a; Szeman 2013b; Lord 2014).  
Overall, the literature that assesses the effects of oil on modern social life and thought, or that 
analyses oil beyond the realms of politics, economics, technology and energy is a fairly recent 
development in academic fields. Frederick Buell’s essay A Short History of Oil Cultures (2014) is 
helpful for this thesis because it develops an approach towards the theorisation of the 
connection between oil and culture, exploring the close relationship between the development of 
energy industries and the cultural and social transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. Buell conceptualises history as a succession of systems of energy, comprised by 
economic, technological, environmental and socio-cultural relationships. He argues that oil has 
become essential to every single aspect of contemporary life,  it underlies ‘material and symbolic 
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cultures’ that partially determines ‘cultural production and reproduction’ (2014, p.70). 
Nonetheless, he notes that a gap remains in the conceptual response to the relationship between 
oil and culture.  
Buell’s approach towards the cultural effects of oil coincides with Mitchell (2011) in first 
addressing the mechanics of the  development of the coal industry in the nineteenth century. 
Coal capitalism ended humanity’s primary dependence on biological energy systems such as 
wood and water, and inaugurated the era of fossil energies. This new era freed the factory from 
the constraints of organic resources and  geography, as ‘factories no longer had to be placed on 
one of the rapidly dwindling number of sites on the banks of usable rivers but could be put 
anywhere’ (Buell 2014, p.73), marking a radical shift in the discourse around nature and 
machinery. Coal-based mechanical power brought with it the promise of never ending progress, 
which inaugurated a double-edged discourse of the effects of fossil energies, oil particularly 
(Buell 2014). The consolidation of global oil capitalism in the twentieth century inaugurated a 
‘new cultural regime’  in which modernity engendered extreme exuberance and catastrophe 
(Buell 2014, p.82).  Oil’s exuberance manifested as modernisation, progress, economic growth, 
technological development, imperial expansion, rapid urbanisation, sanitation, and consumerism. 
Its inseparable catastrophic side manifests as environmental disasters, air pollution, grim working 
conditions in the oil fields, colonial domination, economic crises caused by the cycles of boom 
and bust of oil prices, rural to urban massive migrations, and destructive war machinery (tanks, 
airplanes, trucks, submarines). The consolidation of global oil capitalism is closely related to the 
rise of modernist culture, oil exerts a significant but seldom acknowledged influence on art and 
popular culture. 
The first publications to assess oil in cultural terms in Venezuela were produced by Venezuelan 
Marxist anthropologist (and former oil camp dweller) Rodolfo Quintero, who published a series 
of works exclusively devoted to analyse the pervasive social and cultural effects of oil, most of it 
written around the period leading up to the oil boom and the nationalisation of the oil industry 
in the 1970s: the seminal La cultura del petróleo (1968), Antropología del petróleo (1972), La cultura 
nacional y popular: ensayo antropolo ́gico sobre aspectos de la dependencia cultural en Venezuela (1972), and El 
petróleo y nuestra sociedad (1975). Quintero’s first work, La cultura del petróleo (1968) is particularly 
relevant for this thesis, explored in depth in chapter three. This thesis also builds on two notable 
contributions by Venezuelan scholars. One is Fernando Coronil’s seminal work The Magical State: 
Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela (1997) which accounts the ways in which the state’s 
monopoly over the oil economy allowed it to enact collective fantasies of progress by way of 
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spectacular projects, becoming the single agent endowed with the ‘magical powers’ to transform 
the nation. The other is Miguel Tinker Salas’ The Enduring Legacy: Oil and Society in Venezuela 
(2009) which explores the oil camps of transnational companies as cultural laboratories that 
promoted forms of citizenship and ways of life related to the global oil industry.  
A number studies on the effects of oil in Venezuela have been published on the aftermath of the 
1980s oil crash, but most notably in recent years, prompted by Hugo Chávez’s entrenchment of 
the country’s dependency on oil. Amid these texts the most relevant for this thesis is Maria Sol 
Pérez Schael’s study Petróleo, Cultura y Poder en Venezuela  (1993) which examines how the cultural 
understanding of oil as a demonic and predatory force has shaped twentieth century statecraft.  
This thesis is mainly concerned with addressing the spatial dimension of the intersection between 
oil and culture, which leads to another key question which is to investigate the particular notion 
of culture conceptualised by the Venezuelan oil company within the strategies of the Sowing Oil 
Plan, that underpin Petrosocialism (examined in chapters five and six) defined as a national 
program based on ‘elevated cultural concepts’ (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.416) as well as their use 
of farming language to refer to the relationship it constructs between oil and culture. The next 
section provides a discussion of the literature on culture and cultural policy relevant for this 
discussion on the intersections between oil and culture, drawing primarily on the work of 
Zygmunt Bauman, Jeremy Ahearne and George Yúdice’s culture as a resource, to define this 
thesis proposition of the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit construed by the state-owned oil 
company within the context of Petrosocialism.  
Culture as a Resource in Petrosocialism: Culture-as-mineral-deposit 
 
The term culture, according to Zygmunt Bauman, originates from farming concepts such 
as cultivation, husbandry and breeding, ‘all meaning improvement’;  culture is seen ‘through the 
eyes of the “farmers of the human-growing fields”– the managers’ (2004, pp.63–64). 
Metaphorically what the farmer does with the seed, culture does to the ‘incipient human beings 
by education and training’ (2004, p.63). This evokes the Victorian period’s understanding of 
culture as ‘the moral betterment and spiritual development’ achieved through the contemplation 
of the best of human creations, where aesthetics articulated differences between what is high 
culture and what is not (O’Brien 2014, p.2; Miller & Yúdice 2002, p.1). However, by mid-
twentieth century, an anthropological register  was connected to culture (Miller & Yúdice 2002, 
p.1), in which culture is about the ‘artefacts and activities associated with a given community’s 
‘way of life’ (O’Brien 2014, p.2). Bauman argues that the notion of management has been 
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endemic to the concept of culture from the beginning, implying an acceptance of an 
asymmetrical social relation:  ‘the split between acting and bearing the impact of action, between 
the managers and the managed, the knowing and the ignorant, the refined and the crude’ 
(Bauman 2004, p.64). Furthermore, the relationship between managers and managed is inevitably 
agonistic and conflictive in which two sides seeking opposite purposes cohabit in a constant 
mode of conflict (Bauman 2004, p.64). Adorno acknowledged that conflict was inevitable, 
because managers and managed need each other: ‘culture suffers damage when it is planned and 
administrated; if it is left to itself, however, everything cultural threatens not only to lose the 
possibility of effect, but its very existence as well’ (Bauman 2004, p.64). O’Brien  (2014, pp.9–10) 
further elaborates that there is a very material historical relationship between management and 
culture when considering state formation and particularly state bureaucracy as the actions of the 
state shape the understanding of culture, and that those aspects of the cultural that appear as 
natural, fixed and unchanging social facts are subject to governmental structures.  
In this sense, Tony Bennett’s discussion about the relationship between culture and power is 
relevant, as he draws attention to the institutional circumstances that interpret and regulate 
culture. Bennett conceptualises culture as ‘a particular field of government’ (McGuigan 2003, 
p.29), the term government encompassing all power/knowledge relations in society. Hence, 
culture can be treated as a ‘historically specific set of institutionally embedded relations of 
government’ which seeks to transform particular forms of thought and conduct of populations, 
through instruments of control and power such as ‘the social body of forms, techniques, and 
regimes of aesthetic and intellectual culture’ (McGuigan 2003, p.30). Culture cannot escape from 
power manipulations or public controversy (McGuigan 2003, p.25). The grip of politics over 
culture tends to be greater where the state plays a significant role in its regulation, as is the case 
of the dominance of the Venezuelan Petrostate, particularly under Petrosocialism, in the manner 
in which the cultural arm of PDVSA frames culture within the extractive logic of the oil industry.  
George Yúdice’s The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era (2003) reveals and 
explains the utilisation of culture as a resource in the context of neoliberalism and globalisation 
as an instrument to aid social and economic development. Culture has acquired to an extent the 
same status as natural resources as a consequence of the process of globalisation which has 
accelerated the transformation of all realms of modern life into a resource (Yúdice 2003, pp.9, 
28). Concurring with Bauman, he asserts that in both cultural and natural resources ‘management 
is the name of the game’ (Yúdice 2003, p.2). He argues that the use of culture as a resource is not 
a perversion or a reduction of its symbolic dimension, on the contrary, the expediency of culture 
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as a resource is a feature of contemporary life;  its transformation into a resource is traced to a 
performative force, a style of social relations generated by diverse organised relations between 
state institutions and society such as schools, universities, mass media, markets, and so on 
(Yúdice 2003, pp. 47, 60–61). Drawing on Judith Butler, Yúdice characterises performativity ‘as 
an act that ‘produces which it names’ revealing the power of discourse to produce realities 
through repetition (Yúdice 2003, p.47,58), focused in particular on the institutional preconditions 
and processes by which culture and its effects are produced.  
The expedience or convenience of culture as a resource allows its use for economic, social and 
political purposes. Yúdice affirms that nowadays it is impossible not to turn to culture as a 
resource as it is congruent to the way we now understand nature, affecting the way culture is 
viewed and produced. The issue here is then, with what intentions and to what purposes culture 
is ‘exploited’ noting that it is currently close to impossible to find  public statements that do not  
instrumentalise art and culture to improve social conditions or to foster economic growth 
(Yúdice 2003, pp.10–11).  Powerful institutions like the European Union, the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank have begun to understand culture as a ‘crucial sphere of 
investment’ meaning that culture is therefore treated like any resource as James D. Wolfenshohn, 
the president of the World Bank, affirmed in his keynote address at the conference Culture 
Counts: Financing, Resources, and the Economics of Culture in Sustainable Development in 
1999: ‘Physical and expressive culture is an undervalued resource in developing countries. It can 
earn income, through tourism, crafts, and other cultural enterprises’ (Yúdice 2003, p.13). This 
has marked a turn to culture as the prime instrument for investing in civil society as culture 
would not be funded unless it provides an indirect form of return in the form of ‘fiscal 
incentives, institutional marketing or publicity value, and the conversion of nonmarket activity to 
market activity’ (Yúdice 2003, pp.14–15) given that ‘cultural institutions and funders are 
increasingly turning to the measurement of utility because there is no other accepted legitimation 
for social investment’ (Yúdice 2003, p.16).  
Yúdice’s discussion frames one of the approaches of this thesis to the work of PDVSA La 
Estancia, which has privileged direct access to the oil rent to be a founder of culture, it needs no 
negotiations with the government or follow any other agenda than its own, and as this thesis 
demonstrates, it can even surpass in financial and political power the jurisdictions of other public 
institutions whose functions overlap with their cultural work over the city. Thus, whilst the term 
expediency refers to the merely politic in regards to self-interest, Yúdice’s performative 
understanding of the expediency of culture ‘focuses on the strategies implied in any invocation 
62 
 
of culture, any invention of tradition, in relation to some purpose or goal’ which is what makes 
possible to invoke culture as a resource ‘for determining the value of an action’ (2003, p.38). For 
Yúdice, the expediency of culture as a resource has become, in practice, the only surviving 
definition (2003, p.279) in which cultural policy becomes the institutional medium for its 
invocation.  
Cultural policy is defined by Miller & Yúdice as the ‘the institutional supports that channel both 
aesthetic creativity and collective ways of life’, functioning as a bridge between the 
anthropological and aesthetic understandings of culture  (2002, p.1). As such, cultural policy is in 
essence bureaucratic. McGuigan revisits Raymond Williams’ categorisations of cultural policy as 
‘display’ developed in 1984 (Ahearne 2009, p.145), expanding them to draw a distinction 
between cultural policy as display characterised by ‘the instrumentalization of cultural resources 
for economic and political purposes’ and cultural policy proper which ‘attends to the proper 
object of cultural policy’ (Ahearne 2009, p.145). Jeremy Ahearne defines cultural policy as not 
just a ‘predefined object for cultural history, but also a particular “lens” through which cultural 
history more generally can be approached’ (2009, p.142). He distinguishes between two broad 
categories of cultural policy: explicit cultural policy and implicit cultural policy (Ahearne 2009, 
p.141). Explicit cultural policy is ‘any cultural policy that a government labels as such’; they often 
work on a definition of culture in terms of the consecrated arts. On the other hand, Implicit 
cultural policy is ‘any political strategy that looks to work on the culture of the territory over 
which it presides (or on that of its adversary)’, which implies the unintended cultural side effects 
of different kinds of policy or government actions that are not labelled as ‘cultural’ (Ahearne 
2009, pp.143–144). Hence, Implicit cultural policy is not constrained to the governmental 
sphere; the actions of transnational commercial organisations have had significant influence on 
shaping cultural practices as it also entails the notion of ‘soft power’ (Ahearne 2009, p.144). 
Implicit cultural policy may be the most influential and important form of cultural policy 
especially when wielded by powerful transnational commercial organisations such as oil 
conglomerates whose ‘policies’ are not as susceptible to government control (Ahearne 2009, 
p.146). In this sense, this thesis will explore in chapter five that implicit cultural policy can be 
found in the most unlikely places, such as the Venezuelan Organic Law of Hydrocarbons 
interpreted and implemented as such by PDVSA La Estancia.  
The above discussion underpins this thesis investigation of the notion of culture as a resource 
within Petrosocialism, as it is exercised in particular by the Venezuelan state-owned oil company. 
This thesis will argue that PDVSA’s use of farming language discursively equates culture to 
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‘renewable oil’, as if it was a mineral deposit that can be mined, extracted and exploited. Yúdice’s 
culture as resource provides the theoretical foundation to characterise PDVSA’s notion of 
culture as culture-as-mineral-deposit. This thesis proposes that culture-as-mineral-deposit is, like 
the subsoil, the exclusive property of the Petrostate, as it belongs to the realm of PDVSA’s State 
Space but unlike oil, culture is not finite, it can be renewed, reconverted, and transformed. 
Chapters five and six argue that by framing its actions under the Sowing Oil Plan and the 
Organic Law of Hydrocarbons PDVSA La Estancia construes a notion of culture-as-mineral-
deposit, as if culture could accumulate like a mineral and be industrially extracted from the soil 
like oil. Whilst Hugo Chávez established his political platform as an alternative to neoliberalism, 
oil capitalism provided the financial resources to advance and implement Petrosocialism. The use 
of culture-as-mineral-deposit is not oriented towards financial profit or the conventional model 
of promotion of modernity and progress, rather it is exploited to perpetuate the oil rentier 
model, to provide the illusion of inexhaustible oil through two discursive constructions: ‘oil that 
harvests culture’ (chapter five) and culture as ‘renewable oil’ (chapter six).  
The state-owned oil company PDVSA conceives culture as ‘high elevated art’, understanding 
culture as a medium and an instrument to transcend the ills of capitalism. This thesis is not 
concerned with engaging with the history of cultural policies of the Venezuelan Petrostate, it is 
particularly interested in deciphering the discursive and institutional mechanisms that enabled the 
oil company to interpret and enact the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons -which is in principle a 
legal instrument limited to matters of fossil fuels extraction and commercialisation- as a parallel 
policy instrument of territory and culture. A key question for this thesis is to explore the 
institutional circumstances that enabled the social and cultural arm of PDVSA to supersede the 
authority of local government to stretch its scope of action to public art and public space, 
informed by the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit. The theoretical challenge of this thesis is 
to demonstrate that within the extractive logic of the oil industry, oil, territory and culture 
become inextricable from each other.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlined the three theoretical premises that guide this thesis’ investigation. First, 
Brenner and Elden’s State Space as Territory serves to characterise the Oil Social District as 
PDVSA’s State Space in chapter four, which provides the foundation to examine the discursive 
mechanisms used by PDVSA La Estancia to implement the Law of Hydrocarbons as an implicit 
cultural policy in chapter five. With this purpose, Harvey’s triad of spatiotemporality underpins 
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the approach of chapters four, five and six, as it enables to identify each particular 
spatiotemporal dimension of the four inter-related sets of documents this thesis examines: policy 
instruments; public speeches of Hugo Chávez, the President of PDVSA and the General 
Manager of PDVSA La Estancia; elite interviews; and the 23 adverts of PDVSA La Estancia’s 
campaign ‘We transform oil into a renewable resource for you’. Secondly, this thesis adopts 
Bennett and Joyce’s perspective of the state as the site where bureaucratic power congregates, 
useful to understand the process of simultaneous fragmentation of the state apparatus and 
centralisation of Bureaucratic Power in the sole figure of Hugo Chávez in the transition towards 
the Socialist State. Finally, this thesis expands George Yúdice’s notion of ‘culture as a resource’ 
by interrogating the intersections between the state-owned oil company, culture and urban space, 
to propose the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit, mobilised through the material space of the 
city reframed as an oil field whilst conceptualising a symbiotic and cyclical relationship between 
oil, land, and culture.  
Having laid out the theoretical foundations of this thesis, the following chapter discusses 
research methodologies and ethical considerations. Chapter two outlines the methodological 
approaches and the process of carrying out fieldwork and research in Caracas in the aftermath of 
violent nationwide student protests. The chapter introduces the case study of PDVSA La 
Estancia by describing the geographical, political and institutional contexts of this research, as 
well as providing a discussion on the ethical challenges of doing fieldwork in a setting fraught 
with political polarisation and conflict. Finally, the chapter describes the mix of methodologies 
used: Critical Discourse Analysis and Visual Semiotics.   
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Chapter two: Fieldwork, Ethics and Data Collection in a Politically 
Polarised Petrostate  
 
This thesis examines the spatial dimension of the relationship between the Petrostate, oil wealth, 
and culture in the era of Petrosocialism in Venezuela by looking at the overlaps and intersections 
between the discursive narratives of Petrosocialism of the state-owned oil company and Hugo 
Chávez to construct new spatial strategies that inform the notion of culture in the construction 
of the Socialist State in Venezuela. It also examines how this process manifests in the erosion of 
the institutional apparatus that enabled PDVSA La Estancia to supersede local government 
authority as well as re-imagine and repossess the material space of the city as an oil field, 
construing a notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit.  The analysis draws on three theoretical 
premises: 
State Space  
Bureaucratic Power 
The Expediency of Culture as a Resource- culture-as-mineral-deposit  
The main question that guides this thesis is: How does the relationship between the state, oil 
wealth, and culture play out in urban space in Petrosocialism?  The investigation is guided by 
four further questions: 
What are the representations of space produced by the discourses of Petrosocialism? 
Do the Oil Social Districts constitute PDVSA’s State Space?   
Is there a Petrosocialist vision of the city? 
What notion of culture is being produced by Petrosocialism? 
PDVSA La Estancia’s interventions in Caracas are used as a case study that serves as a gateway 
to examine the intersections between State Space, Bureaucratic Power and culture under 
Petrosocialism, as exercised by the Venezuelan state-owned oil company PDVSA. Located at the 
intersection of state space, bureaucratic power, and culture, this project collected four different 
sets of sources: interviews, public speeches, policy instruments, images and advertisements.  The 
scope and focus of the research required a mix of qualitative methodological approaches: Critical 
Discourse Analysis and Visual Semiotics. In the following section I will elaborate on the research 
approach chosen for this research project, the rationale, and how they intersect and interact in 
revealing the relationship between space, state, city and culture under Petrosocialism. 
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Research Settings  
 
This research is delimited by three specific settings. First, the political setting is Hugo 
Chávez’s third and fourth presidential terms that saw the launch of Petrosocialism and the 
transition towards the Socialist State. Second, the geographical setting is Caracas, the capital city 
of Venezuela and the location of the institutions of central government. Finally, the institutional 
setting is PDVSA La Estancia, the social and cultural arm of the state-owned oil company 
PDVSA.  
Political Setting: Petrosocialism and the Transition Towards the Socialist State 
 
President Hugo Chávez announced in 2007 that he was building the Socialism of the 21st century 
(2007b), a Bolivarian socialism supported by the oil rent, a socialismo petrolero, in other words,  
Petrosocialism. Petrosocialism broadly defines a political and economic model in which the flow 
of the oil rent is channelled into the construction of a Socialist State and a new socialist society. 
It was guided by the Sowing Oil Plan, a 25 year national oil policy launched in 2005 that forms 
the foundation for the advancement of Petrosocialism. Chapter three explores how the state-
owned oil company PDVSA  effectively became the ‘engine of revolutionary change’ (Maass 
2009, pp.202, 215) along with the launch of the Five Motors of the Revolution, which marked 
the transition towards the Socialist State with the aim of transforming Venezuela into an ‘a world 
power of oil energy’ (Chávez 2008, p.7).  This thesis is concerned with the fourth motor: The 
New Geometry of Power, manifested in the reorganisation of national territory which implied 
the dismantlement of the existing institutional apparatus of the ‘counter revolutionary State’ 
(Chávez 2007d). The weakening of the existing institutional framework created the 
circumstances that enabled PDVSA La Estancia to embark on an ambitious program of public 
art restoration and urban regeneration, justified by its institutional social and cultural mission and 
its interpretation of Article 5 of the Law of Hydrocarbons as implicit cultural policy. The work of 
PDVSA La Estancia cannot be fully understood without addressing the transformation taking 
place in the dimension of State Space in the creation of the Representations of Space of the 
Socialist State conceptualised in the new policy instruments, explored in detail in chapters four 
and five.   
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Geographical Setting: Caracas, the Capital City of Venezuela 
 
The geographical context of this research is the city of Caracas. Although Caracas is the 
capital of Venezuela and the seat of government, there exists long standing discrepancies in the 
relationship between its legal institutional framework and its territorial organisation. According 
to leading Venezuelan urbanist Maria de los Angeles Delfino (2001, p.36) the legal political 
framework of the capital city is complex, disperse and vague, she defines Caracas as a city with a 
structural deficiency in institutional organisation. The Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela of 1999 (CRBV) stipulated the creation and definition of 18 new juridical political-
territorial entities such as the Metropolitan District and the substitution of the Federal District by 
the Capital District. The Metropolitan District was subsequently outlined by the Law of the 
Metropolitan District of Caracas (LEDIMCA), which encompasses the geographical space of the 
valley of Caracas including the Capital District, with a Metropolitan Mayor as its elected 
authority. Nonetheless, the CRBV did not define explicitly the political boundaries of the capital 
of the Republic, whether the space of the Capital District occupied the valley of Caracas, if it was 
limited to the colonial grid of the historical quarter or by the boundaries of the former Federal 
District (Delfino 2001, p.81). Still, for ten years the Capital District only existed on paper 
(Delfino 2001, p.42);  it wasn’t until 2009 that the Special Law for the Organisation and Regime 
of the Capital District was created and put into effect (Gobierno del Distrito Capital n.d.). That 
same year Hugo Chávez created the Chief of Government of the Capital District named directly 
by the President, whose legislative functions are carried through the National Assembly. This 
undermined the authority of the Metropolitan Mayor (elected by popular vote) since the entity’s 
function is to coordinate the five municipalities that comprise Caracas. The Chief of 
Government of the Capital District governs primarily over Libertador Municipality (which also 
has its own Mayor, currently a member of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela PSUV), the 
largest and most populated municipality of Caracas whilst the Metropolitan District maintained 
its role of coordinator between the other four municipalities. But in practice the Chief of 
Government of the Capital District took over the headquarters of the Metropolitan District and 
many of its functions, effectively limiting the Metropolitan Mayor (at the time Antonio Ledezma, 
a member of the opposition) to oversee the four municipalities with elected opposition 
authorities. The main mission of the Chief of Government of the Capital District is to guarantee 
that local development plans are aligned with Hugo Chávez’s National Development Plan for the 
Nation. In 2010 Hugo Chávez created the Ministry of the State for the Revolutionary 
Transformation of the Greater Caracas (absorbed in 2014 by the Presidential Commission for 
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the Revolutionary Transformation of the Greater Caracas), with jurisdiction over the  Capital 
District, the Metropolitan District and part of Miranda State. These entities are part of the set of 
policies of the transition towards the Socialist State. Chapter four provides a detailed 
chronological account and analysis of the policy instruments created to dismantle the existing 
institutional apparatus of urban governance to pave the way for the Socialist State.  
Institutional Setting: PDVSA and PDVSA La Estancia 
 
The state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (PDVSA) was 
created by decree in 1975, taking over the functions and operations of the existing Corporación 
Venezolana de Petróleo (Venezuelan Corporation of Oil).  In 1976 president Carlos Andres 
Pérez nationalised the oil industry, just one year after the promulgation of the new law that 
reserved to the state the industry and commerce of hydrocarbons (Bye 1979, p.57). In the years 
after the nationalisation of the oil industry, PDVSA’s corporate efficiency differentiated it from 
the rest of the public sector. Its managers, executives and workforce at large had worked for the 
international oil corporations, adopting  their corporate culture and technocratic practices 
(Tinker Salas 2009; Wainberg 2004, p.4). By late 1980s and early 1990s, PDVSA’s management 
pursued to transform the state-owned oil company into an international conglomerate but it 
wasn’t until Rafael Caldera’s second presidency (1994-1999) that the state-owned oil company 
consolidated its investment program called Apertura Petrolera (Oil Opening) for reopening the 
industry to foreign capital investment and increasing productive capacity, in contradiction of 
OPEC’s policy of maintaining oil prices by limiting production. By exerting control over the 
main  source of the state’s income, PDVSA counted with a larger budget than the government, 
making it almost completely independent from the state that owned it, operating like a 
‘prosperous first world company in an impoverished third-world nation’ (Maass 2009, p.202).  
Hugo Chávez criticised PDVSA for functioning like a ‘state within the state’  (Giussepe Ávalo 
2014, p.26; Párraga 2010, p.29); his presidential election in 1998 marked the beginning of a shift 
in the relationship between the state and PDVSA. He altered the institutional channels of the 
flow of the rent from PDVSA to the state: instead of transferring oil money  to the government 
to be redistributed to the ministries that oversaw social programs, PDVSA was put in charge of 
new government programs (Maass 2009, pp.202, 215) effectively establishing PDVSA as the key 
player in advancing Hugo Chávez’s nationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist model of 
Petrosocialism.  
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After the events of 2002-2003 (failed coup d’etat and national oil strike) explored in chapter 
three, Hugo Chávez announced the rise of a ‘new PDVSA’ ideologically aligned with the 
Bolivarian Revolution. Coinciding with the launch of the Sowing Oil Plan 2005-2030, the Centro 
de Arte La Estancia, regarded as an elitist institution by the revolution, reopened its doors in 2005 
as PDVSA La Estancia, the social and cultural arm of PDVSA.  PDVSA La Estancia dates back 
to 1993, when the chief executive of Biserca Bienes y Servicios C.A., a branch of PDVSA, 
created the Centro de Arte La Estancia, a cultural centre for the arts and industrial design following 
the advice of experts from the Galería de Arte Nacional and the artist-designer Miguel Arroyo 
(Sato Kotani 2015). The cultural activities were accompanied by a program of community 
outreach, included in PDVSA’s strategies of corporate social responsibility (Grauer 2015). With 
the exception of private corporate events, Centro de Arte La Estancia was open to the public, free 
of charge (Sato Kotani 2015). 
PDVSA La Estancia takes its name from its main building, the eighteenth century colonial house 
of the Hacienda Estancia La Floresta, a former coffee and sugarcane plantation that was 
privately urbanised in the 1940s and 1950s to become the upper middle-class neighbourhood of 
La Floresta. Only the house and its adjacent gardens survived. By the 1950s and 1960s La 
Estancia was surrounded by middle and upper middle class neighbourhoods and modern office 
buildings such as the headquarters of Mobil and the United States Embassy. The hacienda house 
and gardens were purchased by PDVSA in the 1980s with the purpose of demolishing it in order 
to relocate its headquarters into a new purpose built high rise office complex (Grauer 2015).  A 
new subsidiary was created for exclusive administrative purposes, with the land of La Estancia as 
its only asset; the project for the new headquarters did not materialise, and the company had to 
decide what to do with the hacienda (Grauer 2015). In 1990 La Estancia was declared a National 
Historic Monument; PDVSA took on the restoration and refurbishment of the house to adapt 
its use as private venue for corporate events and accommodation for V.I.P. guests.  
PDVSA La Estancia describes itself as ‘an oasis of culture and knowledge’ (PDVSA La Estancia 
n.d.) for  ‘the appreciation, restoration, promotion and dissemination of the historical and artistic 
heritage of the country’ (PDVSA La Estancia n.d.) guided by three lines of action: social, cultural 
and heritage. The organisation has become a reference within the country for the scope and 
quality of their work and modern aesthetics of the spaces and architecture they have intervened. 
Chapter four argues that these works were able to take place because the institutional and 
bureaucratic framework of city governance was weakened by a simultaneous process of 
fragmentation and centralisation of bureaucratic power. Based on the case study approach, this 
70 
 
thesis focuses exclusively on PDVSA La Estancia’s heritage line of action, which encompasses 
public art and public spaces (PDVSA La Estancia n.d.), the majority located in Caracas. This also 
determines Caracas as the Material Space that frames the thesis and the research’s fieldwork. The 
following section addresses the research design of this thesis. 
Research Design: Case Study Approach 
 
The case study approach was selected because it provides a concrete historical frame and 
focal point from where to draw broader conclusions on the relationship between the state, oil 
wealth, space and culture in Venezuela. This project adopts the definition developed by John 
Gerring  in which a ‘case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where 
the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases’ (2007, 
p.20). Archetypal case studies within the social sciences encompass social and political units such 
as cities, regions, communities, social groups and families, or particular institutions such as 
corporations, political parties, or  interest groups (Gerring 2007, p.19). A case is always singular 
because it ‘embodies the unit of concern in the central inference’ (Gerring 2007, p.26). The main 
questions in defining a case study are the number of cases studied and how comprehensively 
they are studied.  
In general ‘case studies tend to be holistic rather than deal with “isolated factors”’ with a 
tendency to emphasise the detailed workings of the relationships and social processes, rather 
than to restrict attention to the outcomes of these (Denscombe 2007, p.36). Attention is paid to 
the processes to explain why certain outcomes might happen than just find out what the 
outcomes are. The case study approach is aligned with ‘the study of processes and relationships 
within a setting’ (Denscombe 2007, p.38).  One of the advantages of the case study approach is 
that it both allows and encourages the use of multiple research methods and the use of a variety 
of sources and evidence in order to capture the complexity of the reality or event under scrutiny 
(Denscombe 2007, pp.37, 45; Gerring 2007, p.27). The distinguishing features of the case study 
approach are its dependence ‘on evidence drawn from a single case and its attempt, at the same 
time, to illuminate features of a broader set of cases’ and that qualitative analysis comprises the 
primary methodology  (Gerring 2007, pp.29, 34). 
The case study approach does have its weaknesses, it is vulnerable to criticism in terms of ‘the 
credibility of generalisations made from its findings’ and is often perceived as lacking the degree 
of rigour in producing hard data since this approach focuses ‘on processes rather than on 
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measurable end products’ (Denscombe 2007, p.45), giving more weight to qualitative data and 
interpretative methods than to quantitative data and statistics. Case studies may also prove 
difficult in defining their boundaries and determine the scope of sources of data to collect.  
Acknowledging the impossibility to study the city of Caracas as a whole, or of studying every 
single public space or cultural infrastructure built between 2007 and 2013, the case study 
approach provides a concrete historical frame and focal point from where to draw broader 
conclusions on the relationship between the state, oil wealth, space and culture in Venezuela. 
PDVSA La Estancia is useful as a case study, used as a gateway to explore Petrosocialism from a 
spatial and cultural perspective.  PDVSA La Estancia is a unique example of a cultural institution 
created, managed and funded by a state-owned oil company. The scope of this thesis does not 
encompass the study of PDVSA La Estancia’s internal bureaucracy, its processes of decision 
making, the logistics of the day to day management of public art and public spaces or its 
nationwide programme of cultural events. This thesis is particularly concerned with the 
observation of the ideological and institutional circumstances that enabled PDVSA La Estancia 
to exert authority over the restored public art and spaces in Caracas, superseding the jurisdiction 
of municipalities whilst effectively functioning as a parallel entity of government.  This requires a 
series of within-case observations, such as public speeches, policy instruments and 
advertisements. The primary focus and interest are the actions of PDVSA La Estancia in 
Caracas’s material space, and the institutional circumstances that allows it to define itself as ‘oil 
that harvests culture’ and appropriate the spaces of the city to advance a notion of culture-as-
mineral-deposit.  
Case Study Selection: PDVSA La Estancia  
 
Considering that the aim of this research project is to explore and reveal the mechanisms 
through which the State and oil wealth have shaped culture and urban space in Caracas between 
2007 and 2013, PDVSA La Estancia, was selected as a case study for having the following 
characteristics:  
× It’s currently one the most important cultural institutions in Venezuela, with a national 
scope and reach.   
× It is directly owned, managed and funded by Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), the 
state-owned oil company.  
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× The majority of PDVSA La Estancia’s interventions, as well as its main headquarter, are 
located in Caracas.  
× PDVSA La Estancia is part of a national oil corporation that has pledged ideological and 
political allegiance to Hugo Chávez, the Bolivarian Revolution and is a key instrument in 
the advancement of Petrosocialism.  
× Beyond its regular program of cultural events, between 2007 and 2013 PDVSA La 
Estancia embarked on an ambitious plan of public art restoration and urban regeneration 
of non-oil-industry related spaces and infrastructures.  
× The social and cultural program of PVDSA La Estancia is part of PDVSA’s Sowing Oil 
Plan and is governed by the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons.  
PDVSA La Estancia is representative of the new institutional landscape brought by Hugo 
Chávez’ radicalisation of the Bolivarian Revolution in 2007 to lead the country towards a 
transition to the Socialist State,  an event that will be explained in depth in chapter four. The 
following section provides a detailed account of the difficult social and political context that 
framed the fieldwork and data collection and the ethical challenges and considerations it raised. 
The Ethics of Doing Fieldwork in the Midst of Extreme Political Polarisation  
 
My fieldwork in Caracas took place between June 2nd and July 17th 2014 in the 
immediate aftermath of nationwide student protests against the government. The process of data 
gathering and collection was completed between August 2014 and September 2015 in the UK. 
The political and social circumstances in Venezuela meant that issues of risk and safety had to be 
taken into serious consideration, particularly for interviewing elites. The political and social 
turmoil informed and shaped the approach towards data collection, and raised unanticipated 
ethical concerns. This section outlines the political and social context that framed the fieldwork.  
The unexpected passing of Hugo Chávez in March 2013, briefly after being re-elected for a 
fourth term in office, required a swift call for another presidential election in April 2013, won by 
Nicolás Maduro by a slim margin –Maduro was handpicked by Chávez to assume as acting 
president before departing to Cuba for cancer treatment (Weyland 2013, p.22).  Maduro took 
over a country with diminishing public finances due to declining oil prices, rampant corruption, 
high inflation, shortages of basic goods and services, and a rapid increase in violent crime rates 
(Lugo-Ocando et al. 2015, p.3782). The continued deterioration climaxed and conflict ensued in 
February 2014 when students and other sectors of the population initiated nationwide street 
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protests against the government (Lugo-Ocando et al. 2015, p.3783), which involved direct and 
violent confrontations between students and military forces, barricades blocking access to 
neighbourhoods and central areas (named guarimbas by the government) and multitudinous 
marches. Protests did not subside until May 2014, following strong and violent repression from 
the government, but skirmishes were still scattered around Caracas by the time I arrived.  This 
challenged personal mobility and safety around the city, and that of potential interviewees, 
meaning that time and locations for meetings had to be carefully planned and chosen.  
Nonetheless, safety and risk issues were not limited to physical harm or freedom of movement, 
issues related to fear of persecution and censorship of common citizens also emerged. In the 
midst of the violence and chaos in which the country was submerged during the protests against 
the government, the figure of the patriota cooperante emerged as an effective instrument of the 
state to suppress dissident voices. It is a legacy of the Law for the National System of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of 2008, widely opposed and vetoed by Hugo Chávez 
himself, which contemplated forcing all citizens to be informants (Medina 2015). Latent ever 
since, it rose to prominence in 2014 as an effective instrument of repression during the protests. 
Considered ‘guarantors of the socialist revolution’, the entity of the patriota cooperante protects the 
identity of anonymous informers who incriminate citizens suspected of committing 
counterrevolutionary acts through anonymous phone calls made to the Bolivarian Intelligence 
Service (SEBIN), which then follows through with arrests (Anon 2014).  Although it is an entity 
created outside of the Constitution and the Organic Law against Organized Crime and Funding 
of Terrorism, the anonymous accusations are validated as legitimate testimonies for prosecution 
and imprisonment by the General Prosecutor of the Republic and the Courts of Justice, without 
further proof of evidence, in violation of the rights to due process and a fair trial (Amnistía 
Internacional 2015a; Amnistía Internacional 2015b). The public and arbitrary arrests of citizens 
during the protests (Hernández 2015) based on anonymous accusations of patriotas cooperantes  
was still in place at the time of doing fieldwork further entrenched a sense of fear and self-
censorship across wide sectors of Venezuelan society.  
Doing research in this context raised unanticipated ethical challenges related to safety, risk and 
access. According to the Economic and Social Research Council Framework for Research Ethics 
(2015, pp.8–10) the ethical issues involved in doing research in Venezuela are: 
-Potentially sensitive topics in terms of political behaviour (elites interviewed fall into this 
category). 
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- Risk to the safety of the researcher, for example researchers working outside the UK in 
their own community. 
- Research undertaken outside of the UK where there may be issues of political 
sensitivities. 
Unanticipated ethical issues arose in the process of data gathering through interviewing elites. 
The information solicited from interviewees was circumscribed to expert opinions on matters 
related to the case study, urban governance and the role of oil wealth in the urban development 
of Caracas. Interviews were a particularly difficult challenge in the context of extreme political 
turmoil. On one side, securing appointments with government officials was fraught with non-
responsiveness or last minute cancellations. On the other, elites not aligned with the Bolivarian 
revolution who agreed to be interviewed were in many cases hesitant in expressing critical 
opinions of the government and signing written forms of consent. The political circumstances 
were in such turmoil and so polarised that traceable consent was impossible to obtain from most 
interviewees.  
The purpose of the interviews was to gather reflective views and professional opinions of elites 
in relation to the case study and its cultural and political circumstances, but this proved to be a 
particularly difficult challenge in the context of extreme political polarisation. Some interviewees 
showed extreme self-awareness and self-censorship as they elaborated their answers. Although 
they had agreed to the interview on the ground that they considered the questions pertinent and 
of their interest and were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality, some became fearful of the 
future repercussions of their critical opinions of the government or of a written consent 
potentially traceable back to them. This fear did not derive from any sense of mistrust towards 
me as a researcher, nor due to unsafe conditions as all interviewees chose the location and time 
considered the safest and most convenient. To minimise risks to the interviewees, oral consent 
was adopted over written consent, because it was less likely to be traceable.  
The intention of the interviews was that no politically sensitive information would be elicited 
from the questions, such as the interviewees’ political leanings, personal opinions about the 
revolution, or any personal information (age, address, phone numbers, etc).  This research did 
not collect any type of personal data from the interviewees as defined by the ESCR Framework 
for Research Ethics (ESRC 2015, p.43). The aim was to gather their expert assessment of the 
influence of oil on urban development, the current state of affairs in urban governance and the 
role of the city in the wider context of the Bolivarian revolution. Participants welcomed the 
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opportunity to share their expert opinions and experience, without having to refer to explicit 
issues of partisan politics. 
Nonetheless, as I have explained earlier, the political circumstances were in such turmoil that 
traceable consent was almost impossible to obtain. Due to the fear of persecution, and also the 
way the government had used signatures collected for the presidential referendum to identify 
citizens who opposed the regime to fire, persecute, deny benefits and discriminate, the majority 
of the participants refused to sign any kind of form. Pushing or enforcing the consent form 
would have worked in detriment to the collaborative ethos of the relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee. It was also important to reassure the interviewees that their consent 
would not be traceable in any way. Although participants are guaranteed anonymity and 
confidentiality under ESRC guidelines, the trust in the UK system is not transferable to 
Venezuela, as the Venezuelan government is known to engage in breaching the privacy of its 
citizens, especially those identified as opposition, regardless of the legal framework that forbids 
breaches of privacy. 
Most interviewees preferred to answer by email, but were still reluctant or hesitant to sign, scan 
and send a written consent form, so the actual act of sending back their answers is interpreted as 
consent without putting themselves in the position of signing a document they felt might carry 
adverse repercussions in the future, or at least whilst the Bolivarian Revolution remains in power. 
The ESRC Framework for Research Ethics does contemplate that, in the case of elite interviews: 
‘it is often argued that formal written consent is not necessary because by consenting to 
see the researcher, the participant is in fact giving consent. However, all such participants 
should receive an initial letter giving the name and status of the researcher carrying out 
the study, a brief rationale of the study including its purpose and value and why the 
individual is being invited to take part. The person interviewed should be aware what will 
happen to any findings, whether the data will be shared with others, and whether he/she 
will be identified.’ (Economic & Social Research Council 2015, p. 42) 
The same criteria would apply to the written answers by email, by replying with the answers to 
the questions, the participant is giving consent. This research fully adhered to these guidelines. 
The interviewees received an initial letter via email which identified me as a researcher directly 
responsible of the study, with a brief explanation of the research project and its aims, and why 
the contacted individual was considered to be invited to take part. Participants were informed 
that findings would be disseminated in the form of papers published in journals, that their 
76 
 
contributions would inform the thinking of the research, that the data would be protected with 
no intention of sharing the data with third parties or to be used in a subsequent study. 
Participants were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity; their identities would not be 
traceable by any means pertaining to this research. It also stated explicitly that they could refuse 
to participate at all and decline to answer particular questions, or withdraw from the interview at 
any point. With this purpose, to do no harm and to avoid any potential risks to participants, 
those who agreed to be interviewed in person or via Skype provided fully informed oral consent.  
Interviews were taped on the phone, whilst in Caracas I took the precaution of not carrying an 
obvious tape recorder as it would not raise any suspicions that I was carrying anything more than 
music or photos in my mobile when I passed the security controls in the airport. Taped 
interviews over Skype were immediately downloaded at my home PC and then uploaded to a 
personal password-protected online drive. In regards to the public speeches and TV broadcasts 
of elites collected for this research, they are of public domain, therefore they are not considered 
personal data (ESRC 2015, p.12) and  thus do not entail ethical issues.  
Doing fieldwork in areas in conflict not only poses particular challenges to the process of data 
collection, but raises difficult ethical questions when collecting data through interviewing 
individuals. Seeking consent, an integral element of conducting ethical research, can be difficult if 
it is perceived by the participants as a potential risk to their personal integrity. The researcher has 
to be aware of the social and political context affecting both the research and the participants at 
the moment of the fieldwork and in the future; this is an ethical issue:  
‘Further, in view of the militarization of daily life and widespread surveillance in most 
conflict zones, researchers must be cautious that the interview process does not 
jeopardise the respondents’ security.’ (Dixit 2012, p.133) 
The particular context of fear of persecution fostered by the government and the reluctance 
from participants to sign any type of formal consent has a strong precedent in the use of the 
signatures collected for the presidential referendum by the government to persecute citizens who 
opposed it, collated and published in a website in 2005:  
‘Chavista legislator Luis Tascón revealed the existence of a list of over 3 million 
Venezuelans who signed petitions in 2003 and 2004 calling for a referendum on Chávez’s 
tenure. Tascón published the list on his website prior to the August 2004 referendum. 
Venezuelans have complained of having been persecuted for daring to associate with the 
opposition by signing a petition.’ (Noriega 2006, p.5)  
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In 2006 the list resurfaced as an electronic software in a CD called Batalla de Santa Inés Maisanta 
containing the data of more than 12 million registered Venezuelan voters, including addresses, 
whether the person had signed the petition for the referendum, and even coded political 
affinities and electoral participation (Noriega 2006, p.6). The list has had long lasting effects 
which cannot be underestimated particularly in terms of breaching the rights of speaking freely 
about political opinions and affiliations:  
‘The importance of these practices, particularly for expressing a political opinion or 
exercising an essential political right, should not be underestimated. Given the 
overwhelming role of PDVSA (Venezuela’s state-owned oil enterprise), which accounts 
for roughly one-third of the GDP and almost half of Venezuela’s fiscal income, and the 
role of the government in the economy more generally—public spending is equal to 
almost one-fourth of the nation’s GDP—government jobs and contracts are in many 
cases vital for an individual’s economic well-being. The threat of losing a government 
post sends a powerful message that not only threatens a citizen’s right to cast a secret 
ballot but to exercise other constitutional rights in opposition to the government.’ 
(Noriega 2006, p.6) 
This research had to take this circumstance into consideration, a circumstance that still endures 
under President Nicolás Maduro, as the opposition has initiated the process for a new recall 
referendum. For this reason, fully informed oral consent was considered the most appropriate 
approach to safeguard the identities and the personal integrity of all the participants who feel 
under greater threat since their condition as elites makes them easier to trace. This approach is 
backed up by the vast majority of literature on conducting academic research, which prioritises 
informed consent obtained in a manner suitable to the context:  
‘Informed consent is an integral component of conducting research. It helps in 
acknowledging the autonomy of the interviewees and underscores respect for 
confidentiality and privacy. Informed consent should be based on the customs and 
norms of the local culture. The researcher must acquire official or verbal informed 
consent (depending on the local context) of the individual prior to the interview.’ (Dixit 
2012, p. 133) 
In terms of the challenges of conducting fieldwork in the aftermath of the student protests of 
February-May 2014, I could not have foreseen the particular ethical dilemmas I faced: 
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‘Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future?’ Mary Douglas asks in Risk and 
Culture (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, 1). Her answer is no, since we can never know all 
risks at all times’ (Sascha Helbardt et al 2010, p. 352) 
Nevertheless, informed consent was obtained following the ESRC guidelines and fieldwork was 
guided by the literature on methodological approaches to working in conflict zones in order to 
be able to conduct fieldwork and the collection of data necessary for this thesis.   
Furthermore, to protect the identities of my interviewees, I am not able to disclose and describe 
my position in relation to my research participants and the research settings of this thesis. Good 
academic practice requires that researchers acknowledge who they are and disclose themselves to 
reveal and understand how it shapes and influences the research. As a Venezuelan national, with 
family and an established professional network in the country, I face the same safety issues and 
risks of persecution of my participants, given the polarised and repressive political climate 
described earlier. The ethical issues I faced and the political environment that framed and 
informed this thesis makes it imperative that I, as the researcher, do not reveal my position in 
relation to my research subject, my participants, and the research context. To fully comply with 
the ethics that binds this research I cannot engage in a detailed reflective discussion of my 
positionality because it would put participants in danger of political persecution (and by 
extension my family and myself) as it could make it easier for all to be identified. Having 
established the severe constraints on of my positionality, this chapter now turns to describe the 
process of data collection.  
Data Collection  
The sources collected for this research consist of four different sets of samples: 
interviews, speeches, policy instruments and adverts. They will be outlined in detail in the 
following sections. The inventory of the data gathered for this research is as follows:  
Interviews: 16 
Political speeches: 42 
Hugo Chávez, delivered between 2005 and 2007: 6 
Hugo Chávez TV broadcasts: 2 
Rafael Ramírez, President of PDVSA and Minister of Oil and Energy, delivered 
between 2004 and 2014: 14 
Beatrice Sanso de Ramírez, General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia, delivered 
between 2005 and 2015: 20 
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Policy instruments: 19 
Pamphletary publications: 1 
Adverts: 23 
A detailed list of the documents is available in appendix one. This project applied a mix of 
qualitative methods to gather the data that informs the analysis. The methodological approaches 
to data collection employed in this project include semi-structured non-standardised interviews 
to elites and documentary research.  
Elite Interviews 
 
I conducted semi-structured non-standardised interviews, chosen as the most appropriate 
approach for this project and a method in which the context of the interview is an equally 
important part of the process (May 2011, p.135). Semi-structured interviews allow interviewees 
‘to answer more on their own terms’ (May 2011, p.135) whilst providing parameters for 
comparison, as each interview will vary in the degree and quality of information generated.  This 
type of interview was considered the most useful  to capture points of view, factual knowledge 
and expertise from elites contained in oral histories pertaining to the case study, which may have 
not been recorded in any other type of medium or document.   
The scope of information needed for this project, in regards to the institutional framework of 
urban governance required interviewing elites. William Harvey argues that across the social 
sciences there is no wide agreement on the definition of the term ‘elite’ (Harvey 2011, p.432). 
This project adopts the definition of elites as ‘those who hold important social networks, social 
capital and strategic positions within social structures because they are better able to exert 
influence’ whose power is relational -their elite status can change over time- and is 
‘geographically specific with people holding elite status in some, but not all locations’ (Harvey 
2011, p.433). The participants in my research are civil servants, academic researchers, architects 
and intellectuals who hold, or have held in the past, positions of power in their respective fields 
and who have influence in the public sphere. The characteristics of the interview sample will be 
outlined in the following section.  
William Harvey stresses the importance of gaining the trust of the interviewees in order to be 
able to gather truthful data, and to be as transparent as possible providing the interviewee with as 
much information as possible such as who the interviewer is, the nature of the research, how the 
data will be used and how the identity of the interviewee will be protected  (2011, p.434). 
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Although it is important to appear as impartial and neutral as possible, a degree of bias was 
inevitable not only because I would be approaching the interview with a plan of what would be 
discussed but also because as a researcher I carry a critical point of view, taking in consideration 
the context of extreme political polarisation.  
To increase the likeliness of a reply to invitations to government officials, I used using 
revolutionary jargon in my communications or pursue access through acquaintances; all attempts 
proved unsuccessful except in one instance. The General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia is the 
only Bolivarian government elite who agreed to an interview. I was not able to interview other 
key personnel of PDVSA La Estancia, such as the Manager of Heritage, as I was told that the 
General Manager is the gatekeeper and the sole voice of the institution. Considering the 
circumstances of limited access, the interview sample then focused on scholars, architects, and 
intellectuals located outside of the Bolivarian government’s circle and ideology, as individuals 
who predominantly identify themselves as opposition.  
The sets of questions were organised thematically to adapt the questionnaire to each 
interviewee’s main area of expertise. Interviews were carried out face-to-face in Caracas 
whenever possible, or by video conference and email depending on the interviewee’s preference 
or convenience.  The questions focused on gathering information about the role of the city in 
the political project of Hugo Chávez, the institutional apparatus of urban governance, and the 
influence of oil wealth in the urban development of Caracas in the context of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  
All potential interviewees were first contacted by email, provided with a detailed explanation of 
the general aspect of the research, the research’s purpose, and what their participation entailed. 
Interviewees were given the option to be recorded in audio or answering the questions by email. 
They were provided volition, meaning they could withdraw or cancel altogether the interview if 
they felt compelled to do so.  Interviewees who preferred to respond by email were given the 
freedom to take as much time as they saw fit to elaborate their answers, they usually requested to 
be allowed between three to six weeks to reply. All interviewees took part freely, without 
coercion, providing written or oral consent where appropriate. Meetings were organised 
according to the interviewees’ wishes, offering three modes of contact: one to one in person, one 
to one via Skype, or via email.  
The interviews consisted of a set of 7 open-ended questions that enquire on the relationship 
between the state, oil wealth, urban space, and PDVSA La Estancia, organised around three 
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main themes outlined below (the original set of questions and replies in Spanish are collated in 
appendix two):  
1. The state and urban development  
1.a. How important is the role of the State in the configuration of the city of Caracas? 
The aim of this question is to explore how interviewees perceive the scope of influence 
of the state in the urban development of Caracas. 
1.b. What fundamental difference do you identify between the current State’s urban management 
in comparison with the previous oil boom?  
This question asks for interviewees to characterise the urban management policies and 
performance of the Bolivarian government, which has enjoyed an oil windfall, compared 
to the oil-boom and post-oil boom period between 1970s and 1998 (period against which 
Chávez differentiated his revolution). The interviewees used a series of different 
adjectives and phrases to diagnose the performance of the Bolivarian state in urban 
planning, in comparison with the pre-Chávez era. 
1.c. What is the institutional platform that supports and/or promotes the transformations or 
urban renovations in Caracas? 
The Bolivarian government has undertaken massive changes in the structure of the state 
and local government; institutions and policy instruments have been eliminated and new 
ones created in the process of the transition towards the Socialist State. This question 
aims to gather insights into how the interviewees judge the current bureaucratic and 
institutional landscape of Caracas, and also how they perceive the effects of these 
transformations on urban development. 
2. The City and the Bolivarian Revolution 
2.a. What is the role of the city and urban space in the political project of the Bolivarian 
Revolution? 
This question aims to explore how the interviewees perceive the role the city and urban 
matters play within the discourse and political project of Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian 
Revolution.  
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2.b. What differentiates PDVSA La Estancia from other institutions with competencies over the 
urban development of Caracas? 
This question aims to explore if the interviewees view PDVSA La Estancia as a 
legitimate body in urban management, and what differentiates it from other instances of 
local government who oversee the urban planning and management of Caracas. 
3. Oil and urban space 
3a. Is it possible to call Caracas an ‘oil city’? 
Historically, the moments of the greatest transformations of Caracas and the undertaking 
of massive works of infrastructure have coincided with periods of oil boom. Considering 
the power and influence of the Venezuelan Petrostate, this question aims to explore if 
interviewees consider if the capital city, the site of central government and where oil 
revenue circulates -but is not produced-, could be labelled as an ‘oil city’, a term 
borrowed from the work of Venezuelan Marxist anthropologist Rodolfo Quintero 
(2011). 
3b. What new relationship should be established between oil wealth and the city, considering the 
experiences of the past? 
The presidency of Hugo Chávez enjoyed one of the largest oil windfalls in the history of 
Venezuela. Considering that the urban infrastructure in Venezuela is still deemed 
deficient to the current needs, and with international oil prices on the decline, the 
question explores what new relationship the interviewed elites believe should be formed 
between oil wealth (and by extension the Petrostate) and the city. 
From an initial sample of 50 contacts that included Bolivarian and opposition government and 
intellectual elites, 20 replied and agreed to meet (only two were aligned with the Bolivarian 
revolution), two cancelled at the last minute, one never replied after agreeing to answering the 
questions via email, resulting in a final sample of 17 interviews. The criteria and characteristics of 
the interview sample is outlined in the next section. 
Interview sample 
 
As mentioned above, there are 17 interviews in total. All interviewees are 40 years old 
and over, as one of the main objectives of the interviews was to gather information from 
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professional elites who had lived through the process of the emergence and establishment of the 
Bolivarian Revolution.  
All interviewees were anonymised by substituting their names with an acronym containing a 
letter and a number. The following chart provides the characteristics of the interview sample: 
 Acronym Occupation 
1 O1 General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia 
2 O2 Executive Member  of Instituto Metropolitano de Urbanismo 
Taller Caracas of the Alcaldia de Caracas 
3 A1 Architect, former Dean of Universidad Simon Bolivar School of 
Architecture 
4 J1 Lead Journalist and activist in urban issues 
5 A2 Architect, in charge of Venezuelan pavilion in  Expo Shanghai 
2010 
6 A3 Awarded Architect and urban designer 
7 R1 Scholar in Urban Studies, former Director of IERU (Institute of 
Regional and Urban Studies) 
8 R2 Scholar in History of Architecture, leading historian of Venezuelan 
modern architecture 
9 A4 Architect, National Prize of Architecture  and columnist of Tal 
Cual Newspaper  
10 A5 Awarded Architect, represented Venezuela at the VII 
Iberoamerican Biennial of Architecture 
11 P2 Political advisor and Radio personality 
12 O3 Former Secretary of Urban Planning of the Alcaldia Metropolitana 
13 W1 Writer, academic, telenovelas playwright and columnist of El 
Nacional newspaper 
14 A6 Architect, former Dean of Universidad Simon Bolivar 
Architecture School 
15 R3 Researcher  in Architecture, Coordinator of Master in Design, 
Universidad Central de Venezuela 
16 R4 Academic in History of Architecture  
17 A7 Architect, Former Executive of PDVSA’s Department of  Urban 
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Development  
Table 3: Interview Sample. Legend: A: Architect, J: Journalist, O: official, R: Researcher, W: writer 
 
It is important as well to characterise the political inclination of the interviewees. The majority of 
the sample can be identified politically with the opposition; only two interviewees (O1 and A2) 
are aligned with the Bolivarian revolution. As explained earlier, attempts to interview 
government officials aligned with Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution were fruitless. The sample 
relied on a professional network that shares similar political and partisan leanings opposed to the 
ideology and the political project advanced by the government.  
Considering that the sample of interviews is small, and that the professional circle of architecture 
and urbanism professionals and academics in Caracas is a relative small population, to guarantee 
anonymity and non-traceable consent they are coded by a letter and a number to indicate the 
respondents. The only risk in which a respondent could be recognised is by means of my identity 
as a researcher, as I have professional connections with many of the interviewees, most of whom 
hold high profiles in their respective fields. The only instances to which anonymity cannot be 
fully guaranteed in the future is the case of interviewees who hold a high profile post in public 
institutions, such as PDVSA La Estancia and the Instituto de Urbanismo Taller Caracas of the 
Alcaldía de Caracas, whose names can be traced by locating the institution and dates during 
which this research was undertaken. Only the fragments of the audio recorded conversations 
containing relevant information for this research were transcribed.  
Documentary Research: Policy Instruments, Speeches, Photographs and Adverts 
 
The interviews alone are not be able to provide the level of detailed information needed 
to explore in detail the discursive narratives around oil, culture and urban space and the legal 
gaps opened by the transition towards the Socialist State that enabled PDVSA La Estancia to 
supersede the authority of local government and cultural institutions. The documentary research 
in this project included searching for public speeches delivered by late president Hugo Chávez, 
the President of PDVSA, the General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia, as well as the policy and 
legal instruments created for the transition towards the Socialist State.   
A document is in general terms an artefact which central feature is an inscribed text (Scott 1990, 
p.5). Traditionally written texts involved the use of paper and pencil or ink but with the 
invention of electronic instruments to store and display texts, files produced and contained by 
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word processors and computers can also be considered documents (May 2011, pp.194–195). 
Documents are therefore defined as the physical embodiment of text, where the containment of 
the text is the primary purpose; what purpose is behind the production of any document lies in 
its authorship, which can only be established through empirical research (Scott 1990, p.13). The 
authorship, referring to the origin of the document, is determined on whether there is a 
separation between personal and public spheres, and within the public, a separation between 
private bureaucracies and the State (Scott 1990, p.14). The largest type of documents available to 
the social researcher are those produced by local and national government authorities, although 
most tend to have limited access (Scott 1990, p.16).  
The separation between public and private spheres determines the level of access to the 
documents to people other than their authors. Scott developed four categories of documents 
based on their degree of accessibility (Scott 1990, p.14):  
× Closed documents are available exclusively to a small circle comprised by those 
who produced it and their bureaucratic superiors.   
× Restricted documents are made accessible for specific purposes under certain 
conditions and are usually closed to outside access. 
× Open-archival documents are stored in a purpose built facility or storage space 
for open access to all. 
× Open-published documents are printed for open circulation accessible to all who 
can afford them if it is a commercial publication or can be obtained in a library 
(to this I would add documents printed digitally, available to all who have access 
to an internet connection and can download them from the websites where they 
are stored).  
In addition to their accessibility, documents can also be grouped into more categories: Primary, 
Secondary and Tertiary; and Unsolicited and Solicited (May 2011, p.196). Primary documents are 
written or collected by those who witnessed the events described and tend to be regarded as a 
more ‘accurate’ account whilst Secondary documents refer to those written after the event, in 
which the author did not personally witness what is described. These documents need to be 
placed in their social and historical context to counteract any discrepancies or inaccuracies in 
their production. Tertiary sources comprise indexes, abstracts and other bibliographies that 
facilitate the location of other sources (May 2011, p.196). Solicited and Unsolicited sources refer 
respectively to whether the document was produced with the aim of research or for personal use, 
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which raises the question of the audience to which the documents was initially addressed to (May 
2011, pp.197–198).  
The documents relevant to this thesis are primary and secondary, open-archival and open-access.  
It was important for this project to ascertain accessibility to official documents, considering the 
lack of access to government authorities. Fortunately, all branches of the Venezuelan 
government provide open-published access to official documents through each institution’s 
official website. With the exception of legal instruments, the personal authorship of many official 
documents clearly identifies personal authorship, naming the public official responsible for 
drafting it, such as late president Hugo Chávez Frías, the President of PDVSA and the General 
Manager of PDVSA La Estancia.  
The range of documents relevant for this research encompass political speeches, transcripts of 
televised speeches, legal instruments and official gazettes, national development plans, as well as 
visual materials such as photographs and adverts. The use of a diverse range of documents 
proved valuable in identifying common discursive strands. This thesis assumes that documents 
are never neutral, as they tend to both reflect and construct ‘social reality and versions of events’ 
(May 2011, p.199). In this sense, the contents of the texts and the relationship they aim to 
establish with their audience are fundamental, taking into consideration that researchers become 
part of the audience as soon as they engage with any document (Scott 1990, p.34).  
Scott identifies three stages as the text travels from the author to its audience: intended content, 
received content and internal meaning. The intended content of a text is the meaning the author 
intended to produce whilst the received content is the meaning the audience constructs upon 
receiving the text (Scott 1990, p.34). The internal meaning mediates between the intended and 
received meanings, it is the transient and ephemeral that is the focus of semioticians and content 
analysts. How a text is interpreted is dependent on the context of its production and its effects: 
‘the reading of a text is validated by relating it to the intentions of the author, and by taking 
account of the fact that its “objective meaning” goes beyond these intentions, and also by 
relating the text to its audience’ (Scott 1990, p.34). The researcher can at most produce an 
analysis that provides a set of possible interpretations of the inferred internal meaning of the text 
by its audience (Scott 1990, p.34).  This thesis deals with the intended content and how it 
informs policy of territorial governance and the understanding of culture in Petrosocialism. It 
also aims to reveal common narratives and inconsistencies in their discourse. For this reason this 
research looks at three dimensions of the same phenomenon (State Space, Bureaucratic Power 
and Culture as a Resource), to elucidate how the intended meaning manifests in State Space to 
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trace the discourses that run across political speeches, policy instruments, and urban and cultural 
projects.  
Analysis Methods 
 
This thesis is concerned with identifying a limited set of discursive narratives as they 
unfold in a multiplicity of texts (written, oral, and visual) using Critical Discourse Analysis and 
Visual Semiotics. A detailed account of the analysis methods used is be described in detail in this 
section; the findings from these documents and analysis are thoroughly examined in chapters 
four, five and six.  
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis is interested in the way in which language and discourse are 
used to achieve social goals and the part this use plays in social maintenance and change. In 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) the assumption is that ideas and practices that constitute such 
discourses transmit, produce and reproduce power, but also undermine and expose the fragility 
of power. CDA is not an analysis of discourse as a text but the analysis of the ‘relations between 
discourse and other elements of the social process’ as well as the internal relations of discourse 
(Fairclough 2010, p.4,10). CDA does include the systematic analysis of texts, but it is not just 
descriptive, it is also normative; the analysis of these complex relations ‘cuts across conventional 
boundaries between disciplines’ making CDA a trans-disciplinary form of analysis.  CDA is also 
relational and dialectical, its primary focus is on discourse as a complex set of social relations, 
which can be also ‘layered’  including relations between relations (Fairclough 2010, p.3) such as 
the dialectical relations between discourse and power (Fairclough 2010, p.8).  
Discourse cannot be defined as a separate entity nor as mere expression of social practice, it can 
only be understood ‘by analysing sets of relations’, as discourse ‘brings into the complex relations 
which constitute social life: meaning, making meaning’ (Fairclough 2010, p.3). Discourse can also 
be defined ‘as the flow of knowledge’ through history, a flow that ‘determines individual and 
collective doing and/or formative action that shapes society, thus exercising power’ (Jager 2011, 
p.34). Discourses can exert power because they are regulated, institutionalised and linked to 
action; as the world is construed discursively, whether these construes exercise ‘socially 
constructive effects’ is dependent on power relations (Fairclough 2010, pp.4–5). Although power 
and discourse can be identified as different moments of the social process they are entangled as 
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‘power is partly discourse, and discourse is partly power’ (Fairclough 2010, p.3); discourses 
condense and simplify the complexities of power relations.  
Power relations bring questions of ideology, understanding ideology as meaning in the service of 
power and domination (Thompson 1984, p.132) as forms of representations of the world that 
‘may be operationalised in ways of acting and interacting’ that contribute  in the establishment 
and perpetuation of unequal relations of power (Fairclough 2010, p.8).  The power of discourses 
is linked to different mechanisms of power and institutions, as discourses both shape societal 
reality and are a reflection of reality.  Hence, discourses can be defined as material realities, they 
shape reality through ‘intervening active subjects in their societal contexts as (co-)producers and 
(co-)agents of discourses’ (Jager 2011, p.36). These active interventions also construe discourses 
as ‘societal means of production’:  
‘discourses exercise power. They are themselves a power factor by being apt to induce 
behaviour and (other) discourses. Thus, they contribute to the structuring of the power 
relations in a society’ (Jager 2011, p.37) 
The character of Bureaucratic Power, exercised by individuals in control of the state apparatus, is 
partially discursive. Critical Discourse Analysis, in the context of this thesis, is concerned with 
the analysis of the production of reality performed by discourse, conveyed by active people 
(Jager 2011, p.36).  In this vein, discourses are also regarded as a means for the production of the 
Socialist State, PDVSA’s State Space and the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit.  
Siegfried Jager (2011, p.47) proposes eight topics to identify the structure of discourses. Discourse 
strands are flows of discourse that concentrate on a common topic, each discourse strand can also 
contain a number of sub-topics that could be summarised into groups of subtopics. Discourse 
fragments are texts or parts of a text that covers a certain theme, discourse fragments can combine 
to form a discourse strand. Entanglements of discourse strands occur when a text can make references 
into several discourse strands: ‘in a text various discourse fragments can be contained, these 
emerge in general and entangled form’ (Jager 2011, p.47). The overall societal discourse in its 
entanglement and complexity take into consideration that societies are not homogeneous, 
therefore, the several discourse strands that flow from the general societal discourse are ‘in a 
state of complex entanglement’; but it also begs to pay attention to the fact that ‘the overall 
discourse of a society is a partial discourse of a (naturally heterogeneous) global discourse’ (Jager 
2011, p.50).  Discursive events and discursive context refer only to events that can be politically 
emphasised to be considered discursive events (Jager 2011, p.48). Discourse planes refer to the 
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societal locations (media, science, business, everyday life, politics, etc.) from which ‘speaking 
happens’ since according to Jager ‘discourse strands operate on various discursive planes’ (Jager 
2011, p.49). It needs to bear into consideration that all discourse planes are closely entangled. 
Discourse position refers to the specific ideological location of the individual or medium. History, 
present and future of discourse strands establishes that all discourses and discourse strands ‘have a 
history, a present and a future’; therefore it is necessary to consider the longer timeframes of 
discursive processes to determine their ‘genealogy’. This sort of endeavour is extremely 
ambitious as it would entail the undertaking of a large amount of strands of single projects, but 
such a scale falls outside of the scope of this thesis as it does not encompass the history of the 
discourse strands that will be identified in the analysis nor the overall entanglements with other 
societal discourses.  
The analysis is confined to the topics and time frame previously described and examined in 
depth in chapter three. Part of the analysis of texts will draw on a selective use of J.L. Austin’s 
speech-act theory, looking in particular at performative utterances. For Austin, all sentences 
form a class of utterances, each class defined grammatically. He contrasted constative and 
performative utterances, but he ultimately argued in his 1958 paper ‘Performatif-Constatif’ that 
there is no precise distinction between performative and constative utterances reducing all 
statements to performatives. However, Jacobsen (1971, p.357) argues that Austin’s relativism 
was produced by basing the distinction on a purely verbal and grammatical criterion. For 
Jacobsen, a performative utterance is: 
‘inseparably connected with the fact that an act is either performed explicitly by a person, 
as e.g. ‘I promise you’, or by a group of persons authorized to act as one person, as e.g.  
‘You are requested to shut the door’, where the request has to be issued either by one 
person or by a group of persons (officials), who have the authority to make requests 
concerning the regulations governing  the public behavior’ (1971, p.359)  
Jacobsen proposes that although it is true that an act is always performed by a person it does not 
necessarily follow that a person performs an act by what that person says, in saying something it 
only follows that the person performs the act of saying: 
‘the fact that an act belongs to somebody, to a person, it becomes clear that the 
performative utterance being a specific act does belong specifically to the person uttering 
it, whereas the constative statements do not belong especially to any person, even though 
both types of utterance viewed as speech acts are acts. Hence without any preceding 
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procedure the performative utterances are non-transferable and the constatives are 
transferable.’ 
A constative is transferable because they refer to more general statements. For example in the 
statement ‘I am Venezuelan’ the ‘I’ is transferable to any person the description applies to. A 
constative utterance is, simply defined, a statement  whilst a performative utterance is a non-
transferable ‘speech act which does not merely describe something but enacts it’ (Cuddon 2013, 
p.525), it has some degree of inherent agency. The issue of a person or group of persons with 
the authority to influence or govern public behaviour, and the non-transferability of their 
performative utterances will be key to the analysis of the public speeches of Hugo Chávez, the 
President of PDVSA and the General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia to examine how their 
discourse exerts power over shaping State Space and culture. The thesis adopts this approach in 
chapters four and five to identify the performative utterances that indicate the will and the power 
to enact a new reality under Petrosocialism.   
Jager proposes an analytical guideline to follow for the critical analysis of discourses. His 
guideline is designed to cater to the specific problems of media analysis (Jager 2011, p.54); 
although the speeches that are the subject of this section are in written text form, their main 
medium of diffusion or publication was mass media: television broadcasts, a personal blog of the 
institution’s key authority, or the institution’s official website. For the purpose of this thesis, 
Jager’s guideline has been adapted in the following form: 
1. General characterisation of the speaker and speeches 
2. Overview of textual material 
× List of speeches selected and criteria for selection 
× Identification of thematic areas or discursive strands, as well as possible 
discourse strand entanglements 
3. Analysis of relevant discourse fragments 
× Institutional framework/context 
× Justification for the selection of fragments (text queries/relevance of 
context) 
× Performatives utterances 
4. Ideological statements based on contents 
× What understanding of the relationship between oil and the state do the 
speeches and interviews convey? 
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× What understanding of the relationship between oil and urban space do 
the speeches convey? 
× What understanding of the relationship between culture and Petro-
socialism do the speeches and interviews convey? 
Summary: main statements, localisation of the speeches in the discourse strand, and its 
relation with the theoretical frames of this project: Bureaucratic Power, State Space and 
Culture-as-mineral-deposit.  
In sum, Critical Discourse Analysis of public speeches of government officials and interviews of 
elites will be used to elucidate the discursive strands that run across the collective meanings and 
ideologies that inform the conceptualisation of space, which manifests in the social practices of 
Bureaucratic Power that shape the formation of PDVSA’s State Space and the Absolute and 
Relative Representations of Space. These discourse strands also inform the Relative Spaces of 
Representation enacted in the adverts, made evident in chapter six through the use of Visual 
Semiotics.  
Visual Semiotics 
 
This section describes the two approaches to visual semiotics this thesis deploys to 
analyse the 23 adverts that compose the campaign ‘Transformamos el petróleo en un recurso renovable 
para ti’: Charles S. Peirce’s semiosis and Roland Barthes’ Mythologies.  
Semiotics, simply defined, is the study of signs (Margolis & Pauwels 2011, p.320). Signs always 
represent something; they are in place of something else, the object, to create meaning. A sign 
does not function as a sign until it is taken as sign of that object. For a sign to exist it must be 
interpreted; the interpretation of signs is what allows us to know the world. Whilst General 
Semiotics studies ‘sign systems, and communicative processes in general’ (Margolis & Pauwels 
2011, p.298), the specific contexts in which signs are used is the focus of Applied Semiotics, of 
which Visual Semiotics is a branch. Visual Semiotics do not necessarily encompass all non-verbal 
communication, geometry, writing, or any manifestation we could label as ‘visually 
communicated signs’; the topics covered by Visual Semiotics are pictures, drawings, paintings, 
photographs, films, posters, diagrams, logograms, and maps (Margolis & Pauwels 2011, p.298).  
Words do not depend on images to be understood, but the meaning of an image can change 
depending on the words that accompany it. However, pictures ‘are superior to verbal 
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communication when spatial configurations have to be represented’ (Margolis & Pauwels 2011, 
p.300). In visual semiotics ‘that which “stands to somebody for something in some respect”’ is 
the image (Margolis & Pauwels 2011, p.301). The processing of information also differs between 
words and pictures, as we are able to process more visual than verbal information;  nonetheless, 
there is a complementary relationship between verbal and visual data in their ‘semiotic potential’: 
‘The superiority of pictures as a medium for the representation of the visible and 
imaginable world is counterbalanced by the superiority of language for representing the 
invisible world of sounds, smells, tastes, temperature, or logical relations.’ (Margolis & 
Pauwels 2011, p.300) 
The meaning of an image can be transformed by the verbal comments attached to it, just as the 
meaning of verbal communication can be changed, enhanced or obscured by an image. Signs 
represent something; they are in place of something else called the object. There are three 
correlative elements that must be contemplated: the sign, its referential object and its meaning, 
which constitute the ‘triadic model of the sign’ (Margolis & Pauwels 2011, p.301) such as the 
model of Semiosis proposed by Charles S. Peirce.   
Charles S. Peirce’s Semiosis 
 
Charles S. Peirce’s Semiosis is based on a triadic model, in which the sign is the unity 
composed by the object (what is represented), the  representamen (how it is represented), and 
the interpretant (how it is interpreted), ‘to qualify as sign, all three elements are essential’ 
(Chandler 2007, p.29). The process of Semiosis is produced by the interaction between 
representamen, object and interpretant. The representamen (similar to Saussure’s signifier) is 
considered by Peirce as a semiotic ‘first’ associated with a semiotic ‘second’, the object that is 
being represented by the sign: ‘the object of the visual sign is something once seen, experienced, 
or imagined’; the association between sign and object lead to a semiotic ‘third’, the interpretant 
(similar to Saussure’s signified) which is the ‘mental or behavioural interpretation of the sign’ 
(Margolis & Pauwels 2011, p.302). The representamen mediates between the object and the 
interpretant; it is, in a sense, the lens through which we view the object. The interpretant must 
not to be confused with the interpreter; the interpretant is produced by the relation between the 
object and the sign.  The interpretant of a visual sign is the idea, action, or reaction that is evoked 
by the sign (Margolis & Pauwels 2011, p.302). 
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This thesis uses Peirce’s approach for its contextuality, his semiosis takes into account the 
context in which signs are produced and interpreted, defining the sign by its effect on the 
interpretant: 
‘Reading pictures is a semiotic process (a process of semiosis). Images are signs that do 
not only have meanings but also create meanings. The meanings they have are related to 
the objects of the visual signs; the meaning they create to their interpretants.’ (Margolis & 
Pauwels 2011, p.312) 
The three elements are necessary for Semiosis to take place. The representamen, the object and 
the interpretant are functional, rather than ontological terms for Peirce; he was interested not on 
what signs are but on what they do as signs to establish the point of view for interpretation. 
Peirce does not ‘postulate the existence of the object, the object could be fictitious’; in this sense, 
the distinction between object and interpretant is ‘not one between something material and 
something mental’ since the three elements of the visual sign can be ‘mental as well as material’ 
(Margolis & Pauwels 2011, p.302). It is a matter of sequence in the semiotic process. In sum, the 
representamen is the form the sign takes, which can be mental or material; the object is that to 
which the representamen refers, and the interpretant is the sense made of the sign in the process 
of signification. For the remaining of this thesis, and for ease of understanding, Peirce’s 
representamen will be referred to as ‘sign-vehicle’.  
Peirce developed a sophisticated sub-classification of signs. This thesis utilises his most 
fundamental sign triad: icon, index and symbol, a classification based on the relation of the sign-
vehicle with the interpretant. A sign is an icon when it ‘is similar to its object’ (Margolis & 
Pauwels 2011, p.302), it physically resembles or imitate the object; however, an icon does not 
‘necessarily refer to real objects’, if it does, it is an index. A sign is an index when it has an 
existential relation with the object, when it is affected by the object, ‘they are connected with 
their objects by a natural cause or a spatial or temporal contiguity’ (Margolis & Pauwels 2011, 
p.303), indexes always reference their object. Photographs are considered both iconic and 
indexical signs: 
‘Passport photos are indexical signs; they serve to identify their owners. In fact, all 
photos are indices, because one of the characteristics of some indices is that they are 
connected with their objects by a natural cause or a spatial or temporal contiguity. 
Photographs, despite their similarity with their objects, are indexical signs for two 
reasons: first, they are produced by the physical cause of a light ray projection on a film; 
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second, they serve to identify the object which they depict. The indexicality of the photo 
does not exclude or contradict its iconicity; the latter is included in the former.’ (Margolis 
& Pauwels 2011, p.303) 
A sign is a symbol when the relationship is arbitrary or strictly conventional, meaning that this 
relationship has been ‘agreed’ upon and learned; for example, language in general is symbolic, 
and so are numbers, national flags or traffic lights.  A symbol is not a physical entity, is a 
concept, a general rule; a symbol is made up of icons and indexes, all indexes have iconic aspects, 
the icon being the simplest sign unit.   
In the context of this thesis, chapter six approaches PDVSA La Estancia’s adverts as fully 
formed signs, dissected to its smallest units of meaning using Peirce’s triadic model. The point of 
departure for the semiotic analysis is a material sign-vehicle: the advert. The analysis will focus 
on what are considered the two main features of the composition in terms of meaning: the 
photographic image and the verbal text. The photographic image depicts the interaction of two 
fundamental features: a giant oil worker and the material space of the city. The verbal text 
communicates the message conveyed (the interpretant) by this visual interaction. The advert, as a 
sign unit, will be analysed as a composite of the city space, the giant oil worker, and the verbal 
text.  The analysis of the visual elements of the PDVSA La Estancia adverts provide the means 
to determine what it is exactly that is being represented, and what is the effect, or intended  
interpretant of the campaign.  
Roland Barthes Mythologies 
 
To further explore the signification of the PDVSA La Estancia adverts, the visual 
semiotic analysis of the adverts also draws on Barthes’ theory of Myths. Roland Barthes was a 
pioneer in the semiotic study of images, with works focused on photography such as The 
Photographic Message (1961) and The Rhetoric of the Image (1964).  This section focuses on Mythologies 
(1957), an earlier and still influential work that developed his theory of the myth through the 
analysis of French adverts.  
For Barthes, Myth is a type of speech, ‘a system of communication, that it is a message’, it is not 
a concept or an idea, it is a concrete entity, a form, a ‘mode of signification’ defined not by its 
literal sense but by its intention than (1993, pp.109, 124); in his sense, myth is a type of speech 
‘chosen by history: it cannot possibly evolve from the “nature” of things’ (Barthes 1993, p.110). 
For Barthes, everything can be a myth as long as ‘it is conveyed by a discourse’, it is not confined 
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to the written word or oral, all visual representation mediums such as cinema, photography, 
reporting, and advertising can serve as a vehicle for mythical speech: 
‘we are no longer dealing here with a theoretical mode of representation: we are dealing 
with this particular image, which is given for this particular signification. Mythical speech 
is made of a material  which has already been worked on so as to make it suitable for 
communication: it is because all the materials of myth (whether pictorial or written) 
presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason about them whilst 
discounting their substance’ (Barthes 1993, p.110) 
Barthes proposed Myth as a semiological system, as ‘one fragment of this vast science of signs 
which Saussure postulated some forty years ago under the name semiology’ (1993, p.111). 
Mythology is part of semiology, as a formal science, and of ideology, as an historical science. 
Mythology derives from Saussure’s signifier (carrier of meaning), signified (mental concept of the 
meaning) and sign (associative total of signifier and signified); for Barthes there are functional 
implications between the three, there is no arbitrariness, on the plane of myth the signifier is the 
form, the signified is the concept, and the sign is the signification (Barthes 1993, p.114). The 
signifier ‘already postulates a reading’, a signification is already built and the meaning complete, 
when the signifier becomes form ‘the meaning leaves its contingency behind; it empties itself, it 
becomes impoverished, history evaporates, only the letter remains’ (Barthes 1993, p.117). 
Mythical signification is always motivated; it is never arbitrary as ‘there is no myth without 
motivated form’ (Barthes 1993, p.126). Signification always contains some analogy, it ‘plays on 
the analogy between meaning and form’, an analogy that is supplied to the form by history 
(Barthes 1993, p.126).  
The concept it’s not an abstract element, through it ‘a new history is implanted in the myth’ and 
the mythical concept is supposed to be appropriated (Barthes 1993, p.119).  The concept can 
take a myriad of forms, making the concept poorer than Saussure’s signifier as it ‘does nothing 
but re-present itself’ (Barthes 1993, p.120) but this multiplication is what allows the myth to be 
deciphered: ‘it is the insistence of a kind of behavior with reveals its intention’ (Barthes 1993, 
p.120). The signification or the association of the form and the concept is the myth itself: ‘myth 
hides nothing: its function is to distort, not to make disappear’ (Barthes 1993, p.121). Furthermore, 
the presence of the form is spatial, ‘the elements of the form are related as to place and 
proximity’, whilst the concept appears in a more abstract manner as ‘hazy’ knowledge it is united 
to the myth by a relation of deformation as in myth the concept distorts the meaning by, for 
example, depriving it from its history (Barthes 1993, p.122).  
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Myth does not hide, lie, confess or flaunt, it distorts, it is an inflexion of the concept, and 
through this inflexion rather than revealing or dissolving it, naturalises it: ‘we reach the very 
principle of myth: it transforms history into nature’ (Barthes 1993, p.129). Therefore myth is read 
as a reason, never as a motive, it aims to cause an immediate impression ‘experienced as innocent 
speech not because its intentions are hidden –if they were hidden they would not be efficacious- 
but because they are naturalized’ as factual (Barthes 1993, pp.130–131). This factualness 
characterises myth as ‘depoliticized speech’ (political understood in its deeper meaning as the 
power humans have in making their own world);  by transforming history into nature 
contingency appears eternal, things lose their historical quality and their memory: ‘Myth is 
constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it things lose the memory that they 
once were made’ (Barthes 1993, p.142).  
The context in which myth flourishes is that of the capitalist bourgeois society (Barthes 1993, 
pp.137–138), for in bourgeois culture according to Barthes ‘there is  neither proletarian culture 
nor proletarian morality, there is no proletarian art; ideologically, all that is not bourgeois is 
obliged to borrow from the bourgeoisie’ (1993, p.139). Therefore revolutionary language is not 
mythical because by definition, revolution excludes myth for it is meant to reveal ‘the political 
load of the world’,  the revolution aims to make the world and be absorbed in the making of the 
world; it is political in all its senses, unlike myth which ‘is initially political and finally natural’ 
(Barthes 1993, pp.143–146). Barthes’s Myth provides the analytical framework to characterise the 
language of the verbal text of the adverts as mythical speech. The text is dissected in chapter six 
to argue that the adverts’ construction of mythical speech is abolishing the history of the public 
art and public spaces depicted, whilst aiming to naturalise the giant oil workers as agents of what 
is in essence a paradoxical proposition: the transformation of oil into a ‘renewable resource’. 
Chapter six demonstrates that the myth of ‘renewable oil’ coalesces oil, culture and the city into 
one entity though the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit, proposed by this thesis as an 
extension of George Yudice’s expediency of culture as a resource (2003). 
In sum, Peirce’s Semiosis is be used to focus on the analysis of the visual component of the 
advert and the verbal text, Barthes’ semiotics will be integrated into the analysis of the verbal text 
to demonstrate the discursive construction of the myth of ‘renewable oil’ within the adverts 
which informs the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit.  
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Summary 
 
This chapter presented an overview of the research design, data collection, analysis 
methods and ethical challenges of this thesis. It described how the research design is informed 
by the case study approach, which provides the advantage of providing a concrete focal point to 
draw broader conclusions on the relationship between the state, oil wealth, space and culture in 
Venezuela. The focus on PDVSA La Estancia as a case study functions as a gateway to explore 
Petrosocialism from a spatial and cultural perspective.  It also developed a detailed description of 
the geographical, political and institutional settings of the research, as well as a detailed account 
of the context under which the fieldwork was conducted. The political setting proved particularly 
challenging, raising unanticipated ethical considerations, especially in the process of collecting 
data through semi-structured interviews to elites in the midst of social turmoil and extreme 
political polarisation.  The chapter then proceeded to describe the two methods of data 
collection employed: semi-structured interviews and documentary research. The data is analysed 
using a mix of two qualitative methodological approaches, Critical Discourse Analysis and Visual 
Semiotics, employed to explore the discursive relations between State Space, Bureaucratic Power 
and culture to examine the notions of PDVSA’s State Space (chapter four),  the myth ‘renewable 
oil’ (chapters five and six) and the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit (chapter six).  
Chapter one laid out the theoretical foundations of this thesis through a review of the relevant 
literature pertaining to space, rentier state theory, city and culture. The following chapter opens 
the substantive material of this thesis. Chapter three reviews the formation of the modern state 
in Venezuela. It was shaped in the twentieth century by the emergence of the oil industry and the 
establishment of foreign oil corporations, transforming itself into what Fernando Coronil (1997) 
has defined as the Magical State personified as a magnanimous sorcerer in the figure of the 
president, able to enact illusions of instantaneous modernity and progress through spectacular 
projects of infrastructure.  The chapter establishes how oil became akin to modernity and culture 
in Venezuela, mediating the relationship between citizens and the state, and how in the wake of 
an oil crash, the rise of Hugo Chávez to power coincided with a steep rise in oil prices that 
allowed him to embody a New Magical State that concentrates the Bureaucratic Powers of the 
state in his persona, and in the process transformed the state-owned oil company PDVSA into 
the engine of revolutionary change, and an instrument of Petrosocialism, in order to build the 
Socialist State.  
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Chapter three: from Rentier Republic to the New Magical State  
 
The consolidation of state formation, modernisation and oil production in Venezuela as 
well the state’s modernising efforts were concentrated on the main urban centres, predominantly 
in the capital, broadly remaining the domain of elites. The transformation of the built 
environment through strategies of modernisation did not cascade into all sectors of Venezuelan 
society, oil created an inflated economy that fostered an illusion of progress and modernity 
promoted from the state, manifested more clearly in Caracas’ rapid urbanisation.  
Oil, the state and modernisation are interdependent phenomena in Venezuela, but tend to be 
predominantly studied within the disciplines of economy and politics; when reference is made to 
culture or urban development they are regarded as direct investment of the oil wealth made 
available by the state to private enterprise and altruistic elites. Up until late 1980s Venezuela was 
considered an exceptional case in the region, regarded as the most stable democracy and the 
most developed and wealthiest country in Latin America, all thanks to its oil industry. To unpack 
the intersections between oil and culture in Venezuela it is crucial to understand them as 
inseparable from the oil-based bureaucratic power of the state and its role in shaping territory 
and urban space. One of the key topics this thesis examines is the implications for culture and 
urban space in the era of Petrosocialism.  
This chapter develops in three parts. Part one contextualises state formation in Venezuela within 
the postcolonial process of the emergence of the Latin American nation states in the nineteenth 
and twentieth century. It also addresses the enduring contradictions generated by a process of 
modernisation led by elites that came accompanied by the perpetuation of the colonial structure 
that preserved their economic and political power.  Part two explores the formation of the 
Venezuelan Petrostate from the period of post-independence to the arrival of the oil industry, 
and the emergence of what Venezuelan anthropologist Fernando Coronil has defined as the 
Magical State. Finally, part three provides a discussion about the historical context of the 
intersections between oil and culture in Venezuela, exploring in particular the slogan ‘sowing oil’, 
coined by Arturo Uslar Pietri in 1936, which runs across historical narratives around oil wealth.  
Post-colonial Bureaucratisation and Modernity in Latin America 
 
Latin American Spanish colonies achieved independence in the nineteenth century, much 
earlier than many colonies in the global peripheries.  According to Heinz Sonntag (1990, p.405), 
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these newly emerging republics adopted the institutions and constitutions of the most advanced 
models of Capitalist State in Europe. Intellectuals and elites involved in shaping the new nations 
imported European ideas and transplanted them in order to shape new state structures modelled 
after the European experience. He affirms the path towards the consolidation of such young 
states was difficult because the recently independent nations lacked the internal socio-economic 
foundations that characterised the development of capitalist states in Europe. Latin American 
nations inherited rigid class structures and institutionalised relations of domination from the 
colonial period, as well as heavily dependent economies (Silva Michelena 1971, p.389) as the 
colonies were not seen as potential markets but merely as sources of wealth extraction.  
Colonial production was exclusively export oriented; raw materials such as silver, gold, coal and a 
variety of agricultural goods were shipped directly to the metropolis, and nay surplus ‘if not 
conspicuously consumed, was reinvested in activities related to the export economy’ (Silva 
Michelena 1971, p.389). The colonial policies of Spain were designed to consolidate its 
monopoly over trade across the continent, secure dependence on the metropolis, and keep a 
tight grip on political rule by preventing its colonies from developing any national identity or 
independent trade. Spain implemented the policy of exclusively appointing Spaniards to the 
higher ranks in political positions, leaving the minor political offices of the city open to criollos 
(Spaniards born in America); this policy effectively prevented criollos from influencing local 
politics or developing associations of their own for centuries (Silva Michelena 1971, p.390).  
However, these continental policies did not mean that their effects were even among the 
colonies or that it prevented them from developing economically and politically. On the 
contrary, major differences emerged depending on the ‘natural and labour resources’ available in 
each colony (Silva Michelena 1971, p.390). Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, who had gold 
and silver mines and a large indigenous labour force available, developed first; these colonies 
became ‘the political centres of the overseas territories’ (Silva Michelena 1971, p.390). The rest of 
the colonies devoted to the exploitation of ‘exotic’ tropical products, developed an economy of 
haciendas (plantations). The predominance of the hacienda economy in most colonies has been 
interpreted as the implementation of a feudal mode of production and social organisation, which 
Michelena affirms is a misconception, considering the situation of Spain in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century. It is more accurate to describe the modes of production in Spanish America 
as heterogeneous, where a diverse set of relations of feudal and mercantile production coexisted, 
with one key feature in common: the overexploitation of the labour force (Silva Michelena 1971, 
p.390). The emphasis on satisfying the needs of the metropolis over the internal needs of the 
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colonies fostered the formation of a particular racial class structure concentrated in regional 
enclaves that had more contact with the metropolis than with each other.  
The solidity social, political and economic structure of the colonies began to weaken in the 
nineteenth century due to a concurrence of internal and external factors. Internally, increasing 
tensions between criollo landowners and Spanish merchants, the ambitions of mestizos and 
frequent revolts by Indians and slaves marked the progressive dissolution of the colonial 
structure (Silva Michelena 1971, p.391). Externally, British and Dutch contraband and piracy 
undermined Spanish control over its colonies, crippled by Napoleon’s occupation of Spain. This 
environment made criollos all the more receptive to the ideas that had emerged from American 
Independence and the French Revolution, which helped launch the wars of independence.  
Although the wars resulted in the political independence of the Latin American nations from 
Spain (Brazil’s independence from Portugal and its postcolonial statehood followed a very 
different path), these wars were not catalysts for the development of an internal centralised 
bureaucracy. Whilst war has been considered the key mechanism of bureaucratic centralisation in 
Europe, it was not the only way: 
‘Depending on contexts, war can even hinder bureaucratization. Indeed, various other 
factors are more important than war, including elite ideologies, administrative models, 
religious doctrines, and elite politics. For states in developing countries that were once 
colonies, a long-standing debate continues between those who attribute the presence or 
absence of centralized bureaucracies to colonialism and those who offer alternative 
explanations.’ (Vu 2010, pp.151–152) 
The wars of independence in Latin America were too short and isolated to have any cumulative 
impact on bureaucratisation (Vu 2010, pp.153–154). Another obstacle was Latin America’s vast 
territory that made bureaucratisation beyond the main cities extremely costly for their poor and 
dependent economies. For the emerging nations, state building could not derive solely from 
territorial control and bureaucracy; ideas of administration, rights and rituals of rule played a 
much more important role (Vu 2010, p.165). Nonetheless, the post-colonial period was 
predominantly defined by the pursuit of modernity with the adoption of modern political and 
economic techniques. But the modernity experienced in Latin America was peculiar, as it 
combined both ‘novel discourses’ as well as ‘inherited structures’ from the colonial rule (Roldán 
Vera & Caruso 2007, pp.13–14). Vera and Caruso highlight the role of Liberalism in Latin 
American nation-building, elites attributed its set of ideas with the ‘capacity to generate change, 
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to bring about positive improvement in a society that was trying hard to “catch up” with the 
times’ (Roldán Vera & Caruso 2007, pp.9–10). The need to ‘catch up’ with the times is a theme 
that would run across national state projects in twentieth century, particularly in Venezuela, a 
predominantly agrarian country that upon the discovery of oil fields and the development of the 
oil industry at the turn of the century, had access to an unprecedented source of wealth which 
determined its swift transformation into an oil rentier economy and an ever more powerful state. 
But it also created an ambivalent relationship with oil, regarded as a carrier of modernity and 
predator of national sovereignty and cultures. This section sketches the historical context of 
post-independence state formation in Venezuela in relation to the Latin American region, as they 
share a common colonial past but with divergent paths among its emergent nations.  
The process of nation-building and state formation across Latin America developed unevenly, 
according to the peculiarities of each former colony. Those countries that inherited a 
consolidated political and economic colonial structure found them difficult to overcome, the 
colonies that had the most prosperous societies and the most integrated state-church apparatus 
‘were not the first to consolidate post-colonial state power’ (Topik 2002, p.112). The path 
towards statehood for colonial viceroyalties like Mexico and Peru faced more obstacles than 
minor colonies such as Venezuela, not only because of their consolidated colonial apparatus, but 
more importantly for their relationship with the world economy that determined that ‘state 
capacity were built from without, slowly reaching into the interior, helping to build a nation as 
well as a polity’ (Sonntag 1990, p.405).  
The development of an effective bureaucratic apparatus would be crucial to the rest of the 
continent as ‘modern centralized bureaucracy is perhaps the most important institution in the 
structure of any state’ (Vu 2010, pp.151–152). But it can hardly be said that Latin American 
states had achieved complete control over their territories; the history of late nineteenth up until 
mid-twentieth century accounts for the prevalence of caudillismo, a system in which regional 
charismatic strongmen used their own armed militias to overthrow government and take over 
power, this severely undermined the constitution of state power, as was the case of Venezuela.  
Modern institutions struggled to take root in Latin America because they  were incompatible 
with the colonial legacy, which generated a pessimistic view among elites on whether modernity 
could find fertile ground (Ortiz 2002, pp.252–253). Renato Ortiz (2002)and Tomás Straka (2006) 
address this incompatibility by speaking of a ‘modern tradition’ in Latin America. For Ortiz, 
tradition ‘is everything that is inserted in daily culture’ (2002, p.258), a concept that is accepting 
of modernity no longer seen as a radical exclusion of the past, just as tradition and past are no 
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longer identified with the exclusion of the new. Similarly, Venezuelan historian Tomás Straka 
speaks of a modernidad criolla that emerged around the eighteenth century along with the 
consolidation of the criollo elite, among which the ideas of the Enlightenment circulated. Criollos 
thought of themselves as Europeans, they sought to be acknowledged as ‘second Europeans’ 
building a Young Europe in America (Straka 2006, p.23) rather than ‘second-class Europeans’.  
Modernidad criolla was Eurocentric; its discourse shaped by the European project of modernity.  
The national project put forward by the criollos also implied the incorporation of their non-
western subordinates -blacks, Indians and mestizos, regarded as barbaric enemies of civilisation- 
and the rest of the territory to their own modern logic and order (Straka 2006, p.39). Changes 
came in modern form -as in ‘icons of progress’- but would transform neither institutions nor 
society so as not to challenge the colonial foundations of the political and economic power of 
criollo elites (Straka 2006, p.17). Modernity was conceived as the final stage in the transit towards 
complete westernisation (Straka 2006). According to Straka, the national modern project of the 
criollos was defined by the following three characteristics:  
‘first, it is a continuity of the conqueror in its imposition of Western order on the New 
World; second, through the incorporation of subordinates into their logic, subordinates 
are creolized which in the course of the following two centuries would produce enough 
hybridizations for something completely new to emerge (…), and third, it is intertwined 
with all European and that, since the eighteenth century, is the modern corollary, in 
consequence its tradition, in always to assume the novelties coming from Europe, it is 
enforced: it turns into the tradition of modernity.’ (Straka 2006) 
The contradictions between modernidad criolla and the processes of modernisation are noted by 
Nestor García Canclini (1989b, p.42), he argues that whilst the  ‘second Europeans’ of the 
nineteenth century and the new economic and political elites of the twentieth century wished to 
modernise their nations based on the European modern project, the discrepancies between 
modernity and modernisation were instrumental in preserving their status as dominant classes. 
The oligarchies of the turn of the century did not constitute States, they brought order to some 
areas of society, which created uneven and fragmentary development (García Canclini 1989b). 
By late twentieth century Latin America had become a continent where ‘traditions have not yet 
disappeared and modernity has not completely arrived’ (García Canclini 1989b, p.1). In the 
particular case of Venezuela, it wasn’t until the rise of the oil industry in early twentieth century 
that Venezuela acquired the economic and political resources to consolidate as a modern state 
with a centralised bureaucracy.   
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Oil and Modernity in the Genesis of the Venezuelan Petrostate 
 
The manner in which Venezuela dealt with the rise of the oil industry is tantamount to 
how it dealt with modernity (Pérez Schael 1993, p.39). Venezuela confronted modernity and the 
oil industry in archaic terms; instead of devising new legal frameworks, decisions were based on 
the traditions inherited from Spanish colonial rule. The emerging Venezuelan state declared itself 
the heir of the rights of the Spanish Crown: ecclesiastic patronage, property over vacant lands 
and ownership over all mines (Pérez Schael 1993, p.39); the property of the Sovereign derived 
from the principle that what belonged to no one must belong to the King. After independence, 
the King was substituted by the new republic that inherited all his rights, according to the terms 
sanctioned by Simón Bolívar in his 1829 Quito Decree -which validated the Ordenanzas de la 
Nueva España (Ordinances of New Spain) of 1783- until new mining laws were created.  
However, the subsequent codes of mining and the new constitutions created up until 1936 
maintained in essence the same principle established by Simón Bolívar (Pérez Schael 1993, p.40). 
The wealth extracted directly from the subsoil in the form of rent from the mines became an 
affirmation of sovereignty as the rent sanctioned the recognition of the Nation’s authority 
analogous to the King’s. The difference is that the Nation does not have the personal incarnation 
of majesty of a king, it acts through the state as a mediator between national sovereignty and 
citizens (Pérez Schael 1993, p.40). The principle of sovereignty is manifested exclusively in the 
power to grant property rights and administer the rent.  
Thus,  Venezuela did not become a rentier state with the rise of the oil industry, it was born a 
rentier state from the moment it became a republic: ‘rentierism does not derive from petroleum, 
on the contrary, the traditional legislation of mining was the instrument used to codify the 
specificity and complexity of oil, until it was converted into a prisoner of the rent’ (Pérez Schael 
1993, p.41). As the concept of sovereignty was built around the notion of property, the rent 
annulled oil’s materiality as a mineral. Furthermore, since Venezuela did not have the resources 
or the capacity to exploit nor produce oil products, revenue would come in the form of 
concessions and royalties. By losing its mineral quality oil would be reduced to the ‘fetish’ of rent 
money  that flows from the soil directly to the state’s coffers: oil mattered as money and not as a 
complex technological reality (Pérez Schael 1993, p.94). The intellectual class attributed an 
ephemeral quality to oil because unlike agriculture, the wealth produced relied on money and not 
on the ‘material’; the discussions around oil were centred on issues of sovereignty and how to 
position oneself  in regards to the territory oil wealth was extracted from: a nationalist or a traitor 
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(Pérez Schael 1993, p.95). Hence, for the Venezuelan state, the only matter to resolve was where, 
how and to who distribute the rent money, not to ‘produce’ the material.  
What is helpful about the discussion above is that it sets off the background to examine PDVSA 
La Estancia’s adoption of farming language to refer to oil and culture, by stating that the 
institution is ‘oil that harvests culture’ (see chapter five).  By discursively equating oil with 
agriculture there is a metaphorical attempt to provide the same permanent and cyclical attributes 
of farming to oil extraction, to take it back to nature and create the illusion that oil is 
inexhaustible (chapter five). On the other hand, culture is equated to oil as a mineral deposit and 
as the ‘fruit’ of ‘sowing oil’, through the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit  oil   regains the 
material quality it lost by been regarded as abstract flows of rent money (chapter six). This thesis 
builds on the above discussion to expand on George Yudice’s expediency of culture as a 
resource to define PDVSA La Estancia’s conceptualisation and instrumentalisation of culture-as-
mineral-deposit, in which the oil company turns to culture as a mineral resource, in literal and 
metaphorical terms. The following section provides a detailed discussion of the relationship 
between oil, culture and modernity in Venezuela, informed by the enduring narrative of ‘sowing 
oil’, a slogan coined by Venezuelan intellectual Arturo Uslar Pietri in 1936, that colludes farming 
and mining language to indicate how oil wealth should be invested.   
Sowing Oil: Modernity and Culture in Venezuela 
 
This section opens with García-Canclini’s assessment that culture in Latin America is no 
longer the exclusive realm of the letrados (intellectual urban elites); culture concerns economists, 
sociologists, workers unions and social movements but it continues to be subservient to 
development and modernisation (1989c, pp.83–84). The unsatisfactory advancement of 
contemporary economic models in the region had forced states to rethink culture as a key 
element in articulating private and public interests in order to create less unequal societies. 
However, relating back to the discussion in the previous section, culture in Latin America is still 
broadly understood in terms of two opposite but inseparable forces: tradition and modernity. 
This opposition determines the role and sphere of influence of the state and the private sector 
over national, and to an extent, regional cultural policies.  
Throughout nineteenth century fine arts and literature had played a crucial role in the 
development of the national identity of Latin American nations through forms of ‘official’ 
culture sanctioned by the state to develop a ‘common symbolic universe’ (Varela 2001, p.26). In 
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the first half of the twentieth century states became paternalistic by assuming the role of the 
main provider for society. Many cultural institutions, national museums, orchestras, theatres and 
archives were created and funded by the state. This steady process saw its first crisis in the1980s, 
when the region suffered political and economic collapses.  
The economic miracle produced by the military regimes of Argentina and Chile and the oil boom 
of the 1970s enjoyed by Mexico and Venezuela, accelerated the continent’s transformation from 
agrarian to heavily urbanised societies; mass migration from the countryside to the main cities 
deepened social inequalities: high levels of mass unemployment, the growth of an informal 
economy, homelessness, squatting, starvation, urban violence, police repression and the increase 
of repressive surveillance as well as the ‘bunkerization’ of the upper classes (Yúdice et al. 1992, 
p.viii). The rapid process of development and industrialisation led by the state and driven by 
deep foreign debt came to a halt in early 1980s when Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and 
Venezuela declared default that brought subsequent interventions by the IMF and the World 
Bank. The implementation of neoliberal economic reforms came accompanied by inflation and 
even hyperinflation, hyper-urbanisation, privatisation, social unrest and increased emigration.  
The first casualty of these economic shocks was the cultural sector; severe cuts in budgets or 
outright elimination of programs or institutions left arts organisations, accustomed to state 
financial support, to compete for funding from the private sector (Martín-Barbero 2000, pp.36–
37; Varela 2001, p.28). The fall of dictatorial regimes and the increased liberalisation of trade in 
the 1990s did not bring the expected economic growth and reduction of social inequalities; the 
region’s development was very uneven, with some nations able to stabilise their economies 
through industrialisation and foreign investment, like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, whilst others 
like Venezuela, had deteriorated as oil prices failed to recover (Varela 2001, p.28). This affected 
investment in culture. Countries where the economy thrived saw the emergence of large 
numbers of private cultural entrepreneurs whilst in those that did not, the cultural sector largely 
depended on government support. However, due to the deep economic crisis brought by the 
neoliberal reforms, government funding was mostly available to ‘official’ culture, leaving most 
cultural organisations to fend for alternative sources of funding (Varela 2001, p.28). Given that 
there is a strong belief in Latin America that it is the state’s exclusive responsibility to protect and 
administer all forms of cultural traditions and heritage (García Canclini 1989c, p.87; Garci ́a 
Canclini 1989a, pp.182–183),  cultural modernity is predominantly the realm of private 
enterprise. Tradition and heritage grant the state symbolic legitimacy as the representative of 
national history, whilst cultural modernity, largely the realm of elites, grants private enterprises a 
106 
 
symbolic image of philanthropy and social solidarity. Traditions have been regarded by the elites 
as an obstacle to development and modernisation (García Canclini 1989c, pp.85–86), hence the 
resulting artificial separation of culture between the state and the private sector, and the difficulty 
of extending state support towards non-traditional cultural manifestations and technological 
innovation. Although the elitist conception of culture has been expanded to include traditional 
cultural productions such as indigenous crafts, dances, and literature, it has been extremely 
difficult for the state to include modernity and innovation into its areas of competence.  
Nonetheless, this separation between cultural tradition and modernity has not been so marked in 
Venezuela. The Venezuelan Petrostate and foreign oil corporations have been patrons of culture, 
traditions and modernity. But as the Bolivarian Revolution sought to construct a narrower 
definition of culture,  it privileged tradition and folklore over cultural modernity, regarded by the 
revolution as foreign  and elitist (Kozak Rovero 2015, p.47). This thesis argues that PDVSA 
effectively bridges the separation of culture between state and private sector through PDVSA 
LA Estancia’s work. The remaining paragraphs of this chapter explore the intersections between 
oil and culture in Venezuela by engaging in a critical discussion of Venezuelan anthropologist 
Rodolfo Quintero’s seminal text from 1968, The Culture of Oil: essay on the life styles of social 
groups in Venezuela, the first of its nature to address oil in cultural terms.  
Venezuela’s identity as a nation is closely entangled with oil; as the Petrostate engaged with 
modernity and its power increased, Venezuelan society learned to see itself as an oil nation and 
to view the  state as the single representative of a population unified by oil (Coronil 1997, p.84). 
Caracas swiftly became the showcase of the state’s achievements of progress and modernity. 
When foreign oil companies began to establish in Venezuela in early twentieth century, the 
material effects of oil wealth were not felt immediately on the areas surrounding oil drills and 
refineries, they materialised first in the remote oil camps and fenced residential quarters built by 
foreign  oil corporations, as enclaves of modernity frequently surrounded by poverty  (González 
Casas & Marín Castañeda 2003, p.381). The iron fences built to isolate the oil camps allowed 
poor neighbouring communities to peek into the cultural modernity brought by foreign capital: 
technology, urban planning, architecture, corporate culture and lifestyle. 
Rodolfo Quintero (2011), a Venezuelan Marxist anthropologist and former oil camp dweller 
wrote in 1968 an essay titled La cultura del petróleo: ensayo sobre estilos de vida de grupos sociales en 
Venezuela (The Culture of Oil: essay on the life styles of social groups in Venezuela), recently 
reedited by the Venezuelan Central Bank. Quintero defined the ‘culture of oil’ as a culture of 
conquest, a foreign force with its own its own technology, instruments, inventions, equipment as 
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well as non-material devices such as language, art and science that create social and psychological 
effects wherever it establishes; he claimed it deteriorated local cultures (2011, pp.19–20). 
Quintero works with a very narrow definition of national culture as that which is rooted in the 
Indigenous.  
According to Quintero, the way of life of the culture of oil is characterised by the exploitation of 
national oil wealth by monopolistic foreign companies. Venezuela, an underdeveloped country, 
was at a disadvantage in the face of the powerful colonising forces of North American oil 
corporations. He viewed the arrival of oil as a second wave of colonisation,  the oil tower 
substituted the wooden plough brought by the Spanish conquest (2011, p.24); he demonises the 
United States, oil wealth, rapid urbanisation and bureaucratic and technological progress as 
predators and destroyers of national culture. Quintero divided the contemporary history of 
Venezuela into two main periods: a pre-oil era and the culture of oil era (2011, p.25), materialised 
in new urban developments: the oil camp and the oil city.  
The oil camps built by foreign oil corporations such as Creole, Shell and Mobil transferred 
modern capitalist ways of building and living to Venezuela. The construction of oil camps next 
to small towns and villages in the interior lands of Venezuela profoundly changed their 
economic, cultural and social landscapes. The oil camp disturbed the life of the human groups of 
surrounding local communities. He characterises the oil camp as a ‘colonial institution’ (2011, 
p.26) governed by a foreign company located in a remote foreign metropolis; he views the oil 
camp is an instrument of foreign capitalists to create and maintain a rigid class structure of 
exploiters and exploited hierarchically sustained by managers and administrators. The oil camp’s 
accumulation of capital, workforce and land overpowered the much weaker regional economies, 
many communities abandoned agriculture altogether to become a reserve of low skilled work 
force economically dependent on the oil camp (Quintero 2011, p.26).  
With the oil camps, a new social organisation emerged comprised of capitalist bureaucrats - 
foreigners and nationals- who became the representatives of the ‘culture of oil’. Venezuelan born 
and raised oil bureaucrats are labelled by Quintero as ‘Shell Men’ or ‘Creole Men’ (2011, p.40) 
who are anti-national men who live by and for the oil companies, who think and live like 
foreigners with the habits, customs and the consumption of products brought from the United 
States. These  assimilated ‘Shell Men’ and ‘Creole Men’ considered the lifestyle copied from the 
United States an expression of progress and modernity, viewing themselves as culturally superior 
to the locals and their ‘primitive’ ways (Quintero 2011, p.40). But Venezuela was not particularly 
more backward or advanced than other countries in the region, what Quintero highlights is an 
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enduring narrative that has shaped the discourse about Venezuela’s backwardness in the ‘pre-oil 
era’ in comparison to the sleek modernity displayed by the oil camp (Tinker Salas 2014, p.64).  
Since the oil camp remained a self-contained entity of the modernity of oil capitalism, oil cities 
developed around their fringes, some emerging anew whilst others grew out of small villages. In 
contrast to the oil camp, an oil city was improvised and monotonous, it lacked public services 
and institutions that fostered an active urban life  (Quintero 2011, pp.46–48, 55). Neither 
national nor regional governments invested on their infrastructure even though the 1961 census  
revealed that approximately a quarter of the national population lived in these oil cities (Quintero 
2011, p.51);  improvements such as paved streets, churches and schools were built by the foreign 
oil companies. For these reason, Quintero argued, an oil city could not produce art, science or 
any form of intellectual culture as all that prevailed was the business and the culture of oil (2011, 
p.55). This notion is relevant for this thesis, because whilst Quintero refers to the pre-
nationalisation oil industry, he regards the ‘culture of oil’ and the spaces it produces as sterile, 
incapable of art, science or any form of intellectual or cultural production. Chapters five and six 
examine how within the logic  of Petrosocialism, PDVSA La Estancia  is challenging this notion, 
by conceptualising the material space of the city as an oil field and discursively construing what 
this thesis proposes as the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit, which expands on Yúdice’s 
expediency of culture as a resource (2003). Therefore the Relative Spaces of Representation of 
the oil city visually re-produced in the adverts combined with PDVSA La Estancia’s discursive 
construction of ‘oil that harvests culture’ overcome Quintero’s contention against the oil city.    
The new Constitution of 1961, drafted three years after the overthrow of dictator Marcos Pérez 
Jiménez, changed the clauses of oil concessions; new ones needed the authorisation of both 
chambers of Congress whilst existing ones had to be handed over to the government. Foreign oil 
corporations decided to reduce investment, retreat from the oil camps, and repatriate many of 
their executives which were ominous for the formerly prosperous oil-camp dependent oil cities. 
The gradual disappearance of the oil camps in the 1960s signified the deterioration of the 
livelihood of its inhabitants, who had accommodated their economic activities around the 
necessities of the foreign employees living at the camps.  
Quintero’s ideas reflect not just his ideological and political stance in the face of the 
development of the oil industry, but also a mindset shared by intellectuals throughout the 
twentieth century. Oil, beyond a source of energy or wealth, had become the  ‘symbol of a 
culture’ that views oil as a demonic force (Pérez Schael 1993, p.9). During the first half of the 
twentieth century Uslar Pietri, Romulo Betancourt and other representatives of the state 
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explained the reality of oil by oscillating between two paradigms: neo-colonial imperialist 
domination and nationalism (Pérez Schael 1993, p.143). The modernity brought by oil was 
viewed under a moral light that construed oil as the destructive agent of nature and culture. In 
Venezuelan literary fiction, such as the novel Mene, the ‘end of oil’ is regarded as a happy ending 
for it allowed the ‘blonde man’ to leave and waters to be pure again (Pérez Schael 1993, p.147). 
And here lies another paradigm: a lingering nostalgia about a lost ideal agrarian past that created 
a discursive tension of simultaneously embracing and demonising oil’s ‘modernising magic 
powers’, as it has created prosperity and poverty in the same degree. The two main figures in the 
construction of a public discourse around oil in the twentieth century are Arturo Uslar Pietri 
(1926-2001) and Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo (1903-1979), who represent antagonistic forms of 
understanding the relationship between oil, the state and development. Arturo Uslar Pietri 
coined the phrase ‘sowing oil’ (1936); it headlined the title of a newspaper article published in 
1936. Uslar Pietri defended the idea of taking advantage of the knowledge, technology and 
financial power of foreign oil corporations, he saw great benefits in keeping the country open to 
foreign capital and to use this capital to invest in development and industrialisation, which is 
what he meant by ‘sowing oil’  (Uzcátegui 2010, pp.37–38). In contrast, Juan Pablo Pérez 
Alfonso, a staunch nationalist and the founding father of OPEC, advocated for the state’s 
absolute sovereignty over its oil reserves since he regarded oil as the ‘devil’s excrement’ (2011). 
The Bolivarian Revolution has celebrated Uslar Pietri and appropriated his phrase for, among 
other things, its use of farming language. PDVSA’s Plan Siembra Petrolera –Sowing Oil Plan- is a 
direct reference to Uslar Pietri, but as it will become clear throughout this thesis, there is a 
conceptual and symbolic contradiction in using it to name Hugo Chávez’s nationalist and anti-
imperialist development plan of PDVSA (Uzcátegui 2010, p.38).  Uslar Pietri’s phrase ‘sowing 
oil’ is at the centre of enduring conflicting views around oil, he used agrarian language as a 
didactic device to explain how oil should be invested, making direct reference to the land from 
where riches are extracted and not to oil as an immaterial and ephemeral source of wealth. Uslar 
Pietri would revisit and replay this phrase in public debate throughout the twentieth century in  
1936, 1945, 1961, 1980, 1983, and 1990, claiming every time that oil had yet to be sown (Pérez 
Schael 1993, pp.199–205), proving that sowing oil had become an unachievable utopia. As the 
substantive chapters of this thesis illustrate, the use of farming language by Hugo Chávez’s and 
PDVSA to refer to the activities of the oil industry (such as the national Sowing Oil Plan) 
underpins the enduring myth that oil can be ‘sowed’, suggesting a natural renewable farming 
cycle of sowing and harvesting the subsoil for oil, which informs the notion of culture-as-
mineral-deposit (Yúdice 2003) construed by PDVSA La Estancia discussed in detail in chapters 
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four and five. Chapter five demonstrates that PDVSA La Estancia seeks to prove that they have 
succeeded in sowing the oil where previous regimes had failed. Their General Manager’s 
discourse defines their work as a ‘way of sowing oil’ thus achieving the ‘utopia of the possible’ 
presenting Petrosocialism as a utopian project that is making ‘renewable oil’ a ‘reality’. Chapter 
six will expand on this discussion through a semiotic analysis of the adverts that construe culture 
as ‘renewable oil’. 
Caracas’ infrastructures, in particular the public art and public spaces that concern this thesis,  
are a reflection of the state’s material power, oil being crucial to the consolidation of such power. 
The influence of oil wealth in the consolidation of the state and urban modernisation in 
Venezuela is not just an outcome of capital investment. Changes in the Ley de Hidrocarburos (Law 
of Hydrocarbons) made by President Medina Angarita in 1943 consolidated the state as the 
owner of the subsoil as well as protector of the nation’s oil and established that ten per cent of 
all oil extracted had to be refined locally. This required oil corporations to build refineries and 
undertake a massive transfer of technology and bureaucratic workforce, which made it necessary 
to set up corporate headquarters (Vicente 2003, p.394). Foreign oil companies such as Creole 
Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mobil and Atlantic settled their headquarters in 
Caracas, rather than by the centres of oil exploitation in the provinces. Creole’s buildings were 
located in the neighbourhood of La Candelaria, an eastern extension of the colonial quarter to 
the east of the city centre. Shell built headquarters in San Bernardino, a recently built modern 
neighbourhood adjacent to La Candelaria designed by the French urbanist Maurice Rotival.  
Illustration 2. ESSO map of Caracas, 1942. Dashed circle indicates the 'Oil District' 
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The settlement of foreign and local oil enterprises consolidated these neighbourhoods as an Oil 
District  (now contained within Libertador municipality), from where modern practices in urban 
planning and architecture would spread to the rest of the city, and the country (Vicente 2003, 
pp.397–398). By the 1990s, the Oil District (Illustration 2) had transformed into the nation’s 
political and financial centre. Currently, Libertador municipality concentrates many public 
buildings such as the headquarters of PDVSA, the Central Bank of Venezuela, the Federal 
Legislative Palace (National Assembly), the National Archives, many ministries, as well as 
notable modern buildings such as Parque Central Complex (which up until 2003 were the tallest 
skyscrapers in Latin America), the corporate towers of Mercantil Bank and BBVA Provincial 
Bank, and the ill fated Tower of David. Whilst the state used the oil riches to remodel itself as a 
modern institution, the modernisation of the urban landscape was, to great extent, the 
consequence of the settlement of oil corporations. 
The emergence of an oil district in the capital, and the modern practices foreign corporations 
brought with them cannot be regarded as the exclusive consequence of flows of oil capital within 
the country. Tim Mitchell explains in Carbon Democracy that any study of oil has to address the 
‘process through which oil is produced and distributed’ and not be restricted as the sole effect of 
oil money and ‘its corrupting powers’ (2011, p.5). The most evident transformations brought by 
oil capital to oil producing countries manifest in the building of infrastructures and negotiations 
between states and corporations to secure revenue and capital accumulation. As this thesis has 
explained, these negotiations generated particular ‘ways of engineering political relations out of 
flows of money’ in Venezuela, the cornerstone for the transformation of oil into ‘large and 
unaccountable government incomes’ (Mitchell, p. 5). As oil flows it is converted into ‘energy, 
profits and political power’ (Mitchell 2011, p.6).  
Oil, seen predominantly in Venezuela as a flow of rent money disregards its material dimension 
as a substance extracted from the subsoil that requires massive financial investment in 
infrastructure and technology to be produced, transformed and commercialised. But this material 
substance also possesses an immaterial dimension, granting great political and financial powers 
to whoever has dominion over it. How these powers are exercised by the Venezuelan Petrostate 
will be the centre of the discussion of the next section. 
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The Magical State: Oil, Land and the Illusion of Modernity  
 
Venezuelan statecraft is inextricable from the development of the oil industry. The 
establishment of international oil corporations enabled the state to expand its jurisdiction beyond 
the private sector by creating a permanent dominance over the public sector comparable in the 
region only to Cuba (Karl 1997, p.90). The first oil wells were drilled in early 1910s during the 
dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez, whose regime granted concessions to foreign corporations 
to explore, extract, refine and commercialise Venezuelan oil (Sullivan 1992, p.259). Within a 
decade, Venezuela’s economy had transformed from agricultural production by private 
enterprise to oil exploitation by foreign oil corporations, with the state acting as landlord. Oil 
became the vehicle for modernisation and industrialisation (Coronil 1997, p.4; Bye 1979, p.59).  
By 1929 the country was the largest oil producer in the world (Bye 1979, p.59).  
The sudden wealth produced by oil exploitation in early twentieth century internally divided 
Venezuela into two bodies (Almandoz Marte 2000; Coronil 1997). For Arturo Uslar Pietri these 
two separate but symbiotic bodies were the Nation and the State: ‘the State owns the oil wealth 
and becomes immensely rich, whilst the nation remains poor and backward’ (Almandoz Marte 
2000, p.204). For Fernando Coronil these two bodies were ‘a political body made up of its 
citizens and a natural body made up of its rich subsoil’ (1997, p.4). The State found in the 
concentration of oil wealth the instrument to affirm its authority, and though growing separate 
from the nation, the state materialised as the sole mediator between the political body  of the 
nation and the natural body of oil, granting itself the power to transform the country into a 
modern nation by manufacturing ambitious projects of infrastructure conceived as ‘collective 
fantasies of progress’ (Coronil 1997, p.5).  
As the Petrostate consolidated its authority became entangled with oil, its monopoly over the 
nation’s oil wealth transformed the state into the ‘single agent endowed with the magical power 
to remake the nation’ (Coronil 1997, p.4). Fernando Coronil’s book The Magical State: Nature, 
Money and Modernity in Venezuela  argues that the Venezuelan state exercised this monopoly 
dramaturgically, enacting collective fantasies of progress by way of spectacular projects of 
development and infrastructure to seize its subjects through the power of marvel rather than 
with the power of reason: ‘the state seizes its subjects by inducing a condition or state being 
receptive to its illusions –a magical state’ (1997, p.5). Coronil acknowledged that the Magical 
State (Coronil 2011) was inspired by the work of playwright and critic José Ignacio Cabrujas.   In 
an  interview for the magazine Estado y Reforma (1987), a tri-monthly publication of the 
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Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State COPRE, Cabrujas defined the Venezuelan 
state as a Estado de disimulo (state of dissimulation). The caudillo decides what the state should be 
and what the law is transforming the state into a ‘legal trick’ that justifies the whims, arbitrariness 
and other forms of me da la gana (‘to do as I please’). Cabrujas affirmed that in a provisional 
nation with precarious institutions, this is the way the Venezuelan state has behaved. In a country 
where the state had been very weak, the expansion of the oil industry promoted the 
concentration of power in the presidency as the embodiment of the ‘magical’ powers of oil. The 
Magical State then, is personified as a magnanimous sorcerer in the figure of the president. Prior 
to the industrialised exploitation of oil, the state in Venezuela remained an unfinished project 
that lacked a ‘national army or an effective bureaucracy’ with ‘partial dominion over the nation’s 
territory and sway over its citizens’ (Coronil 1997, p.76). As oil wealth increased, so did the 
State’s capacity to construct itself as a national institution, able to expand the range of its 
dominion over society through material signs of progress:  massive works of infrastructure and 
the vertiginous modernisation of cities in just a few decades. Oil wealth made possible the 
illusion that modernisation could be achieved almost overnight (Coronil 1997, p.68).  Coronil’s 
notion of The Magical State will be useful for this thesis because it expands on Marxist analysis 
of Latin America often centred on the relationship between labour and capital, which tend to 
overlook the role of land, which encompasses all the powers of nature  (Coronil 2011, p.4). For 
Coronil ‘land is the foundation of both the Venezuelan state and Venezuelan society’ (Coronil 
2011, p.5). Therefore, the state’s dominion over the nation’s land and subsoil is not limited to the 
availability of resources, the exploitation of land and subsoil means power over the extraction 
and circulation of wealth because power over the land equates to power over oil, as both a 
natural resource and a political tool. Chapter four revisits Coronil’s Magical State to explore the 
contradiction of  Chávez’s ambition to transform Venezuela into a Socialist State almost 
overnight whilst maintaining the ‘illusions’ of oil of the prior capitalist Magical State. 
After the 1920s, oil policies became even more favourable. Venezuela became extremely 
attractive for foreign capital because it had one of the most liberal oil policies in Latin America 
(González Casas & Marín Castañeda 2003),  which translated into a significant increase in the 
investment on infrastructure, urban development and architecture in the process transplanting 
the model of capitalist urban life. Whilst, as discussed previously, the republic was born a rentier 
state, with the exploitation of oil Venezuela inaugurated its modern history as a Petrostate, ‘one 
whose capacity to create consensus and enforce collective decisions rested largely on the fate of 
the international oil market as well as on its ability to tax foreign firms and distribute its gains’ 
(Karl 1997, p.91). The Venezuelan Petrostate rather than symbolise national glory came to be 
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viewed mainly as an ‘enormous distributive apparatus’ of oil rent, a father state that provides but 
whose power is hollowed out by a gap between authority and territory. This set in motion what 
Terry Lynn Karl calls in his study The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Boom and Petrostates  a historical cycle of 
widespread ‘political rent-seeking behaviour’ manifested in the centralisation of authority in the 
executive (particularly in the presidency) and the continuous search for increased oil revenues 
through a deepening of oil dependence combined with the emergence of new demands to the 
state to amend the resulting imbalances (1997, p.91). Juan Vicente Gomez’s death in 1935 put an 
end to 27 years of dictatorship and consolidated ‘the final breakthrough of capitalism as the 
dominant mode of production’ (Bye 1979, p.63). The dominance of foreign capital fostered the 
emergence and growth of a ‘petty bourgeoisie’ long before the working class became relevant in 
numbers or an organised workforce. In addition, oil production initiated a process of fast 
urbanisation accompanied by the deterioration of much of the agricultural sector.  
For a country that had been in chronic debt and lacked basic infrastructure such as a national 
road network and systems of communications, oil wealth suddenly made possible lavish and 
monumental works of infrastructure (Coronil 1997, p.76). This encouraged massive migrations 
from rural areas to the cities searching for employment (Bye 1979, p.63). In 1958, the overthrow 
of Marcos Pérez Jimenez’s dictatorship marked the beginning of the democratic era, government 
and private sectors were concerned with investing the oil wealth in developing domestic 
industrialisation, in other words, they were concerned with ‘sowing oil’.  
The institutionalised access to oil wealth created mechanisms to avoid conflicts and placate 
demands from heterogeneous sectors through public spending financed directly by the oil rent, 
without being forced to make compromises, affecting negatively certain interests or having to 
raise domestic taxes (Karl 1997, p.111). By mid-twentieth century, broad popular sectors 
increasingly advocated for the nationalisation of the oil industry. In 1960, Venezuela, along with 
oil producing countries Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and Iran, set up the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): 
‘For Venezuela, where a revolution had overthrown the military government and brought 
an elected government to power, the aim was to imitate the collective arrangement 
among US states for restricting production, in order to negotiate an increased share of oil 
revenues and conserve supplies, and thus to allow an orderly process of economic 
growth and avoid a premature depletion of reserves.’ (Mitchell 2011, p.167) 
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The belief that only the state could distribute the nation’s oil wealth, and that such distributive 
capacity had to rise above partisan conflict was cemented in the new Constitution of 1961, which 
reaffirmed state intervention and turned the president into a ‘supreme political arbiter’ with very 
few mechanisms for accountability (Karl 1997, p.105). Venezuela gave absolute freedom to 
foreign capital transactions, but this began to change in the 1970s. In 1973, the outbreak of 
another Arab-Israeli war and the oil embargo enacted by Arab oil-producing countries generated 
a steep rise in the price of fuel, which significantly increased Venezuela’s oil revenues. This 
windfall prompted President Carlos Andrés Pérez, elected in late 1973 with wide popular 
support, to promise that the increased financial power of the state would allow Venezuela to 
become a developed country in just a few years. The unprecedented oil bonanza of 1973-1978 
presented Pérez with once in a lifetime opportunity to completely restructure the country, but 
also generated deep contradictions that would prove everlasting.  
The political rent seeking behaviour explained earlier defined the actions of Pérez’s government. 
His presidency was highly personalist, he isolated himself from criticism by ruling by decree, 
further concentrating bureaucratic power on the presidency; he used Bolivarian symbols to 
present him as the only leader capable to seize the unique opportunity brought by the oil boom: 
‘Many citizens and much of the press viewed Pérez’s success as the nation's success and his 
hopes as the nation's hopes’ (Karl 1997, pp.122–130). Pérez launched with little public debate La 
Gran Venezuela (The Great Venezuela), an ambitious national development plan; at the centre 
The Great Venezuela was the expansion and nationalisation of all basic industries: aluminium, 
steel and particularly oil (Karl 1997, p.124). The state-owned oil company Petróleos de 
Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (PDVSA) was created by decree in 1975, to take over the 
functions and operations of Corporación Venezolana de Petróleo (Venezuelan Corporation of 
Oil).  In 1976 Pérez nationalised the oil industry, just one year after the promulgation of a new 
law that reserved to the state the industry and commerce of hydrocarbons, and the expropriation 
of the iron and steel industries (Bye 1979, p.57). The next section provides a historical account of 
the relationship of PDVSA with the state in the years following the nationalisation of the oil 
industry, leading up to the changes brought by the rise to power of Hugo Chávez, in which the 
state-owned oil company became the key instrument for the consolidation of the Socialist State.  
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PDVSA: Instrument of the New Magical State 
 
In the years after the nationalisation of the oil industry, PDVSA projected an image of 
high efficiency that differentiated it from the rest of the public sector. Its managers, executives 
and workforce had been educated by the international oil corporations in their corporate culture 
and technocratic practices (Tinker Salas 2009; Wainberg 2004, p.4). It was largely assumed that 
the oil policies established in the aftermath of the nationalisation were aligned with national 
interests. Political parties (including parties of the Left) and most importantly Congress ‘lost 
interest in oil as a topic for debate and as a central feature of their programs’ (Parker 2006, p.62).  
This allowed the directors of PDVSA to keep the oil company’s policies on the margins of 
public debate. They pursued a policy of insulation from government interference on the grounds 
that they were serving public interest by protecting the state owned oil company from the 
endemic clientelist practices of public administration to preserve it  ‘as an efficient modern 
corporation’ (Parker 2006, p.63). This meant that the national executive, and particularly the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines, progressively relinquished their capacity to enforce policies, 
ending up as a ‘mere rubber stamp’ for the decisions of PDVSA (Parker 2006, p.62).   
Venezuela’s oil based prosperity came to a halt in 1983 with the devaluation of the national 
currency and the fall in oil prices, which initiated a downward spiral of economic stagnation, 
increase of foreign debt and inflation, with the subsequent deterioration of quality of life and 
impoverishment of large sectors of the population (Salamanca 1994, p.11). By late 1980s and 
early 1990s, PDVSA’s management pursued to transform the state-owned oil company into an 
international conglomerate. The second presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez was marked by 
economic, social and political turmoil. On 16 February 1989,  with barely a month in office, 
Pérez announced an IMF-backed programme of macroeconomic adjustments, which most 
notably included a 100 per cent increase in the price of gasoline enforced over the weekend of 25 
and 26 February (López-Maya 2003, p.120). Students were massively opposed to Pérez’s ‘neo-
liberal package’. A revolt known as the Caracazo that started as a student protest against the 
increase of transport fares and of price increases in general, was soon joined by working class 
sectors; the protests turned into a country-wide popular revolt that only subsided by way of 
brutal repression by the military and the National Guard (López-Maya 2003, p.129). The 
Caracazo, an event without precedents in Venezuela’s contemporary history, intensified the 
economic and social crisis but did not deter Pérez from pushing forward the neoliberal reforms. 
A political crisis unfolded in February 1992, when a small group of the army, with the support of 
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leftist civilian groups, staged a failed coup d’état led by the then Lieutenant-Coronel Hugo 
Chávez Frías (Coronil 2000, p.37). A second failed coup d’état attempt took place in November 
led by officers from the Navy and the Air Forces. Although Pérez’s presidency survived both 
coups, it did not survive the deterioration of his public image and political leadership; he was 
impeached by Congress in 1993 and put under house arrest by the Supreme Court (Salamanca 
1994, p.12).  
The cycle of boom and bust in oil prices paired with deep economic and political crises meant 
that by early 1990s PDVSA lacked ‘sufficient capital to develop their country’s oil and gas 
reserve base and the associated infrastructure, much less fund increasingly urgent economic 
development needs’ (Wainberg 2004, p.4). Notwithstanding these crises, PDVSA continued to 
push for internationalisation. Once PDVSA sought to establish itself as an international oil 
corporation it assumed the fiscal behaviours of any large private enterprise: it developed a policy 
of restricting the industry’s information available to the public, their profits abroad were not 
repatriated thus contributing nothing to the state’s coffers, it lobbied for tax reductions and 
limited fiscal obligations towards the state resulting in a legislative reform in 1993 that reduced 
PDVSA’s tax burden (Parker 2006, pp.63–64).  
It wasn’t until Rafael Caldera’s second presidency (1994-1999) that PDVSA consolidated its plan 
to reopen the industry to foreign capital and increase productive capacity through  the 
investment program of Apertura Petrolera (Oil Opening) that ran in contradiction of OPEC’s 
policy of maintaining oil prices by limiting production. The unexpected collapse of the 
commercial banking sector in 1994 required massive bailouts from the government that further 
deteriorated the socioeconomic landscape (Urbaneja 2013, p.343). Caldera’s government relied 
on the oil rent to counterbalance the high cost of the bailouts, rooted in the belief that the oil 
industry alone was sufficient to reactivate the economy. He implemented in early 1996 the 
Agenda Venezuela, a set of economic measures that closely resembled the much criticised 
neoliberal reforms of Carlos Andres Pérez (Urbaneja 2013, p.345). By late 1990s PDVSA’s 
management was accused of contributing to the state’s financial crisis by decreasing its fiscal 
contributions over the previous twenty years (Parker 2006, p.63).  
PDVSA’s corporate strategies were implemented without any major public debate. They were 
widely criticised by local political figures associated with leftist parties such as La Causa R and a 
few organisations and associations linked to the oil industry, whose nationalism protested the  
Apertura Petrolera for offering foreign investors favourable conditions at the expense of state 
revenues but most importantly, for breaking with OPEC (Parker 2006, p.63; Urbaneja 2013, 
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p.353). PDVSA was also criticised for being far less efficient than its well polished image 
suggested; international business statistics set PDVSA’s productivity far below other oil giants 
like Texaco, Exxon, Shell and BP-Amoco (Parker 2006, p.64). Among the most salient critical 
voices was former coup plotter and future president Hugo Chávez.  
Hugo Chávez, imprisoned after the failed coup d’état of 4 February 1992, was given a 
presidential pardon in 1994 which allowed him to launch his political career to run for the 1998 
presidential elections with his own party Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200) 
(Coronil 2000, p.36). Founded in 1983, the MBR-200 was a fusion of the military with groups of 
the radical left that up to that moment had been working in clandestinely (Silva-Ferrer 2014, 
p.77). Chávez campaigned as an outsider, on an anti-establishment platform tapping into the 
widespread public rejection of Puntofijismo, the old political system. Puntofijismo refers to the Pact 
of Punto Fijo signed by the three main political parties Acción Democrática, Comité de 
Organización Política Electoral Independiente COPEI and Unión Republicana Democrática 
URD on the aftermath of the ousting of the dictatorship in 1958 which created a bi-partisan 
system where Acción Democrática and COPEI alternated power for decades to come. Chávez’s 
presidential campaign  promised to put a halt to Puntofijismo through a peaceful revolution that 
would radically change the political landscape of Venezuela (Coronil 2000, p.34).  
PDVSA’s Apertura Petrolera was one of the key campaign issues of the presidential race (Wainberg 
2004, p.6). By exerting control over the main  source of the state’s income, PDVSA counted 
with a budget much larger than the government’s making it almost completely independent from 
the state that owned it, operating like a ‘prosperous first world company in an impoverished 
third-world nation’ (Maass 2009, p.202).  Chávez criticised PDVSA for functioning as a ‘state 
within the state’  (Giussepe Ávalo 2014, p.26; Párraga 2010, p.29) that contravened OPEC 
policies and contributed to the downfall of oil prices; by 1998 Venezuelan crude oil had reached 
the unprecedented low of USD 7.35 per barrel (Wainberg 2004, p.6). 
Hugo Chávez won the presidency by a landslide on a political platform outlined as an alternative 
to neoliberalism (Silva-Ferrer 2014; Urbaneja 2013, p.362; Parker 2006, p.64).  His presidential 
election marked the beginning of a shift in the relationship between PDVSA and the State, he 
implemented reforms in the areas of social policy, development models and most importantly, 
oil policies (Parker 2006, p.64).  Venezuelan historian Margarita López-Maya characterises 
Chávez presidencies as the ‘new debut of the magical state’ (2007; Coronil 2011), she identifies 
close similarities between Chávez’s government and the first presidency of Carlos Andres Pérez  
in the centralisation of power and the use of the oil rent to transform the state: ‘the Magical state 
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seems to be taking possession one again of the body of the nation’ (2007). Chapter four argues 
that Chávez went further; he came summon all the bureaucratic powers of the state to embody a 
New Magical State in his persona. Chávez’s government is better understood by viewing it in 
relation to Juan Vicente Gómez, Marcos Pérez Jiménez and particularly Carlos Andres Pérez 
(Coronil 2011, p.3). Chávez, just as presidents before him, promised to use the oil rent to bring 
wellbeing and prosperity to the Venezuelan people (Coronil 2000, p.40) but in the context of 
hegemonic neoliberal globalisation he proposed a different model for modernity and 
development, bidding to completely refashion the country into a Socialist State (Coronil 2011, 
p.9). The economic policies of the first two years of Chávez’s presidency focused on increasing 
oil revenue, strengthening Venezuela’s position inside OPEC, re-establishing state control over 
PDVSA and reinstating the policy making role of the Ministry of Energy and Mines (Parker 
2006, p.64; Wainberg 2004, p.6).  Conflict with PDVSA soon ensued. Between 1999 and 2000 
Chávez appointed successive presidents challenging PDVSA’s ‘meritocracy’  which did little to 
change the company’s corporate behaviour (Wainberg 2004, p.6; Parker 2006, p.65). In 
November 2001 a new Organic Law of Hydrocarbons was promulgated that reduced taxes, 
increased royalties, and ‘mandated state possession of a majority of stocks in all mixed 
companies engaged in primary activity in the oil industry’ (Parker 2006, p.65), which was strongly 
rejected by PDVSA’s top management.  
Conflict soon evolved into direct confrontation between the oil company and the president. 
PDVSA’s executives organized as Gente del Petroleo (People of Oil) joined forces with the 
opposition to overthrow Chávez, to take part in the one day general strike organized by 
FEDECAMARAS (Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce) and CTV 
(Confederation of Workers of Venezuela) in December 10 2001, which set the stage for the 
short lived coup d’état against Chávez in April 2002.  The confrontation continued in December 
2002 when a majority of PDVSA’s employees joined the Paro Petrolero (oil strike) which put the 
oil company to a standstill for 65 days (Parker 2006, p.65; Wainberg 2004, p.6). Once the 
government regained control of the oil company, Chávez dismissed eighteen thousand managers 
and engineers (Parker 2006, p.65; Wainberg 2004, p.7; Maass 2009, p.202). Reforms to PDVSA 
were implemented swiftly and with ease.  
The overhaul of PDVSA’s staff by Chávez meant that he could count with more loyal civil 
servants, which included naming his close ally Rafael Ramírez as its president, and his spouse, 
Beatrice Sansó de Ramírez as the General Manager of Centro de Arte La Estancia (now PDVSA 
La Estancia). He also increased the revenues to the state from 40 per cent to two thirds, and 
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most importantly he shifted the institutional channels of the flow of the rent from PDVSA to 
the state: instead of transferring oil money  to the government to be redistributed to the 
ministries that oversaw social programs PDVSA was put in charge of the new government 
programs, effectively transforming the oil company into the ‘engine of revolutionary change’ 
(Maass 2009, pp.202, 215). Chávez, aware of the diminished capacity of the public sector, 
believed that ‘an oil company would succeed where government ministries might not ’(Maass 
2009, p.215). In this sense, PDVSA went from being completely independent from the state to 
effectively becoming a ‘parallel state’.  The events of 2002 marked a turning point in Chávez 
politics, marking the radicalisation of his Bolivarian revolution to embark the nation on a 
transition towards Socialism (Coronil 2011, p.13). In 2005 he launched the Plan Siembra Petrolera 
(Sowing Oil Plan), named in honour of Uslar Pietri, a 25 year national plan and oil policy that 
forms the foundation for the advancement of Petrosocialism to lay the foundations for the 
transition towards the Socialist State. 
Chávez declared his third presidential term as the beginning of a new era, the era of the 
expansion of the Bolivarian Revolution towards Socialism, the only alternative for transcending 
capitalism: ‘The people voted for the way of socialism and it is socialism that the people want, 
what the fatherland needs’ (Chávez 2007c, p.63). He emphasised the uniqueness of his socialist 
project in an Aló Presidente  in July (programa #288, July 29th 2007) broadcasted from the 
Orinoco Oil Belt, where he affirmed that he was building a socialist model different to the 
‘Scientific Socialism’ that Karl Marx had originally envisioned, he was building a socialismo petrolero: 
Petrosocialism. Petrosocialism defines Hugo Chávez’s political and economic project, in which 
the oil rent is invested in the dismantlement of capitalism for the construction of the Venezuelan 
Socialist State. Bernard Mommer, Vice-Minister of Hydrocarbons and also former Director of 
PDVSA UK and Venezuela representative at OPEC was present in the broadcast; he affirmed 
on national TV that oil was a very favourable condition and a blessing for socialism because it 
provided the resources for an easier and accelerated advancement of the project (Chávez 2007b). 
PDVSA has been a key player in Hugo Chávez’s nationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist 
Petrosocialism. Rafael Ramírez, PDVSA’s president until his demotion in 2014 by President 
Nicolás Maduro, occupied simultaneously the posts of president of the state-owned oil company, 
Minister of Energy and Petroleum, Vice-President of Territorial Development of the Republic 
and President of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela PSUV (Párraga 2010, p.122; Colgan 
2013, pp.205–206). Ramírez was put in charge of PDVSA’s  new ‘social sense’ (Párraga 2010, 
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pp.24–26), to expand the oil company’s functions beyond its core commercial mission of 
generating maximum oil revenue to the state: 
‘Ramírez explicitly stated, and Chávez agreed, that PDVSA employees owe political 
allegiance to the Bolivarian Revolution, and that they should vote for Chávez or leave 
their jobs. PDVSA was delisted from the New York Stock Exchange, so its accounting 
practices no longer needed to comply with international standards for transparency. Most 
importantly, the company's revenue and assets became freely accessible to the 
government, which uses them for expenditure programs, including the misiones 
bolivarianas. In 2005, the transfers from PDVSA to the misiones were almost seven 
trillion bolivars ($3.2 trillion), more than twice the financial contributions from the 
central government itself.’ (Colgan 2013, p.206) 
In order to fulfil PDVSA’s new socialist sense, seven subsidiaries were created by Hugo Chávez 
mandate. The principal one, PDVSA Agrícola (PDVSA Agricultural) was created to literally ‘sow 
the oil’;  PDVAL (PDVSA Foods) distributes food staples but unlike the state-funded popular 
food markets Mercal it was aimed directly at the middle classes; PDVSA Servicios developed in 
partnership with  the Belarusian oil company, it  absorbed the seismic analyses previously 
commissioned to private contractors; PDVSA Industrial manufactures oil and non-oil related 
equipment; PDVSA Naval was created to expand the company’s fleet; PDVSA Gas Comunal to 
supply domestic gas; and PDVSA Urban Development took over some of the responsibilities of 
the Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Habitat (Párraga 2010, pp.26–29). The  new 
relationship between PDVSA and the government was summarised in the slogan ‘PDVSA now 
belongs to all’ to reflect the direct channelling of the oil rent into social investment (Corrales & 
Penfold 2011, p.83). In practice, ministries that had traditionally been in charge of social 
spending were replaced by PDVSA (Corrales & Penfold 2011, p.84). Beyond a dramaturgical 
exercise of bureaucratic power, the control over PDVSA enabled Chávez to summon all the 
Bureaucratic Powers of the State in his persona, but as will be made clear in chapter four and 
five, by delegating to PDVSA many functions of the government, he paved the way for the 
Venezuelan oil company to exercise power as a parallel state. Chapters four and five examine 
how, by consolidating as a parallel State Space, it absorbed the material space of the city by 
conceptualising it as an oil field.  
The Sowing Oil Plan uses farming language to designate a new mode of oil policy management 
as the following quote can attest: ‘[Sowing Oil Plan] speaks of the fertilisation of new productive 
operations; the gestation of operative plants in different fields of the economy’, ideas are ‘seeds’ 
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that grow into a ‘harvest’ of concrete results (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.416). The aims of the 
Sowing Oil Plan are organised in two ‘branches’: the socio-economic branch and the socio-
cultural branch. The most relevant materialisation of the socio-economic branch is the Oil Social 
District defined as:  
‘units of territorial management, of productive and ecological character, where 
engineering functions take place and studies on industrial development and projects 
implementation are conducted, with the purpose of consolidating strategies that in the 
process of exploration, production, refinement and commercialisation of oil and gas, 
enable the joint effort of PDVSA staff and the local population to guarantee endogenous 
development to eradicate poverty. The Oil Social Districts operate in areas near the great 
developments of extractive activity of hydrocarbons’ (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.419). 
The Oil Social Districts encompass a broad range of economic activities unrelated to the oil and 
gas industry, such as the production of rice, plantain, cattle, dairy, as well as other services such 
as health care and schools for indigenous populations. The plans of the Oil Social Districts are 
coordinated with regional and local governments: governorships, municipalities, parish councils 
and communal councils (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.420). The socio-cultural branch operates 
through PDVSA La Estancia, defined as an ‘organism’ that operates as the social and cultural 
arm of PDVSA (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.417). PDVSA La Estancia is a management unit 
ascribed to the Corporacion Venezolana de Petróleo. Its objectives are to ‘support programs of social 
development, strengthen the cultural identity of Venezuelans, promote and disseminate the 
historic and artistic heritage of the country, including the restoration of the fundamental works 
that conform that heritage’ (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.425).  These objectives have translated 
into a nation-wide program of recreational activities for the public based on ‘elevated cultural 
concepts’, the restoration of public art in Caracas as well as works of urban regeneration, 
including the transformation of former foreign oil companies’ headquarters into cultural centres 
in Maracaibo and Paraguaná. All these works are a direct investment of the oil rent, of ‘sowing 
oil’  to achieve the ‘democratisation of cultural goods’ (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.426). PDVSA 
La Estancia characterises its headquarters in Caracas, located in a restored colonial hacienda, as 
an ‘oasis of culture, peace and harmony’ (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.426).  This underpins 
PDVSA La Estancia‘s statement of ‘oil that harvests culture’ which informs the implementation 
of the Law of Hydrocarbons as implicit cultural policy (Ahearne 2009) examined in chapter five, 
and the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit  that expands on Yudice’s expediency of culture as a 
resource, explored in chapter six. Chapter four expands on Coronil’s Magical State to define 
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Hugo Chávezs’ use of the oil windfall and centralisation of Bureaucratic Power to embody a 
New Magical State in his persona; with the later absence of Chávez it is left to PDVSA La 
Estancia the ability to enact the power of marvel through works of public art restoration and 
urban regeneration in the material space of the city.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has traced state formation in Venezuela back to the postcolonial emergence 
of Latin American nations; it explained how the process of independence and construction of 
bureaucratic structures was fraught with contradictions, such as the enduring rigid social 
structure inherited from the colony that perpetuated the social and political power of elites was 
at odds with the project of national modernisation. It also explained how Venezuela did not 
become a rentier state with the rise of the oil industry in early twentieth century, but was born a 
rentier state from the moment it became a republic by adopting the mining codes inherited from 
Spanish Crown. It also provided a historical review of the political and cultural effects of the 
arrival of the oil industry in Venezuela, how the way the country dealt with the oil industry was 
akin to how it dealt with modernity manifested in the use of archaic bureaucratic instruments 
combined with the state’s technological and financial incapacity; state sovereignty was built 
around the notion of property and control over oil rent money. Oil lost its mineral quality, as it 
was understood predominantly as wealth that flowed from the soil directly to the state’s coffers 
and not as a complex technological reality.  
The chapter also established that Venezuela’s identity is entangled with oil; Venezuelan society 
learned to see itself as an oil nation with the  state as the single representative of a nation unified 
by oil (Coronil 1997, p.84). Coronil defines the manner in which the state exercised its monopoly 
over oil wealth as the Magical State,  a dramaturgical exercise of bureaucratic power through the 
power of marvel of massive infrastructure projects rather than with the power of reason (1997, 
p.5). Building on Coronil, the chapter characterised Hugo Chávez’ exercise of bureaucratic 
power as the New Magical State that channels the oil wealth to transform the country into a 
socialist society within a few years, using Petrosocialism as the foundation to build the Socialist 
State.  Furthermore, the chapter also established how Chávez transformed PDVSA into the 
engine of revolutionary change, delegating many non-oil related functions and social programs to 
the state-owned oil company, in the process consolidating as a parallel State Space, which as 
chapters four and five demonstrate, absorbed the material space of the city into the Oil Social 
District through the work of PDVSA La Estancia, enabled by the institutional fractures created 
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by the transition towards the Socialist State. This sets the background of this thesis investigation 
of the effects of Petrosocialism on culture and urban space, as the interfaces between oil and 
culture are inextricable from the bureaucratic power of the New Magical State and its role in 
shaping.  
Having laid out the historical background and cultural underpinnings of the relationship between 
oil and the state, chapter four examines the Absolute-Representations of Space produced by the 
discourse of Petrosocialism through the creation of the policy instruments of the Socialist State 
Space, which opened an institutional and legal breach that enabled PDVSA to enact the Oil 
Social District as a parallel State Space. Chapter four sets the scene to grasp the inherent 
conceptual contradictions of Petrosocialism and the distortions of the institutional apparatus of 
urban governance fostered by Chavez’s surrender of bureaucratic power to PDVSA. It also 
provides the basis to understand the diverse discursive mechanisms utilised by PDVSA La 
Estancia to re-present and re-imagine the material space of the city as an oil field, claiming that 
they are ‘harvesting’ culture from the ‘sowing’ of oil by construing a notion of culture-as-mineral-
deposit that ties culture to the land and to the extractive logic of the Petrostate.   
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Chapter four: Fault Lines of Bureaucratic Power and Parallel State Spaces  
 
Hugo Chávez was the leader and central figure of the Bolivarian revolution from his rise 
to power in 1999 until his death in March 2013, after winning re-election for a fourth term in 
December 2012. Petrosocialism was his personal project, penned by his own hand, a point he 
emphasised to the National Assembly in 2007 (Lopez-Maya 2013, p.102). Chávez embodied the 
New Magical State, discussed in chapter three, as he condensed the magical bureaucratic powers 
of oil in his persona to completely refashion the country under his alternative model guided by 
the dyad Petrosocialism-Socialist State using oil wealth once again as the vehicle for transforming 
the nation. 
This chapter explores entanglements between Hugo Chávez’s discourse and the new spatial 
strategies for the Socialist State Space, in the terms defined by Brenner & Elden as the 
mobilisation of state power to reorganise sociospatial relations. In so doing, it regards policy 
instruments as containers of Absolute-Representations of Space, legal entities of space that 
conceptualise the administrative boundaries of State Space. This chapter asks: what are the 
representations of space produced by the discourse of Petrosocialism? A study of the legal 
instruments for the management of territory and national plans will help elucidate what kind of 
spatiality is was conceived in Petrosocialism, which created a particular institutional resource 
curse (Corrales & Penfold 2011) that further entrenched the diminished state capacity that 
enabled PDVSA to construct a parallel State Space. This chapter sets the scene to grasp the 
inherent conceptual contradictions within Petrosocialism and the distortions of the institutional 
apparatus of urban governance fostered by Chavez’s surrender of bureaucratic power to 
PDVSA. It also provides the basis to understand the diverse institutional and discursive 
mechanisms utilised by PDVSA La Estancia appropriate and re-imagine the material space of the 
city as an oil field within the jurisdiction of the Oil Social District, claiming that they are 
‘harvesting’ culture from the ‘sowing’ of oil by construing a notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit 
that ties culture to the land and to the extractive logic of the Petrostate.   
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, it develops the Critical Discourse Analysis of a 
selection of public speeches of Hugo Chávez that, as described in the preceding chapter, were 
delivered between 2005 and 2007, the period where he gave form to Petrosocialism, a model that 
binds the oil industry with socialism. Furthermore, it demonstrates that although one of the key 
premises of his project was the establishment of a ‘new geometry of power’, the policy 
instruments created do not represent space geometrically but conceptualise it in political and 
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administrative terms to define the boundaries of State Space authority.  Secondly, it contrasts 
Chávez’s discourse with the expert opinions and perspectives of elites in regards to the state, its 
relationship with urban development and the institutional context of urban governance.  Finally, 
the chapter is concerned with tracing the process of the abrogation and substitution of the 
existing legal framework of political-administrative territorial management, fraught with 
inconsistencies that created a vacuum that diminished State Space authority, enabling PDVSA La 
Estancia to claim that the Social Oil Districts defined by the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons 
superseded regional and municipal authority. It takes a chronological approach to describe how 
Chávez’s discourse informed the creation and implementation of new spatial strategies outlined 
in the new policy instruments created between 2005 and 2010; it examines how land was 
considered crucial for the establishment of the Socialist State,  guided by the principle of 
Chávez’s New Geometry of Power, it required the dismantlement of the institutional apparatus 
through the abrogation and creation of policy instruments to reconfigure the national territory.  
 
Contradictions in Hugo Chávez’s Discursive Construction of Petrosocialism 
 
As previously discussed in chapter two, discourses can exert power because they are 
regulated, institutionalised and linked to action. In the case of Hugo Chávez his discursive 
exercise of bureaucratic power was manifested in changes to reality through his embodiment of 
the New Magical State. The oil windfall that characterised the period that frames this thesis 
(2007-2013) provided Chávez with the resources to reform the institutional apparatus and to 
create new policy instruments that conceptualise the Socialist State Space. Considering the 
prolific quantity of political speeches and public broadcasts delivered by Chávez during his three 
presidencies, which would have made the selection of public speeches extremely laborious and 
time consuming, for the aims of this thesis, the selection is based on the collection of speeches 
included in the online archive of the former President of PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, selected as 
the most relevant discursive events in matters of national oil policy.  The New Magical State 
frames the discursive plane from which Chávez spoke, the power of his performative utterances 
to enact a new reality manifested in the creation of new policy instruments, is echoed in the 
speeches of the leaders of PDVSA and PDVSA La Estancia, examined in chapter five, and novel 
visual representations of Petrosocialism in urban space, explored in chapter six.  
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The speeches analysed in this section were delivered during a period of steady rise in oil prices -
they reached the USD100 per barrel in 2008 but began a steady decline in 2013 to reach values 
below USD40 per barrel in early 2016 (OPEC 2016).  
To select the discourse fragments relevant for analysis in Hugo Chávez’s speeches, a word 
frequency query found that the five most frequently used 1000 words are: 
Venezuela 189 
Presidente [President] 179 
Petróleo [Oil] 146  
Desarrollo [Development] 110  
Palabras [Words] 109 
 
Discarding the common words Venezuela, Presidente and Palabras, oil and development are the two 
most recurrent terms in the six speeches. Far behind, the terms socialismo and socialista are 
referenced 19 and 9 times respectively. To explore which kind of relationship between oil and 
socialism is inferred within Chávez’s speeches search queries of the terms socialista, socialismo and 
petróleo where used to identify and extract the key passages collated in Table 7.  
The word socialista (socialist) appears only in two of the five speeches: 
Name References Coverage 
Palabras del Presidente de la República, Comandante Hugo Chávez, 2007 8 0.08% 
Palabras del Jefe de Estado en la presentación del “Plan Siembra Petrolera”, 2005 1 0.01% 
Table 4 
The word socialismo is referenced in three of his speeches, most mentions were concentrated in 
his presidential inauguration speech of January 2007: 
Name References Coverage 
Palabras del Presidente de la República, Comandante Hugo Chávez, 2007 16 0.15% 
Discurso del Presidente Hugo Chávez en la Sesión de Apertura de la 3era 
Cumbre de la OPEP, 2007 
1 0.03% 
2005_Palabras del Jefe de Estado en la presentación del “Plan Siembra 
Petrolera”, 2005 
2 0.02% 
Table 5 
Meanwhile, the word petróleo features in every speech but most predominantly in the speech 
delivered at the 141st Extraordinary Meeting of OPEC (2007) mentioned 57 times, followed by 
the speech for the presentation of the Sowing Oil Plan (2005) mentioned 43 times. In the 
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remaining speeches, the term is mentioned 19 times (IV Summit of Petrocaribe and 3rd Summit 
of OPEC), to 5 and 3 (Inauguration Speech in 2007 and the LXI ONU General Assembly, 
respectively): 
Name References Coverage 
Palabras del Presidente Chávez en la Instalación de la 141ª Reunión Extraordinaria 
de la OPEP, 2006 
57 0.53% 
Palabras del Jefe de Estado en la presentación del “Plan Siembra Petrolera”, 2005 43 0.41% 
Discurso del Presidente Hugo Chávez en la Sesión de Apertura de la 3era Cumbre 
de la OPEP, 2007 
19 0.41% 
Palabras del Presidente Hugo Chávez Frías en la inauguración de la IV Cumbre de 
Petrocaribe, 2007 
19 0.17% 
Palabras del Presidente de la República, Comandante Hugo Chávez, 2007 5 0.04% 
Hugo Chávez LXI Asamblea General de la ONU, 2007 3 0.05% 
Table 6 
Relevant discourse fragments were extracted from the speeches by cross referencing the three 
terms socialista, socialismo, and petróleo, collated in Table 7: 
Key passages Speech Title Date / Context 
He said, like saying farewell at his over 90 years 
of age: ‘we could not or did not know how or 
did not want to sow oil’. I propose in honour to 
the spirit of that phrase and why not, to that of 
doctor Uslar Pietri and that of Juan Pérez 
Alfonzo and to all those that warned, wrote, 
said, fought and even died for oil sovereignty, 
that we call this 2005-2030 Plan, Sowing Oil.  
 
Then this Project is going to be, from today, 
one of the enclaves, of the levers to carry 
forward the socialist project, not to underpin the 
capitalist model of exploitation. That would be 
contrary to constitutional mandate and contrary 
to national interest, but nobody be scared by 
this, it is about equality and the economic, 
social, integral development of the country.  
Extractos del discurso 
ofrecido por el Ciudadano 
Presidente de la República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela, 
Hugo Chávez Frías, con 
motivo de la presentación 
de los Planes Estratégicos 
de Petróleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA)  
 
18 August 2005 
Caracas, Hotel Caracas 
Hilton. 
 
Presentation of the 
strategic plans of 
PDVSA, which 
included the Plan 
Siembra Petrolera 
(Sowing Oil Plan) 
There never was one drop of oil for the people 
of Venezuela, oil was sucked by the creole 
Palabras del Presidente 
Chávez en la Instalación de 
1 June 2006 
Caracas. 
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oligarchy and above all by the North-American 
empire. Oil now belongs to the Venezuelan 
people and oil will be for justice, for equality, 
for the development of our people, that is the 
truth.  
 
OPEC was born 45 years ago. OPEC was put to 
its knees. OPEC rose. OPEC will live with 
success forever. So be it. I formally declare this 
141st Assembly of Ministers and Governors 
inaugurated.   
la 141ª Reunión 
Extraordinaria de la 
Conferencia Ministerial de 
la Organización de Países 
Exportadores de Petróleo 
OPEP 
 
141st Extraordinary 
meeting of the 
Ministerial Conference 
of OPEC 
Nothing and nobody will divert us from the 
road towards Bolivarian socialism, Venezuelan 
socialism, our socialism.  
 
Second motor: the socialist constitutional 
reform, we are going towards the Socialist 
Republic of Venezuela and that requires a 
profound reform of the National Constitution, 
our Bolivarian Constitution.  
 
We have to go marching towards the formation 
of a Communal State and the oil Bourgeois 
State that still lives, that is still living and 
kicking, we have to dismantle it progressively 
whilst we are building the Communal State, the 
Socialist State, the Bolivarian State. A State that 
has the conditions and the capacity to drive a 
revolution. Almost all states were born to halt 
revolutions. What a challenge we have! To turn 
the oil counter revolutionary state into a 
revolutionary State.  
Palabras del Presidente de 
la Republica Comandante 
Hugo Chávez 
8 January 2007 
Caracas. 
 
First public speech of 
2007, on the 
inauguration of his 
third presidential period 
Table 7 
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The following statements were extracted from the discourse fragments for analysis, identifying 
the relevant performative utterances: 
A. I propose in honour of the spirit of that phrase and why not, to that of doctor Uslar and 
that of Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo and to all those that warned, wrote, said, fought and 
even died for the national oil sovereignty, that we call this Plan 2005-2030, Sowing Oil.  
B. This project will be, from today, one of the enclaves, of the levers to carry forward the 
socialist project, not to truss the capitalist model of exploitation.  
C. Now oil belongs to the Venezuelan people and oil will be for justice, for equality, for the 
development of our people, that is the truth.  
D. OPEC was born 45 years ago. OPEC was brought to its knees. OPEC rose. OPEC will 
live with success for ever. So be it. 
E. Nothing and nobody will divert us from the road towards the bolivarian socialism, the 
Venezuelan socialism, our socialism.  
F. we are headed towards the Socialist Republic of Venezuela. 
G. Towards the conformation of a communal State and the old bourgeois State that is still 
alive, alive and kicking, we have to dismount it progressively whilst we are building the 
communal State, the socialist State, the Bolivarian State. (…) Transform the old counter 
revolutionary State into a revolutionary State.   
Chávez’s performative utterances around oil are neither founded in fiction nor are they mere 
dramaturgical exercises of Bureaucratic Power. Petrosocialism relied on a certainty: Venezuela 
stands over the biggest proven oil reserves in the world, surpassing Saudi Arabia’s (Rowling 
2012) which led Chávez to assume that Venezuela would never run out oil, and would enjoy a 
never-ending supply of oil rent. In other words, the success of Petrosocialism relied on the 
success of global oil capitalism. This meant that the merger of oil rentierism and socialism of 
Petrosocialism could endure forever, fed by the illusion of never ending high oil revenues. This 
illusion is what informs the performative utterance in statement D: ‘OPEC will live with success 
for ever. So be it’. The so be it transforms an expression of hope into truth, and thus Chávez 
reaffirms his power as the leading figure of the revolution and of OPEC.   
These certainties are reflected in Chávez’s particular version of Petro-socialism: Venezuelan, 
Bolivarian, and oil-based. Statement A, I propose […] that we call this Plan 2005-2030 Sowing Oil 
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Plan, is evidence of the power of Chávez’s discourse, he is the sole authority who can verbalise 
the performative utterance that gives birth and names the strategy envisioned to govern the 
Venezuelan oil industry, and the country at large, for the following 25 years: the Sowing Oil Plan. 
It was also a way of affirming he would succeed in ‘sowing oil’ where previous leaders had failed.  
Chávez’s use of farming language to underpin that oil would finally be ‘sowed’ highlights that his 
bureaucratic power as the  New Magical State (Coronil 2011, p.4; López-Maya 2007; Joyce & 
Bennett 2010) was tied to the land and its subsoil, where all the powers of nature and its 
resources originate.  
The purpose of the Sowing Oil Plan is cemented in the performative utterances in statements B, 
E, F and G. At the time these speeches were delivered, the Socialist State had yet to be realised, 
but it is verbalised as a present truth. He also consolidates the Sowing Oil Plan as the pillar of 
Petrosocialism, moulding the role PDVSA as the engine of revolutionary change (Maass 2009, 
p.202,2015): oil is put at the service of Socialism. He stresses the particular relationship his 
model established between oil, the state and the people in the performative utterance in 
statement C: ‘oil now belongs to the Venezuelan people’. As discussed in chapter three, the 
Venezuelan Petrostate holds the monopoly over oil, and in turn, oil has mediated the 
relationship between society and the state. By embodying the New Magical State, Chávez was 
able to construct a direct relationship between oil and the people whilst exerting full control over 
the distribution of oil revenue. The reality of the statement is enacted by adding that ‘oil will be 
for justice, for equality, for the development of our people’ and if any doubts lingered in his 
audience, he closes by declaring that ‘that is the truth’. Although Chávez’s proposal to reform the 
Constitution was defeated in a referendum in 2007, he proceeded to carry out the proposed 
reforms by governing by decree to devise the policy instruments for the dismantlement of what 
he characterised as the ‘counter revolutionary state’. 
But Chávez’s anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal model for the Socialist State would not cease to 
be an oil rentier state. Whilst he discursively called for the eradication of capitalism, in practice, 
he advocated for the longevity of OPEC and global oil capitalism. Given that the vast majority 
of state revenue comes from oil exports, it highlights the intrinsic contradiction of 
Petrosocialism, when Lenin himself had condemned the rentier state as a parasite of decadent 
capitalism, as discussed in chapter one (Lenin 1978, p.96).  However, Chávez reconciled this 
incongruence when he affirmed that whilst in the past oil was used as a force of capitalist 
domination and plunder by oil corporations and a neoliberal PDVSA loyal to the empire (the 
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United States), in Petrosocialism oil would become a force of liberation, equality and 
development.  
PDVSA’s Sowing Oil Plan was devised as an alternative model to the neoliberal strategies of the 
‘old’ PDVSA. The name uses farming language to underpin the idea that oil can be ‘sowed’ to 
suggest a natural renewable cycle of sowing and harvesting the subsoil for oil, which as will be 
discussed in chapter five and six, informs the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit advanced by 
PDVSA La Estancia. Thus, the advancement of Petrosocialism called for the dismantlement of 
the ‘old’ institutional structures to pave the way for the consolidation of the Socialist State.  
Chávez did not envision a post-oil world, on the contrary, his model relied on the illusion of an 
inexhaustible supply of oil that assured the endurance of Petrosocialism and the Socialist State;  a 
world in which OPEC would forever guarantee high oil prices and a continuous flow of oil rent 
to the state’s coffers. For Chávez, oil rentierism was necessary for Socialism to be irreversible. 
The policies and strategies created for the advancement of Petrosocialism were based on 
unrealistic expectations of inexhaustible high oil revenues, expectations that began to collapse in 
2013.  
The following section explores the perceptions and opinions of elites in regards to Chávez’s 
Bureaucratic Power and its relationship with urban development and the institutional apparatus 
of urban governance. The purpose is to contrast the Absolute-Representations of Space of the 
Socialist State informed by Chávez discourse with the abrogated Absolute-Representations of 
Space, based on the opinions and perceptions of expert elites interviewed, based on their sense 
of ownership and authority on matters related to urban development and the city. Their opinions 
elucidate, on one hand, the ability of Chávez’s discourse to change reality in regards to State 
Space, and on the other, it substantiates the characterisation of Chávez as the embodiment of the 
New Magical State.   
Elites’ Perspectives on the Effect of Hugo Chávez’s Bureaucratic Power on the City 
 
Whilst Chávez discursively summoned all the bureaucratic powers of the Petrostate as 
the embodiment of the New Magical State, the oil boom allowed him to entrench the fractures 
and erosion of the existing institutional apparatus to ease the dismantlement of the ‘old’ state and 
establish the new Socialist State. The pervasive influence of oil in all matters of national life was 
underlined by Corrales & Penfold (2011, pp.72–75) in chapter one, stressing that Hugo Chávez’s 
regime can only be understood by engaging with how oil flows and interacts with pre-existing 
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institutional configurations through the institutional resource curse perspective.  Along these 
lines, this section focuses on elites’ responses in regards to the relationship between oil wealth 
and the institutional apparatus of urban governance. The aim is to explore how elites perceived 
Chávez’s Bureaucratic Power as it manifested in the urban development and institutional 
apparatus that governs Caracas.  
Elites compared Chávez’s government’s urban policies and performance in the investment of the 
oil windfall to the oil-boom and bust between 1970s and 1998. Between 2005 and 2012 Chávez 
made significant changes to the institutional structure of national, regional and local government: 
institutions and policy instruments were eliminated and new ones created in the transition 
towards the Socialist State. This reshuffle was perceived as deficient planning by elites. When 
asked what role the state plays in urban management, referring in particular to Caracas, the 
predominant response was to acknowledge the centrality of the state in all matters concerning 
city planning with statements such as: 
 ‘Everything. That is to say, the role of the state… the role of the state… No… the role 
of this State’ (PDVSA La Estancia) 
 ‘Everything is done from the central state’ (O2) 
 ‘A dominant state and therefore, determining (by action or by omission)’ (R3) 
 ‘The role of the state has been fundamental’ (R2) 
 ‘I would say all the importance, because it’s a historical fact that there is a direct 
relationship between state and oil’ (A1) 
 ‘The state has a fundamental role’ (A5)   
‘The State, as the central axis of economic and political power, has configured in a 
determining manner all of the country’ (W1)   
 ‘The state has had a very important role (…) It’s a state of great works, and complete 
neglect of the small’ (J1) 
 
The interviewees assessed the role of the state from the scale of the city to reveal how they 
perceive the state at the scale of the nation. From the statements above three ‘attributes’ of the 
state can be identified, based on its perceived role or degree of influence in urban development 
collated in Table 8: 
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The state as a totality  In-capacity of the state  Oil determines the state 
Everything (this state) 
Central 
Dominant 
Determining 
Fundamental  
Directly and indirectly responsible 
Total concentration of power 
All the importance 
Central axis 
Very important 
Acts post-morten 
Fractured 
Bad father 
State is fundamental in oil cities 
A direct relationship between state 
and oil 
A crisis of oil is a crisis of the state  
Table 8 
All interviewees regarded the state as a pervasive force that drives the policies of urban planning 
as well as urban development and infrastructure of the capital city, hinting at a very small 
participation of the private sector. The state is regarded as a dominant, fundamental and central 
force that determines the Absolute-Material Space of the city as well as its spatial practices. Most 
elites spoke of the state as a totality that governs every aspect of urban development. Only one 
made an exception, the General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia emphasised this state, not the 
state. This state refers directly to PDVSA in its condition as a parallel state, which as this chapter 
argues in part three, also possesses its own State Space manifested in the Oil Social Districts 
defined by the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons.  
However, whilst the state is perceived as a dominant force, in practice its dominance is 
undermined by its incapacity, as expressed by the statements grouped under ‘in-capacity of the 
state’ in Table 8. The state is characterised by A3 as a ‘fractured head’, its institutional fractures 
both caused and aggravated by oil wealth: ‘we are a society with a fractured head (…) because oil 
is there, because everything is built easily, we can do it easily, we don’t have to come together’. 
Oil wealth is perceived as a determining factor, establishing a direct relationship between the oil 
industry and the state (A1). The fundamental role played by the state in the urban development 
of the capital city is explained by characterising Caracas as the principal ‘oil city’ in Venezuela 
(R1). Finally, and more poignantly, a negative symbiotic relationship is described by drawing a 
parallel between the crises of oil prices in the global market and the crises of the State (W1). 
According to the rentier state theory discussed in chapter one, the abundance of oil wealth 
allows the Petrostate to develop predominantly expenditure policies as well as to disregard 
representative bargains. In practice this currently tends to favour the elites in government aligned 
with the Bolivarian revolution whilst leaving very little room for sectors that are under-
represented or aligned with the revolution.   
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Hence, the current state of urban planning was characterised in negative terms as the following 
statements can attest: 
‘There is no vision (…) they plan by helicopter’ (O2) 
‘The consolidation of improvisation as method’ (R3) 
 ‘Frank ineptitude in matters of public planning’ (R2)   
 ‘Absolute absence of a notion of the concept of planning’ (R4) 
 ‘Current urban planning has deeper characteristics in this sense [magic or mythic in 
Coronil’s or Torres terms, respectively], to the point that I would qualify it as spasmodic 
and delirious’ (R1) 
 ‘There is none’ (A1) 
 ‘Urban policy is an area where the current system shows absolute paralysis’ (A4) 
 ‘Oil is being used to strengthen the centralist government’ (O3) 
 ‘Interest in urban planning has diminished as more money has come into the country 
from the sale of oil’ (A5) 
‘an anarchic management of public planning’ (W1) 
 ‘I think that the vision of President Chávez is a vision, first, of rupture’ (A2) 
‘acted without much planning’ (J1) 
‘Evidently, there has to exist planning.(…) we are waging for a new scheme for the city’ 
(PDVSA La Estancia) 
 
The statements are grouped in three common threads in table 9: 
No Planning  Poor Planning  New vision of planning  
No vision 
Absolute absence 
None 
Absolute paralysis 
Without 
Improvisation 
Ineptitude 
Disconnected 
Contradictory 
Spasmodic 
delirious 
Centralist 
Diminished 
At least there is one 
Fracture 
Anarchic  
Discretionarily 
A new scheme  
Vision of rupture 
Table 9 
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A third of the respondents qualified planning as non-existent in comparison to administrations 
prior to Chávez’s government. The statements from which the above keywords are extracted are 
blunt, affirming there is an absolute lack of urban planning which is characterised as improvised, 
disorganised, haphazard and fraught with discretionary decisions that suggests a chaotic state of 
affairs in urban governance. Only two respondents, aligned with the revolution, characterised the 
Bolivarian government’s urban management in positive terms, either as a ‘new scheme’ (PDVSA 
La Estancia) or ‘a vision of rupture’ (A2) that breaks away from the ‘neoliberal’ way government 
functioned prior to the arrival of Hugo Chávez. By 2014, the year these interviews were 
conducted, the transition towards the Socialist State was well under way, having been continued 
by Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s chosen successor. One of the major changes undertaken was the 
reconfiguration of the policies and institutional apparatus governing State Space, a process that 
generated contradictions and further fragmentation of the existing inefficient legal framework. 
This is the new scheme/vision of rupture PDVSA La Estancia and A2 refer to, but the effect of 
this new vision of rupture is seen by the rest of the respondents as working against the 
consolidation of any institutional apparatus. There is a consensus among the elites interviewed in 
characterising it as an ongoing process of fragmentation that further erodes urban governance. A 
thread runs through the interviews that describe the institutional structure as chaotic, 
labyrinthine and inefficient: ‘Indecipherable labyrinth’ (R3), ‘the institutions are completely 
crumbled’ (A3), ‘Isolated and inefficient bodies’ (R4), ‘Institutional atomisation’ (J1). The words 
used to describe the institutional apparatus indicate the difficulty to understand or visualise how 
the bureaucracy of the state, even at the scale of local government, currently functions. It is 
perceived as unreadable, to the point that some interviewees qualified it as practically non-
existent: ‘There is no institutional structure’ (A3), ‘if there is one, let me know’ (A6). This 
perceived non-existence of any institutional structure is explained by the ‘personal’ character of 
government in Venezuela:  
‘The institutional chaos in which we are submerged is too difficult to map, but I think it’s 
the first thing we need to highlight. It’s not so much a product but a chaotic map, which 
makes it very difficult for the citizen to know what authority to go to, and the person 
ends up being the one that solves the problem. You access the person, not the 
institution.’ (A1) 
In other words, when the state’s bureaucracy becomes unreadable, the relationship of common 
citizens with the state is ‘personalised’, meaning that by getting access to the particular person 
who holds the bureaucratic power they are able to bypass the inefficient and chaotic bureaucratic 
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labyrinth for a more expedite and direct solution to any problem. On a larger scale, this speaks of 
personalisation across all the institutional apparatus of the state, revealing that as Hugo Chávez 
concentrated the bureaucratic powers of the state in his persona,  the bureaucratic structure was 
further fragmented as the ‘person’ in charge becomes more powerful that the structure they 
stand for.  
The next section discusses how Chávez’s Bureaucratic Powers materialised in refashioning the 
state’s territorial strategies, in the terms defined by Brenner & Elden, as a means of devising new 
spatial policies to dismantle the existing institutional apparatus of urban governance through the 
creation of new legal instruments for the construction of a Socialist State Space.  
Overlaps and Vacuums in the Production of the Socialist State Space   
 
Chávez had outlined in his First Socialist Plan 2007-2013 that the Five Motors of the 
Bolivarian Revolution contemplated the production of a New Geometry of Power that 
conceptualises the political and administrative boundaries of  the Socialist State Space, in conflict 
with the existing institutional apparatus and the CRBV, creating fault lines within the 
bureaucratic structure that enabled PDVSA La Estancia to interpret and implement the Law of 
Hydrocarbons as a territorial policy and implicit cultural policy instrument. 
Language was an important element  in the discursive construction and legitimisation of Hugo 
Chávez ideological and political project (Aponte Moreno 2008); he proclaimed in his televised re-
election speech of December 2006 that: 
‘Today is a point of departure, of ignition. Today begins a new epoch, a new era, within 
the national project of Bolivarian development summarised in four lines. The new epoch 
that begins today will have as its central idea and force the deepening, enlargement and 
expansion of the Bolivarian revolution, of the revolutionary democracy, in the life of 
Venezuela towards socialism’ (BBC Mundo 2006) 
He declared that the expansion of the Bolivarian Revolution towards Socialism was the only 
alternative for transcending capitalism (Chávez 2007c, p.63). In January 2007 he resumed his 
weekly Sunday television show Aló Presidente (Chávez 2007a) to launch the Five Motors of the 
Bolivarian Revolution. He emphasised that his project was unique because he was building a 
socialist model different to the socialism of Marx, he was building Petrosocialism. Bernard 
Mommer, the Vice-Minister of Hydrocarbons affirmed that oil was a blessing for socialism 
138 
 
because it provided the resources that allowed an easy and swift advancement of the transition 
towards the Socialist State (Chávez 2007b). The transition was outlined in the First Socialist Plan 
for the Economic and Social Development of the Nation 2007-2013, which included a five steps 
strategy to create the Venezuelan socialist model named the Five Motors of the Bolivarian 
Revolution. It is worth describing briefly the sequence proposed by Chávez for the ‘ignition’ of 
the Five Motors:  
First Motor: Ley Habilitante (Enabling Law to give special powers to the President to 
legislate) 
Second Motor: Reforma Constitucional (Reform of the 1999 Constitution, Socialist rule of 
law -the proposal lost the referendum vote in 2007) 
Third Motor: Educacion “Moral y Luces” (Lights and Morals Education, socialist values in 
national public education) 
Fourth Motor: Nueva Geometría del Poder (New Geometry of Power, socialist 
reorganisation of national geopolitics, the re-distribution of political, economic, social 
and military power in the national territory) 
Fifth Motor: Explosión del poder comunal (Explosion of Communal Power, the 
implementation and consolidation of the Communal State, socialist democracy).  
The First Motor, the Enabling Law, was named ‘the law of laws’ that granted Hugo Chávez all 
the legislative powers to reform laws and create new ones. In other words, it is the law that 
allowed him to concentrate all the Bureaucratic Powers of the state. The First Motor needed to 
run in parallel with the Second Motor: the reform of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela of 1999 (CBRV) to expand control over the oil and gas industry to consolidate 
Chávez as the embodiment of the New Magical State, whilst insisting on creating an alternative 
model to reorganise the territory (Chávez 2007c, p.65). The Third Motor is a national plan of 
moral, political, economic, and social education. The Fourth Motor consists in the creation of 
the ‘New Geometry of Power’ (associated with the reform of the political territorial division in 
the Second Motor), proposed as a way to re-distribute political, social, economic and military 
powers over the space of the country according to the new socialist order (Chávez 2007c, p.67). 
Finally, the first four motors create the conditions for the ignition of the fifth: Communal 
Power. The climax of the sequence of ‘ignition’ is the establishment of the Socialist State, and 
with it the complete dismantlement of the existing institutional apparatus (Chávez 2007c, p.72). 
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It also involved the creation of a socialist model of federal territories and cities to transition 
towards the socialist city,  a city where communal power would render parishes, councils, 
municipalities and its authorities obsolete (Chávez 2007c, p.69). Chávez affirmed that all these 
ideas occurred to him whilst flying over the countryside in a helicopter using binoculars to look 
below like a modernist town planner and wondering what could be done to develop the large 
expanses of uninhabited land which he saw as voids of bureaucratic power: ‘we have great 
uninhabited spaces where there is no state, where there is no law, and therefore there is no 
Republic’ (2007c, p.70).  
This chapter is particularly concerned with the Fourth Motor: the development of the New 
Geometry of Power to eliminate what was regarded as gaps of State Space authority through the 
redistribution of power across the national territory. The term is an appropriation of Doreen 
Massey’s ‘power-geometry of time-space compression’, which concerns power differentials 
regarding who and who doesn’t control flow and mobility which reflects the unequal distribution 
of power in relation to time-space compression (Massey 1991, p.149; Massey 1994, p.150). The 
term time-space compression, first proposed by David Harvey to refer to the acceleration of 
technology, communications and economic activities that lead to the annihilation of spatial 
boundaries and distances is used by Massey to speak of ‘the geographical stretching of social 
relations, and to our experience of the world’ unevenly distributed under a predominantly 
westernised and colonised view (Massey 1994, p.147). Massey’s rhetoric was important for Hugo 
Chávez, her language was influential but it wasn’t applied in the terms she intended, as the 
following quote from Chávez inaugural speech of 8 January 2007 demonstrates: 
‘The fourth: something that sounds a little technical, pardon me, the new geometry of 
power over the national map. The new geometry, you know that is has like three 
dimensions, the dimension in line, the distance; the dimension in extension of a territory 
and the volumetric dimension, the content, the volume. I want us to redesign the 
geometry of power in Venezuela. This will lead to depths. An example is how the Apure 
State is organised, this will take us to review organic laws such as the municipal councils, 
that remains intact and even more, it’s worse than before, Municipal Councils that do not 
have any power, that are the same old structures, the same old fourth republican State, 
the regions of the country, how to achieve a symmetrical application of political power, 
of economic, social, military power across the length and width of the whole territory’ 
(Chávez 2007d) 
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Although in this speech Chávez presents the notion of New Power Geometry in simplistic 
geometric terms, he acknowledged that the existing deficiencies of bureaucratic power over the 
territory could endanger the consolidation of the Socialist State, a crucial matter for the longevity 
of his political project.  Lefebvre’s notion of State Space elaborated by Brenner & Elden is useful 
to understand this. Territory is a political form of space shaped by historically specific forms of 
economic and political interventions of the state. Given that Chávez’s ultimate purpose was to 
bring into being a future socialist society he set off to completely  restructure the state apparatus, 
in the process demolishing the bureaucratic structures that were deemed an obstacle or 
unnecessary.  A new Socialist State could not be consolidated unless it manifested as well as a 
Socialist State Space, crucial not only in terms of the Bureaucratic Power of the state but most 
importantly to secure control and authority over the subsoil from which oil wealth and the 
magical powers of the New Magical State originate.  
The unexpected death of Hugo Chávez in 2013 left the transition towards the Socialist State 
Space incomplete and orphaned of its mastermind. The need to consolidate the Socialist State in 
the absence of Chávez prompted the publication of a posthumous compendium of Chávez’s 
ideas on the New Geometry of Power. The book Estado Comunal: La Nueva Geometria del Poder 
(Comunal State: The New Geometry of Power) (2014), published by the National Assembly was 
written by Manuel Briceño Méndez, a representative of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela 
PSUV to the National Assembly and a member of the Permanent Commission of Environment, 
Natural Resources and Climate Change. The book is presented as a ‘humble pedagogical 
contribution in the revolutionary debate’ around the creation of the new Socialist State, an 
alternative to the destructive model of capitalism to enable the territorialisation of public policies 
necessary to achieve ‘social collective wellbeing and supreme happiness’ (2014, p.10). Most 
relevant for this thesis is that the book (Briceño Méndez 2014, p.11) outlines how Hugo Chávez 
ideas for the creation of a new socialist society were tied to the territory.  
Therefore, rather than providing a critical discussion on the ‘New Geometry of Power’, the book 
primarily echoes the structure of Chávez’s Second Socialist Plan for the Nation 2013-2019 
(Maduro Moros 2013), which calls for the territorialisation of politics, in particular geographical 
spaces defined by the communities, which would then ‘expand like a giant spider web, covering 
the whole territory’ (Briceño Méndez 2014, p.12) through the complete disaggregation of the 
bureaucratic power into specific geographical areas of popular power to conform  a ‘socialist 
geographical space’ with political, social, economic and historical dimensions (Briceño Méndez 
2014, pp.13, 16, 26). The book  does not provide a working definition of ‘socialist geographical 
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space’, it is used to broadly refer to the territorialisation of the public policies of the Socialist 
State, as a way of to consolidate a Socialist State Space.  
However, the book makes no mentions of oil, and by that same token, of Petrosocialism, it only 
refers generally to ‘natural resources’ which can be read between the lines as an abandonment of 
Petrosocialism, and ‘sowing oil’ upon the death of Hugo Chávez. By 2014 the steep decline of 
global oil prices had reached historic lows, PDVSA had been showing severe deficiencies due to 
the overextension of its duties and lack of investment, which translated into a severe withdrawal 
of the oil wealth that formed the basis of Petrosocialism. 
The next part of this chapter takes a chronological approach to examine the process of 
dismantlement and disaggregation of bureaucratic power as prescribed by the National Project 
Simón Bolivar First Socialist Plan 2007-2013. It is particularly concerned with the process of 
abrogation of the existing legal instruments of territorial management and creation of the legal 
entities of the Socialist State Space. It demonstrates that the process was far from coherent as it 
was fraught with inconsistencies that further fragmented and eroded the already diminished state 
capacity in urban governance, particularly in Caracas. Although it did not translate into an actual 
transformation of the material space of the city, it had clear and palpable implications in 
generating an overlap of conflicting Absolute-Representations of Space confirming elites’ 
perceptions of institutional chaos. This is important to the overall argument of this thesis, as the 
overlaps and discrepancies of Absolute-Representations of Space of the abrogated policy 
instruments, PDVSA’s State Space and the Socialist State were instrumental in enabling PDVSA 
La Estancia to override the authority of municipalities by abiding to the Organic Law of 
Hydrocarbons. This allowed PDVSA La Estancia to appropriate the material space of the city re-
conceptualised as an oil field, pertaining to the Oil Social Districts, made manifest physically in 
the city and discursively in the adverts through the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit that 
binds culture to the subsoil, conceived by the oil company as a material entity that accumulates in 
the subsoil, under the tight control of the Petrostate. 
The re-election of Hugo Chávez’s in 2006 marked a shift in his policies when he put forward the 
National Project Simón Bolívar First Socialist Plan 2007-2013 (PPS) along with the Five Motors 
of the Revolution, discussed earlier. The PPS (Chávez 2008) is subdivided into six ‘directives’: 
I. New Socialist Ethic 
II. Supreme Social Happiness 
III. Protagonist and Revolutionary Democracy 
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IV. Socialist Productive Model 
V. New National Geopolitics 
VI. New International Geopolitics (Venezuela: New Energy World Power) 
The PPS required the replacement of the existing institutional apparatus with the apparatus of 
the Socialist State.  Of special interest for this chapter are directives IV, V and VI, for what they 
reveal about how the PPS conceptualised the relationship between territory, Petrosocialism and 
the consolidation of the Socialist State. Section IV establishes that the socialist model is founded 
on the state’s total control over all productive activities considered strategic for the country’s 
development, the oil industry in particular (Chávez 2008, p.43).  
In this regard, section V diagnosed Venezuela’s existing  ‘socio-territorial model’ as the product 
of the dependency on oil exports managed through a formerly neoliberal PDVSA (Chávez 2008, 
p.57). The criticised ‘socio-territorial model’ manifested in cities concentrated along the central-
northern coastal areas, deemed characteristic of an export-based economy which created a 
‘structural disarticulation’ anchored in a deficient regional and national integration that prioritised 
connections between ports and centres of primary extraction and the main cities that consume 
the oil rent; cities that also concentrate large misery belts as well as unregulated human 
settlements that lack basic services (Chávez 2008, p.59).  In other words, the PPS speaks of a 
system of oil cities in Quintero’s terms, engendered by a national oil industry dominated by 
foreign corporations, and more recently, by a neoliberal PDVSA. To overcome these hindrances, 
the ‘territorial structure’ had to be modified (Chávez 2008, p.61). The guidelines of the PPS for 
the years 2007-2013 laid the foundations for the transition towards a Socialist State Space 
congruent with Petrosocialism.  
Nonetheless, directive VI acknowledges the dependence of the socialist project on the oil rent. 
Whilst directive V denounced the pervasive influence of global oil capitalism and a rentier 
economy in the country’s distorted ‘socio-territorial model’,  directive VI affirms that oil would 
continue to have a significant influence on Venezuela’s future, a country that could potentially 
become an energetic world power due to its vast reserves of crude oil. Moreover, it claims that in 
the face of a world hungry for fossil fuels, Venezuela should not refuse to produce it. Yet again 
this  reveals Hugo Chávez  unrealistic expectations for believing in an ‘irreversible trend in the 
increase of oil prices’ (Chávez 2008, p.77), discussed in part one. In this context it was the duty 
of PDVSA to maximise production and increase oil revenues to the state’s coffers since, as this 
thesis argues, the development and longevity of Petrosocialism and the Socialist State were 
completely dependent on the global oil market and PDVSA’s production capacity.  It is evident 
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that Chávez’s unrealistic reliance on an inexhaustible supply of oil with sustained high prices 
informed his discourse and policies. This also reveals an ambition to completely integrate a 
Socialist Venezuela into global oil capitalism in order to maximise oil revenues, which is in 
contradiction with his ambition to establish Petrosocialism as an alternative to capitalism and 
neoliberalism. It becomes clear that an essential contradiction runs through Petrosocialism: 
Chávez’s goal to establish an alternative model to capitalism was heavily reliant on the success of 
the very model he proposed to eradicate.  
However, it becomes coherent in terms of Chávez’s exercise of Bureaucratic Power given that 
the New Magical State is by definition an oil rentier state, its powers and survival are reliant on 
the strength of a national oil industry reframed as revolutionary that provides the resources to 
consolidate the state’s ownership and control over the territory, its subsoil and its natural 
resources. Chávez’s discourse also aimed to re-frame the relationship between the state and its 
territory, but contrary to Lefebvre’s conceptual point of the ‘territory effect’ (Brenner & Elden 
2009, p.373) there was no attempt to mask or naturalise the spatial interventions of the state.  
Chávez was explicit in his ambition to dismantle existing political-administrative structures. The 
CBRV, the development plans for the nation and the new laws manifested Chávez’s will to 
create a new Socialist State Space through an urban planning based on the New Geometry of 
Power with the creation of Federal Provinces, Functional Districts, Special Military Regions and 
Special Authorities to substitute the authority of municipalities, parishes and mayoralties. The 
modification the legal framework of territorial organisation under which regions, states, cities, 
municipalities and parishes are governed was far from smooth.  
The fast pace of abrogation and creation of new laws created instability and the lack of 
continuity magnified existing deficiencies. The case of Caracas, whose fragmented legal and 
institutional framework already carried deficiencies inherited from previous governments serves 
to illustrate the discontinuities of the transition and the mechanisms that ultimately enabled 
PDVSA to use the Law of Hydrocarbons to supersede the legal authority of municipalities and 
in the process, be interpreted and implemented as an implicit cultural policy.  
In order to unpack the web of strategies deployed by the New Magical State to dismantle and 
reform the institutional apparatus whilst creating new legal entities that conceptualise the 
Socialist State Space, a detailed chronological account is needed to trace the myriad of 
institutional changes brought by Chávez as he disassembled the bureaucratic power of the 
‘counter revolutionary state’ at all scales, from the CRBV to municipal laws. To remain within 
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the scope of this thesis, the chronological account will focus primarily on Caracas, as it is where 
most of PDVSA La Estancia’s interventions concentrate.  
The CRBV was the first constitution approved by popular referendum in the history of 
Venezuela. It displaced the Constitution of 1961 and inaugurated the era baptised by Chávez as 
the Fifth Republic. Among the innovations of the CRBV are the change of the name of the 
country from Republic of Venezuela to Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the reform of the 
structure of the government that established a decentralised government and granted greater 
powers to the legislative branch (King 2013, p.379). And most relevant for this thesis, the CRBV 
also reformed the institutional structure of the capital city. The juridical framework of Caracas’ 
territory has been fraught with weaknesses and dispersion in terms of the policies that define the 
Absolute-Material Space of the city, its administrative boundaries and bureaucratic structure 
(Delfino 2001, pp.36–40; Negrón 2001, p.11) which manifests in severe deficiencies in urban 
management, as each municipality works autonomously. However, the reforms in the 
constitution and the later actions of Chavez’s government did not remedy these weaknesses; on 
the contrary they were magnified as the institutional and juridical dispersion were fertile ground 
to implement with ease the New Magical State’s territorial strategies, as the later section of this 
chapter illustrates.   
Article 18 ratified Caracas as the seat of national power and specified that a special law had to be 
created to ‘establish the territorial and political unity of Caracas’ (Asamblea Nacional 
Constituyente 1999). Article 16 of the CRBV substituted the Federal District with the Capital 
District, mainly circumscribed to the boundaries of Libertador Municipality. The Capital District 
is the only district in the country under a special regime, it is a special political-territorial entity 
that constituted the capital of the republic but has attributions similar to the other 23 states 
(Gobierno del Distrito Capital n.d.). The Capital District is the permanent seat of the Presidency, 
many ministries, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, Comptroller General, as well as the 
Joint Command of the Armed Forces and the Marine, Air Forces and the Bolivarian National 
Guard.  
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Illustration 3. Map of the Metropolitan District. Source: http://alcaldiametropolitana.gob.ve/portal/index.php 
146 
 
Although the CRBV only mentions the creation of the Capital District, Article 18 was 
interpreted as the foundation to create the Metropolitan District of Caracas, put in effect in 2000 
through a Special Law for the Regime of the Metropolitan District of Caracas LERDMC, 
legislated by the National Assembly (Delfino 2002, p.134). The LERDMC established that the 
Material Space of the Metropolitan District is composed by Libertador Municipality/Capital 
District and the municipalities of Chacao, Sucre, Baruta and El Hatillo (Asamblea Nacional de 
La República Bolivariana de Venezuela 2000).  The Metropolitan District was defined as an 
entity that guarantees the territorial unity of Caracas, which is confusing because the law 
simultaneously establishes the preservation of the territorial integrity of Miranda State, which has 
sway over El Hatillo and Baruta (Delfino 2002, p.137). The Metropolitan District was given the 
same competencies as municipalities, that also overlap with the attributions and competencies of 
Miranda State, rendering municipalities redundant. Moreover, the law was perceived by 
municipal authorities as a threat to their autonomy (Delfino 2002, pp.135, 142). As a result of the 
LERDMC, four different spheres of government coexist and clash within the Absolute-Material 
Space of Caracas: national government, Miranda State, Metropolitan District and Capital District 
(Delfino 2001, p.40). This fragmented and dispersed institutional landscape is the context of the 
extension of PDVSA’s State Space, the Oil Social District, over the Metropolitan District, which 
allowed PDVSA La Estancia to intervene in the restoration of public art and public spaces 
across the city, displacing the authority of municipalities.  
Hugo Chávez put forward in 2007 a referendum for a reform of the CRBV, coinciding with the 
launch of Petrosocialism. The reform was conceived as an instrument for the dismantlement of 
the ‘constitutional and legal superstructure’ that had sustained the capitalist mode of production, 
in order to embark on the construction of a socialist society for the twenty-first century and the 
establishment of a New Geometry of Power. Although the reform lost the referendum vote, all 
the laws, decrees and policy instruments created right before and after Chavez’s re-election in 
December 2006 conformed to the precepts of the repealed constitutional reform. Even more, 
the legal foundations for the Socialist State had already been laid out by the National Assembly 
in clear breach of the CRBV, with the sanction in 2006 of the Ley de Consejos Comunales (Law of 
Communal Councils), reformed and elevated to the status of Organic Law in 2009 (Brewer 
Carías 2011, p.127). In December 2010, a month before the newly elected National Assembly 
took power with a larger representation of the opposition, a number of organic laws were swiftly 
sanctioned (Brewer Carías 2011, p.128) to establish the legal framework of the Socialist State: 
Organic Law of the Popular Power of the Communes, Organic Law of the Communal 
Economic System, Organic Law of Public and Communal Planning, as well as reforms to the 
147 
 
Organic Law of Municipal Public Power and the Organic Law of Local Councils of Public 
Planning. These laws reorganised the bureaucratic structure of the state under the principles of 
Socialism to establish a communal economic system that contradicts, and runs in parallel to, the 
mixed economic structure and economic liberties established by the CRBV. The Commune, 
defined as an entity of direct popular sovereignty, is the backbone of the socialist order, meant to 
displace the municipality as the primary entity of territorial organisation (Brewer Carías 2011, 
p.129). Under this principle, municipalities are meant to surrender their power and authority to 
Communal Councils (Brewer Carías 2011, p.129). 
The deficiency in coherent spatial policies for Caracas were compounded with the transition 
towards the Socialist State Space, evidenced by the  journey from bill to legal vacuum of the 
Organic Law for the Planning and Management of the Organisation of Territory LOPGOT (Fig. 
1). The LOPGOT created in 2005 abrogated the laws of Organic Law for the Organisation of 
Territory of 1983 and the Organic Law of Urban Planning of 1987, the key spatial policy 
instruments that shaped the role of institutions with competencies in urban planning and 
management in Caracas, and the country at large. The publication of the LOPGOT in the 
Official Gazette of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela included a vacatio legis of six months to 
come into effect in March 2006. In March 2006, a partial amendment to the law was published 
with another vacatio legis of six months that deferred its enactment to September 2006. The day 
the amendment was due to come into effect, a second amendment was published with another 
vacatio legis of six months with an specific date: 28 February 2007 (Brewer Carías 2007, p.2). In 
February 2007 it was repealed by the Organic Law for the Repeal of the Organic Law for the 
Planning and Management of Territory which consisted of only two articles. Article 1 repeals the 
law whilst article 2 states that the repeal would come into effect from the date of its publication 
in the Official Gazette. The announced publication on the Official Gazette never happened. The 
twice deferred LOPGOT of 2005 and the two partial amendments meant to substitute the law of 
1983 never came into effect and remained in a suspended vacatio legis that left a vacuum in the 
regulation of territory and urban planning. It is in the breach left between the suspended vacatio 
legis that lingered from 2005 and the creation of the legal framework for the Communal State in 
2010 that the interventions in the city by PDVSA La Estancia take place (Figure 2).  
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Diagram 3. PDVSA La Estancia’s interventions located in the legal vacuum left by the LOPGOT 
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PDVSA La Estancia managed to override the unstable institutional dispersion described 
previously by abiding to the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons, particularly Article 5, and the Oil 
Social Districts, further examined in chapter five. The Oil Social District is an entity of corporate 
management that establishes that communities surrounding oil fields must be benefitted by 
social programs and infrastructures funded and built by PDVSA. The Oil Social Districts cover 
most of the national territory. This thesis is particularly concerned with the Metropolitan Oil 
Social District that extends from central Guárico State in the south to the north to cover Aragua 
State, Miranda State and the Metropolitan District (Illustration 4).  
 
Illustration 4. PDVSA Social Oil Districts. Source: http://www.pdvsa.com/PESP/Pages_pesp/rolpdvsa/dtos_sociales.html 
 
By definition, the Oil Social District should only cover areas of extraction and refinement of 
hydrocarbons. Caracas’ subsoil does not contain crude oil reserves, nor has the city ever been a 
centre of oil crude extraction or refinement. Nonetheless, the Metropolitan Oil District covers 
Caracas because it is where the corporate headquarters of PDVSA are located. Thus, the 
headquarters of PDVSA are conceptualised as a centre of oil extraction and distribution of oil 
rent right in the midst of Libertador Municipality, effectively reframing the Absolute-Material 
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Space of Caracas as an oil field. The legal vacuum left by the transition towards the Socialist State 
Space also created the conditions to conceptualise and enact the Oil Social District as PDVSA’s 
parallel State Space. This is what enabled PDVSA La Estancia to absorb Caracas in the ‘areas of 
influence’ of PDVSA and undertake its works of public art and public space restoration across 
the city. 
Conclusion 
 
The discursive entanglements between Hugo Chávez’s discourse and the creation of the new 
spatial strategies of the Socialist State Space are a mobilisation of his bureaucratic power to 
completely remodel sociospatial relations according to his political project. This chapter argued 
that the power of Chávez’s discourse to translate into action originated on his embodiment of 
the New Magical State, which concentrated all the bureaucratic powers of the state in his 
persona. Furthermore, his model of Petrosocialism was informed by an unrealistic expectation of 
an inexhaustible supply of oil and high revenues that emphasised the contradiction of creating a 
Socialist State heavily dependent on the success of global oil capitalism since Chávez did not 
envision a post-oil future. The survival of the Socialist State became unequivocally dependent on 
a direct life line to global oil capitalism, the system he set out to challenge within Venezuela’s 
borders when the outlined his political platform as an alternative to neoliberalism. Chávez’s 
reliance on oil rentierism for the consolidation of the Socialist State revealed an essential 
contradiction that underpins Petrosocialism: its reliance on the success of the very economic 
model it was supposed to eradicate. Nonetheless, the contradiction gains coherence in terms of 
Chávez’s exercise of Bureaucratic Power, given that only an oil rentier state can be a Magical 
State, and only oil could provide the resources needed to embark in the spatial strategies of the 
Socialist State to consolidate ownership and control over the territory, its subsoil and its natural 
resources. In this sense, territory is central to Petrosocialism. The chronological approach used 
to unpack the process of abrogation, creation and amendments of the legal instruments of 
territorial organisation guided by the premises of the New Geometry of Power, served to 
illustrate a process fraught with inconsistencies that entrenched diminished state capacity and 
created a chaotic bureaucratic landscape in urban governance, particularly in the case of Caracas.  
The lack of coherence and inherent contradictions within Petrosocialism also points to the 
failure of the consolidation of the New Geometry of Power as a coherent spatial policy for the 
Socialist State. If, as Brenner and Elden have argued, territory and state are mutually constitutive, 
the later section of this chapter has shown that in the process of re-constituting the territory, it 
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created a void in spatial policies that destabilised the bureaucratic structure of the institutions 
that govern Caracas (as observed by elites), in order to reconstitute the state according to the 
ambition to create a new Socialist State. This is why territory was fundamental for Chávez’s 
project, but in the process the spatial and territorial strategies of the Socialist State had to coexist 
with the structures it was meant to substitute.  
In this context, the New Magical State’s ‘territory effect’ failed to naturalise and mask its spatial 
interventions. The new spatial strategies were intended as an abrupt break and disruption of the 
institutional order inherited from previous regimes, to undermine and eventually completely 
substitute the existing legal apparatus. The vacuum left by the delay in pushing forward the new 
legal instruments, or Absolute-Representations of Space of the Socialist State, generated a 
chaotic bureaucratic landscape in which the only remaining stable legal framework and 
institution were PDVSA’s. It is PDVSA, as a parallel State Space, that succeeds in the territory 
effect, not just by naturalising its sway over the city through the Oil Social District, but also by 
concealing it through the visual construction of the adverts analysed in chapter six, in which the 
giant oil worker becomes a naturalised sign of PDVSA’s State Space.  
This chapter contributes towards two of the main arguments of this thesis. First, it has shown 
the institutional circumstances that enabled the social and cultural arm of PDVSA, PDVSA La 
Estancia, to interpret and implement the Law of Hydrocarbons as an implicit territorial and 
cultural policy instrument, with the Social Oil District functioning as PDVSA’s State Space. 
Secondly, it has illustrated how the Absolute-Material Space of Caracas is conceptualised as an 
oil field, absorbed by the Metropolitan Oil Social District by construing the corporate 
headquarters of PDVSA as a centre of oil extractive activity which enables PDVSA La Estancia 
to supersede regional and municipal authority.  
Chapter five expands on this discussion by looking in particular at the speeches of the former 
President of PDVSA Rafael Ramírez and the former General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia, 
Beatrice Sanso de Ramírez. The chapter explores the discursive strands that run through the 
state-owned oil company’s narrative of its commitment with Petrosocialism, assuming the 
‘magical’ power of marvel of the new Magical State confined to the realm of oil around the 
narratives of ‘sowing oil’ and ‘renewable oil’. It will also examine  how PDVSA La Estancia’s 
management of city space compensates for the state’s diminished capacity, and how through its 
direct access to the oil rent, it is able to extend its own dominant space over Caracas and the 
country at large, aided by the interpretation of Article 5 of the Law of Hydrocarbons as an 
implicit cultural policy.  
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Chapter five: PDVSA La Estancia as an instrument of ‘Sowing Oil’ that 
‘Harvests Culture’ 
 
‘Oil, to paraphrase the famed essayist Arturo Uslar Pietri, not only determined 
the character of the Venezuelan economy but also created a false image of the 
nation, a national consensus premised on the illusion of prosperity.’ (Tinker 
Salas 2009, p.6) 
 
Hugo Chávez’s oil-driven restructure of the national territory is not without precedents 
in Venezuelan history. During the first half of the twentieth century, established foreign oil 
companies not only intervened in national politics, they also reorganised the territory, both in 
rural and urban areas, shaping the attitudes of subsequent generations towards the oil industry -
whether national or foreign- as oil became akin to progress, development and the emerging 
modern nation (Tinker Salas 2014, p.18). It was in the context of the oil windfall brought by the 
concessions in the 1930s, and later by the oil boom that followed the nationalisation in the 
1970s, that Arturo Uslar Pietri became an influential voice who asked the nation’s leaders and 
elites to sow the oil. Sowing oil, as chapter three argues, is central to enduring and conflicting 
views around oil in Venezuela (Pérez Alfonzo 2011; Pérez Schael 1993; Quintero 2011). Uslar 
Pietri’s used farming language as a didactic device to suggest the manner in which he believed oil 
should be invested, by making reference to the riches of the land rather than to oil as an 
immaterial and ephemeral source of wealth (Pérez Schael 1993, pp.199–205). In the aftermath of 
the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s (period that led to the rise of Hugo Chávez), 
sowing oil had become an impossible utopia.  
Nonetheless, Hugo Chávez’s adoption of Uslar Pietri’s slogan to baptise his national oil policy 
reveals a discursive construction used to present Petrosocialism as a strategy that succeeds in 
sowing oil. The Sowing Oil Plan was conceived as a long term strategy, but with the passing of 
Hugo Chávez in 2013, only PDVSA could exert the Bureaucratic Powers of the New Magical 
State, as this chapter demonstrates by looking into PDVSA La Estancia’s discursive narrative of 
achieving an ‘utopia of the possible’ and by the construction of the myth of ‘renewable oil’ 
explored in depth in chapter six. This chapter asks: is there a vision of the city in Petrosocialism, 
and who has the ‘magical’ Bureaucratic Powers to enact such a vision?  Whilst Petrosocialism is 
the instrument to constitute the Socialist State Space, the disarticulated process described in 
chapter four enabled PDVSA to expand the Oil Social District as a dominant parallel State Space 
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that absorbed Caracas. If the city is the material space of the state’s bureaucratic power, this 
chapter examines that PDVSA, as the engine of Petrosocialism, is exercising its power over 
Caracas by envisioning the city as a Petrosocialist urban oil field.   
To answer these questions, this chapter examines the speeches of the president of PDVSA 
Rafael Ramírez to identify the entanglements with Hugo Chávez’s discourse. Then it examines 
elites’ perspectives on the relationship between oil, the state and city planning which frames their 
opinions on the role of PDVSA La Estancia. Through the analysis of the interviews four themes 
are identified: one, close relationship between oil wealth, PDVSA and the city; two, the vision of 
the city in Petrosocialism; three, Caracas as an oil city; and four, PDVSA La Estancia as an 
instrument of sowing oil that ‘harvests’ culture expediently, in the terms defined by Yúdice, that 
conceptualised culture-as-mineral-deposit. Finally, the chapter builds on the four themes by 
examining the speeches of the General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia. This chapter draws on 
Zygmunt Bauman (2004) and Jeremy Ahearne (2009) to demonstrate how these discursive 
constructions, built on the stratum of the disjointed process to constitute the Socialist State 
Space examined in chapter four, enabled PDVSA La Estancia to interpret Article 5 of the 
Organic Law of Hydrocarbons as an implicit cultural policy. It traces the discursive use of 
culture by PDVSA La Estancia that frames the institution’s actions as an ‘utopia of the possible’, 
based on construing the city as an oil field whilst conceptualising a symbiotic and cyclical 
relationship between oil, land, and culture condensed in the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit 
by stating that PDVSA La Estancia is ‘oil that harvests culture’.   
PDVSA as an Agent of Revolutionary Change 
 
Rafael Ramírez, president of PDVSA between 2004 and 2013, was one of Chávez’s 
closest allies. Ramírez occupied simultaneously the posts of president of the state-owned oil 
company, Minister of Energy and Petroleum, Vice-President of Territorial Development of the 
Republic and President of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela PSUV (Párraga 2010, p.122; 
Colgan 2013, pp.205–206). Ramírez effectively had complete control over the national oil 
industry. He delineated PDVSA’s socialist profile (Párraga 2010, pp.24–26) by expanding its 
functions beyond the core commercial mission of producing the maximum oil revenue to the 
state by channelling the investment of the oil rent into the construction of the Socialist State. 
This section uses Critical Discourse Analysis to trace the reverberations of Chávezs’ discourses 
in the speeches of Rafael Ramírez.  
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A word frequency query found that the five most frequently used words are: 
PDVSA 734 
Petróleo (Oil) 653 
Petrolera 644 
Nuestro/Nuestros 619/537 
Nacional 471 
 
Unsurprisingly, the most referenced terms are the company itself (PDVSA) and Petróleo (oil); the 
terms nuestro/nuestros (our/ours) and nacional (national) hint at a nationalistic discourse in regards 
to oil in tune with Hugo Chávez’s rhetoric. In a similar manner to the analysis of Hugo Chávez’s 
speeches in chapter four, to trace the discursive entanglements between oil and socialism, text 
queries were conducted with the terms socialista, socialismo, petróleo, adding in this instance siembra 
petrolera (sowing oil) to identify the discursive fragments that intersect oil, PDVSA’s Sowing Oil 
Plan and Socialism. The word socialismo is referenced in five of his speeches, most mentions 
concentrated on his speech delivered to celebrate the centenary of the burst of the first oil field 
of Zumaque I: 
Name References Coverage 
Sesión Especial Con Motivo De La Conmemoración Del Centenario Del 
Inicio De La Actividad Comercial Petrolera En Venezuela, Con La 
Explotación Del Pozo Zumaque I, 2014 
4 0.04% 
Memoria y Cuenta de los Ministros de la Vicepresidencia del Área de 
Desarrollo Territorial, 2013 
3 0.05% 
Discurso del ministro del Poder Popular de Petróleo y Minería y presidente de 
PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, en la presentación del Informe de Gestión Anual de 
PDVSA 2012 
3 0.01% 
PDVSA Fiel al Legado de Chávez. Discurso del Ministro del Poder Popular 
de Petróleo y Minería y Presidente de Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., Rafael 
Ramírez, en la Jornada PDVSA¬ Sector productivo nacional conexo, 2012 
2 0.01% 
Discurso de Rafael Ramírez, Presidente de PDVSA y Ministro de Energía y 
Petróleo, ante la Asamblea Nacional, 2005 
1 0.01% 
Table 10 
The word socialista (socialist) appears only on three of the sixteen speeches; most notably it is 
mentioned twice in the speech delivered at the hearing of ministers for territorial development in 
2013: 
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Name References Coverage 
Memoria y Cuenta de los Ministros de la Vicepresidencia del Área de 
Desarrollo Territorial, 2013 
2 0.03% 
PDVSA Fiel al Legado de Chávez. Discurso del Ministro del Poder Popular 
de Petróleo y Minería y Presidente de Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., Rafael 
Ramírez, en la Jornada PDVSA¬ Sector productivo nacional conexo, 2012 
1 0.01% 
Sesión Especial Con Motivo De La Conmemoración Del Centenario Del 
Inicio De La Actividad Comercial Petrolera En Venezuela, Con La 
Explotación Del Pozo Zumaque I, 2014 
2 0.02% 
Table 11 
The words socialista and socialism are absent from the speech delivered in August 2005 to launch 
the Sowing Oil Plan. It is mentioned only once, as can be seen in table 11, in the speech 
delivered to the National Assembly in May of that same year, right at the last line of the text, 
with no other references made. It is after 2012 that both terms appear in his speeches, but not as 
frequently considering the public commitment he made to Hugo Chávez’s political project.  
Relevant discourse fragments were selected from the speeches by cross referencing the terms oil, 
socialist and socialism, collated in Table 12: 
Discourse Fragment Speech title year context 
Ii is a revolutionary 
policy because oil income 
is going to become and 
that is how it is 
established in our Plan of 
the Fatherland, the main 
lever to overcome the oil 
rentierist model, the main 
lever to create the 
material foundations for 
the construction of 
socialism in our country. 
 
Discurso del ministro del Poder Popular 
de Petróleo y Minería y presidente de 
PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, en la 
presentación del Informe de Gestión 
Anual de PDVSA 2012 Salón Simón 
Bolívar, Complejo Ministerio­Pdvsa 
3 May 
2013 
Presentation of 
PDVSA Annual 
report 
We intend to capture that 
vast oil rent so we can 
build an alternative 
model to the oil rentier 
PDVSA FIEL AL LEGADO DE 
CHÁVEZ  
Discurso del Ministro del Poder Popular 
de Petróleo y Minería y Presidente de 
16 May 
2013 
‘PDVSA Loyal to the 
Legacy of Chávez’, 
speech for the 
productive sectors of 
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model, a productive 
model that we have said, 
will be socialist.  
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., Rafael 
Ramírez, en la Jornada PDVSA­Sector 
productivo nacional conexo. Maracaibo, 
Estado Zulia 
PDVSA in 
Maracaibo 
President Chávez, 
indisputable leader of our 
revolutionary process, 
has said it with clarity 
and courage, our 
revolution is profoundly 
anti-imperialist and 
socialism is the path of 
our salvation. It is the 
socialist fatherland or 
death.  
Comparecencia de ministros para el 
desarrollo territorial 
4 
November 
2013 
Hearing of the 
Reports and 
Accounts of the 
Ministers of the 
Vicepresidency of 
Territorial 
Development  
The oil rent must be an 
instrument for the 
construction of a new 
economic order, it must 
be an instrument for the 
construction of socialism.  
 
The society dreamt by 
our Eternal Commander 
Hugo Chávez: ‘the 
socialist society’, is the 
best recognition we can 
make to the selfless, 
disinterested work, to the 
love of the humble, to 
the Fatherland of 
Commander Chávez. 
Sesión especial con motivo de la 
conmemoración del centenario  
Del inicio de la actividad comercial 
petrolera en Venezuela, con la 
explotación del pozo Zumaque I, 
Maracaibo 
5 August 
2014 
Special session in the 
Centenary of the 
beginnings of the 
commercial activity 
the oil industry with 
the exploitation of  
the Zumaque I oil 
well 
Table 12 
The following statements were extracted from the discourse fragments for analysis, identifying 
the relevant performative utterances: 
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A. It is a revolutionary policy because that oil income is going to become and that is how it 
is established in our Plan of the Fatherland, the main lever to overcome the oil rentierist 
model, the main lever to create the material foundations for the construction of socialism 
in our country.  
 
B. President Chávez, indisputable leader of our revolutionary process, has said it with clarity 
and courage, our revolution is profoundly anti-imperialist and socialism is the path of our 
salvation. It is the socialist fatherland or death. 
 
C. The oil rent must be an instrument for the construction of a new economic order, it 
must be an instrument for the construction of socialism.  
 
D. The society our Eternal Commander Hugo Chávez dreamt: ‘the socialist society’.  
The performative utterance in statement A establishes PDVSA’s new identity as a revolutionary 
institution. By defining the Sowing Oil Plan as a revolutionary policy, he mirrors Chávez’s 
contention that the national oil policy laid the foundations for the advancement of 
Petrosocialism and the construction of the Socialist State. Here Ramírez declares that his 
Bureaucratic Power as president of the oil company, Minister of Oil and Energy and Vice-
president of the ruling party, is subservient to Chávez. His discourse is able to exert power and 
contribute to construct the Socialist State because, as discussed in chapter two, it is 
institutionalised and linked to action. The Sowing Oil Plan’s 25 years timeframe is an instrument 
put at the service of the power of the New Magical State embodied by Hugo Chávez, to 
contribute in the construction and perpetuation of Petrosocialism. Along these lines, echoes of 
Chávez’s discourse on the Socialist State are found in statements B, C, D and E. Ramírez’s 
performative utterances do not intend to describe reality, they describe the act of creation of a 
future that is built as it is verbalised, in which the oil rent is presented as the foundation to build 
the Socialist State and the future socialist society.  
However, it is contradictory for the head of an international oil corporation to affirm that the 
path of salvation from oil rentierism and capitalism is found only in socialism as PDVSA’s raison 
d’etre is to produce the highest oil revenue to the state by taking part in the dynamics of global oil 
capitalism. There is a conceptual conflict in Ramírez’s condemnation of capitalism: the oil rent 
that responds to the capitalist economic order is put at the service of creating an alternative 
economic model to capitalism, which is what Petrosocialism was meant to achieve. Overall, 
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Ramírez’s performative utterances conceal that Venezuelan oil revenues are tied to global 
capitalism and are highly dependent on the fluctuations of the international oil markets. 
Nonetheless, the purpose of these speeches is to discursively establish PDVSA’s identity as a 
revolutionary corporation even though in practice, for all matters concerned with the oil 
industry, it remained a capitalist oil corporation. As this thesis has already established, only the 
vast wealth produced by PDVSA could provide the necessary resources for the creation of the 
new socialist society dreamt by Hugo Chávez.   
Hence, the relationship between oil and the state that the speeches convey reaffirms PDVSA’s 
allegiance to Hugo Chávez. Whilst Chávez intention was to exert close control over PDVSA and 
the use of the oil rent, in practice, the oil company became a parallel state, with its own parallel 
State Space, as demonstrated in chapter four. 
To summarise, Ramírez instrumentalises his bureaucratic power as the head of the national oil 
industry to contribute to Chávez’s vision. His discourse is able to exert power and construct a 
new national reality because he is in complete control of the entity that extracts and 
commercialises oil as well as the bureaucratic entities that govern it. The wealth produced by 
PDVSA’s participation in the global oil market is at the service of the New Magical State and 
Petrosocialism.  
The following section examines elites’ perspectives in regards to the influence oil wealth exerts 
on urban development and city planning by looking at the intersections between oil wealth, 
PDVSA, the state and city planning in relation to the work of PDVSA La Estancia.  
Elites’ Perspectives on PDVSA, Oil Wealth and the City 
 
It will become clear throughout this section, as in the previous chapter, that when elites 
speak of the relationship between oil and the city, it is used as a proxy for speaking about how 
the state deploys the oil rent in urban development. None of the interviewees suggested that 
Venezuela should cease to be an oil rentier state. On the contrary, elites believe that oil is, should 
and will be the main livelihood of the country, even in the midst of a dramatic downturn in 
global oil prices. Uslar Pietri’s slogan ‘sowing oil’ underlines the way most elites envisioned how 
the relationship between oil wealth, PDVSA and the city should manifest: 
 ‘You know we always add to the spaces an oil element, because we all need to feel we 
are oil workers. That’s the idea. There always will be an oil mural, an oil sculpture. The 
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only contact the common Venezuelan has with oil when they don’t work for PDVSA, or 
if they don’t live in an oil area, is the petrol station. We have to feel oil workers. This 
exists because PDVSA exists. That’s the idea.’ (PDVSA La Estancia) 
‘oil is not being used as a tool of transformation and future development’ (O3) 
‘The city being the realm where the largest part of the population of the country is 
concentrated, it’s in its facilities and public spaces where the conditions must be given so 
she can find the conditions that allow it to improve its quality of life, in particular the 
groups with lower incomes: education, health, mobility, are topics in which the income 
from oil should decidedly contribute in the action of the State, above all in moments of 
bonanza.’ (R2) 
 ‘The relationship should be like a sponsor with social responsibility, independent from 
partisan interests, open to all social sectors without exclusion, detached from populism, 
detached from the oil aristocracy that had its quota of responsibility in determined 
moments.’ (R4) 
 ‘The first consideration is to stop understanding the country as a ‘rich country’ when in 
reality it isn’t. That would suppose the establishment of urban policies of greater 
rationality and realise efforts for the recovering of investments, greater budget autonomy 
for municipal authorities and cease the capricious spending of the resources derived from 
that understanding of “wealth”’ (R1) 
 ‘oil must have a presence in every urban settlement so they won’t be in the state of 
misery they are in, there should be a [PDVSA] La Estancia in Cabimas, Lagunillas, in 
Maturín oil camps, in Monagas.’ (A1) 
‘If PDVSA has the money and can do it, it should pay its social responsibility quota like 
any company, why does it have to pay all its social responsibility in Caracas?’ (A1) 
‘The ‘oil wealth’ is not wealth, but a great quantity of money available; as long as we 
don’t understand that difference nothing can be done.’ (A6) 
‘PDVSA La Estancia has contributed with this loss of focus that we have now with the 
oil industry… because, let’s be clear, when I criticise all this with oil it’s not that I’m 
saying… no, oil is great, that thing gives money! We have to live off it, we have to… We 
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should all have the fortune of living in an oil country, we should all know, let’s say, more 
about oil and live more from oil’ (A3) 
‘I think that if we don’t take advantage of the oil wealth to turn the city around, we are 
simply wasting time and resources.’ (J1) 
A couple of elites were adamant on disproving that Venezuela is a rich country. They affirmed 
there needs to be a realisation that oil wealth does not make a country ‘wealthy’ (R1, A6). The 
abandonment of the belief of being a ‘rich country’ (which is a vestige of the oil boom era of the 
Great Venezuela of the 1970s) would end with capricious and wasteful spending and help 
establish rational investment and financial autonomy to local governments (R1, A6). 
Nonetheless, the ‘sowing oil’ narrative runs through their statements as an unsatisfied demand to 
invest the oil rent in industrial and social development; it is a phrase that has endured in political 
discourse as well as in colloquial conversations.  
Hugo Chávez’s Sowing Oil Plan, as chapter four argued, appropriated Uslar Pietri’s slogan but 
PDVSA La Estancia, rather than seeking to establish a new relationship between oil wealth, the 
state and the city is seeking to create a new direct relationship between citizens and oil by stating 
that ‘we all need to feel oil workers’. Their reasoning is that, in Caracas and other major cities, 
the only contact the common citizen has with the oil industry is the petrol station in a detached 
and utilitarian relationship. Caracas is regarded as the city where this strategy is most needed, 
because it is where oil is less visible and where the citizen has had less evident, direct and close 
contact with the oil industry. They aim to change the mechanics and meaning of that relationship 
by adding ‘oil elements’ to the city through oil-inspired and oil-funded public art. And where 
such a literal oil elements cannot be added, PDVSA La Estancia resorts to visual constructions in 
adverts that turn cultural objects into ‘oil elements’ by digitally adding a giant oil worker to the 
images of public art and public spaces restored, as examined in chapter six.  
According to the majority of elites interviewed, PDVSA should isolate itself from any political 
affiliations and stop functioning as parallel state as it had done under the regime of Hugo 
Chávez. In other words, elites regard PDVSA as a private transnational oil corporation that 
should invest its revenues as social corporate responsibility to all Venezuelan society because, as 
A1 asserts, poverty exists where the social investment from the oil company is absent.  
Therefore, if PDVSA has the capacity and the resources to invest where the state seems unable 
to, it should do so nationwide and not just in Caracas. Moreover, elites want PDVSA to behave 
as the foreign oil corporations did during the first half of the twentieth century that invested in 
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the infrastructure the state was not capable to build. But this would entrench the circumstances 
that are currently allowing PDVSA to function as a parallel state whilst perpetuating the enduring 
myth of ‘sowing oil’.  
It was relevant for this thesis to ask elites if they thought of Caracas as an ‘oil city’, in the terms 
defined by anthropologist Rodolfo Quintero (2011) given that Caracas is being reconceptualised 
as an oil field by PDVSA. As the statements outlined below show, there was disagreement on 
whether to characterise Caracas as such: 
 ‘Without a doubt. Was. We are fighting for it to stop being that through the popular, 
national and revolutionary Sowing Oil Plan’ (PDVSA La Estancia) 
‘An oil city is literally, in Venezuelan history, one that depends on the dynamic imposed 
by the exploration, extraction, processing, distribution and export of that natural 
resource. (…) But the concept is not literal, since it applies, like Quintero passed on to 
us, to the cities in which the economic benefits of the oil activity materialise, in all their 
phases. Therefore, Caracas is, since the first decade of the 20th century, an oil city.’ (R4) 
‘Yes. The important infrastructure that exists in the city is nothing but the result of the 
centralisation of the resources derived from that industry’ (R2) 
‘Certainly. The concentration of resources derived from oil income allow to name it that 
way’ (R1) 
‘this city is the product of the dynamic and the synergy of the oil issue, of the rent, of oil 
extractivism’ (A2) 
‘I would say absolutely yes. And unfortunately yes. (…) It is an oil city, and a city with a 
culture of oil, that exists in the state that it’s in and in the citizen’ (J1) 
 ‘it would be an incomprehensible reduction to say that Caracas is an oil city’ (R3)   
 ‘To consider Caracas an oil city? Maybe it was, but it never had a face’ (A1) 
 ‘From my particular point of view an ‘Oil City’ should be a city product of the important 
resources that oil generates and its good administration (…) Oslo could be an example of 
an ‘Oil City’ like Houston or Toronto. Not Caracas.’ (A5) 
 ‘I don’t know what that would mean; if it is for ‘city of the automobile’, yes, but it’s not 
the only one in the planet’ (A6) 
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‘I’m afraid, in our imaginary, that category refers to another thing. I think of Houston, 
but not Caracas’ (W1) 
The disagreement stemmed from the attributes the interviewees believed constituted an oil city 
as such, since the centres of oil extraction and production are located in remote regions, and the 
oil-related infrastructures present in Caracas, besides the petrol station, are of a corporate nature. 
Caracas is not, and has never been, a site of oil extraction or refinement, but it is where resources 
and wealth concentrate and circulate (R1), materialised in works of infrastructure and 
architecture that the city would not have if it wasn’t for the oil wealth (R2). Venezuela has been 
oil dependent since early twentieth century; the modern city in Venezuela is a by-product of the 
dynamics of the oil industry (A2). However, an oil city is predominantly characterised in negative 
terms by elites because they relate oil wealth to the institutional chaos the country is submerged 
in (J1).  This negative perception contradicts the historical attribute of oil as the carrier of 
modernity and progress, as elites now believe that oil wealth is what undermines institutions, 
along the lines of the discussion developed in chapter one on how oil rents ‘have a strong and 
decisive influence on the nature of the state’ (Luciani 1987, p.68) specially at times of oil booms 
(Karl 1997; Maass 2009; Ross 2012) which alter fiscal and bureaucratic structures. This 
perception is substantiated by five of the interviewees who affirm that Caracas is not an oil city 
because unlike Houston (A5, W1) it is not directly involved in the extraction of oil (P2).  
The only ambiguous answer was given by PDVSA La Estancia, saying that Caracas is ‘without a 
doubt’ an oil city, but that ‘they’ are working for it to stop being one. But PDVSA La Estancia 
contradicts itself when, as the next section illustrates, it declares that it is an instrument of the 
Sowing Oil Plan, and that the Law of Hydrocarbons grants it authority over Caracas by using the 
Oil Social District to supersede municipal authority. Thus, they effectively conceptualise the 
Absolute-Material Space of the city as an oil field.   
According to Venezuelan anthropologist Rodolfo Quintero (2011) an oil city was deprived of 
institutions and did not produce any art or intellectual culture, in other words, a city of oil is not 
urban. However, although Caracas is being construed and managed as an oil field by PDVSA La 
Estancia, they challenge Quintero’s notion by discursively defining itself as ‘oil that harvests 
culture’, coalescing oil and the urban as carriers of culture and modernity.   
When asked about the role of the city within the Bolivarian Revolution in the era of 
Petrosocialism, elites coincided in regarding Hugo Chávez’s discourse on the city as non-existent: 
‘None’ (A5) 
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‘there is no vision of the city, well, it is changeable, it changed according to Chávez’s 
moods.’ (O2)  
‘The “process” has two clear phases, made more evident every day: with HChF [Hugo 
Chávez Frias] and without HChF [Hugo Chávez Frias]. (…) a point of inflexion is the 
GMVV [Great Mission of Housing Venezuela] (beyond any criticism), when it was finally 
understood that the population is urban and so must be the discourse and the action’ 
(A6) 
‘At the beginning, in the search of a ‘territorial equilibrium’ a strong anti-urban slant 
emerged. Subsequently, surely by effect of the electoral logic with more than 80% of 
people living in cities, the efforts of investment in social programs focused on cities’ (R1) 
‘I don’t know if it’s a cause or consequence but the fact is that the political project of the 
Bolivarian Revolution is an anti-urban project, it’s at odds with the city and against the 
city’ (A3) 
‘The city is a phenomenon that contradicts the ideology they profess’ (R3) 
 ‘Maybe, there is no idea or project, beyond a mere enunciation of principles, about the 
“role” of the city. There is no plan. Just the disorganised practice of a polarised crowd’ 
(W1) 
‘Anything I say here is mere speculation. I have not seen any document that speaks about 
that in particular’ (J1) 
Elites affirmed that Chávez had no vision or plans for the city (A5, A4, W1, P2, J1), that it was 
absent from his discourse, a perception derived from the process described in chapter four, 
which manifested in a lack of coherent spatial policies and strategies of urban management. 
These statements are supported by J1, whose expertise on reporting on city issues lead him to 
affirm with absolute confidence that ‘I have not seen any document that speaks about that in 
particular’.  Elites refer to the vacuum left by the dismantlement of the policy instruments and 
institutions and the slow and discontinuous transition towards the Socialist State Space, which 
most of the elites do not seem to endorse. Thus, they characterise Hugo Chávez’s political 
project as anti-urban (A3), claiming that the city and urban society contradict the ideology 
professed by the government (R3). Nonetheless, some elites (O2, A1, R1, A6) provided a 
nuanced view by clarifying that Chávez’s discourse on the city varied over his three presidencies. 
They explained that at the beginning he had a very strong slant against the city as he intended to 
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move people from the main cities into rural areas to achieve ‘territorial equilibrium’ according to 
the New Geometry of Power, explored in chapter four, which explains the initial lack of 
investment and neglect of cities, Caracas particularly. Chávez’s discourse shifted, influenced by 
electoral results that proved (R1, A6) he could no longer ignore that the vast majority of the 
Venezuelan population lives in the main cities.  
Subsequently, this led elites to perceive that Chávez began to view the city as an instrument of 
his bureaucratic power: ‘it is another instrument of the neo-populist exclusion, a medium to 
implant the model of domination’ (R4). The model of domination R4 refers to is the Socialist 
State, a project that generates uncertainty in terms of what the creation of socialist society and a 
socialist city means, considering the disjointed process described in chapter four. O2 made 
reference to a statement heard from the director of the Museum of Architecture (MUSARQ- 
created in 2006) about the uncertainty on what creating socialist cities entails: ‘we don’t know 
what a socialist city is but that’s where we are headed’. This uncertainty is answered by PDVSA 
La Estancia as the socialist city is not built ex novo but emerges as the restoration of the modern 
city as it stood during the past glories of the golden years of the Magical State and the oil booms, 
prior to the oil crash of the 1980s. PDVSA La Estancia is constructing a Petrosocialist vision of 
the city on the substratum of the Oil Social District, PDVSA’s State Space, which enables it to 
reframe the city as an oil field where the public art and public spaces serve as markers of the 
appropriation of the Relative-Material Space of the city, materialised in the Relative-Spaces of 
Representation of the adverts, which speaks of a twofold colonisation of the city by oil. Fixed in 
time but spatially mutable, the boundaries of the actions of PDVSA La Estancia expand as 
PDVSA’s State Space expands and consolidates. Consequently, the concrete material entities of 
the public art and public spaces are simultaneously located in two superimposed State Spaces: 
PDVSA’s and the Socialist State’s. 
The contradiction identified above is made evident by the terms in which PDVSA La Estancia 
characterises itself. Table 13 contrasts the statements of the General Manager of PDVSA La 
Estancia with the views expressed by the elites in regards to what differentiates PDVSA La 
Estancia from other institutions of urban management in Caracas: 
PDVSA La Estancia Interviewees 
We are an instrument of the state oil company, we are 
an instrument, we are a management unit of the state 
owned oil company, we are oil workers. 
PDVSA La Estancia is one of the deviations that have 
been autocratically provoked by the oil industry (R3) 
 
PDVSA is a true ‘State within the State’(R2) 
165 
 
 
The oil company has broadened its scope of action 
beyond the boundaries of a productive enterprise (R1) 
 
access to resources and professional capacity (A5) 
 
I have never understood what an enterprise is doing 
whose objective is to produce money so other 
enterprises do what they are supposed to do doing what 
these enterprises should do.(A6) 
 
we have functions that derive from what is established 
in the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons, the other 
management entities of public space in Caracas have 
functions that derive from the laws of territorial 
decentralisation. That is to say, they are popularly elected 
organs and have competencies that derive from 
municipal laws, specific, and specific state laws, we 
don’t. 
They completely ignore zoning laws.(O2) 
 
contributes with the de-institutionalisation of the State 
itself as a whole (R2) 
 
The appointment of lawyer Beatrice Sansó de Ramírez, 
was a factor that should not be discarded in this 
juncture, given her direct connection with the new 
President of PDVSA (R4) 
 
La Estancia are institutions that are created ad hoc, that 
don’t depend on anyone and can do whatever they 
please, they can carry out work without consulting 
anyone (A3) 
 
 
We are an entity of national management. We must 
work in a realm that revolves around what is called in 
PDVSA social district, social district means that all that 
is found around the oil areas has to be positively 
impacted by oil revenue. 
can make it appear as a superministry of public works 
(R1) 
 
Because to the distortion of roles is added, here, the 
entanglement between Nation, State, Government and 
City (A6) 
 
I think that its emergence as an executor arm has 
something interesting for the results, a little, not because 
I think that’s the way, but you see the results and well, is 
it that through the normal way this could have been 
possible? (J1) 
 
it is absurd that we have to make up these kinds of 
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parallel governments to make a vision of the city 
possible (J1) 
Table 13 
 
PDVSA La Estancia was emphatic in saying that what differentiates it from other entities of local 
government is that they are oil workers (petroleros). This is not an innocuous remark, petrolero in 
Venezuela carries professional prestige but also specific cultural, historical and social weight 
(Tinker Salas 2009) that locates them in a special hierarchical and social category within the 
government and Venezuelan society. Petrolero also means direct access to the oil rent which 
translates into economic and Bureaucratic Power. What differentiates PDVSA La Estancia, as 
A5 points out, is the access to the financial resources and professional capacity that central and 
local government lack. Similarly, the emergence of an entity like PDVSA La Estancia is part of a 
wider trend of parallel institutions created to compensate for the incapacity of the state. In this 
specific instance it compensates for the deficiencies of public entities of urban management: 
‘institutions that are created ad hoc, that don’t depend on anyone and can do whatever they 
please, they can carry out work without consulting anyone’ (A3). Still, elites showed ambivalent 
opinions of PDVSA La Estancia. They praised the good quality of the works undertaken in the 
city whilst simultaneously acknowledging they are a product of the erosion of the institutional 
apparatus, seeing pernicious effects in the long term as PDVSA La Estancia successfully 
overrides the authority of municipalities. PDVSA La Estancia is perceived as an institutional 
deviation and a clear symptom of the expansion of PDVSA’s functions beyond its core role of 
producing oil revenue. To have PDVSA La Estancia directly carry out public works in the city in 
non-oil industry related infrastructure is considered incongruent with the oil company’s main 
mission, akin to PDVSA building social housing or distributing food; elites predominantly agreed 
that PDVSA should be a private capitalist enterprise focused solely on maximising oil rents.   
Furthermore, PDVSA La Estancia stresses its superiority by adhering to the Organic Law of 
Hydrocarbons, establishing that it supersedes other government entities such as municipalities 
adhered to the abrogated laws of territorial organisation and municipal laws:  
‘we have functions that derive from what is established in the Organic Law of 
Hydrocarbons, the other management entities of public space in Caracas have functions 
that derive from the laws of territorial decentralisation. That is to say, they are popularly 
elected organs and have competencies that derive from municipal laws, specific, and 
specific state laws, we don’t.’ 
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Governorships, mayoralties and municipalities are governed by the abrogated Organic Law of 
Land Management of 1983, which had the same constitutional status as the Organic Law of 
Hydrocarbons. As described in detail in chapter four, the years of legal vacuum left between 
2005 and 2010 enabled PDVSA to construct a parallel State Space through the Oil Social 
Districts, and for PDVSA La Estancia to instrumentalise the Law of Hydrocarbons as an implicit 
cultural policy by defining itself as ‘oil that harvests culture’ in which culture is conceived as a 
mineral deposit in Yúdice’s terms of the expediency of culture as a resource, within the extractive 
logic of the oil industry.  
PDVSA La Estancia is ‘Another Form of Sowing Oil’ 
 
This section examines the speeches of Beatrice Sansó, the General Manager of PDVSA 
La Estancia, to trace the discursive use of culture that frames the institution’s conceptualisation 
of the city as an oil field and its use of language to define a relationship between oil, land, and 
culture in which PDVSA La Estancia becomes ‘oil that harvests culture’.  This section 
investigates how this discursive construction enables PDVSA La Estancia to interpret the 
Organic Law of Hydrocarbons as an implicit cultural policy. 
Venezuelan lawyer Beatrice Sansó de Ramírez occupied the post of General Manager of PDVSA 
La Estancia between 2005 and 2014, her discourse plane is defined as an elite with access to 
Bureaucratic Power within and outside the oil industry that establishes the non-transferability of 
her performative utterances. All of the speeches were delivered on the occasion of event 
openings or the inauguration of restored public art and public spaces, discursive events politically 
emphasised in Jager’s terms, according to the definitions discussed in chapter two.  
A word frequency query of all speeches found that the five most frequently used words are: 
Estancia 450 
PDVSA 432 
Caracas 326 
Paraguaná 221 
Maracaibo 202 
 
Although PDVSA La Estancia has a national scope, its works and discourse concentrate on 
Caracas. The word cultural is the seventh most frequent term (172) whilst cultura (culture) is 
referenced 78 times. The equivalent terms of petrolero, petroleros and petrolera are referenced a total 
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of 132 times, whilst petróleo (oil) is referenced 51 times. Text search queries of cultura, cultural, 
petróleo, petrolero, socialista, socialismo and siembra petrolera were conducted to identify discourse 
fragments that intersect oil, culture and socialism, as well as the work of PDVSA La Estancia and 
the Sowing Oil Plan.  This search led to the unexpected discovery of a statement that is repeated 
to the letter in different speeches delivered between 2007 and 2012:  utopía de lo posible (utopia of 
the possible). The discourse fragments identified are collated in Table 14: 
 
Key Passage Speech title year context 
To the outside, we want 
people to go on the street 
and say ‘that was done by 
Centro de Arte La 
Estancia’, ‘La Estancia 
put its hand there’, so 
they identify through our 
work the social and 
cultural fruit of oil. That 
there is not one person 
that works for PDVSA, 
at the Ministry of Oil and 
Energy, in Cadafe or at 
Pequiven that does not 
know La Estancia. That 
there is not a person in 
Caracas, and in the 
interior of the country, 
that does not know La 
Estancia, that does not 
feel identified with it, 
because La Estancia is 
part of all of us. 
 
That is another way of 
sowing oil 
 
PDVSA La Estancia is 
PDVSA La Estancia Arte para todos 2005 PDVSA La Estancia 
home webpage, 
accessed on 
12/08/2015 
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the social and cultural 
arm of Petróleos de 
Venezuela S.A., destined 
to the valuation, 
restoration, promotion 
and diffusion of the 
historic and artistic 
heritage of the country.  
Its actions are based on 
the principles of the 
Sowing Oil Plan.  
(…) we wish to project as 
a model of action that 
allows us to achieve by 
the year 2010, on the 
19th April bicentenary, 
the goal of living in a 
beautiful Caracas, with all 
its spaces recovered, a 
socialist city, paradigm of 
the city of the 21st 
century. 
Discurso con motivo de la develación 
del Abra Solar de Alejandro Otero 
9 
November 
2007 
Revealing of the 
restoration of the 
Abra Solar sculpture 
in Plaza Venezuela, 
Caracas. 
    
the terrible pessimism of 
the impossible and we 
will substitute it for the 
Utopia of the Possible, 
ideal that inspires the 
daily actions of the 
Cultural Oasis of the 
capital.  
 
Paradigm of the possible, 
utopia of the desirable  
 
 
 
Discurso con motivo de la develación 
del Abra Solar de Alejandro Otero 
 
 
Discurso con motivo de la develación de 
la Fisicromía del maestro Carlos Cruz 
Diez 
 
 
Discurso con motivo de la inauguración 
de la exposición Mateo Manaure: el 
Hombre y el Artista 
Inauguración de la Quinta versión de la 
Fuente de Plaza Venezuela 
2007 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
Revealing of the 
restoration of the 
Abra Solar sculpture 
in Plaza Venezuela, 
Caracas. 
Revealing of 
Fisicromía by Carlos 
Cruz Diez 
 
Opening of Mateo 
Manaure: the Man 
and the Artist, 
exhibition 
Opening of the Fifth 
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The Sowing Oil will find 
again the furrows to 
inseminate, achieving the 
utopia of the possible  
 
 
Utopia of the Possible 
 
 
 
 
 
Inauguración de la sede de PDVSA La 
Estancia Maracaibo 
 
 
 
 
PDVSA LA ESTANCIA: LA UTOPÍA 
DE LO POSIBLE 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 
 
Version of the Plaza 
Venezuela Fountain 
 
Opening of PDVSA 
La Estancia branch 
in Maracaibo 
    
PDVSA-Centro de Arte 
La Estancia has given a 
radical turn to cultural 
management in regards 
to a practical and unique 
conception of our 
policies, according to 
article 5 of the Organic 
Law of Hydrocarbons 
and the Sowing Oil Plan 
Discurso con motivo de la Inauguración 
de PDVSA La Estancia Paraguaná 
 
Inauguración de la Quinta versión de la 
Fuente de Plaza Venezuela 
 
 
 
 
13 August 
2008 
 
10 March 
2009 
Opening of the 
Paraguaná branch 
 
Opening of the fifth 
version of the Plaza 
Venezuela Fountain 
Oil that harvests culture 
 
We keep finding for 
Sowing Oil, the furrows 
to inseminate it, and 
continue, inspiring the 
possible! 
A year of labour PDVSA La Estancia 
Oil that harvests culture 
5 February 
2011 
First anniversary of 
PDVSA La Estancia 
Maracaibo, opening 
of the exhibition 
titled ‘oil that 
harvests culture’ 
documenting the 
work of PDVSA La 
Estancia across 
Venezuela in 2010.  
Table 14 
The following performative utterances have been extracted from the discourse fragments above: 
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A. We want people to go on the street and say ‘that was done by Centro de Arte La 
Estancia’, ‘La Estancia put its hand there’, so they identify through our work the 
social and cultural fruit of oil  
 
B. That is another way of sowing oil  
 
C. PDVSA-Centro de Arte La Estancia has given a radical turn to cultural 
management in regards to a practical and unique conception of our policies, 
according to article 5 of the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons and the Sowing Oil 
Plan   
 
D. Oil that harvests culture  
 
E. Achieve by the year 2010, on the 19th April bicentenary, the goal of living in a 
beautiful Caracas, with all its spaces recovered, a socialist city, paradigm of the 
city of the 21st century  
 
F. Achieving the Utopia of the Possible  
 
G. instrument of Sowing Oil 
 
H. We keep finding for Sowing Oil, the furrows to inseminate it, and continue, 
inspiring the possible!  
As this thesis has established, Caracas is the location of PDVSA’s headquarters and where most 
of it works of restoration have taken place.  The recovery and beautification of Caracas aims to 
make it an example of what a future socialist city of the twenty first century would look like in 
Venezuela: ‘Caracas beautiful, with all its spaces recovered, a socialist city, paradigm of the city of 
the 21st century’. In practice, the emphasis is put on the restoration of public art and public 
spaces in Caracas rather than building anew. The focus on Caracas is intentional. The majority of 
the public art and public spaces restored are the legacy of the golden years of the Magical State, 
considered symbols of the modern oil nation, prior to the presidencies of Hugo Chávez. The 
socialist city, or more specifically, the petro-socialist city, manifests as the recovery of the city as 
it stood during the decades of the oil boom in contrast to the extreme deterioration the city fell 
under in the 1990s, exacerbated during the first five years of Chávez’s presidency. In this sense, 
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the performative utterance in statement A -‘that they identify the social and cultural fruit of oil 
through our work’- indicates a will to mediate people’s perception of oil through the actions of 
the institution and to repossess these symbols. But as the previous section argued, the socialist 
city is in essence an oil city and an oil field, owned, cared for and managed by PDVSA. The 
deteriorated city is equated to capitalist decay contributed to by a neoliberal PDVSA, whilst the 
phrase ‘Caracas beautiful’ discursively reframes the areas recovered by PDVSA La Estancia as 
the model of the future petro-socialist city as re-presented in the adverts.  
Consequently, Sanso’s performative utterance that states that PDVSA La Estancia ‘has given a 
radical turn to cultural management’ accurately describes the way it functions as the cultural arm 
of the oil company, which differentiates it from any other national or local cultural institution in 
Venezuela. Its policies are aligned with the Sowing Oil Plan and the Organic Law of 
Hydrocarbons, more specifically with Article 5 of the law.  At this point it is worth quoting in 
full Article 5, included in Chapter II of the law titled ‘Of Activities Related to Hydrocarbons’: 
Article 5: The activities regulated by this Law will be directed to promote the integral, 
organic and sustained development of the country, attending to the rational use of the 
resource and the preservation of the environment. With this end the strengthening of the 
national productive sector and the transformation in the country of the raw materials 
produced by the hydrocarbons will be promoted, as well as the incorporation of 
advanced technologies.  
The revenues that originate from hydrocarbons received by the nation will foster health, 
education, the creation of funds for macroeconomic stabilisation and productive 
investment, to achieve an appropriate linkage between oil and the national economy, all 
according for the people’s wellbeing.  
Article 5 does not make any explicit reference to culture or cultural activities or to social 
development, it’s the last line of the second paragraph ‘for the people’s wellbeing’ that is 
interpreted as such, by connecting the term wellbeing to the socio-cultural ‘branch’ of the 
Sowing Oil Plan, in which PDVSA La Estancia is the ‘organism’ that operates as the social and 
cultural arm of PDVSA (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.417). Therefore, PDVSA La Estancia 
instrumentalises Article 5 of the Law of Hydrocarbons as an implicit cultural policy in the terms 
defined by Jeremy Ahearne in chapter one. An implicit cultural policy is ‘any political strategy 
that looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides’ (Ahearne 2009, pp.143–
144); this is the manner in which Article 5 is instrumentalised  since according to the Sowing Oil 
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Plan, PDVSA La Estancia’s objectives are to ‘promote and disseminate the historic and artistic 
heritage of the country, including the restoration of the fundamental works that conform that 
heritage’ (Rondón de Sansó 2008, p.425), all encompassed within the  State Space that PDVSA 
presides.  
Consequently, PDVSA La Estancia presents its actions as a form of sowing oil, bearing the 
‘social and cultural fruit of oil’ through their work. They are aiming for a direct identification 
between people and PDVSA La Estancia, as well as a direct correlation between oil and culture.  
Even more so, beyond sowing oil, PDVSA La Estancia is oil that harvests culture, an entity that 
transforms a non-renewable natural resource into culture, materialised in their programme of 
events, public art restoration and urban regeneration projects. The continuous reference to Uslar 
Pietri’s ‘sowing oil’ is used to claim, as in the performative utterance of statement H, that they 
are opening furrows to scatter and plant  ‘seeds of oil’ that grow into possibilities, establishing 
that only through culture can oil be sown, relating culture back to the land. They discursively 
engage oil and culture in a symbiotic and cyclical farming relationship: PDVSA La Estancia is a 
form of sowing oil, and once sown, culture is ‘harvested’ and therefore the institution is ‘oil that 
harvests culture’. Sansó’s vision of culture, to paraphrase Bauman (2004, p.64),  is seen through 
the eyes of the farmer-manager whose  growing field is in this case the city as an oil field, and 
culture is ‘extracted’ as if it was a mineral deposit accumulated in the subsoil, the basis of this 
thesis proposition of the notion of culture-as-mineral deposit.  
PDVSA La Estancia does not present utopia as an ideal unattainable world in the future. On the 
contrary, it is ‘possible’, attainable and realised in the present by ‘sowing oil’ and ‘harvesting 
culture’ through the works of restoration of public art and public spaces. The inspirational 
language presents the oil company as the producer of material spaces of an oil based utopia, a 
real utopia, as stated in the title of the speech delivered by Sanso on May 7 2012, ‘PDVSA La 
Estancia: Utopia of the Possible’ meaning that when they sow the oil they harvest it as culture, 
and once harvested, utopia becomes real. 
Conclusion 
 
Petrosocialism emerged at a moment when oil prices were at an all time high, it is an oil boom 
phenomenon. PDVSA was central to guarantee the success of Petrosocialism which as chapter 
three argued, relied on the certainty that Venezuela sits over the biggest proven crude oil reserves 
in the world (Rowling 2012), which led Chávez to assume that Venezuela would enjoy a never-
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ending supply of oil money. Hence, the success of Petrosocialism relied on the success of global 
oil capitalism. This contradiction runs across State Space and bureaucratic power particularly 
trough the instrumentalisation of culture to construct the New Magical State’s illusion of 
‘renewable oil’. The recurrent use of the phrase ‘utopia of the possible’ is grounded on this 
discursive construction. PDVSA La Estancia establishes itself as a national management entity 
bound to the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons, which in their view prevails over regional and 
municipal laws, giving them the authority to govern over the space of Caracas, as it were a quasi-
state authority.  2007 was also the year in which PDVSA La Estancia extended its scope of 
action beyond an arts centre,  through its nationwide expansion establishing branches in 
Paraguana and Maracaibo, cultural programming across the country, and most notably by 
embarking on an ambitious programme of regeneration of public art and public spaces, 
effectively  taking over the functions of local government institutions such as the Instituto de 
Patrimonio Cultural and municipalities, claiming ownership over  Caracas.  
As a self-defined instrument of the Sowing Oil Plan, the act of sowing oil to harvest culture is 
defined by this thesis as an illusion of the New Magical State: oil ceases to be finite when it is 
sown to bear the fruits of culture. Within this vision, the Material Space of the city is meant to be 
absorbed by the Oil Social District and populated by petroleros (oil workers), a message visually 
delivered by the adverts of the campaign ‘we transform oil into a renewable resource for you’ 
that feature idealised giant oil workers. Chapter six uses visual semiotics to examine how the 
verbal and visual language of PDVSA La Estancia’s adverts depict Relative-Spaces of 
Representation of the Absolute-Material Space of the city as an oil field dominated by giant oil 
workers who are transforming oil into a ‘renewable resource’, which construes the notion of 
culture-as-mineral-deposit.  
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Chapter six: Relative-Spaces of Representation of Culture-as-mineral-
deposit 
 
There is a historical narrative in Venezuela that has regarded the arts, and by extension 
culture, as a resource to be exploited like oil. The most evident reference is a quote by 
Venezuelan visual artist and playwright César Rengifo: 
 ‘We [artists] are like oil: a reserve; but in Venezuela we have yet to be put in motion’  
Rengifo made headlines in 1973 when he made this statement in an interview to daily newspaper 
El Nacional. He asserted his value as an artist by saying that artists are like oil, a natural resource, 
to suggest that the Petrostate would invest in arts and in culture more generally, only if artists 
were viewed like a reserve of crude oil waiting to be extracted. Rengifo’s statement illustrates the 
clout oil carries in defining the relationship between the Petrostate and culture in Venezuela. 
This chapter examines the notion culture construed by Petrosocialism by examining the 
advertisement campaign launched by PDVSA La Estancia in 2013 titled Transformamos el petróleo 
en un recurso renovable para ti (we transform oil into a renewable resource for you) through the 
semiotic lens of Charles Peirce Semiosis and Roland Barthes’ Mythologies. It explores how the 
advertising campaign imagines the ‘utopia of the possible’ that renders oil and culture as 
equivalent by construing culture as a mineral, as if culture could be extracted, exploited and 
processed like oil.   
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part provides an overview and context of 
PDVSA’s advertising campaign, it also describes the visual and textual elements that compose 
the adverts. The second part develops a semiotic analysis of the visual element of the adverts, 
looking in particular at the public art depicted and the giant oil worker using Charles Peirce’s 
Semiosis. The third part continues the semiotic analysis by focusing on the verbal text of the 
campaign using Barthes’ theory of Mythical speech to elucidate the reality the phrase ‘We 
Transform oil into a renewable resource for you’ is creating and thus what notion of culture is 
mobilised by PDVSA La Estancia. Finally, the analysis of the visual and verbal elements draws 
on Yúdice and Bauman to look into the discursive construction of oil as a ‘renewable resource’, 
congruent with PDVSA La Estancia’s ‘utopia of the possible’ explored in chapter five, to 
examine how the adverts construe the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit.  
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Profile of the Campaign ‘We Transform Oil Into A Renewable Resource For You’ 
 
In 2005 PDVSA La Estancia embarked on an ambitious programme of public art 
restoration and urban regeneration, guided by the aims of the Sowing Oil Plan. In July 2014, 
after interviewing the General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia at their main building in Caracas, 
the Department of Public Relations of PDVSA La Estancia provided a CD with a set of 
photographs of every public art and public space that had been restored by the institution up to 
that moment, such as Alejandro Otero’s Abra Solar (Illustration 5), Jesus Soto’s Esfera Caracas 
(Illustration 6), and Sabana Grande Boulevard (Illustration 7).  
The set of photographs in the CD form the basis of the campaign; adding PDVSA La Estancia’s 
logo to the photograph would not have sufficed to evidence the institution’s direct involvement 
in restoring these locations to their original state. To evidence their direct role in the restoration, 
PDVSA La Estancia deployed visual and linguistic strategies, such as the inclusion of a giant oil 
worker and the verbal text ‘we transform oil into a renewable resource for you’ to make it clear 
to the viewer that it was the oil company, and not the institutions that had traditionally received 
funds from the oil company to carry out such works, like municipalities or the National Heritage 
Institute. The campaign consists of 23 posters that depict the public spaces and public art that 
have been restored by PDVSA La Estancia; each poster features a giant oil worker, clad in red 
gear, portrayed as if caught in the middle of a maintenance job, giving the finishing touches to 
the spaces they are working at. The adverts can be seen on most of the PDV petrol stations 
(owned by PDVSA), on PDVSA La Estancia’s main headquarters in Caracas (Illustration 8), as 
well as on their Facebook page (PDVSA La Estancia 2013).  
The visual element of the 23 adverts is a photographic image, composed by public art or 
architectural structure and the giant oil worker, complemented by the verbal text. The Relative-
Spaces of Representations in the adverts present photographs digitally altered to include the 
giant oil worker. A sample of three of the adverts showing the Esfera Caracas (Illustration 9), the 
Abra Solar (Illustration 10) and Sabana Grande Boulevard (Illustration 11) is presented in the 
following pages (for the full set of adverts see Appendix three).  
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Illustration 5: Abra Solar. Photo courtesy of PDVSA La Estancia 
 
Illustration 6: Esfera Caracas. Photo courtesy of PDVSA La Estancia 
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Illustration 7: Sowing Oil Square, Sabana Grande Boulevard. Photo courtesy of PDVSA La Estancia 
 
Illustration 8. Adverts at PDVSA La Estancia offices in Caracas. Photo by Penelope Plaza, 2014 
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Illustration 9. Esfera Caracas Advert 
 
Illustration 10. Abra Solar Advert 
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Illustration 11. Sowing Oil Square, Sabana Grande Boulevard Advert. 
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The adverts are grouped into the following categories: Public Art (18/23), Public Space (2/23), 
Playground (2/23), Sports Ground (1/23). The majority of the adverts feature Public Art; this is 
a key point showing not just the regeneration aspect but also the intention to create cultural, 
aesthetic and artistic associations with the oil company. Nineteen of the Material Spaces depicted 
are located in Caracas, three don’t specify any particular location whilst only one is located in 
Zulia state (specifically in Maracaibo, although it is not identified specifically in the poster), the 
main oil producing region of Venezuela. The campaign highlights PDVSA La Estancia’s 
investment in urban regeneration has taken place predominantly in Caracas.  The public art 
works are identified by a label that contains the name of the artwork, the name of the artist, and 
its location but excludes the year they were erected, listed below: 
Plaza Venezuela, Santos Michelena, Caracas-Venezuela 
Abra Solar, Alejandro Otero, Caracas-Venezuela 
Esfera Caracas, Jesus Soto, Caracas-Venezuela 
Fisicromía, Carlos Cruz-Diez, Caracas-Venezuela 
Los Cerritos, Alejandro Otero, Mercedes Pardo, Caracas-Venezuela 
Pariata 1957, Omar Carreño, Caracas-Venezuela 
Uracoa, Mateo Manaure, Caracas-Venezuela 
Venezuela Ocho Estrellas, Ender Cepeda, Edo. Zulia, Venezuela 
 
Since the labels do not indicate the date they were built, the adverts don’t differentiate between 
‘Bulevar de Sabana Grande, Caracas-Venezuela’ built in the 1970s from the restored structure of 
the ‘Gazebo of El Calvario, Parque Ezequiel Zamora’ that dates back to late nineteenth century. 
Playgrounds and sports grounds are not provided with any specific location; the sports grounds 
are simply labelled canchas (courts) without providing much more detail. Playgrounds are labelled 
Parques La Alquitrana (Tar Parks), suggesting that such parks have been built by PDVSA La 
Estancia all over the country. La Alquitrana is a feminised Spanish term for tar;  PDVSA La 
Estancia’s website explains that the circuit of La Alquitrana parks is named after Venezuela’s first 
oil well that spurt crude oil in 1878, located in the Andean region of Táchira (PDVSA La 
Estancia n.d.).  Overall, the adverts depict material spaces of leisure and cultural recreation: 
playgrounds (childhood), sports grounds (youth), public art and parks (families); all made 
possible by PDVSA La Estancia, by oil.   
But these material spaces appear miniaturised by the presence of what is in effect the actual focal 
point of the campaign: the giant oil worker. The campaign was launched in early 2013. It was the 
year of Hugo Chávez’ unexpected death, right at start of what would have been his fourth term 
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in office.  As discussed in chapter four, he had outlined an ambitious presidential programme for 
the elections of 2012  with the objective to transform Venezuela into a  world power of oil 
energy by expanding  the extraction of Venezuela’s vast reserves of hydrocarbons (Terán 
Mantovani 2014, p.161; Chávez 2012, pp.7, 27). Nonetheless, the majority of the public art and 
public spaces depicted in the adverts predate the arrival of Hugo Chávez to the presidency. They 
are symbols of the modern oil nation, built and erected during the golden years of the oil boom 
and the consolidation of the Magical State (1950s-1980s). The next section opens the visual 
semiotic analysis of the adverts, starting with Peirce’s Semiosis followed by Barthes’ Myth.   
Visual Semiotics:  Giant Oil Workers and the Myth of ‘Renewable Oil’ 
 
The set of professional photographs provided by the Department of Public Relations of 
PDVSA La Estancia are part of a larger set intended to be used as stock for promotional 
material. The photographs possess a postcard quality of the spaces that also identify Caracas as a 
modern metropolis. The material spaces are predominantly photographed at dusk, under dark 
blue skies, the night lights blurring the hustle and bustle of motorised traffic and people at rush 
hour. As argued earlier, the photographs by themselves would not evidence PDVSA La 
Estancia’s direct involvement in restoring the depicted public spaces and public art to their 
original state. With a few exceptions that will be highlighted later in the chapter, the public art 
and public spaces restored by PDVSA La Estancia predate the arrival of Hugo Chávez to the 
presidency. The main focal point of the adverts is not the city itself but the giant oil worker, who 
signals the viewer to look at what she/he is working on: public art and public space restored by 
PDVSA La Estancia.   
Each one of PDVSA La Estancia’s adverts is a fully formed sign-vehicle in Peirce’s terms. The 
two main features of the composition in terms of meaning are the photographic image and the 
verbal text. The photographic image depicts the interaction of two fundamental elements: a giant 
oil worker and the material space of the city. The verbal text communicates the message (the 
interpretant) of the visual interaction between giant oil worker and the city. The photographs 
used in the adverts are indexical because, according to Peirce, they have a similarity to their 
object, the actual material spaces of the city intervened by PDVSA La Estancia, and which are 
readily identifiable. The indexicality is emphasised by the label attached that identifies each place, 
or public art. Beyond the indexicality of the photograph, the density of meaning of the advert is 
brought by the inclusion of the giant oil worker through digital manipulation, who engages in a 
direct interaction with the public space/public art depicted. The original photographs were 
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altered to include this figure into the composition. This chapter examines the motives and 
meanings behind such strategy.   
In Peirce’s terms, the giant oil worker is both an iconic and indexical sign. Iconic for its similarity 
to an actual oil worker (a human-scale one, as actual giant oil workers do not exist) and indexical 
because of the existential relationship with the oil industry. The giant oil worker suggests the 
totality of the oil industry, mainly the extraction of crude oil. The oil workers are the main 
feature of the sign-vehicle, they appear in full working gear, clad in red from head to toe (red is 
the colour that identifies the Bolivarian revolution), with hard hats, protective overalls, boots, 
gloves, and wielding tools as if  they were repairing or giving the final touches to the public art or 
public spaces. The predominant action in which they are engaged suggests the undertaking of 
heavy duty work, they are wielding tools such as pipe wrenches and protective gloves, directly 
manipulating the public art or architectural structures as if they were heavy machinery in a 
refinery, the actual natural environment of an oil worker, and not in the midst of the city. 
Although they are of an unnatural monumental size, collectively the oil workers are portrayed as 
benevolent giants occupied with beautifying the city, as a naturalised and ubiquitous presence in 
a city visually miniaturised by their scale.  All the adverts vividly capture the face of each giant oil 
worker, they are all easily identifiable. Their portraits are predominantly three-quarter or full 
body photographs, their monumentality emphasised by the low-angle angle shot, they do not 
gaze directly at the viewer; they are either focused on their duty or engaging with the 
miniaturised city inhabitants below them in a cordial manner.  
In the pair of posters of Sabana Grande Boulevard (Illustrations 11 and 12), the giant oil workers 
are seen installing a canopy, in a space that has been aptly named Plaza Siembra Petrolera 
(Sowing Oil Square), they are presented as if they were turning the giant pipe of an oil drill into 
the ground.  In the case of the adverts that depict public art, it loses the monumental scale 
through the interaction with the giant oil worker. Like the canopies, public art is handled as if it 
was heavy machinery in a refinery; the city spaces and public art celebrated by the adverts are 
miniaturised by the colossal scale of the giant oil worker. These spaces, although already 
completed and accomplished in reality, are shown as unfinished in the adverts as if the giant oil 
workers were caught in the midst of the active process of repairing them. 
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Illustration 12. Sowing Oil Square, Sabana Grande Boulevard Advert 
 
Illustration 13. Sowing Oil Square, Sabana Grande Boulevard Advert 
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As Iconic-Indexical signs, the giant oil workers also function as visual-cultural ambassadors of 
PDVSA La Estancia. Instead of the ejecutivo petrolero (oil executive) the Petrosocialist and 
revolutionary PDVSA chose to be represented by the obrero petrolero (oil worker), the one who 
gets down and dirty to perform the extraction of crude oil from the subsoil. Overall, this strategy 
is a continuation of the legacy left by the foreign oil companies, like Shell and Creole, who 
inaugurated the use of Public Relations in Venezuela:  
‘The departments of public relations of Creole and Shell in Venezuela had multiple 
functions: internally they promoted practices considered useful among foreign and 
Venezuelan employees, whilst externally they served as the public face of the company. 
These tasks were not mutually exclusive because these companies viewed employees as 
their ambassadors’ (Tinker Salas, 2009, p. 281, my translation) 
If the giant oil workers are the visual and cultural ambassadors of the oil industry, then their 
inclusion and interaction with the public art and public spaces depicted point to a re-possession 
of the material space of the city, visually reconstructed as an oil field in a clear attempt at 
naturalising a direct and mechanistic relationship between oil, culture and the city. Hence, the 
giant oil workers also function as a visual metaphor of PDVSA’s State Space, in other words, the 
extractive logic of the oil industry is transferred to the city mediated by public space and public 
art. But as an artificially constructed image, the giant oil worker also offers a direct connection 
between the oil company and the viewer (and within the advert between the giant oil worker and 
city dwellers) suggesting a break with the historical social division between workers of the oil 
industry and the rest of the population, as Tinker Salas has argued: 
‘Many directly employed or indirectly benefiting from the oil industry subsequently 
assumed key positions in Venezuelan society, government, commerce and industry. Their 
views reflected a series of self-sustaining myths about the oil industry and its importance 
to the nation and society. Paramount among these was the notion that for Venezuela the 
oil industry was the means to achieve modernity in all its forms. For those employed by 
the industry, these new modern traditions accentuated certain traits and behaviour 
patterns –discipline, efficiency, work ethic, meritocracy, and in some cases even 
bilingualism- that helped define the “collective consciousness” of the oil industry and 
distinguished those working in it from the rest of society.’ (Tinker Salas 2009, p.5) 
But the symbolic break with the social hierarchy that used to distinguish those working for the 
oil industry with the rest of society is contradicted by the colossal scale of the giant oil workers 
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and their paternalistic demeanour towards the viewer. Oil is once again presented as the source 
of prosperity and the producer of culture through the labour of a ‘workers elite’. To emphasise 
this, the campaign romanticises the harsh reality and ‘dirtiness’ of the work in the oil  fields by 
offering a sanitised version of the oil worker and the working environment of the refinery as it is 
visually relocated into the midst of the city. The signification in the adverts is that PDVSA is the 
sole provider of prosperity and culture through the actions of PDVSA La Estancia, materialised 
in the beautiful restored public spaces and public art. The giant oil worker appears as a symbol of 
PDVSA’s bureaucratic power and benevolence. 
The relocation of the sanitised version of the giant oil worker turns the adverts into symbolic-
signs (defined by Peirce as a relationship that has been ‘agreed’ upon and learned) of the Oil 
Social District as PDVSA’s State Space, a symbolic-sign of the Material Space of the city 
colonised by oil and appropriated by PDVSA La Estancia. Furthermore, seen together,  the 23 
adverts (Illustration 11) as if they were a sequence, represent a cause and effect relation as 
‘sequences of pictures and films are more likely to represent cause–effect relations’ (Margolis & 
Pauwels 2011, p.308). The actions of the giant oil workers as a collective of images represent a 
cause and effect relation of the impact of the work of PDVSA La Estancia on the city, which 
could not be entirely conveyed by just pairing the photograph of the restored space and the logo. 
In order to tell the story the adverts had to make it explicit to the viewer that the institution is 
behind it, that it was not the central government, not the municipality, not the Instituto de 
Patrimonio Cultural, but PDVSA, further emphasised by PDVSA La Estancia’s General 
Manager performative utterance discussed in chapter five: ‘We have to feel oil workers. This 
exists because PDVSA exists. That’s the idea.’ (Sanso de Ramírez Interview 2014). 
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Illustration 14. The 23 adverts of the campaign ‘We transform oil into a renewable resource for you’ 
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Two types of cause and effect relations can be identified in the adverts: a natural one and an 
artificial one. The natural is that those spaces were in fact restored by PDVSA La Estancia by its 
self defined revolutionary oil workers, all directly funded by the oil rent. But the giant oil worker 
in the advert also serves to obscure the bureaucratic mechanisms and institutional structures 
needed for restorations of this scale to come to fruition, only the authorship of the oil company 
is acknowledged. Visually, it is not as simple as having a giant oil worker do the repairs, public 
works need sophisticated and complex sets of decisions and institutional arrangements to make 
them possible. However, there is some truth to this portrayed simplicity; the mechanisms 
discussed in chapter four that led to the progressive dismantlement of the existing institutional 
apparatus opened a breach that allowed PDVSA La Estancia to claim complete ownership of the 
public spaces and public art, without having to acknowledge the set of institutions and 
bureaucratic logistics that had to come together to make these works possible. The artificial 
cause and effect lies in claiming that through the actions depicted in the adverts they are 
transforming oil into a ‘renewable resource’. The term ‘renewable resource’ is used 
interchangeably by PDVSA to refer either to oil or culture. The magazine Petróleo y Revolución 
#14 (Oil and Revolution, May 2012),  an internal publication produced and distributed by the 
Ministry of Popular Power of Oil and Mining, includes an article that reviews the work of 
PDVSA La Estancia titled ‘making our culture a renewable resource’.    
According to Peirce, images ‘cannot express the ideas of possibility, necessity, obligation, or 
volition’ (Margolis & Pauwels 2011, p.309); whilst the visual elements of the adverts cannot tell 
us the motivations or subsequent effects of the giant oil workers’ engagements with the material 
space of the city, the verbal text aims to do just this, it provides  the images with volition, it 
expresses the idea of possibility latent in the advert. It is the visualisation of the ‘utopia of the 
possible’ discussed in chapter five, the realised utopia of inexhaustible oil dreamt by Chávez, 
obtained by harvesting culture from sowing oil,  constructed as an illusion of the New Magical 
State.  
The verbal text that identifies the campaign suggests the correlation between the myth of 
‘renewable oil’ put forward by the adverts and the instrumentalisation of culture-as-mineral-
deposit. This chapter now turns to develop a semiotic analysis of the verbal text to identify the 
‘mythical speech’ of the adverts, using Roland Barthes’ Mythologies. Barthes provides the 
analytical framework to decipher the type of reality that the language of the adverts aims to 
create, and hence what notion of culture is construed by PDVSA La Estancia.  A  Myth is a 
concrete type of speech, a ‘mode of signification’ defined not by its literal sense but by its 
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intention (Barthes 1993, p. 109-110, 124). Everything can be a myth as long as ‘it is conveyed by 
a discourse’ (Barthes 1993, p.109) since it is not confined to the written word or oral speech; 
hence, all mediums of visual representation are vehicles for mythical speech. 
The verbal text of the advert: Transformamos el petróleo en un recurso renovable para ti  (We transform 
oil into a renewable source for you), has also been used in press releases for cultural events 
organized by PDVSA La Estancia, from salsa concerts, music festival, art exhibitions to puppet 
shows; almost every press release in 2013 closes with it. It expresses eloquently the purpose of 
the campaign, this expressed purpose, or intention, reveals the verbal text as the construction of 
myth in Barthes’ terms. For Barthes there is nothing arbitrary in the functional implications 
between the three elements of the myth: on the plane of myth the signifier is the form, the 
signified is the concept, and the sign is the signification (Barthes 1993, p.114). The signifier 
‘postulates a reading’, a signification is already built and the meaning complete when the signifier 
becomes form (Barthes 1993, p.117).   
The myth is completed by the interaction between the verbal text and the visuals of the 
campaign. The campaign presents as fact that PDVSA La Estancia is transforming oil into a 
‘renewable resource’ but it does not explain what this renewable resource is, rather it is suggested 
in the images of the oil workers ‘sowing oil’ in the city.  The intention of the campaign was 
already suggested in chapter five through PDVSA La Estancia’s discursive construction of ‘oil 
that harvests culture’ in the city as the relationship it should to establish between oil and culture 
as an ‘utopia of the possible’, made more explicit by its General Manager as the following extract 
from the interview already discussed in chapter five, useful to bring back at this point: 
‘You know we always add to the spaces an oil element, because we all need to feel we are 
petroleros. That’s the idea. There always will be an oil mural, an oil sculpture. The only 
contact the common Venezuelan has with oil when they don’t work for PDVSA, or if 
they don’t live in an oil area above all, is the petrol station. We have to feel petroleros. This 
exists because PDVSA exists. That’s the idea.’ (Sanso de Ramirez 2014) 
The emphasis on ‘we have to feel oil workers’ depoliticises the campaign.  ‘Petroleros’ (oil workers) 
as an identity is less controversial and divisive than ‘socialist’ in a nation that, as Coronil (1997) 
has determined, is unified by oil but is currently suffering from extreme political polarisation. 
This confirms the campaign as mythical depoliticised speech in Barthes’ terms. The adverts of 
the campaign locate all public art, sports grounds and public spaces in the same present 
temporality, in the same quality of newness. The temporality of the adverts speaks of a history-
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less present. This is emphasised by the absence of the date the art works and spaces were 
created/installed/built in the label that identifies them. The Abra Solar, the Esfera Caracas, The 
Fisicromía, Pariata 1957, Los Cerritos, Gazebo de El Calvario, Sabana Grande Boulevard, and 
Plaza Venezuela are all products of the demonised ‘counter revolutionary state’, they are the 
legacy of the golden era of the Magical State, stripped in the adverts of their political and cultural 
history. The campaign proposes an abolition of history; it appropriates ‘high art’, public spaces 
and heritage for the oil industry rather than for the Bolivarian revolution.  
The verbal text presents as fact that PDVSA La Estancia is ‘transforming oil into a renewable 
resource’. Although it does not make explicit what the renewable resource is, it is shown in the 
images of the giant oil workers busy ‘harvesting’ public art. The renewable resource is culture. 
The myth of transforming oil into a ‘renewable resource’ is emphasised in the colouring and 
layout of the typography. The words of the verbal text are given two different colour 
combinations, white and red, or black and red. The same three words are always highlighted in 
red and bold in every single advert:  
 
We transform OIL 
into a resource RENEWABLE FOR YOU 
The implied ‘nosotros’ (we) in the plural of Transformamos (we transform) in the verbal text is the 
voice of the institution represented by the collective of giant oil workers depicted in the adverts 
(Illustration 13), who function as the  visual and cultural ambassadors of PDVSA La Estancia. 
Petróleo (oil) is not only highlighted, but appears in a larger size, singled out visually. In the 
typographic layout, the left hand side half of the text is written in lowercase letters whilst the 
right hand side half dominates the composition with words in capital letters and highlighted in 
bold red: OIL RENEWABLE FOR YOU. The key message of the campaign is contained in 
the right hand side half. The position of Petróleo (oil) and renovable (renewable) in the layout of the 
text puts Petróleo right on top of renovable, which visually suggests them to be read together as 
petróleo renovable (renewable oil):  
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The next words in the text highlighted in bold red lead to the intended audience of the 
campaign, the FOR YOU:  
 
The last word highlighted in red bold typeface is ti (you). It’s made renewable for you. The ‘for 
you’ aims to create identification, a sense of closeness between the institution and the viewer by 
addressing the viewer directly. The audience to which the YOU is addressed to is the potential 
users of the spaces, the dwellers of the cities these structures are located in, but given the 
national scope of the campaign, it implies the population of Venezuela at large, in other words, 
all citizens of the Petrostate who share the national identity of oil and are the subjects of the 
New Magical State.  
The meaning of oil and renewable put together is incongruent, it is paradoxical because oil is a 
non-renewable natural resource, and it is finite.  But the paradox implied here is not literal. The 
paired words suggest that PDVSA La Estancia is claiming that a never ending supply of oil is 
made possible as PDVSA succeeds in realising the ‘utopia of the possible’ by ‘magically’ 
transforming oil into a renewable resource. Admittedly, oil is made renewable metaphorically by 
investing the oil rent in culture, in other words by sowing oil in the restoration and renewal of 
public art and public spaces undertaken by PDVSA La Estancia as a harvest of culture. If oil is 
made renewable by investing in culture then culture is like renewable oil: oil, culture and the 
Material Space of the city are conflated into one entity. Thus, PDVSA La Estancia disputes 
Rodolfo Quintero’s assertion that an ‘oil city’ does not produce art, science or any form of 
intellectual culture when the  inert  and money-driven ‘culture of oil’ prevails (Quintero 2011, 
p.55) by coalescing oil, culture and the material space of the city, making an expedient use of 
culture as a mineral resource in Yúdice’s terms.  
Oil, City and Culture: Culture-as-mineral-deposit 
 
As discussed earlier, most of what is celebrated by the adverts dates back to the golden 
era of the oil-driven development of the 1940s-1980s: Plaza Venezuela Fountain, Abra Solar, 
Fisicromía, Pariata 57, Los Cerritos, Esfera Caracas, Sabana Grande Boulevard. Oil is presented 
as the source of enduring prosperity. The adverts as a group are the material form of the sign. 
Barthes’ concept, unlike Saussure’s signifier, can take a variety of forms because it only re-
presents itself. It is this multiplication of the verbal text and giant oil workers what allows to 
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decipher the myth through the repetition of the idea of the transformation of oil into a 
‘renewable resource’.  The concept relies on understanding culture as crude oil, as an expedient 
natural resource or a mineral deposit that accumulates in the subsoil that can be transformed and 
renewed. Oil then becomes a double-sided cultural entity invoked as a singular force capable of 
producing palpable cultural effects and producer of culture when sown, but also a cultural 
product itself. If culture is a mineral deposit extracted from the subsoil of the nation, then 
culture and the discursive and political wealth produced by culture-as-mineral-deposit can be, 
like the subsoil, the exclusive property of the Petrostate.  
The signification, or the association between the form and the concept, is the myth itself. The 
myth presented by the adverts is oil made renewable by investing in culture; therefore culture 
becomes analogous to renewable oil. Culture, oil, and the city are coalesced into one entity 
through the myth of renewable oil. The myth comes into fruition through the performative force 
of the New Magical State (Coronil 1997; López-Maya 2007), the magical powers of oil  are 
embodied in this particular instance by PDVSA’s giant oil workers, not by the deceased Hugo 
Chávez. The myth of ‘renewable oil’  also serves to calm anxieties about the end of oil reserves 
and high oil prices which endanger Petrosocialism, the survival of the Socialist State and the 
construction of the ‘utopia of the possible’, discussed in chapter five. PDVSA La Estancia makes 
possible the impossible, as chapter five has argued, of realising the ‘utopia of the possible’ by 
transforming oil into a renewable resource.  Oil and culture are rendered as equivalent when 
culture is turned into a mineral, as if culture was a physical material that could be industrially 
extracted, exploited, processed, measured and commercialised. Moreover, ‘renewable oil’ 
attaches to culture conflicting notions of resource: resource as nature and resource as deposits 
extracted from the subsoil that yield wealth.   
For Yúdice, ‘the notion of culture as a resource is the only surviving definition’ (2003, p.279).  
The expediency of culture as a resource allows its use for economic, social and political purposes 
within institutional contexts such as PDVSA and PDVSA La Estancia. To paraphrase Yúdice, it 
is close to impossible for the state-owned oil company not to view culture as a mineral resource. 
Hence, PDVSA La Estancia’s discursive construction of culture as ‘culture-as-mineral-deposit’, 
which is this thesis contribution to the literature on culture.  Whilst Yúdice (2003) looks at 
performativity in grassroots movements of Latin America as a resistance to neoliberal strategies, 
in this case it is the ‘anti-neoliberal’ giant oil workers of Petrosocialism that are being called to 
perform culture.  
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In the Petrosocialist notion of culture as culture-as-mineral-deposit, culture is discursively bound 
to the subsoil, so that it becomes the exclusive property of the Petrostate and belongs to the 
realm of PDVSA’s State Space. In this context, the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit can be 
regarded as more than a mere discursive construction.  The  implications is that by tying culture 
to the land, it constructs culture as a material entity that accumulates in the subsoil, ready to be 
extracted, processed, weighed, measured under the tight control of the Petrostate. Therefore, 
modern and abstract manifestations of culture such as the ones depicted in the adverts can only 
be quantified as valuable if they are transformed into oil machinery, rather than as symbols of the 
abstract notions of civilisation and progress.  Then, for culture to fit this rhetoric, it has to be 
defined in narrower terms.  
PDVSA La Estancia’s instrumentalisation of culture-as-mineral-deposit is not oriented towards 
the conventional model of development discussed by Yúdice, rather it is ‘sown’ and ‘harvested’ 
for political aims. PDVSA La Estancia, as discussed in the two preceding chapters, conceives 
culture as a medium and an instrument to transcend the ills of capitalism and urban living. Under 
Petrosocialism culture is not required to provide financial returns, as the Petrostate’s distributive 
expenditure policies do not require financial accountability or representative bargains. Culture-as-
mineral-deposit condenses the materiality lost by oil when it was reduced to the fetish of rent 
money (Pérez Schael 1993, p.94) becoming inextricable from land. The use of culture-as-mineral-
deposit becomes the fuel to extend the life of the illusions of the New Magical State beyond the 
physical death of Chávez.  
Conclusion 
 
The whole campaign or the image per se can be interpreted as a symbol (through the oil worker) 
of the Oil Social District, PDVSA’s State Space. PDVSA La Estancia is a national management 
entity of PDVSA; its jurisdiction and cultural policy are founded on the Law of Hydrocarbons. 
Caracas, as already discussed in chapter four, is covered by the Metropolitan Oil District, 
spanning across the Metropolitan District. There are no oil fields or refineries in Caracas, or the 
Metropolitan area at large, but it is where the main headquarters of PDVSA are located. 
PDVSA’s building in the neighbourhood of La Campiña is then considered a site of ‘oil 
extraction’, the Metropolitan District then determining its sphere of influence, which justifies 
PDVSA La Estancia’s interventions in Caracas depicted in the adverts.  
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The spaces in the adverts are, in Peircean terms, tokens of the cultural effects of oil that could be 
expanded to other regions covered by the Oil Social Districts. The material space of the city is 
envisioned as an oil field, where giant oil workers are seen repairing or installing architectural or 
sculptural structures. They give a face, or rather a collective face, to the oil industry as their 
colossal figures subliminally communicate that urban spaces, and the city at large, are contained 
within PDVSA’s State Space.  
PDVSA La Estancia devised the visual strategy of the giant oil worker to establish their 
ownership over the Absolute-Material Space of the city. The giant oil worker functions as an 
indexical sign of the oil industry, their inclusion and interaction with the Relative-Material  
Spaces depicted in the adverts visually reframes them as oil fields in a clear attempt at 
naturalising a direct and mechanistic relationship between oil, urban space and culture, 
functioning also as a visual metaphor of PDVSA’s State Space. The adverts visualise the 
performance of sowing oil and harvesting culture, using the giant oil worker as the 
personification of Bauman’s ‘manager-farmer’; the labour of the giant oil workers transform oil 
into a ‘renewable resource’ as the new illusion of the New Magical State, congruent with PDVSA 
La Estancia’s ‘utopia of the possible’ that uses culture expediently, in Yúdice’s terms, to 
conceptualise it as culture-as-mineral-deposit.  
This chapter has argued that PDVSA La Estancia discursively renders oil and culture equivalent 
by construing culture-as-mineral-deposit, as if culture could be extracted, exploited and 
processed like oil.  This evokes a farming cycle that on one hand, responds to the discursive 
strand of ‘renewable oil’ and, on the other, provides a new illusion, a novel dramaturgical act for 
the New Magical State: culture as renewable oil is tied back to the land. Hence, culture-as-
mineral-deposit is inextricable from State Space (specifically from the Oil Social District as 
PDVSA’s parallel State Space), from territory. If culture is ‘harvested’ from the subsoil, then the 
Petrostate can claim complete ownership and tight control over culture as a ‘renewable resource’ 
as established by the Law of Hydrocarbons.  
This is the context of the naturalisation of the giant oil worker metaphorically harvesting culture, 
acting outside of its natural environment, the refinery and oil fields; stripped of the dirtiness of 
directly handling oil they appear more analogous to gardeners than actual oil workers. And 
although the colossal scale is intended to provide them with a mythical aura, they are at the same 
time put in a subservient position to the viewer.   The giant oil worker performs the material 
quality oil lost when it was reduced to rent money  (Pérez Schael 1993, p.94). This performativity 
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is also made possible by a State Space in flux, in transition toward the Socialist State; hence, 
culture as mineral resource becomes inextricable from State Space.  
The myth of ‘renewable oil’ also serves the purpose of calming anxieties about the end of oil, 
which endangers the survival of Petrosocialism.  The term ‘renewable resource’ is used 
interchangeably to refer either to oil or culture. In the specific context of the campaign, the 
verbal text suggests that oil is being transformed into culture, inferring that culture is the 
‘renewable resource’, naturalising as truth that PDVSA La Estancia is making possible the utopia 
of inexhaustible oil.   
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Conclusion: The Untenable Sowing of Oil 
 
‘oil is great, that thing gives money! We have to live off it, we have to… We should all have the 
fortune of living in an oil country’ (Interview, A3) 
For a nation whose identity is entangled with oil and with an economy that is almost 
entirely dependent on oil, even in the midst of the current debacle in oil prices, oil remains the 
only plausible path towards development. The memory of the glories of the Magical State and 
the oil boom lurks behind the spectacular modernism of the 1950s and the rapid urbanisation 
and modernisation with the most enviable cultural infrastructure and architecture in the region 
from the 1960s and 1970s. After the crash in oil prices of the 1980s and 1990s, the coincidental 
rise to power of Hugo Chávez in 1998 and the steep rise in oil prices marked a shift in the 
history of the Venezuelan Petrostate. The oil windfall allowed Chávez to embark on an 
ambitious plan of transforming the country through Petrosocialism, which turned the now 
revolutionary PDVSA into the key instrument for building an alternative model of development 
to capitalism and neoliberalism. But, as this thesis has explored, the legislative gymnastics that 
the Chávez regime engaged in enabled the state-owned oil company to gain more power and to 
expand its dominion across non-oil related city spaces and over cultural objects.  
This thesis employed critical theories of the state (Joyce & Bennett 2010; Coronil 1997; 
Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987; Jessop 1990; Beblawi & Luciani 1987; Miller & Rose 2008), space 
(Brenner & Elden 2009; Harvey 2006a; Lefebvre et al. 2009; Lefebvre 1991; Lefebvre 2003; 
Stanek 2011) and culture (Ahearne 2009; Bauman 2004; McGuigan 2003; O’Brien 2014; 
Stevenson 2003; Yúdice 2003; Zukin 1995) to investigate how Petrosocialism, the transition 
towards the Socialist State and the dismantlement of the institutional apparatus of urban 
governance in Venezuela enabled PDVSA La Estancia to appropriate the city’s urban spaces to 
instrumentalise the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons as an implicit cultural policy as well as to 
invoke the expediency of culture as a resource (Yúdice 2003) by what this thesis has proposed as 
the notion of culture-as-mineral-deposit within the logic of Petrosocialism.  
To this end, this thesis engaged with a mix of methodological approaches to address the scope 
and focus of these processes. To explore the intersections of State Space, Bureaucratic Power 
and Culture, the research collected four different sets of sources, relying predominantly on 
documentary research: interviews, public speeches, policy instruments and advertisements that 
were analysed through the methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2004; Fairclough 
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2010; Jager 2011) and Visual Semiotics, using in particular Charles Peirce’s Semiosis and Roland 
Barthes’ Mythologies. The main challenge this thesis faced to investigate these questions had to 
do with access to government officials and PDVSA La Estancia bureaucrats, explained in detail 
in chapter two in the section devoted to the unexpected ethical issues that arose during the 
fieldwork in Caracas. However, it is crucial to clarify that the conclusions this investigation has 
arrived to would remain the same even if the whole of PDVSA La Estancia staff and 
government officials had been interviewed. The thesis adopted a case study approach to PDVSA 
La Estancia’s interventions in Caracas as a gateway to explore Petrosocialism, and the Petrostate 
at large, from a spatial and cultural perspective. More broadly, the thesis was concerned with 
exploring the interfaces between the politics of space and politics of culture within a Petrostate. 
The main question that this thesis set out to investigate was how the relationship between the 
state, oil wealth, and culture played out in space in Petrosocialism. The investigation was guided 
by four further questions:  
What are the Representations of Space produced by the discourses of Petrosocialism? 
Do the Oil Social Districts constitute in practice PDVSA’s State Space?   
Is there a vision of the city in Petrosocialism? 
What notion of culture is being produced by Petrosocialism? 
This concluding chapter begins by addressing the discrepancies and contradictions that have 
underpinned this thesis throughout. It then revisits the research questions that guided the thesis’ 
investigation to provide a synthesis of the core arguments, as well as the contributions to the 
literature developed in the substantive chapters. It closes with the emerging research agenda that 
this thesis taps into as well as some concluding observations about the current Venezuelan 
context.  
Discrepancies and Contradictions 
 
As the introduction and chapter two described, even though Chávez championed an 
anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal agenda, the shift in the  relationship between the state and the 
state-owned oil company brought by Petrosocialism blurred the boundaries between state and 
corporate power (Crouch 2011; Harvey 2005). Once PDVSA was reframed as a revolutionary oil 
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company at the service of Petrosocialism, Chávez surrendered many of the bureaucratic powers 
of the state to the state-owned oil company. This was one of the major contradictions identified 
by this thesis, examined more clearly in chapter five through the analysis of the speeches of 
former President of PDVSA Rafael Ramírez, who declared that the bureaucratic power of the oil 
company was subservient to the construction of the Socialist State and the eradication of oil 
rentierism. It is paradoxical for the president of an oil company to publicly denounce oil 
capitalism and argue for the end of oil rentierism. Nonetheless, the real purpose was to establish 
PDVSA’s public identity as a revolutionary corporation even though, in practice, it had to 
preserve the capitalist practices of any oil corporation but whose active engagement in the global 
oil market is at the service of the New Magical State and Petrosocialism.  
Another contradiction centres on PDVSA La Estancia’s slogan ‘utopia of the possible’. The term 
utopia refers to an ideal state or place where everything is perfect, an impossible place because its 
perfection cannot be realised. Whilst utopia speaks of an unattainable perfection, the word 
‘possible’ speaks of what is able to be done or achieved, it is grounded on reality. Chapter five 
clarified that the reiteration of the slogan word by word in several speeches was an unexpected 
finding. This thesis did not examine the historical and political underpinnings of the slogan of 
‘utopia of the possible’ or analysed it in philosophical or linguistic terms. It engaged with it 
exclusively in relation to the manner in which PDVSA La Estancia constructed its institutional 
public image and effects on urban space. The slogan can be paraphrased as the perfection of 
what can be done, or what is already done.  Chapter five demonstrated that PDVSA La Estancia 
does not present utopia as an ideal unattainable oil-based world in the future, it is made possible 
by perfecting what already exists. As a self-defined instrument of the Sowing Oil Plan, the 
‘utopia of the possible’ encloses the resuscitation of the ‘sowing oil’ slogan. PDVSA La 
Estancia’s beautification of the city is discursively presented as a possible utopia, attainable and 
realised in the present by ‘sowing oil’ and ‘harvesting culture’ in the works of restoration across 
the city. As with any utopian project, PDVSA La Estancia constructed its own utopian 
inhabitants embodied by the giant oil workers of the adverts examined in chapter six. This thesis 
also demonstrated that the metaphorical act of sowing oil to harvest culture enacted by the giant 
oil workers is another illusion of the New Magical State: oil ceases to be finite when it is sown to 
bear the fruits of culture.  
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Revisiting the key questions: Representations of Space in Petrosocialism, PDVSA’s State Space, 
‘Oil that harvests culture’ and the expediency of culture-as-mineral-deposit 
What are the Representations of Space produced by the discourses of Petrosocialism? 
To examine the manner in which the transition towards the Socialist State Space took form, this 
thesis first examined Chávez’s use of the oil industry and his exercise of bureaucratic power. 
Petrosocialism was heavily dependent on the longevity of OPEC and the continued growth of 
global oil capitalism. Therefore, the entrenchment of oil rentierism was necessary to guarantee 
the irreversibility of Socialism; Chávez’s territorial policies were designed on the premise of 
inexhaustible highly priced oil. The thesis demonstrated that an essential contradiction runs 
through Petrosocialism: Chávez’s goal to establish an alternative model to capitalism was actually 
heavily reliant on the success of global oil capitalism, the very model he proposed to eradicate. 
But in terms of Chávez’s exercise of Bureaucratic Power it gained some coherence given that 
only an oil rentier state could produce a New Magical State; its powers and longevity were 
heavily dependent on a ‘revolutionary’ PDVSA that provided the necessary resources to 
consolidate the Socialist State.  
This thesis drew on Fernando Coronil’s The Magical State (1997) and Margarita López-Maya 
(2007) to characterise Hugo Chávez as the New Magical State. On one hand, Coronil’s notion of 
The Magical State acknowledges land as ‘the foundation of both the Venezuelan state and 
Venezuelan society’ (Coronil 2011, pp.4–5) in which land equates to  wealth extracted from its 
oil-rich subsoil. On the other hand, Coronil (1997, p.5) argued that the Petrostate’s ownership of 
the subsoil and its monopoly over oil wealth is exercised dramaturgically: the expansion of the oil 
industry promoted the concentration of power in the presidency as the embodiment of the 
‘magical’ powers of oil to transform the country. Hence, the Magical State is personified as a 
magnanimous sorcerer in the sole figure of the president. This thesis argued that the oil windfall 
and the reforms of the state apparatus enabled Hugo Chávez to summon all the bureaucratic 
powers of the state to embody a New Magical State in his persona to transform the country into 
a Socialist State (Coronil 2011, p.9). It also argued that despite Chávez’s anti-capitalist and anti-
neoliberal rhetoric, the Venezuelan Socialist State could never cease to be an oil rentier state. 
This thesis also found that Chávez did not envision a post-oil world.  
Chapters four and five examined the Representations of Space produced by the discourses of 
Petrosocialism through the creation of the new policy instruments of the Socialist State, and 
whether this process aided PDVSA in constituting a parallel State Space. Hugo Chávez launched 
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Petrosocialism as an economic a political model to use the vast financial resources generated by 
the oil boom to build a future socialist society governed by a Socialist State. Still, a new Socialist 
State could not be consolidated unless it consolidated a Socialist State Space (Brenner & Elden 
2009), crucial not only in terms of the deployment of Bureaucratic Power but most importantly 
to secure control and authority over the soil from where oil wealth and the powers of the New 
Magical State originate. Once this thesis defined Hugo Chávez’s exercise of Bureaucratic Power 
as the New Magical State, it then engaged in exploring the territorial strategies for the Socialist 
State Space. It adopted the  definition of State Space as a historically specific  political form of 
space, continually produced and reproduced by state actions, understandable only through the 
processes of statecraft and its relation to the state (Brenner & Elden 2009). The CRBV, the 
development plans for the nation and the new laws manifested Chávez’s will to create a new 
Socialist State Space through urban planning based on the New Geometry of Power. To this 
end, he set off to completely restructure the state apparatus, proceeding to dismantle the 
bureaucratic structures that were deemed an obstacle or unnecessary.  Chapter four took a 
chronological approach to trace in detail the process of abrogation of existing laws and creation 
of the new legal instruments for the transition towards the Socialist State. What this thesis 
revealed was that Petrosocialism failed to produce coherent Representations of Space. Although 
the New Geometry of Power was proposed as the guiding principle for the creation of the 
spatial policies of the Socialist State, in practice, the government proved to be inefficient in 
clearly delineating a cohesive conceptual framework to constitute a Socialist State Space. 
Moreover, despite the influence of Doreen Massey’s language, this thesis revealed that the New 
Geometry of Power was explained in extremely simplistic geometric terms by Hugo Chávez. In 
practice, in lieu of a cohesive territorial strategy, PDVSA was able to exercise and impose the Oil 
Social District outlined by the Law of Hydrocarbons as a parallel State Space, to extend its 
dominant space beyond the spatial enclaves of the oil industry.  
Do the Oil Social Districts constitute in practice PDVSA’s State Space?   
 
The deficiency in the development of coherent spatial policies, such as the specific case 
of the city of Caracas,  were compounded by the chequered transition towards the Socialist State 
Space, evidenced by the  journey from bill to indefinite legal vacuum of the Organic Law for the 
Planning and Management of the Organisation of Territory LOPGOT. The fast pace of 
abrogation, creation and non-enactment of the LOPGOT, as well the creation of new laws for 
the Socialist State that contravened the CRBV created what elites defined as a chaotic 
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institutional landscape. The case of Caracas, whose fragmented legal and institutional framework 
of urban governance already carried deficiencies inherited from previous governments served to 
illustrate the discontinuities of the transition and the mechanisms that ultimately enabled 
PDVSA to use the Law of Hydrocarbons to supersede the legal authority of municipalities, and 
in the process, be interpreted and implemented as an implicit cultural policy.  
Through this account, this thesis demonstrated that the discontinuous process of dismantlement 
of the existing state apparatus created a breach in the legal framework of territory between 2005 
and the creation of the legal framework for the Communal State in 2010 that enabled PDVSA La 
Estancia to override the unstable institutional circumstances by abiding to the Organic Law of 
Hydrocarbons, particularly to Article 5 and the Oil Social Districts. The vacuum left by the 
transition towards the Socialist State Space created the conditions to conceptualise and enact the 
Oil Social District as PDVSA’s State Space. Since PDVSA had been effectively functioning as a 
parallel state, this confirmed Brenner & Elden’s contention that there is no state without territory 
and no territory without a state. The fault lines created by the conflicting coexistence of two 
models of State Space, identified by elites in chapter five, left a vacuum of bureaucratic power 
that enabled PDVSA to extend its own State Space, encompassed by the Oil Social District, over 
the Material Space of Caracas through the interventions of PDVSA LA Estancia. This thesis 
focused particularly on the Metropolitan Oil Social District, but before progressing further with 
the analysis it had to state the obvious: Caracas is not, and has never been, a site of oil extraction 
and refining; there are no crude oil deposits in its subsoil. Nonetheless, The Metropolitan Oil 
District covers Caracas because that is where the corporate headquarters of PDVSA are located. 
Thus, chapter four argued that as the headquarters of PDVSA were conceptualised as a centre of 
oil rent extraction and distribution, right in the midst of Libertador Municipality, Caracas was 
then  absorbed it into of the ‘areas of influence’ of PDVSA’s State Space.  
PDVSA’s parallel State Space raised broader issues on the oil company’s corporate ownership 
and authority over the material space of the city. As the producer of the oil rent PDVSA controls 
the  main income of the state; its vast financial resources and managerial efficiency both 
challenged and diminished the authority of municipalities and regional governments that still 
abide to the abrogated laws of territorial organisation and urban planning of 1983 and 1987, 
respectively. That being the case, in Petrosocialism PDVSA has come full circle to the manner in 
which it related to the state during the time of Apertura Petrolera, almost completely independent 
and unaccountable to the state, as it behaved like any private corporation whilst possessing a 
larger budget than the government (Maass 2009). It also created an ambivalent relationship with 
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PDVSA La Estancia’s actions in the city. Chapter five showed that whilst elites affirmed that 
PDVSA La Estancia contributed to the erosion of the institutional apparatus they simultaneously 
welcomed its managerial efficiency in delivering aesthetically pleasing spaces. This thesis drew on 
the theoretical premise of State Space to demonstrate how the construction of the Socialist State 
Space and the discursive interpretation of the Law of Hydrocarbons as implicit cultural policy by 
PDVSA La Estancia colluded to enable the oil company to constitute its own State Space and 
extend its dominant space over the Absolute-Material Space of Caracas.  
Is there a vision of the city in Petrosocialism? 
Having established the above, the thesis was also concerned with investigating what type of city 
was envisioned to emerge in Petrosocialism.  This research found gaps and discrepancies in 
regards to this question when it compared and contrasted elite interviews responses with the 
Critical Discourse Analysis of the speeches of Hugo Chávez in chapter four. First, this thesis 
identified a gap in Chávez’s discourse in regards to the role the city played in his political project. 
Elites identified a complete absence of the city from Chávez’s discourse during his first term, 
affirming he had no plans or visions for the city as there was a lack of state policies and severe 
deficiencies in strategies of urban management. One interviewee in particular, with expertise on 
public space issues and mobility asserted with absolute confidence that the revolution had not 
produced any document that spoke about cities. However, as chapter four states, this thesis 
argued that the gap perceived by the elites is a symptom of the vacuum left by the dismantlement 
and abrogation of the policy instruments and institutions inherited from the ‘counter 
revolutionary state’ and the slow and discontinuous transition towards the Socialist State. The 
discontinuous process of abrogation and creation of what this thesis defined as spatial policies 
generated fault lines in the bureaucratic apparatus of city management in Caracas, as well as a 
chasm between the Absolute-Representations of Space sanctioned by the Constitution of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the new policy instruments of the Socialist State.   
Given this chasm, it was then primordial for this thesis to revisit Rodolfo Quintero’s conception 
of the ‘oil city’ as an institutionally deprived and culturally sterile city, as it also contradicts 
Zukin’s (1995) proposition that culture is what cities do best, suggesting that the business of oil 
overrides their capacity for cultural production. To explore what vision of the city was being 
conceived in the era of Petrosocialism, elites were asked if they would characterise Caracas as an 
oil city. Caracas, as the capital of the country and seat of government, is where the flows of oil 
money concentrate, circulate, and manifest as works of urban and cultural infrastructure. Whilst 
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elites’ statements generally suggested that Caracas could be characterised as an oil city, they 
predominantly described an oil city in negative terms, claiming that the country’s oil wealth has 
induced the institutional chaos as elites believe that oil rentierism hinders institutions, alters fiscal 
and bureaucratic structures and diminishes the capacity of the state in concordance with the 
literature on rentier states (Beblawi & Luciani 1987; Corrales & Penfold 2011; Karl 1997; Maass 
2009; Mitchell 2011; Ross 2012), which contradicts the historical attribute of oil as a carrier of 
progress and modernity (Coronil 1997; Pérez Schael 1993; Tinker Salas 2009).  
PDVSA La Estancia provided an ambiguous statement saying that Caracas is ‘without a doubt’ 
an oil city but that ‘they’ are working for it to stop being one as the restoration of city spaces and 
public art beautification would transform Caracas into a ‘socialist city, paradigm of the twenty 
first century’. Here lies one of the key topics identified by this thesis. By initially defining Caracas 
as an oil city in Quintero’s terms, PDVSA La Estancia is disregarding the city’s cultural 
production, urban infrastructure and institutions (however deficient they might be). According to 
PDVSA La Estancia’s discourse, Caracas would stop being an oil city once they transform it into 
a socialist city.  But this socialist city, or rather the petro-socialist city is an appropriation; the 
work of PDVSA La Estancia is fundamentally a large scale restoration of the public art and 
spaces that predate the arrival of Hugo Chávez to their original condition as they stood during 
the golden years of the oil bonanza, prior to the oil crash of the 1980s. Even more, PDVSA La 
Estancia is effectively conceptualising the Absolute-Material Space of the city as an oil field, as 
the adverts analysed in chapter six visually demonstrated, whilst it declares that as an instrument 
of the Sowing Oil Plan the Law of Hydrocarbons grants it authority over Caracas by using the 
Oil Social District (PDVSA’s State Space) to supersede municipal authority.  In summary, 
PDVSA La Estancia is constructing a Petrosocialist vision of the city through the Oil Social 
District which enables it to reframe the city as an oil field, in which public art and public spaces 
serve as ‘territorial’ markers of the appropriation of the Relative-Material Space of the city, 
materialised in the Relative-Spaces of Representation of the adverts, which speaks of a twofold 
colonisation of the city by oil.  
What notion of culture is being produced by Petrosocialism? 
Having argued that in Petrosocialism, the city is reconceptualised as an oil field, chapters five and 
six explored what notion of culture is being produced by Petrosocialism.  This thesis revisited 
Rodolfo Quintero’s text, in light of the Critical Discourse Analysis of the speeches of the 
General Manager of PDVSA La Estancia and the semiotic analysis of the advertising campaign 
204 
 
‘we transform oil into a renewable resource for you’. Drawing on an exploration of the 
relationship between culture, management, power and the city (Ahearne 2009; Bauman 2004; 
McGuigan 2003; O’Brien 2014; Stevenson 2003; Yúdice 2003; Zukin 1995) it argued that 
PDVSA La Estancia is challenging Quintero’s notion of the ‘culture of oil’ as sterile and 
incapable of arts and intellectual productions by constructing a notion of culture-as-mineral-
deposit. Chapters five and six demonstrated how PDVSA La Estancia conflates farming and 
mining language to perpetuate the oil rentier model in order to provide an illusion of ‘renewable 
oil’ in which PDVSA La Estancia’s interventions in the city are presented as a form of sowing oil 
that ‘harvests’ culture.  
The thesis expands on Yúdice’s (2003) expediency culture as a resource to define PDVSA La 
Estancia’s instrumentalisation of culture within the logic of the oil industry and the Petrostate as 
culture-as-mineral-deposit. Yúdice’s performative understanding of the expediency of culture as 
a resource focuses on the uses of culture in relation to a goal that determines its value (2003, 
p.38). PDVSA La Estancia presents its works of restoration in the city as a form of sowing oil 
that bears the ‘social and cultural fruit of oil’ to construct a direct correlation between oil and 
culture. Also, it defines itself as an entity of ‘oil that harvests culture’, an entity that transforms 
oil, a non-renewable natural resource, into culture as the renewable resource, materialised in 
public art restoration and urban regeneration projects. Chapter five argued that PDVSA La 
Estancia General Manager’s vision of culture is seen through the eyes of the farmer-manager 
(Bauman 2004) whose growing field is in this particular case, the material space of Caracas 
conceptualised as an oil field. PDVSA La Estancia’s advertising campaign ‘we transform oil into 
a renewable resource for you’ renders oil and culture as equivalent, as if culture could be 
extracted, exploited and processed like oil. PDVSA La Estancia’s slogan ‘oil that harvests culture’ 
actually means that it engages in the harvest of pre-existing cultural objects.  
This thesis established that their work on the Heritage branch has predominantly consisted in the 
regeneration and restoration of existing city spaces and public art. In this sense, their harvest is 
not a process of creation, it is collecting what has already been grown, gathering together what 
previous governments have built with the investment of the oil rent. This is one of the 
motivations behind the myth (Barthes 1993) constructed by the visual constructions and verbal 
text of the adverts. The adverts allow them to claim the benefit of having restored them, when in 
reality what they have done can be regarded as maintenance. Thus, the adverts negate the original 
cultural process that created the public art, for they were produced by a state that was considered 
by Hugo Chávez as bourgeois, capitalist and counter-revolutionary. PDVSA celebrates the 
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extinction of the cultural actions of the past. Moreover, the illusion of the New Magical State is 
that oil has been sown, and grown into cultural objects that can be harvested. But, once again, 
sowing and harvesting allude to a creative process, not maintenance. Therefore, the giant oil 
workers are not interacting with cultural objects; they are portrayed manipulating the public art 
and public spaces as if they were heavy machinery in a refinery or an oil drill. The giant oil 
workers are engaged in a mechanical process of maintenance of ‘oil equipment’. Therefore, in 
Petrosocialism, they are only valuable as oil machinery. 
Chapter six used Barthes’ theory of myth to establish how the concept in the adverts relies on 
understanding culture as crude oil, as an expedient natural resource, a mineral that accumulates 
in the subsoil that upon extraction yields political and social benefits but that, unlike oil, can be 
transformed and renewed. Oil then becomes a double-sided cultural entity; it is invoked as a 
singular force capable of producing palpable cultural effects when sown but also a cultural 
product by itself. If culture is a mineral extracted from the subsoil of the nation then culture and 
the discursive and political wealth produced by culture-as-mineral-deposit is, like the subsoil, the 
exclusive property of the Petrostate.  
Moreover, PDVSA La Estancia’s adverts only show the exuberant side of oil (Buell 2014). The 
sanitised and impeccable giant oil worker erases any trace of pollution and dirt and conceals the 
catastrophic side of oil extraction by discursively and visually colluding oil and culture as a 
renewable resource. Although this thesis established that PDVSA La Estancia disputed 
Quintero’s contention that oil cities do not produce culture, by construing the notion of culture-
as-mineral-deposit, it constrains culture to the boundaries and history of the Venezuelan 
territory, to those cultural expressions tied to the land: traditional culture and folklore. Hence, it 
negates any manifestations of modern and contemporary culture that have come about by the 
circulation of flows of people, money, ideas, media and influences from the world at large. For 
these to find their place within the logic of Petrosocialism, they have to be reframed as oil 
machinery and emptied of their history and meaning, as is the case of the public art ‘celebrated’ 
by the adverts.  
This thesis argued that culture-as-mineral-deposit is more than a discursive construction.  The 
implication is that by tying culture to the land, it constructs culture as a material entity that 
accumulates in the subsoil, ready to be extracted, processed, weighed, and measured under the 
tight control of the Petrostate. Therefore, modern and abstract manifestations of culture such as 
the ones depicted in the adverts can only be quantified as valuable if they are transformed into 
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oil machinery, rather than as symbols of the abstract notions of civilisation and progress.  
Moreover, culture-as-mineral-deposit condenses the materiality lost by oil when it was reduced 
to the fetish of rent money (Coronil 1997; Mitchell 2011; Pérez Schael 1993) becoming 
inextricable from land, and by that same token, from PDVSA’s State Space. Culture-as-mineral-
deposit is invoked by PDVSA La Estancia as fuel to extend the illusions of the New Magical 
State beyond the physical death of Chávez. Then, for culture to fit this rhetoric, it has to be 
defined in narrower terms, as that which is exclusively Venezuelan as well as the exclusive 
property of the Petrostate. 
Looking Forward:  Oil as Cultural Culprit 
This research addressed a gap in the study of the spatial and cultural dimensions of oil 
rentierism, looking in particular at the city as the site of the material manifestations of the 
bureaucratic power of the Venezuelan Petrostate. In this sense, this thesis tapped into emerging 
lines of enquiry that focus on the material politics and visual cultures of oil, which calls for a 
trans-disciplinary approach into new ways of engaging in a mix of cultural critique and resistance 
of the effects of oil capitalism on the unequal access to public space, mobility, public art and 
cultural infrastructure at large in oil dependent nations. In a Petrostate, oil binds bureaucratic 
power and culture to the land and its mineral-rich subsoil. This thesis posits that the challenge to 
overcome oil rentierism and oil’s centrality to modern life is above all cultural. Imre Zseman has 
aptly diagnosed that as a society ‘we are incapable of imagining a world without oil’ (Barrett & 
Worden 2014, p.XX).  
This thesis contributes to the emerging field of Energy Humanities, particularly on what has 
been defined as Petrocultures, a transnational and multidisciplinary approach that examines the 
social and cultural implications of oil, and energy more broadly, on individuals, communities, and 
societies around the world today. This thesis opens opportunities to interrogate the cultural and 
urban effects of the Petrostate, along two lines of enquiry. The first would expand on oil as a 
‘utopia of the possible’ in relation to Coronil’s notion of the Magical State in order to 
problematise the ‘oil city’. In Coronil’s study Venezuela functioned as an exemplary case of a 
dysfunctional post-colonial Petrostate that attributes ‘magical’ powers to oil, as a promise of 
development and wealth accumulated in the subsoil that can be transformed into material signs 
of modernity made manifest in urban space above ground, whilst failing to achieve  
comprehensive technological and cultural modernisation.  As this thesis has suggested that oil is 
not immune to tropes of magic and utopia, it begs to question whether every Petrostate is prone 
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to become a Magical State, and if so, would it manifest in producing ‘oil cities’. The Petrostate 
inhabits the interstice between the vast oil wealth stored below ground and the signs of 
modernity materialised above ground. A cross-national comparative ‘petrocultural study’ of the 
urban effects of oil in countries that discovered oil around the 1960s, at the dawn of the 1970s 
oil boom, like Nigeria (1956), Norway (1963), and Scotland (1969) would be useful to discover 
commonalities and disparities on the effects of oil wealth on the urban form and the emergence 
of oil cities.  
The second line of enquiry would expand on this thesis proposition of the expediency of culture-
as-mineral-deposit beyond the realm of the oil industry and the Petrostate to explore how it is 
received and contested at the scale of creative practice. In other words, it would build on the 
findings of this thesis to shift the focus towards cultural forms of critique and creative resistance 
to the power of the Petrostate and the oil industry on the instrumentalisation of public art and 
the resulting inequalities of access to public space, mobility, and culture more broadly. The 
research would adopt a transnational perspective to explore the subversive work of visual artists 
and architects that engage in tactical performative actions in urban space to interrogate the 
material politics, visual cultures and aestheticisation of oil dependency, and the oil industry at 
large, in Europe and the Americas.   
Venezuela is currently embroiled in a downward spiral of economic stagnation, scarcity of basic 
goods and medicines, extreme violence and political conflict caused by the steep decline in global 
oil prices compounded by government mismanagement and corruption. The crash of oil prices 
laid bare the deficiencies in state capacity that for years the constant influx of high oil revenues 
was able to mask. Yet, Venezuela does not cease to be a rentier state as power continues to be 
tied to the subsoil (State Space) and its mineral resources; the recent concessions given by the 
Maduro government to exploit the mineral resources of the Amazon basin is an attempt to find 
an alternative that emulates the wealth extracted from oil as a way of extending the illusions of 
the New Magical State beyond the physical death of Chávez. The historical cyclic revival of Uslar 
Pietri’s slogan ‘sowing oil’ is a clear sign of the nations’ incapacity of imagining itself as anything 
other than a Petrostate. Not even Hugo Chávez, who championed an anti-capitalism and anti-
neoliberalism agenda, was able to wean his ideals from oil.  
 
The illusions of the New Magical State are increasingly becoming untenable amidst the current 
crisis of the oil market. The ‘utopia of the possible’ as presented in discourse and images by 
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PDVSA Las Estancia, negates the existence of poverty, crime, scarcity and political polarisation. 
The utopian space of oil materialised by PDVSA becomes perverse not for what it shows but by 
what and who it conceals. The adverts show an imaginary of prosperity that is in stark contrast 
to the deterioration that is currently sweeping the country. Amid a nation that cannot imagine 
itself as anything other than a Petrostate, in a car-centric city the petrol station emerges as a 
beacon of the oil industry to highlight the centrality of oil in contemporary cultural production. 
The petrol station, as the General Manager of PDVSA said in chapter five, is usually the only 
direct contact common people have with oil if they don’t work for an oil company or live near 
remote sites of oil extraction. Crude oil is not visible in the experience of the everyday; it is 
concealed and contained inside pipelines, barrels, and tanks. But oil is the culprit hiding behind 
modern cultural production, from vinyl records to fashion, it continues to flow and inform our 
imagination. Only by engaging with oil as a cultural material can our incapacity to envision a 
non-dystopian post-oil world can be understood and overcome.   
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Key passages Speech Title Date Context 
Sabemos y conocemos aquella frase 
de un venezolano insigne, yo lo 
respeto mucho y lo respetaré 
mientras viva, el doctor Arturo Uslar 
Pietri. En aquel Editorial de por allá 
en 1936, si mal no recuerdo, decía 
Uslar –recordémoslo­ “hay que 
sembrar el petróleo”. Y Uslar, el 
mismo pero anciano ya, terminando 
el siglo, estaba yo en prisión cuando 
recuerdo haber leído uno de sus 
escritos, de sus tantos escritos. El 
dijo, como despidiéndose ya a sus 90 
y tantos años: “no pudimos o no 
supimos o no quisimos sembrar el 
petróleo”. Propongo en honor al 
espíritu de aquella frase y por qué 
Extractos del discurso ofrecido 
por el Ciudadano Presidente de 
la República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela, Hugo Chávez Frías, 
con motivo de la presentación 
de los Planes Estratégicos de 
Petróleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA)  
 
18 August 2005 
Caracas, Hotel 
Caracas Hilton 
Presentation of the 
strategic plans of 
PDVSA, which 
included the Plan 
Siembra Petrolera 
(Sowing Oil Plan) 
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no, al del doctor Uslar y al de Juan 
Pablo Pérez Alfonzo y al de todos 
los que alertaron, escribieron, 
dijeron, lucharon y hasta murieron 
por la soberanía petrolera nacional, 
que llamemos a este Plan 2005­2030, 
Siembra Petrolera. 
 
Entonces este proyecto va a ser, a 
partir de hoy, uno de los enclaves, de 
las palancas para llevar adelante el 
proyecto socialista, no para apuntalar 
el modelo capitalista de explotación. 
Eso sería contrario al mandato 
constitucional y contrario al interés 
nacional, pero que nadie se asuste 
por esto, se trata de la igualdad y el 
desarrollo económico, social, integral 
del país. 
Nunca hubo una gota de petróleo 
para el pueblo de Venezuela, el 
petróleo se lo chupó la oligarquía 
criolla y sobre todo el imperio 
norteamericano. Ahora el petróleo 
es del pueblo venezolano y el 
petróleo será para la justicia, para la 
igualdad, para el desarrollo de 
nuestro pueblo, esa sí es la verdad. 
 
La OPEP nació hace 45 años. La 
OPEP fue puesta de rodillas. La 
OPEP se levantó. La OPEP vivirá 
con éxito para siempre. Que así sea. 
Declaro formalmente inaugurada 
esta 141ª Asamblea de Ministros y 
Gobernadores. 
Palabras del Presidente Chávez 
en la Instalación de la 141ª 
Reunión Extraordinaria de la 
Conferencia Ministerial de la 
Organización de Países 
Exportadores de Petróleo 
OPEP 
1 June 2006 
Caracas 
141st Extraordinary 
meeting of the 
Ministerial 
Conference of 
OPEC 
Nada ni nadie podrá desviarnos del 
camino hacia el socialismo 
bolivariano, el socialismo 
venezolano, nuestro socialismo. 
 
Vamos a darle duro estos 15 años 
que vienen, rumbo al Bicentenario 
de Carabobo, Proyecto Nacional 
Simón Bolívar, socialismo 
bolivariano. 
 
Segundo motor: la reforma socialista 
constitucional, vamos rumbo a la 
República Socialista de Venezuela y 
para eso se requiere una profunda 
reforma de la Constitución Nacional, 
de nuestra Constitución Bolivariana. 
 
El cuarto: algo que suena un poco 
técnico, ustedes me perdonan, la 
nueva geometría del poder sobre el 
mapa nacional. La nueva geometría, 
ustedes saben que tiene como tres 
dimensiones, la dimensión en línea, 
la distancia; la dimensión en 
Palabras del Presidente de la 
Republica Comandante Hugo 
Chávez 
8 January 2007 
Caracas 
First public speech of 
2007, on the 
inauguration of his 
third presidential 
period 
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extensión de un territorio y la 
dimensión volumétrica, el contenido, 
el volumen. Quiero que nosotros 
rediseñemos la geometría del poder 
en Venezuela. Esto va a llevar a 
profundidades. Un ejemplo es cómo 
está organizado el Estado Apure, 
esto nos va a llevar a revisar leyes 
orgánicas como la de los concejos 
municipales, eso está intacto y yo 
diría más, está peor que antes, 
Concejos Municipales que no tienen 
ningún poder, que son las mismas 
viejas estructuras, es el mismo viejo 
Estado cuarto republicano, las 
regiones del país, cómo lograr una 
relación simétrica o una aplicación 
simétrica del poder político, del 
poder económico, social, militar a lo 
largo y ancho de todo el territorio. 
 
Y el quinto: creo que el quinto 
motor debe ser el más poderoso, la 
explosión revolucionaria del poder 
comunal, los Consejos Comunales, 
pero los consejos comunales en este 
año debemos trascender ahora lo 
local y debemos ir creando por ley 
en primer lugar, una especie de 
confederación regional, local, 
nacional de Consejos Comunales. 
Tenemos que ir marchando hacia la 
conformación de un Estado 
comunal y el viejo Estado burgués 
que todavía vive, que está vivito y 
coleando, tenemos que irlo 
desmontando progresivamente 
mientras vamos levantando al 
Estado comunal, el Estado socialista, 
el Estado bolivariano. Un Estado 
que esté en condiciones y en 
capacidad de conducir una 
revolución. Casi todos los estados 
nacieron para detener revoluciones. 
¡Vaya qué reto el nuestro! Convertir 
al viejo Estado contra revolucionario 
en un Estado revolucionario, 
El oro negro se está haciendo cada 
vez más transparente y si el petróleo 
se está convirtiendo en instrumento 
de liberación,  
Palabras del Presidente Hugo 
Chávez Frías en la inauguración 
de la IV Cumbre de Petrocaribe 
21 December 
2007 
Cienfuegos, 
Cuba 
Inauguration of the 
IV Summit of 
PetroCaribe  
 
 
 
 
212 
 
Rafael Ramírez, President of PDVSA  
 
1. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2005. Palabras del Ministro Rafael Ramírez en la presentación del Plan 
Siembra Petrolera, extractos de la Conferencia Planes Estratégicos de PDVSA, presentados por el Ministro de 
Energía y Petróleo y Presidente de PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez Carreño, 19 August, Hotel Caracas Hilton, 
Caracas, in http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/palabrasdelministrorafaelramirezenla-
presentaciondelplansiembrapetrolera/ (Accessed on 12/08/2015) 
2. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2005. Discurso del ministro de Energía y Petróleo y presidente de 
PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, con motivo del 45 aniversario de OPEP, 14 September, Caracas, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/discurso-del-ministro-de-energia-y-petroleo-y-
presidente-de-pdvsa-rafael-ramirez-con-motivo-del-45-aniversario-de-opep/ (Accessed on 
12/08/2015) 
3. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2005. Discurso del Ministro de Energía y Petróleo y Presidente de 
PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez Carreño, en ocasión del Ciclo de Conferencias “Venezuela, Política y Petróleo” en el 
marco del 45 aniversario de la Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo (OPEP), organizado por la 
Asociación Civil Casa Amarilla Patrimonio de Todos y el Instituto de Altos Estudios Diplomáticos Pedro Gual, 
del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 20 October, Caracas, in 
http://www.pdvsa.com/interface.sp/database/fichero/publicacion_opep/2376/169.PDF 
(Accessed on 03/03/2015) 
4. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2005. Discurso de Rafael Ramírez, Presidente de PDVSA y Ministro de 
Energía y Petróleo, ante la Asamblea Nacional, 25 May, National Assembly, Caracas,  in 
http://www.aporrea.org/imprime/a14338.html (Accessed on 12/08/15) 
5. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2005. Palabras del ministro de Energía y Petróleo y presidente de 
PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, en el encuentro de fin de año con los periodistas nacionales e internacionales, 21 
November, Caracas, in http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/palabras-del-ministro-de-
energia-y-petroleo-y-presidente-de-pdvsa-rafael-ramirez-en-el-encuentro-de-fin-de-ano-con-los-
periodistas-nacionales-e-internacionales/ (Accessed on 12/08/2015) 
6. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2006. Discurso del ministro de Energía y Petróleo y presidente de 
PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, en el Tercer Seminario Internacional de la OPEP: “OPEP en una nueva era 
energética: desafíos y portunidades”, 21 September, Vienna, Austria, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/plena­soberania­petrolera/ (Accessed on 
12/08/2015) 
7. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2006. Discurso del ministro de Energía y Petróleo de Venezuela, Rafael 
Ramírez, en la Instalación de la 141a Reunión Extraordinaria de la OPEP, 01 June, Caracas, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/discurso-del-ministro-de-energia-y-petroleo-de-
venezuela-rafael-ramirez-en-la-instalacion-de-la-141a-reunion-extraordinaria-de-la-opep/ 
(Accessed on 12/08/2015) 
8. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2006. Discurso del Ingeniero Rafael Ramírez, ministro de Energía Petróleo 
y presidente PDVSA, en la Exposición Latinoamericana del Petróleo, 27 June, Maracaibo, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/?s=Discurso+del+Ingeniero+Rafael+Ram%C3%ADrez
%2C+ministro+de+Energ%C3%ADa+Petr%C3%B3leo+y+presidente+PDVSA%2C+en+la+
Exposici%C3%B3n+Latinoamericana+del+Petr%C3%B3leo&x=0&y=0 (Accessed on 
12/08/2015) 
9. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2007. Discurso del Ministro Ramírez durante el Foro Energético de Lisboa 
2007, 2 October, Lisbon, Portugal, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/discurso­del­ministro­ramirez­durante­el­foro­en
ergetico­de­lisboa­2007/ 
213 
 
10. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2008. Palabras del ministro Ramírez en encuentro con los medios de 
comunicación, 18 March, PDVSA, Caracas, Venezuela, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/palabras­del­ministro­ramirez­en­encuentro­con­
los­medios­de­comunicacion/ (Accessed on 12/08/2015) 
11. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2012. Discurso del ministro del Poder Popular de Petróleo y Minería y 
presidente de PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, en la presentación del Informe de Gestión Anual de PDVSA 2012, 3 
May, PDVSA, Caracas, Venezuela, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/discurso­del­ministro­rafael­ramirez­en­la­presen
tacion­del­informe­de­gestion­anual­de­pdvsa­2012/ (Accessed on 12/08/2015) 
12. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2013. PDVSA Fiel al Legado de Chávez. Discurso del Ministro del 
Poder Popular de Petróleo y Minería y Presidente de Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., Rafael Ramírez, en la 
Jornada PDVSA Sector productivo nacional conexo, 16 May, Maracaibo, Edo. Zulia, Venezuela, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/pdvsa­fiel­al­legado­de­Chávez/ 
13. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2013. Discurso del Ministro del Poder Popular de Petróleo y Minería y 
presidente de PDVSA, Rafael Ramírez, durante la 163ª Reunión de la Conferencia Ministerial de la OPEP, 
31 May, Caracas, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/?s=Discurso+del+Ministro+del+Poder+Popular+de+Pet
r%C3%B3leo+y+Miner%C3%ADa+y+presidente+de+PDVSA%2C+Rafael+Ram%C3%ADre
z%2C+durante+la+163a+Reuni%C3%B3n+de+la+Conferencia+Ministerial+de+la+OPEP&x
=0&y=0  (Accessed on 12/08/2015) 
14. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2013. Memoria y Cuenta de los Ministros de la Vicepresidencia del Área 
de Desarrollo Territorial, 4 November, Caracas, in 
http://rafaelramirez.desarrollo.org.ve/articulos/comparecencia­de­ministros­para­el­desarrollo­t
erritorial/ (Accessed on 12/08/2015) 
15. Ramírez Carreño, Rafael Darío. 2014. Sesión Especial Con Motivo De La Conmemoración Del Centenario 
Del Inicio De La Actividad Comercial Petrolera En Venezuela, Con La Explotación Del Pozo Zumaque I, 5 
August, Maracaibo, in 
http://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/uploads/documentos/doc_51637a01209475f34f71c1e204
a24cf61e97c0fc.pdf  (Accessed on 12/08/2015) 
 
Key Passage Speech title year context 
Es un plan no sólo de 
PDVSA. Es un plan, como 
lo señaló el Presidente, para 
un ciclo: del 2005 al 2030. 
Se le ha llamado Plan 
Siembra Petrolera en honor 
al doctor Arturo Uslar 
Pietri. Estamos trabajando 
para que ahora sí sea posible 
hacerse una real siembra del 
petróleo. 
Palabras del Ministro Rafael Ramírez en la 
presentación del Plan Siembra Petrolera 
19 August 
2005 
Extractos de la 
Conferencia Planes 
Estratégicos de 
PDVSA, presentados 
por el Ministro de 
Energía y Petróleo  
y Presidente de 
PDVSA, Rafael 
Ramírez Carreño 
Caracas, Hotel Caracas 
Hilton, 19 de agosto de 
2005 
es una política 
revolucionaria porque ese 
ingreso petrolero se va a 
convertir ahora y así está 
plasmado en nuestro Plan 
de la Patria, en la principal 
palanca para superar el 
modelo rentista petrolero, la 
principal palanca para crear 
las bases materiales para la 
Discurso del ministro del Poder Popular de 
Petróleo y Minería y presidente de PDVSA, 
Rafael Ramírez, en la presentación del 
Informe de Gestión Anual de PDVSA 2012 
Salón Simón Bolívar, Complejo 
Ministerio­Pdvsa 
3 May 
2013 
Presentation of 
PDVSA Annual report 
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construcción del socialismo 
en nuestro país.  
 
El tema petrolero es tan 
importante para la nación 
que todos los sectores, los 
privados, los públicos, los 
opinadores tienen que verlo 
desde una situación de 
equilibrio, como una 
oportunidad extraordinaria 
de ir a construir un modelo 
alternativo que tampoco 
ocultamos, que es el 
socialismo que está 
plasmado en el Plan de la 
Patria. 
nosotros pretendemos que 
esa inmensa renta petrolera 
se capte para que podamos 
construir un modelo 
alternativo al modelo 
rentista petrolero, un 
modelo productivo que 
hemos dicho, será socialista. 
Nosotros vamos a utilizar la 
renta petrolera para 
expandir todas nuestras 
capacidades industriales y 
todas nuestras fuerzas 
productivas. 
PDVSA FIEL AL LEGADO DE CHÁVEZ  
Discurso del Ministro del Poder Popular de 
Petróleo y Minería y Presidente de Petróleos 
de Venezuela, S.A., Rafael Ramírez, en la 
Jornada PDVSA­Sector productivo nacional 
conexo. Maracaibo, estado Zulia 
16 May 
2013 
“PDVSA is Loyal to 
Chávez’s Legacy”, 
speech for the 
productive sectors of 
PDVSA in Maracaibo 
El Presidente Chávez, líder 
indiscutible de nuestro 
proceso revolucionario, lo 
ha dicho con claridad y 
valentía, nuestra revolución 
es profundamente 
antiimperialista y el 
socialismo la vía de nuestra 
salvación. Es la patria 
socialista o la muerte. 
 
Para nadie es un secreto que 
en nuestro Gobierno 
Bolivariano tenemos la 
firme convicción de que la 
única posibilidad de resolver 
los agobiantes problemas 
económicos, sociales y 
políticos que aquejan a la 
humanidad se encuentran 
en el socialismo. El sistema 
capitalista ha demostrado su 
fracaso histórico, ha 
conducido a millones de 
seres humanos a la miseria, 
al hambre y a la violencia. 
 
Así trabajamos, sobre la 
posibilidad cierta de 
construir una sociedad de 
Comparecencia de ministros para el 
desarrollo territorial 
4 
November 
2013 
Presentation of the 
Memory and Accounts 
Memoria y Cuenta of 
the Ministers of the 
Vicepresidency of the 
Area of Territorial 
Development  
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hombres libres y justos, 
construir el socialismo. 
Patria Socialista o Muerte. 
Venceremos. Muchas 
gracias compañeros 
diputados. 
la renta petrolera debe ser 
un instrumento para la 
construcción de un nuevo 
orden económico, debe ser 
un instrumento para la 
construcción del socialismo. 
 
Estamos en el marco de una 
guerra económica, son 
propias de la contradicción 
que surge del esfuerzo por 
construir el socialismo en 
permanente lucha con los 
valores y categorías del 
capitalismo atrasado y 
dependiente del modelo 
rentista que todavía 
sobrevive en nuestro país. 
 
Tenemos ahora la inmensa 
tarea de utilizar la renta 
petrolera como un  
instrumento para la 
superación del modelo 
rentista petrolero, que se ha 
desarrollado en estos 100 
años de historia; apoyar la 
expansión de nuestras 
fuerzas productivas, todas 
nuestras capacidades 
internas; seguir elevando las 
posibilidades sociales, 
educativas y de trabajo de 
nuestro pueblo para que se 
incorporen a las tareas de la 
producción, el trabajo por 
toda la sociedad, por la 
Patria toda y por el 
socialismo. 
 
la sociedad que soñara 
nuestro Comandante 
Eterno Hugo Chávez: “la 
sociedad socialista”; es el 
mejor reconocimiento que 
podemos hacer al trabajo 
abnegado, desinteresado, al 
amor por los humildes, a la 
Patria del Comandante 
Chávez. 
Sesión especial con motivo de la 
conmemoración del centenario  
Del inicio de la actividad comercial petrolera 
en Venezuela, con la explotación del pozo 
Zumaque I, Maracaibo 
5 August 
2014 
Centenary of the 
exploitation of  the oil 
well Zumaque I  
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Key Passage Speech title year context 
El Centro de Arte La 
Estancia cumple funciones 
de índole cultural y social. 
Estas son  manifestaciones 
que no pueden ser separadas 
porque la cultura forma 
parte de la sociedad. A partir 
de este principio, trabajamos 
desde dos perspectivas, una 
de La Estancia hacia 
adentro y otra de La 
Estancia hacia fuera. 
 
Hacia afuera, queremos que 
la gente vaya por la calle y 
diga “eso lo hizo el Centro 
de Arte La Estancia”, “ahí 
puso la mano La Estancia”, 
que identifiquen el fruto 
social y cultural del petróleo 
a través de nuestra obra. 
Que no haya una sola 
persona que trabaje en 
PDVSA, en el Ministerio de 
Energía y Petróleo, en 
Cadafe o en Pequiven que 
no conozca La Estancia. 
Que no haya una persona en 
Caracas, y luego en el 
interior del país, que no 
conozca a La Estancia, que 
no se sienta identificado con 
ella, porque La Estancia es 
parte de todos nosotros. 
 
“Esa es otra forma de 
sembrar el petróleo”, 
recalcó. 
 
PDVSA La Estancia es el 
brazo social y cultural de 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., 
destinado a la valoración, 
restauración, promoción y 
difusión del acervo histórico 
y artístico del país. Sus 
acciones se fundamentan en 
los principios del Plan 
Siembra Petrolera. 
PDVSA La Estancia Arte para todos 2005 
Caracas 
PDVSA La Estancia 
webpage, accessed on 
12/08/2015 
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(…) deseamos proyectar 
como modelo de acción que 
nos permita alcanzar para el 
año 2010, en el Bicentenario 
del 19 de abril, la meta de 
vivir en una Caracas bella, 
con todos sus espacios 
recuperados, una ciudad 
socialista, paradigma de la 
urbe del siglo 21. 
Discurso con motivo de la develación del 
Abra Solar de Alejandro Otero 
9 
November 
2007 
Caracas 
The reveal of the 
restoration of the Abra 
Solar sculpture in Plaza 
Venezuela, Caracas. 
PDVSA-Centro de Arte La 
Estancia ha dado un vuelco 
radical a la gestión cultural 
en cuanto a la definición de 
una concepción práctica y 
propia de nuestras políticas, 
de acuerdo con el artículo 5 
de la Ley Orgánica de 
Hidrocarburos y el Plan 
Siembra Petrolera 
Discurso con motivo de la Inauguración de 
PDVSA La Estancia Paraguana 
 
 
Inauguración de la Quinta versión de la 
Fuente de Plaza Venezuela 
 
 
 
 
13 August 
2008 
Paraguana 
 
10 March 
2009 
Caracas 
Opening of the 
Paraguana branch 
 
 
Opening of the the 
fifth version of the 
Plaza Venezuela 
Fountain 
“el terrible pesimismo de lo 
imposible y lo sustituiremos 
por la Utopía de lo Posible, 
ideal que inspira el diario 
quehacer en el Oasis 
Cultural capitalino” 
 
 
 “la oportunidad hoy más 
que nunca de serlo, 
paradigma de lo posible, 
utopía de lo deseable.”  
 
 
 
un espacio para la danza, 
para niños grandes y 
pequeños, donde la Siembra 
Petrolera encontrará otra 
vez surcos para inseminarse, 
logrando la utopía de lo 
posible. 
 
utopía de lo posible 
 
 
Discurso con motivo de la develación del 
Abra Solar de Alejandro Otero 
 
 
Discurso con motivo de la develación de la 
Fisicromía del maestro Carlos Cruz Diez 
 
 
Discurso con motivo de la inauguración de la 
exposición Mateo Manaure: el Hombre y el 
Artista 
Inauguración de la Quinta versión de la 
Fuente de Plaza Venezuela 
 
 
 
Inauguración de la sede de PDVSA La 
Estancia Maracaibo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDVSA LA ESTANCIA: LA UTOPÍA DE 
LO POSIBLE 
2007 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 
 
Revealing of the 
restoration of the 
restoration of Abra 
Solar  
Revealing of the 
restoration of Cruz 
Diez’s Fisicromía 
 
Revealing of the 
restoration of Mateo 
Manaure exhibition 
Inauguration of the 
fifth version of Plaza 
Venezuela Fountain 
 
 
Opening of the new 
headquarters in 
Maracaibo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
El ente cultural que 
recibimos en el año 2005 se 
caracterizaba por una visión 
reduccionista y fragmentaria 
de la cultura, divorciada de 
las circunstancias políticas, 
económicas y sociales del 
país 
Discurso con motivo de la Inauguración de 
PDVSA La Estancia Paraguaná 
 
Inauguración de la Quinta versión de la 
Fuente de Plaza Venezuela 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
Opening of the 
Paraguaná branch 
(2008), and opening of 
the fifth version of the 
Plaza Venezuela 
Fountain. 
Vengamos a la Plaza, e 
incentivemos en los niños el 
sentimiento de la 
pertenencia, el viaje a 
Inauguración de la Quinta versión de la 
Fuente de Plaza Venezuela 
2009 Opening of the fifth 
version of the Plaza 
Venezuela fountain 
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nuestra semilla, alejándolos 
del llamado “mall”, del 
“Fast food”, del 
“autoautismo” generado por 
la televisión, el celular, los 
aparatos electrónicos y el 
consumismo, apartándolos 
de la cultura de la 
dominación. Traigámoslos a 
la Plaza, que vengan con 
nosotros a una patinata y a 
recibir en conjunto todos el 
Año Nuevo. 
Petróleo que cosecha 
cultura 
 
Por eso, nos sentimos 
contentos, aunque no 
satisfechos, porque muchas 
son aún las ideas, los 
proyectos y los sueños. 
¡Seguimos pues 
encontrando para la Siembra 
Petrolera, los surcos para 
inseminarla, y continuar, 
inspirando lo posible! 
A un año de labor PDVSA La Estancia 
Petróleo que cosecha cultura 
5 February 
2011 
First anniversary of 
PDVSA La Estancia 
Maracaibo, opening of 
the exhibition titled 
“petróleo que cosecha 
cultura” (oil that sows 
culture)-  a collective of 
photographies that 
document the work of 
PDVSA La Estancia 
across Venezuela 
during 2010.  
PDVSA LA ESTANCIA, 
instrumento de la Siembra 
Petrolera 
Palabras como oradora de orden en la Sesión 
Solemne del Concejo Municipal del 
Municipio Carirubana, Estado Falcón 
2012 Speaker for the solemn 
sesión of the Municipal 
Council of Carirubana 
Municipality, Falcon 
State 
La construcción de parques 
infantiles La Alquitrana en 
nuestras zonas populares, 
porque nuestros niños y 
niñas deben saberse 
petroleros, en remembranza 
del primer pozo explotado 
comercialmente en nuestro 
país 
PDVSA LA ESTANCIA: LA UTOPÍA DE 
LO POSIBLE 
 
2012  
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Appendix two: Interviews 
 
 
  Question 1a Question 1b Question 1c 
  ¿Qué importancia tiene el rol del Estado en 
la configuración de la ciudad de Caracas? 
¿Qué diferencia fundamental identifica en la 
gestión urbana actual del estado en 
comparación con periodos anteriores de 
bonanza petrolera?  
¿Cuál es la plataforma institucional que apoya 
y/o promueve las transformaciones o renovaciones 
urbanas en la ciudad de Caracas?  
G
O
V
E
RN
M
E
N
T PDV
SA-
La 
Esta
ncia 
“Todo. Es decir, el rol del estado… 
el rol del Estado… No... el rol de este 
Estado. Porque fíjate que nosotros 
tenemos una ciudad que es producto, 
absolutamente, de la economía 
petrolera.  Y es la consecuencia del 
rentismo petrolero. Es decir, es los 
cordones, los grandes cordones de 
miseria, imposibles de solucionar 
salvo de ir llevando poco a poco y de 
ir resolviendo pero que son años y 
años de desidia... Si tú te pones a ver 
la ciudad de Caracas tuvo un gran 
empuje en los primeros años, en los 
años de la dictadura, en los años de 
Pérez Jiménez, cuando vinieron los 
inmigrantes, y una gran inversión 
porque esa es una forma también de 
dar trabajo, evidentemente como han 
hecho todos, como hizo Mussolini, 
como hizo el otro… las grandes 
obras de…”  
 
 
 
“Entonces el Estado... ¿cómo puede 
participar el Estado? Primero, con la 
planificación, en primer lugar. 
Evidentemente que tiene que existir 
una planificación. Y la planificación 
significa la investigación, el trabajo 
social, los diagnósticos, la inversión, la 
inversión sustentable, y luego el aupar 
los instrumentos para poder generar las 
ideas de ciudad, los llamados a 
concurso, los foros, las conferencias... y 
el generar el amor por la ciudad, esa 
generación del amor por la ciudad va 
también en el tema de la transmisión de 
los valores hacia la ciudad. (...) También 
a través de campañas,  campañas de 
concienciación, nosotros tenemos trece 
comerciales, 13 propagandas, de alguna 
manera llamando al cuido de Sabana 
Grande, la del motorizado, la del que 
bota la basura, fíjate que en Sabana 
Grande nosotros estamos apostando a 
un nuevo esquema de ciudad.” 
 
N/A 
G
O
V
E
RN
M
E
N
T O2 “Continuamos viendo lo que siempre ha sido, ahora acentuado, de hacer 
todo desde el Estado central.”  
 
 
“Yo no creo que haya una visión estos 
días… bueno, ellos planeaban en 
helicóptero, Chávez iba en helicóptero 
y decía “ahí hay un terreno, vamos a 
expropiarlo para hacer un edificio”  
 
“Yo no veo en ningún documento una 
propuesta. Venezuela es ahora uno de 
los países más urbanos en el mundo, 
más del 90% de nuestra población vive 
en ciudades y tu no vez un documento 
sobre ciudades de parte del chavismo. 
Yo no he visto ninguno. Y no lo debe 
haber porque esa es mi área de 
experticia.”  
 
“[en el pasado] Hubo intentos a la 
regionalización, que tenían que ver en 
gran parte con ordenamiento territorial. 
Todo eso se perdió con el chavismo, no 
hay visión de la ciudad, bueno, es 
cambiable, cambió de acuerdo a los 
estados de ánimo de Chávez.  Porque 
era evidente que nadie contradecía a 
una persona como Chávez; además el 
se rodeó de gente muy mediocre. 
Particularmente en temas de urbanismo 
no tienen idea.”  
“Eso es parte de la complejidad, han 
habido tantos cambios institucionales que 
no entiendes nada si no explicas la 
fragmentación que ha ocurrido, muchas 
veces sin mucha lógica, respondiendo a 
presiones políticas”  
 
“Hay decisiones que tu nunca sabes dónde 
se toman, o a quien le corresponden” 
 
“Hay contradicciones; no hay una posición 
política explícita en términos del territorio. 
Hay una ley que están discutiendo en la 
Asamblea Nacional, la Ley Orgánica de 
Ordenamiento y Gestión Territorial apunta 
a la dispersión, es una ley que va a liquidar 
las municipalidades y sustituirlas con las 
comunas, esa ley se está discutiendo en la 
Asamblea.” 
G
O
V
E
RN
M
E
N
T O3 El gobierno regional tiene capacidad limitada para desarrollar políticas, 
casi toda la gestión viene del 
gobierno central, básicamente con 
intereses políticos… el estado 
venezolano es un estado centralista. 
el petróleo se está utilizando para 
fortalecer el gobierno centralista  
no hay condiciones de gobierno porque no 
interesan que existan esas relaciones de 
cooperación entre gobiernos que no son 
afines políticamente 
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R3  La realización de las ciudades en 
Venezuela, Caracas como particular 
caso de estudio, ha sucedido por 
acción de un Estado dominante y por 
tanto, determinante (por acción u 
omisión) 
Desde el enfoque de la práctica de la 
planificación de políticas públicas, lo 
que pudiese entender propiamente 
como la gestión urbana actuada desde 
uno de los órganos del gobierno, 
considero que sí hay una diferencia 
importante: se ha consolidado la 
improvisación como método.  
La “plataforma institucional” por la que 
esas transformaciones suceden es un 
indescifrable laberinto en el cual todo 
ciudadano está entrampado y perdido. Ni 
siquiera el funcionariato debe ni puede 
saberlo. 
A
CA
D
E
M
IC
 
 
R2 El rol del Estado ha sido 
fundamental.  
La diferencia radica en un marcado 
desinterés por las ciudades y sus 
habitantes, quizá por razones 
ideológicas (la ciudad es la cuna de la 
burguesía, clase social estigmatizada por 
los que han monopolizado el poder 
desde el año 1999) y por franca 
ineptitud en materia de gestión pública. 
La escasa inversión en infraestructura y 
equipamiento urbano no refleja los 
inmensos recursos de que ha dispuesto 
el Estado tras la bonanza petrolera de la 
última década, dinero que en gran 
medida ya han salido del país. 
Debería ser el poder local: alcaldías de 
Libertador, Chacao, Sucre, Baruta y El 
Hatillo, conjuntamente con un órgano de 
coordinación: la Alcaldía Metropolitana de 
Caracas. La pérdida de competencias y de 
recursos por parte de esta última figura es 
sintomática del poco interés que han 
tenido las autoridades nacionales por la 
ciudad capital y sus habitantes. 
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 R4 El Estado venezolano ha sido directa 
e indirectamente el responsable –
generalmente para mal, más que para 
bien- de la configuración física y 
legal, la historia socio-urbana, la 
evolución urbanística, la forma 
urbana, el perfil arquitectónico, la 
ocupación del espacio urbano y 
territorial de la ciudad, la relación 
entre el paisaje natural y construido, 
las escalas de densificación y 
ocupación, la demografía, las 
migraciones, el poblamiento y 
densificación, los problemas 
históricos, la dramática desaparición 
del patrimonio arquitectónico, el alto 
grado de degradación ambiental de 
esta ciudad, la valoración y/o 
devaluación económica, la ausencia 
de una política y una cultura 
ciudadana e higienista actual de los 
habitantes en general, etc. de la 
capital de la nación.  
Las diferencias principales con los 
períodos anteriores de auge petrolero, 
son: la absoluta ausencia actual de 
sustento teórico y basamento 
profesional que respalde una 
planificación por demás inexistente; la 
falta absoluta de idoneidad en el 
funcionariado encargado de los 
organismos públicos con inherencia en 
la gestión urbana; la incoherencia y falta 
de complementariedad entre las 
diversas instancias responsables de 
solucionar problemas; la carencia de 
interacción orgánica en tiempo y 
espacio entre las instituciones; en fin, la 
falta absoluta de noción del concepto 
de planificación. 
 
El Estado actual y los organismos 
centralizados, regionales, locales y 
parroquiales, actúan a la deriva, 
inconexa y contradictoriamente. El 
interés ideológico del partido en el 
poder en el país, priva sobre la lógica de 
la cooperación entre los diversos entes 
de todos los niveles.  
Lo que en países civilizados se llama 
“plataforma institucional” para la gestión 
urbana, en Caracas es sustituido por 
organismos aislados e ineficientes, que 
actúan según impulsos carentes de criterios 
coherentes de planificación. En las 
instituciones que actúan sobre la ciudad 
domina el interés político-partidista y el de 
los particulares asociados al poder central y 
al partido de gobierno 
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 R1 (…) con los ingresos por petróleo 
(recordar que de acuerdo con 
legislación de inspiración hispana, los 
recursos del subsuelo pertenecen al 
Estado) la gestión pública es 
fundamental en el desarrollo urbano, 
en particular de Caracas, que es la 
principal "ciudad petrolera" del país 
En general, la gestión pública moderna 
(al menos desde la tercera década del 
siglo XX) se ha enmarcado en lo que 
algunos autores, como Fernando 
Coronil Ímber o Ana Teresa Torres 
han denominado mágico o mítico, 
respectivamente. Solo que la gestión 
urbana actual tiene características más 
profundas en esos sentidos, al punto 
que yo la calificaría de espasmódica y 
delirante 
La plataforma institucional (si se le puede 
llamar así) es hoy día muy amplia y 
compleja. Dejando de lado las iniciativas 
privadas, el sector público aparece como el 
actor principal, con el poder y las 
competencias urbanísticas distribuidos en 
diversos niveles; nacional (ministerios de 
Vivienda y Hábitat, del Ambiente y los 
Recursos Naturales recientemente 
desaparecido, Transporte, los demás 
ministerios y diversas autoridades como 
Petróleos de Venezuela, oficinas de 
proyectos y misiones para Caracas y el 
Estado Miranda promovidas desde la 
Presidencia de la República); regional 
(Gobernación de Miranda con 
competencia en 4 de los 5 municipios del 
Distrito Metropolitano); y local (Alcaldía 
del Distrito Metropolitano y Alcaldías de 
los municipios Libertador, Chacao, Sucre, 
Baruta y El Hatillo).  
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A1 Yo diría que toda la importancia, 
porque es un hecho histórico que hay 
una relación directa entre estado y 
petróleo, la riqueza es controlada por 
el estado, en algún momento estuvo 
delegada a los privados pero hoy en 
día está delegada entre varios entes 
institucionales que influencia, de 
“En términos de la gestión actual de la 
ciudad, creo que no hay ninguna. Hay 
imposición, en términos de las políticas 
de ocupación y confiscación de 
terrenos, o expropiaciones forzadas sin 
justa compensación. La expropiaciones 
siempre han existido, más de la mitad 
de los proyectos de renovación urbana 
El caos institucional en el que estamos 
sumergidos es muy difícil de mapear, pero 
creo es lo primero que hay que resaltar. No 
es tanto un producto resultante sino un 
mapa caótico, que le hace muy difícil al 
ciudadano saber a qué instancia dirigirse, y 
la persona termina siendo quien resuelve el 
problema.  Tú accedes a la persona, no a la 
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alguna u otra manera, la 
configuración urbana de la ciudad. 
Desde la forma en que se ocupó el 
territorio, moviendo indirectamente 
esa riqueza a los Amos del Valle y sus 
respectivas parcelas, para que 
pudieran urbanizarlas, y pasamos de 
una sociedad agrícola, prácticamente 
rural, a una ciudad urbana… eso es 
evidente.   
fueron hechos vía expropiación, como 
la Avenida Bolívar o el Foro 
Libertador, a esa gente se le pagó, pero 
desafortunadamente, al final, la gerencia 
de proyectos públicos es muy limitada, 
estamos repitiendo los mismos 
modelos de desarrollo de los 70s 
creados para ejecutar las obras del 
Metro.”  
 
Si no hay una visión reflexionada de la 
historia, una visión educada, más culta, 
de la ciudad, y esta falta de visión es 
acompañada con poca democracia, el 
resultado es un desastre, una política 
Frankenstein, porque si fuera mestiza 
podrías decir que es una política 
saludable, que permite reconocer las 
diferencias y puede evolucionar, porque 
el mestizaje no es estático, evoluciona, 
pero esto es un Frankenstein, un 
híbrido producido en un laboratorio, 
donde tu mezclas y resulta este horror 
que tenemos ahora.  
 
institución. Y eso le ha hecho un gran 
daño institucional a este país porque, por 
más malas que nuestras instituciones 
fueran en el pasado al menos el mapa 
estaba algo claro, no lo sentías cercano 
pero sabías que estaba ahí. Ahora la 
confusión es total. Yo creo que este 
confuso y diverso mapa institucional es 
deliberado para garantizar cuotas de poder 
dada la intrínseca ineficiencia del aparato. 
Aunque es vertical, al final la estructura no 
fluye. Chávez vio esto cada vez que tenía 
ideas claras de lo que quería hacer pero no 
se transmitían hacia abajo, de hecho la 
Misión Vivienda llegó con 10-11 de 
retraso.”  
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A4 La situación actual no responde a un 
proyecto político. Presumir que 
existe es una ingenuidad y 
desconocimiento de lo que ocurre en 
Venezuela. Que quede claro en la 
tesis. Es un proyecto político basado 
en la conservación total del poder. 
Las políticas urbanas es un área donde 
el sistema actual revela una absoluta 
parálisis. 
N/A 
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A5  En términos conceptuales el Estado 
tiene un rol fundamental en la 
configuración de las ciudades 
Paradójicamente el interés sobre la 
gestión urbana ha disminuido en la 
medida que ha crecido la entrada de 
dinero al país por causa de la venta de 
petróleo. Si ubicamos la bonanza 
petrolera a partir de la nacionalización 
del petróleo (1976), vemos que la 
gestión urbana ha sido cada vez menor. 
Los planes urbanísticos han sido todos 
olvidados o "engavetados" y las 
acciones del Estado se han resumido a 
tareas de maquillaje y mantenimiento, 
cada vez más inexistentes.  
Debería ser el Ministerio del Poder 
Popular para la Transformación 
Revolucionaria de la Gran Caracas 
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A6 La acción del estado venezolano (no 
sólo en Caracas) ha sido 
generalmente "post-mortem" (...)  su 
rol ha sido de acompañante de 
convalidación de los promotores.  
Que al menos hay alguna... Antes de la 
"bonanza petrolera" puede decirse que 
no hubo gestión urbana formal.  
Si la identificas me avisas... En una ciudad 
con cinco municipios, dos gobernaciones 
(pues el Gobierno del Dto. Capital es una 
gobernación de hecho) y una Alcaldía 
Metropolitana sin competencias, donde las 
grandes obras las hacen los ministerios 
nacionales o las paga la compañía petrolera 
nacional se me hace complicado hablar o 
hasta pensar de "plataforma institucional".  
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 A3 Tenemos como una especie de 
mentalidad de fractura, somos una 
sociedad que tiene la cabeza 
fracturada, que cree que a partir de la 
individualidad... como todo es rápido, 
como todo es fácil, como el petróleo 
está allí, como todo se construye 
fácil,  nosotros podemos hacerlo 
fácil, no tenemos que ponernos de 
acuerdo. Yo voy y lo hago.  
(…) había como dos instancias del 
Estado con responsabilidad sobre ese 
lugar trabajando de manera paralela, 
cada uno con su plan y sin encontrarse, 
si ese encuentro no se da la fractura en 
la ciudad no se va a poder solucionar. 
no hay una estructura institucional y hay 
una cosa como de complejo de Adán, que 
yo creo que otra vez tiene que ver, 
discúlpame que me meta otra vez con esa 
idea de que el petróleo hace que la cosa sea 
fácil, y no tengo que construir 
estructuralmente... (…) tu el petróleo lo 
sacas y ya lo vendes, y listo, entonces es 
muy fácil, entonces no tienes que 
establecer una estructura institucional a 
largo plazo, entonces aquí las instituciones 
están completamente desmoronadas, no 
solamente hay muchas sino que no 
estamos muy claros de la responsabilidad 
de cada una y las instituciones  son vistas 
como una manera (…) Muchos de ellos lo 
que buscan es poder dar resultados 
desesperados porque la maraña total no da 
resultados. 
A
RC
H
IT
E
CT
 A2 N/A ¿qué ocurre en la ciudad? Yo creo que 
la visión del Presidente Chávez es una 
visión, primero, de ruptura, creo que 
hay dos momentos, creo que antes del 
golpe hay un momento, este… yo no lo 
he analizado realmente, pero si tú ves 
eh… el poco de ministerios y de 
ministros que hay antes del golpe no 
están tan conformados por militares, 
¿ya? O sea hay una… creo que luego 
del golpe la cosa cambia, Chávez se 
puso mil brazos y empieza  la 
negociación, y el poder viene y 
entonces bueno ocurre una cosa que 
además viene acompañada de una 
entrada tremenda del petróleo ¿ya? y 
que bueno, se vuelven locos un gentío 
¿no? gente conocida, desconocida...  
 
Entonces, ¿qué pasa? pues hay miles de 
instituciones que están buscando 
intervenir la ciudad de todas las 
maneras posibles. 
lo que ocurre un poco es que hay una 
anomia, una ruptura de lo institucional, en 
el buen y en el mal sentido, Durkheim 
define la anomia como un elemento del 
desorden, Simmel habla de la anomia 
como un elemento que permite el 
desequilibrio y por tanto la movilidad de 
los poderes políticos, entonces para mí la 
anomia, o sea, si este país no fuera lo que 
fuera yo jamás habría hecho lo que he 
hecho, porque nunca he hecho 
concesiones políticas. 
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 W1  (…) en el contexto de nuestra 
sociedad, el Estado, como eje central 
del poder económico y político, ha 
configurado de manera determinante 
todo el país.(...)  las crisis del Estado 
condicionan directamente el 
crecimiento o desarrollo de la ciudad. 
Y las crisis del Estado, también, en 
alguna medida, suelen ser en nuestro 
caso parte de las crisis del mercado 
internacional del crudo. A esto 
además habrá que sumar el hecho de 
que el Estado no es único ni tiene un 
solo proyecto. 
la diferencia fundamental reside en la 
apropiación de lo público y en la 
redefinición de la identidad urbana.(...)     
Creo que una de los cambios más 
determinantes que produce la llegada de 
Hugo Chávez al poder tiene que ver 
con la construcción de una nueva 
narrativa en el país. (...) todo esto se da 
en medio de un proceso donde, 
también, hay una resurrección política 
del paternalismo estatal, una gerencia 
anárquica de la gestión pública, un uso 
de las instancias oficiales para el control 
político, etc.,…Todo forma parte de 
una complejidad que no se resuelve con 
el esquematismo al que generalmente 
acude la polarización. 
N/A 
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) P2 el Estado pasa de una relación de 
lejanía oceánica –la España de la 
madre patria, a la Venezuela del 
caudillo represor. (...)  el Estado ha 
sido una suerte de mal padre que 
quiere más a unos hijos que otros.  
 
(…) posiblemente el punto nodal está 
en la idea de los círculos concéntricos 
del poder, lo que llamamos en 
Venezuela “la macoya” y que autores 
de la nueva ciencia política italiana –
Michels, Pareto, Mosca-  pudieran 
entender como “oligarquías intra-
partidistas”. Una vez que se acentúan 
las diferencias entre gestión de 
municipios de gobierno versus 
municipios de oposición se nota con 
total claridad el apoyo -o no- en 
términos de asignación de recursos 
entre ambas corrientes políticas.  
N/A 
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) J1 El estado ha tenido un rol 
importantísimo, no solo por lo hecho 
sino también por lo no hecho. O lo 
que dejo de hacer. (…) por omisión 
ha dejado que la ciudad se haya ido 
transformando un poco a su cuenta y 
riesgo. Es un estado de grandes 
obras, y de descuido total en lo 
pequeño. 
 
 
(…) uno echa de menos que teniendo, 
estando en un momento político donde 
se habla de grandes transformaciones, 
transformaciones además radicales, 
haya tan poco radicalismo en las 
políticas justamente de reordenamiento 
de la ciudad. (…)Se ha actuado un poco 
a trocha y mocha sin mayor 
planificación, se irrumpieron digamos,  
¿qué hay que hacer? hay meterse dentro 
la ciudad, bueno vamos a meternos 
adonde sea. 
(…) aquí la plataforma más bien lo que hay 
es una atomización  institucional que lo 
que hace es atentar  en contra de esas 
transformaciones, que  tu tengas 
reconocida, porque existe una Alcaldía 
Metropolitana pero al  mismo tiempo le 
montas un ministerio para la 
transformación revolucionaria de la ciudad, 
dices aja pero al mismo tiempo le sumas a 
 eso un montón de instituciones o 
inclusive que no tengamos hoy día una 
autoridad metropolitana o regional de 
transporte habla de eso. Una atomización 
institucional para atender un problema que 
es de toda la ciudad. 
 
  Question 2a Question 2b Question 2c 
  ¿Qué relación ve entre las políticas de 
gestión urbana y el desarrollo de una 
infraestructura cultural en Caracas? 
¿Cuál es el rol que tiene la ciudad, el espacio 
urbano, dentro del proyecto político de la 
Revolución Bolivariana? 
¿Qué diferencia la gestión de PDVSA La 
Estancia de otras instancias con injerencia en el 
desarrollo urbano de Caracas? 
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A La 
Estanci
a 
N/A N/A ¿Qué diferencia a PDVSA La Estancia? 
Primero el origen de la gestión, que se trata 
de una gestión que tiene que ver con la 
Siembra Petrolera de manera directa. No 
quiere decir que el ingreso que ellos 
obtengan no deriva de la Siembra 
Petrolera, del ingreso petrolero porque en 
definitiva ya partimos del hecho de que 
somos un país rentista, que lo sabemos y 
que estamos buscando la vía para dejar de 
serlo. Por eso es revolucionaria la Plena 
Soberanía Petrolera. Pero, aparte de eso, 
fíjate, nosotros somos un instrumento de 
la empresa petrolera del estado, somos un 
instrumento, somos una gerencia de la 
empresa petrolera del estado, somos 
trabajadores y trabajadoras petroleros. 
Trabajamos además hacia dentro de la 
industria petrolera y hacia fuera de la 
industria petrolera, entonces ya tú ves que 
tenemos trabajo en todos esos ámbitos.  
 
Ahora, en cuanto a la forma de 
funcionamiento, nosotros tenemos 
digamos funciones que derivan de lo 
establecido en la Ley Orgánica de 
Hidrocarburos, los demás entes de gestión 
de espacio público en Caracas son 
funciones que derivan de las leyes de 
descentralización territorial. Es decir, ellos 
son órganos elegidos popularmente y que 
tienen competencias que derivan de las 
leyes municipales, específicas, y las leyes 
estadales específicas, nosotros no. 
Nosotros no somos un ente de gestión 
local, nosotros somos un ente de gestión 
nacional. Nosotros debemos trabajar en un 
ámbito que gira en torno a lo que se llama 
en PDVSA Distrito Social, distrito social 
significa que todo lo que se encuentre 
alrededor de las áreas petroleras debe verse 
impactado positivamente por el ingreso 
petrolero. Entonces esa es una forma de 
trabajo de PDVSA a nivel nacional. 
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T O2 N/A “(…) la llegada de Chávez. En el tema 
de ciudad y territorio, él tenía una 
visión primitiva y contradictoria”  
 
“no hay visión de la ciudad, bueno, es 
variable, variaba de acuerdo al estado 
de ánimo de Chávez”  
 
“Además, la ideología. En Venezuela 
tenemos una ideología anti-urbana 
compartida por las clases política en 
intelectual. Ven a la ciudad como un 
obstáculo para el desarrollo.”   
 
“También lo encuentras en el periodo 
de Chávez, en sus primeros años él está 
en contra de la ciudad.” 
 
“De hecho, lo que proclamaban al 
principio era que necesitábamos sacar a 
la gente de las ciudades, la tragedia de 
Vargas fue vista como una oportunidad 
ideal para llevarse a la gente a Barinas, 
Guayana, etc., pero todos se regresaron. 
Lo que pasó en Vargas… 
desperdiciaron las mayor oportunidad 
de reestructuración urbana en este país, 
y las desperdiciaron por puras razones 
ideológicas. Tú observas el estado en el 
que permanece Vargas, ¿después de 
cuántos años? Casi 15 años después del 
deslave. (…) Eso ha cambiado, a 
medida que ha pasado el tiempo, sin 
ninguna reflexión. De repente, Chávez 
empezó a decir que en Caracas cabía el 
doble de la población.”  
 
“También está este asunto con las 
llamadas ciudades socialistas, yo 
claramente recuerdo una frase –no sé si 
llamarla estúpida o cínica- dicha por 
Juan Pedro Posani en un foro en el cual 
yo también era panelista: “no sabemos 
lo que es una ciudad socialista pero 
para allá vamos”. No lo tengo grabado, 
pero te aseguro que eso fue lo que dijo, 
no sabemos lo que es pero hacia allá 
vamos… completamente 
irresponsable.” 
“Ignoran completamente las ordenanzas.” 
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T O3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A N/A N/A 
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R3 Sea cual sea la interpretación que se 
le dé al término, considero que la 
relación entre las políticas de gestión 
urbana y el desarrollo de la 
infraestructura cultural de una ciudad 
cualquiera, por ejemplo, Caracas, es 
directa, imbricada, interdependiente. 
Si se desarrollas en políticas de 
gestión urbana basadas en un 
verdadero ejercicio de poder de 
decisión, información y control por 
parte de los ciudadanos, estaríamos 
en presencia de una producción 
directa de infraestructura cultural en 
el sentido más amplio posible. Las 
edificaciones (espacios urbanos 
abiertos o contenidos) destinadas al 
ocio y la recreación creativa serían 
resultado directo de la propia 
dinámica social de la ciudadanía y 
Sólo el que según los cálculos del 
partido hegemónico le rinda réditos 
para sostenerse en el poder a la nueva 
oligarquía y el funcionariato.  
Nada más. 
La ciudad es un fenómeno que 
contradice la ideología que profesan. 
PDVSA La Estancia es una de las 
desviaciones que se le han provocado 
autocráticamente a la industria petrolera, 
institucionalizada en lo que denominamos 
PDVSA. No veo diferencia entre ella y 
PDVAL y los otros órganos equivalentes. 
PDVSA La Estancia (y PDVSA) invade 
competencias de las Alcaldías y del 
Ministerio de Obras Públicas. Lo que 
debería ser es una fundación pública para 
garantizar un cierto rango de 
direccionalidad de fondos y subsidios 
especiales  a entidades municipales, en 
cuanto a proyectos vinculados con salud y 
educación. 
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menos de lo que un funcionariato o 
un grupo empresarial disponga. 
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 R2 deberían ir de la mano, ya que el 
aprovechamiento de la 
infraestructura cultural debería ser 
uno de acciones primordiales dentro 
cualquier política pública de gestión 
de la ciudad. Los espacios culturales 
son primordiales como lugares de 
encuentros de todos los sectores 
sociales, y en la actualidad no existen 
estos espacios, lo que promueve 
indirectamente la polarización 
política y social. 
Es sólo un escenario para la 
movilización de los colectivos al 
momento de exaltar las figuras que 
ostentan el poder, particularmente en 
años electorales. El desfile cívico-militar 
en el paseo Los Próceres es su mayor 
expresión. 
Contar discrecionalmente con los recursos 
que ha generado la bonanza petrolera de 
los últimos años ha hecho de PDVSA un 
verdadero “Estado dentro del Estado”; 
crítica de que fue objeto la empresa antes 
de la actual gestión chavista, pero que se ha 
marcado notablemente con su injerencia 
directa en competencias que son propias 
de instancias de poder públicas, tanto 
nacionales como locales. En efecto, en vez 
de financiar los planes y proyectos 
elaborados por alcaldías, gobernaciones y 
otros institutos públicos (y concentrar sus 
esfuerzos técnicos y de gestión en la labor 
que sí incumbe a la empresa, que es 
producir petróleo), PDVSA ahora muestra 
distintas facetas (importador de alimentos, 
restaurador de obras de arte y edificios 
patrimoniales, etc.), una labor que compete 
a otros entes pero que (si bien parece 
plausible en un primer momento) poco se 
imbrica con una verdadera política de 
planificación; por el contrario, contribuye 
con la des-institucionalización del propio 
Estado en su conjunto. 
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 R4 Caracas es víctima, especialmente 
durante los últimos 15 años, del 
populismo que ha dominado desde el 
poder político en todas las instancias 
de gobierno. En el caso de la 
promoción cultural, los organismos 
en manos del partido oficialista han 
priorizado el asedio e invasión de 
espacios tradicionalmente dirigidos a 
todos los sectores sociales, para 
“recuperarlos” para lo que ellos 
llaman “pueblo”, excluyendo de esos 
espacios a los sectores que 
supuestamente no son “pueblo”. 
“El rol de Caracas en el proyecto de la 
revolución “bolivariana es, pues, el de 
un instrumento más de la exclusión 
neo-populista, un medio para implantar 
el modelo de dominación, un 
mecanismo para la absorción 
inescrupulosa de fondos para el partido 
y para los particulares corruptos 
adscritos a él, un aparato de 
dominación moral y doblegación 
psíquica sobre el funcionariado para 
sostener el poder local y central.” 
Una segunda etapa es marcada por las 
transformaciones de PDVSA luego de los 
paros petroleros de 2002-2003, a partir de 
los cuales el CALA asume una 
programación más directamente enlazada 
con el partido de gobierno y su proyecto 
político, el proselitismo y el populismo 
marcaron las actividades que se 
emprendieron, bajo un tejido creciente de 
relaciones con los núcleos partidistas de 
los barrios caraqueños; en esta etapa se 
nutre el Centro con algunos profesionales 
de mérito, que van a marcar la evolución 
de la tercera etapa a partir de 2005-2006, 
cuando asume la intención de recuperar el 
bulevar de Sabana Grande para la ciudad 
de Caracas. El nombramiento de la 
abogada Beatrice Sansó de Ramírez, fue un 
factor a no descartar en esta coyuntura, 
dada su vinculación directa con el nuevo 
Presidente de PDVSA, lo cual garantizaba 
el flujo de caja necesario para ejecutar los 
proyectos urbanos de integración artística y 
cultural, que el CALA se plantea desde 
entonces. Esa era su mayor diferencia con 
otros proyectos de incidencia urbanístico-
cultural en Caracas. 
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 R1 No encuentro ninguna relación en el 
plano de la praxis urbanística similar 
a la que pudiera mencionarse, por 
ejemplo, en el caso de la vivienda. 
“Al principio, en busca de un 
"equilibrio territorial" surgió un fuerte 
sesgo anti-urbano. Posteriormente, por 
efecto seguramente de la lógica 
electoral con más del 80% de la gente 
viviendo en ciudades, el esfuerzo de 
inversión en programas sociales se 
enfocó en las ciudades. Sin embargo, la 
tensión entre ambas situaciones 
continúa y en este momento no estoy 
seguro que haya políticas específicas en 
relación con el espacio urbano o con la 
infraestructura recreacional de las 
principales ciudades por parte del 
ejecutivo nacional.” 
La diferencia proviene, a mi entender, en 
que las iniciativas, al menos en el plano de 
la ejecución de obras, debían ser tomadas 
por entes con competencia urbanística, 
cultural y patrimonial, como el IPC y los 
municipios. La petrolera ha ampliado su 
radio de acción mucho más allá de las 
franjas propias de una empresa productiva, 
con los resultados que conocemos y que se 
harán sentir con fuerza en los tiempos por 
venir. Considero que el fin no justifica los 
medios y que la intervención de la 
petrolera, por el hecho de disponer de los 
recursos (por ahora), puede hacerle 
aparecer como un superministerio de obras 
públicas, haciendo más complejo el 
panorama institucional del país. Creo que 
es un caso en el cual aplica plenamente la 
vieja conseja de "zapatero a tus zapatos". 
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A1 “Creo que si ha habido una relación 
pero no estoy seguro que haya sido 
directa en términos de gestión 
urbana, tal vez en términos de 
gestión pública, políticas públicas.”  
 
 
 
“Yo creo que la ciudad… la Revolución 
ha variado su discurso, eso te lo puedo 
asegurar…” 
 
“El rol de la ciudad está bajo juicio, 
porque en el sentido dictatorial solo es 
vista como una gran infraestructura o 
propaganda, invocando la memoria de 
Pérez Jiménez, “mira todo lo que Pérez 
Jiménez hizo… el gran mensaje es 
emular a las acciones urbanas de Pérez 
Jiménez, sea la universidad, o el Núcleo 
de Desarrollo Endógeno Fabricio 
Ojeda, tiene que ser enorme, tiene que 
ser como Los Próceres,  o La Estancia, 
ése es el equivalente.” 
Muchas de las acciones del Estado, como 
lo que está haciendo La Estancia, es una 
acción propagandística para captar la 
atención de la clase media, eso está muy 
claro. Le doy a la clase media la 
recuperación del patrimonio, reparo el 
parquet de Este para la clase media, reparo 
Sabana Grande para la clase media para 
que puedan satisfacer su nostalgia por los 
viejos cafés cuando en realidad era un 
espacio elitista para las clases intelectuales 
con una visión aséptica de saneamiento 
urbano.  Y con agenda aun más terrible 
que es gobernar todo por decreto, hay una 
clara identificación del patrimonio con el 
turismo y  espacio público, y por lo tanto 
los uso para proyectar una imagen de 
ciudad saludable escondiendo la basura en 
los bordes. Con todo el respeto que 
merece la intervención, creo que tenemos 
que celebrarla, pero hay en todo caso una 
visión política, en todas las instancias del 
estado, para que tenga una clara influencia 
en sus votantes. 
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A4 N/A “Respecto a la ciudad, no ha habido un 
tronco central en relación a la acción 
del Estado. Se invierte sin coordinación 
coherente del Estado.” 
 
“Obstruir gestión pública de todo 
sector público que no sea partidario del 
régimen.” 
El Boulevard de Sabana Grande es 
inhóspito, es un desfile de gente, no hay 
actividad comercial y lo comercial es 
intercambio social. En La Estancia ven lo 
comercial como el enemigo, sin valor 
social, son prejuicios ideológicos. 
 
La economía de la ciudad no es un tema 
capitalista o socialista, la ciudad tiene su 
propia economía 
A
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A5  Actualmente ninguna porque ni hay 
planificación desde el Estado ni ha 
habido desarrollo de infraestructura 
cultural en Caracas. Lo único que se 
ha realizado (en parte) han sido los 
edificios de La Gran Misión Vivienda 
Venezuela cuyos resultados han sido 
lamentables en materia urbanística y 
arquitectónica producto de una total 
improvisación. En menor medida 
podemos ver algunas construcciones 
muy puntuales en Alcaldías de la 
ciudad de Caracas cuyo ejemplo más 
significativo es Chacao en la gestión 
de Leopoldo López. 
Ninguno.  El acceso a los recursos y la capacidad 
profesional. 
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A6 También las instituciones culturales 
surgen con mucha frecuencia, de 
iniciativas privadas que luego logran 
apoyo oficial (el caso Ateneo es 
emblemático) o que ocupan espacios 
públicos abandonados (sótanos de 
Parque Central y MACCSI). La 
práctica continúa en operaciones tipo 
Trasnocho, Galpones o Secaderos; es 
como llegar por mi cuenta, ocupar y 
sobre ese hecho cumplido exigir 
derechos a los que el Estado medio 
responde porque se siente agarrado 
en falta. Quizá el caso opuesto es la 
retoma del Ateneo, que no implica 
construcción nueva pero sí una 
voluntad de resignificar una 
operación previa o la retoma y 
despojo de imaginería comercial de 
Sabana Grande; algo ha podido pasar 
en El Cementerio o Catia, pero creo 
no lo dejaron cuajar. Comienza a 
verse una acción más decidida (no 
puedo opinar sobre calidad pues no 
la he visto en vivo) en los edificios y 
espacios del Casco, también 
superponiendo instancias 
administrativas y de financiamiento. 
El "proceso" tiene claramente dos 
fases, cada día más evidentes: con 
HChF y sin HChF. Maduro es el 
primer presidente venezolano nacido 
en ciudad que, además, hace hincapié 
en eso. Los efectos de esta condición 
sobre su actuación urbana aún no se 
pueden juzgar pues viene completando 
obras sin terminar que heredó. En todo 
caso, aún en el "proceso con HChF" 
hubo un punto de inflexión con la 
GMVV (más allá de las críticas que se 
le puedan hacer), cuando se entiende 
que la población venezolana es urbana 
y el discurso y la acción deben serlo. 
Nunca he entendido qué hace una empresa 
cuyo objeto es producir el dinero para que 
otras empresas hagan lo que les 
corresponde hacer haciendo lo que 
deberían hacer esas otras empresas. Y eso 
sin hablar de la asignación de esos 
presupuestos favorecer ciertas gestiones y 
emborronar otras. Porque a la distorsión 
de roles se suma, aquí, el enredo entre 
Nación, Estado, Gobierno y Ciudad. 
Quizá en ese amasijo hay una clave cultural 
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 A3 N/A “yo no sé si es causa o consecuencia 
pero el hecho es que el proyecto 
político de la Revolución Bolivariana es 
un proyecto anti-urbano, está 
encontrado con la ciudad y está en 
contra de la ciudad.” 
 
“El estado comunal, la ciudad comunal, 
es un soviets, es exactamente el soviets 
de la Unión Soviética.” 
 
Lo de PDVSA yo creo que es, yo creo que 
tiene que ver con la fantasía de las 
instituciones de  proyectos especiales, 
digamos, yo creo que eso es un problema, 
para mi PDVSA La Estancia con todo el 
cariño que le tengo a  la gente de adentro, 
porque hay gente buena ahí, Virginia Vivas 
es una tipa talentosísima, con una visión de 
ciudad muy clara pero eso tiene que ver 
que ante la imposibilidad de hacer ciudad 
con las instituciones que tenemos, genero 
una cosa de proyectos especiales que me 
puede dar obra en el corto plazo, pero que 
no construye institucionalidad para poder 
sostener eso en el largo plazo. Y eso es una 
cosa venezolanísima, si tú ves en la 
empresa privada cada vez que hay un 
problema, genera un departamento de 
proyectos especiales. Una alcaldía tiene un 
problema, genera una cosa de proyectos 
especiales, que además es son instituciones, 
que además lo he visto en muchos lugares, 
en la Alcaldía de Sucre lo vi, lo vi cuando 
trabajé en el Banco de Venezuela, aparece 
en la ciudad con el Centro de Arte La 
Estancia que son instituciones que se crean 
ad hoc, que no dependen de nadie y pueden 
hacer lo que les dé la gana, pueden hacer la 
obra sin consultarle a nadie. 
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 A2 N/A N/A N/A 
W
RI
TE
R/
CO
LU
M
N
IS
T W1 N/A “Quizás, no existe ninguna idea o proyecto, más allá de una mera 
enunciación de principios, sobre el 
“rol” de la ciudad. No hay plan. Solo la 
práctica desordenada de ser una 
muchedumbre polarizada.” 
N/A 
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T P2 La estructura cultural en Caracas se 
ha debatido entre la refacción y la 
adaptación. Con esto me quiero 
referir a que se repara a medias lo 
que ya existía, y se acondiciona 
precariamente algún local que no 
cuenta con todas las capacidades para 
cumplir ciertos objetivos, funciones o 
actividades. (…) Es de destacar la 
acción decidida que ha tenido La 
Fundación La Estancia, dependiente 
de PDVSA para recuperar espacios 
como el Boulevard de Sabana 
Grande que fueron literalmente 
destruidos por la buhonería, la 
desidia y el hampa, especialmente 
durante el período del alcalde Juan 
Barreto. 
por lo que pareciera a primera vista, no 
es más que un sucedáneo de 
improvisaciones y de obras prometidas 
y ejecutadas en tiempos pre electorales. 
La peor idea que posiblemente haya 
salido de una mente gubernamental fue 
el llamado plan “ciudad, dentro de la 
ciudad” lo que a todas luces ofrece una 
intoxicación en la densidad poblacional 
para un entorno urbano que carece de 
áreas verdes y vías de comunicación 
alternas, así como la presencia del 
deterioro de la calidad de vida 
entendida como acceso continuo a la 
luz eléctrica, agua corriente, aseo 
urbano, seguridad peatonal y espacios 
para el esparcimiento de la niñez, 
juventud y tercera edad. 
N/A 
W
RI
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R/
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M
N
IS
T J1 En cuanto a la infraestructura 
cultural, el estado, central, el 
expresado en el caso de Caracas, se 
ha centrado mucho en recuperar 
estructuras, no necesariamente en 
 crear nueva infraestructura a modo 
de teatros ni ese tipo de espacios.  
Cualquier cosa que diga aquí es una 
mera especulación. No  he visto ningún 
documento que hable de eso en 
particular, y si hablamos de espacio 
urbano, desde el punto de  vista de la 
transformación de los barrios, por 
ejemplo, el rol de la ciudad es un 
contrasentido (ininteligible) 
transformación revolucionaria porque 
si  consideras espacio urbano la mancha 
esa que ya existe y es la única 
reconocida oficialmente, 
cartográficamente, el rol de reivindicar 
no es lo nuevo. No sé si me explico. 
  
 
Yo creo que esa aparición como un brazo 
ejecutor tiene una cosa interesante por los 
resultados, un poco, no porque crea que 
esa deba ser la vía, pero ves los resultados 
y oye, ¿será que por la vía normal esto 
hubiese sido posible?  ¿A través de la 
alcaldía nada más? 
 
Lo que ha hecho PDVSA La Estancia la 
manera como, los resultados que ha 
generado tienen mucho que ver con una 
visión de ciudad que  probablemente es la 
que es, crear unos espacios para la gente, 
 de recuperar patrimonio, de conectar 
cosas,  eso lo ha estado haciendo PDVSA 
La Estancia. Ahora lo que digo es que es 
absurdo que tengamos  que inventarnos 
este tipo de gobiernos paralelos para hacer 
posible una  visión de ciudad. Pero los 
resultados son  interesantes en ese sentido. 
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  Question 3a Question 3b 
  ¿Es posible denominar a Caracas como una “ciudad del petróleo”? ¿Qué nueva relación debe establecerse entre la riqueza petrolera y la 
ciudad, considerando las experiencias urbanas del pasado? 
G
O
V
E
RN
M
E
N
T PDVS
A La 
Estanci
a 
¿Una ciudad del petróleo? Sin duda. Era. Estamos luchando 
para que no lo sea a través de la Plena Soberanía Petrolera 
popular, nacional y revolucionaria. 
Tú sabes que nosotros siempre le agregamos a los espacios un 
elemento del petróleo, porque todos necesitamos sentirnos 
petroleros. Esa es la idea. Siempre va  a haber un mural de 
petróleo, una escultura del petróleo. El único contacto que el 
venezolano común tiene con el petróleo cuando no trabaja 
para PDVSA, o si no vive en un área petrolera sobre todo, es 
la bomba de gasolina. Tenemos que sentirnos petroleros. Esto 
existe porque PDVSA existe. Esa es la idea 
 
G
O
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E
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T 
O2 N/A N/A 
G
O
V
E
RN
M
E
N
T 
O3 N/A el petróleo no es utilizado como una herramienta de 
transformación y desarrollo a futuro sino como un 
instrumento de control económico, de control político y de 
control social, de hecho bueno todas las misiones son 
financiadas por el recurso proveniente de esa vía y también las 
inversiones que se están haciendo en el campo de la vivienda.  
A
CA
D
E
M
IC
S R3 La noción de “ciudad petrolera” es un recurso retórico de 
Quintero para demonizar y despreciar a un grupo humano y 
a un modelo de producción, dejando de reconocer la 
hipercompleja realidad de una ciudad, en un país. 
Por eso, para mí, sería una reducción incomprensible decir 
que Caracas es una “ciudad del petróleo”. 
De lo que consideremos que es el total de nuestros recursos 
financieros, la creación de verdaderos espacios públicos y, por 
tanto, de ciudad, sucedería en uno de los modos de inversión 
de los tres aspectos esenciales en la misión de la República que 
intentamos ser: garantizar nuestros derechos a la salud, a la 
educación y al cuido de nuestras vidas. No puedo pensar 
separadamente esos aspectos de la existencia de la sociedad de 
una de las expresiones tangibles de esa existencia: la ciudad. 
Verdaderos espacios públicos significa que se crean sistemas 
reales y efectivos para que los ciudadanos tengan verdadera 
participación en la toma de decisiones, control e información 
de los lugares que habitan; de los espacios en los que se realiza 
la ciudadanía: los espacios públicos (y todos los sistemas y 
aspectos que hacen posible la habitabilidad civil, democrática y 
fundada en los derechos humanos). 
R2 Sí. La importante infraestructura que existe en la ciudad no 
es sino el resultado de la centralización de los recursos 
provenientes de esa industria, que son “reinvertidos” o 
“redistribuidos” por el propio Estado (su actual dueño-
administrador) desde la ciudad donde asienta su sede. 
Siendo la ciudad el ámbito en donde se concentra la mayor 
parte de la población del país, no es sino en sus equipamiento 
y espacios públicos en donde se deben dar las condiciones 
para que ella encuentre las condiciones que permitan mejorar 
su calidad de vida, en particular los grupos de menor ingreso: 
educación, salud, movilidad, son temas en los cuales los 
ingresos petroleros deberían contribuir decididamente en la 
acción del Estado, sobre todo en momentos de bonanza. 
R4 Claro que sería posible hacerlo, pero definiendo 
previamente lo que entendemos como tal. Una ciudad del 
petróleo es literalmente, para la historia venezolana, una que 
depende de la dinámica impuesta por la exploración, 
extracción, procesamiento, distribución y exportación de ese 
recurso natural. Así, las ciudades que en Venezuela surgen 
alrededor de esas actividades (campamentos, refinerías, 
plantas de elaboración de subproductos, etc.), son 
literalmente ciudades del petróleo. Así serían tales 
Maracaibo, Lagunillas-Ciudad Ojeda, Cabimas, Judibana y 
toda Paraguaná, Puerto Cabello, Puerto Píritu, Puerto La 
Cruz, Jusepín o Caripito, sin detallar abundantemente otras 
ciudades menores.  
Pero el concepto no es literal, pues se aplica, tal como nos 
legó Quintero, a las ciudades en que se materializan los 
beneficios económicos de la actividad petrolera, en todas 
sus fases. Así, Caracas  es, desde la primera década del siglo 
XX, una ciudad petrolera. 
La relación debe ser como la de un sponsor con 
responsabilidad social, independiente de intereses partidistas, 
abierta a todos los sectores sociales sin exclusión, ajena al 
populismo, ajena a la aristocracia petrolera que también tuvo 
su cuota de responsabilidad en determinados momentos. El 
traslado de la riqueza petrolera hacia la población, tendrá que 
manifestarse en el futuro en contribuciones porcentuales de las 
ganancias, producto de la racionalización de las inversiones, 
que se instale en la industria; y esas contribuciones serán en 
todos los campos de la vida social: la educación, la salud, la 
construcción, la industrialización, la inversión en nuevas 
fuentes energéticas, la ampliación de la distribución eléctrica y 
de telecomunicaciones, la construcción de nuevas ciudades en 
las futuras fuentes de extracción y producción, etc… 
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R1 Ciertamente. La concentración de recursos derivados del 
ingreso petrolero permiten denominarla de esa manera. De 
hecho, al menos a partir de la desaparición en 1935 de Juan 
Vicente Gómez, uno de los dictadores anteriores, la 
inversión en la industria de la construcción, el mecanismo 
fundamental para la distribución de la renta petrolera, se 
concentró en la capital. 
La primera consideración es dejar de entender al país como un 
"país rico" cuando en realidad no es tal cosa. Ello supondrá 
establecer políticas urbanísticas de mayor racionalidad y 
realizar esfuerzos para la recuperación de inversiones, mayor 
autonomía presupuestaria a las autoridades municipales y 
detener el dispendio antojadizo de recursos proveniente de ese 
entendimiento de la "riqueza". 
A
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S A1 Yo diría que no porque Caracas siempre se benefició del 
petróleo como un commodity, como un zumo para el  
bienestar pero Caracas fue más como una ciudad de 
trasbordo, entre el medio petrolero rural y el mundo, era 
una ciudad que se movía entre las referencias hacia afuera, 
Nueva York, París, Italia, la que fuera, y el medio rural que 
le mandaba la plata. Tanto que el gran edificio de la 
Corporación Venezolana de Petróleo que es PDVSA hoy 
día, hasta la nacionalización del petróleo en los 70, y luego 
se le cambia el nombre a PDVSA, el edificio es casi 
concebido como una infraestructura privada que le daba 
petróleo y dinero al país, que además como sede lo que 
hacía era centralizar las políticas que controlaban lo que 
hacían las corporaciones trasnacionales y que luego se 
convierten en corporaciones nacionales, que diluyen poder y 
que es un elemento crítico del plan petrolero de esta gente. 
(…) Cuando se nacionaliza el petróleo ésta adquiere la sede 
PDVSA pero sigue siendo prácticamente un recinto privado 
que la gente ni siquiera sabía que significaba, la gente pasaba 
por allí y ni siquiera…  
 
(…) Realmente para Caracas el petróleo significaba estas 
sedes de PDVSA, Lagoven, Maraven, no sé qué… donde 
sin duda trabajó mucha gente e indirectamente esa cultura 
del petróleo como dije antes se la vivió en otras formas de 
comercio de la industria o en el manejo gerencial pero no 
tuvo un rostro, no se pudiera decir que era una ciudad del 
petróleo, este hubo proyectos… quizás Maracaibo.  
 
(…) Quizás los campos de golf son una evidencia de la 
ciudad petrolera, a lo mejor estoy cambiando mi respuesta, y 
si hay signos, pero yo no lo consideraría una ciudad del 
petróleo, todo lo que ocurrió en San Bernardino, la propia 
La Floresta, con lo que era, yo no sé cuál era esta, la Shell, 
no me acuerdo lo que era lo que es hoy en día la universidad 
la UNEFA, creo que era la Shell, yo no me acuerdo, y en 
frente la embajada,  ¿por qué la embajada está en frente de la 
petrolera? Porque bueno… no, no era la Shell, era la Mobil 
o la Creole, la Creole porque era americana, porque para 
tener la embajada en frente… y esta zona de casas eran las 
casas de todos los ejecutivos tanto de la petrolera como de 
la embajada. Y es un ghetto, es un bunker, era un pueblo 
cerrado… y la manera en que fue planificado es 
evidentemente un polígono cerrado, o sea, no había 
integración.   
 
¿Considerar a Caracas una ciudad del petróleo? Tal vez lo 
fue, pero nunca tuvo un rostro.  
Si hubiese un mensaje claro… no es que el petróleo no deba 
tener presencia en Caracas, el petróleo debe tener presencia en 
cada asentamiento urbano para que no estén en el estado de 
miseria en el que están, debería haber un Centro La Estancia 
en Cabimas, Lagunillas, en los campos petroleros de Maturín, 
en Monagas.  
 
Porque yo pienso que la gran conclusión de tu trabajo es, y 
aquí me estoy adelantando, es que no es Caracas, tiene que ser 
un sistema de influencia nacional, no tiene sentido. Si es 
directamente a través de PDVSA, ese no es el problema, si 
PDVSA tiene el dinero y lo puede hacer, debería pagar su 
cuota de responsabilidad social como cualquier empresa, ¿por 
qué tiene que pagar toda su responsabilidad social en Caracas? 
 
A4 N/A la cultura petrolera es una falta enorme de proyecto. La 
Excepción es Noruega. No tenemos un proyecto urbano.  
 
Según Oriol Bohigas, el Proyecto Urbano es actuar sobre 
sectores de ciudad incorporando inversión privada, 
construcción de ciudad. 
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A5  Desde mi particular punto de vista una "Ciudad del 
Petróleo" debería ser una ciudad producto de los 
importantes recursos que el petróleo genera y su buena 
administración. En este sentido una "Ciudad del Petróleo" 
debe ser planificada, con normas compartidas y respetadas, 
con un alto sentido de pertenencia, con orden ciudadano, 
con claridad en su crecimiento futuro, tolerante, con una 
enorme inversión en espacios públicos, esperanzadora, 
donde se respete la vida, clara, amable, bien diseñada, 
funcional, eficiente y bella. En este sentido Oslo pudiera ser 
un ejemplo de "Ciudad del Petróleo" como también 
Houston o Toronto. Caracas no. 
Una relación sana donde el manejo transparente de los 
recursos y la gestión urbana en manos de profesionales 
altamente capacitados y con experiencia comprobada en el 
área sea lo principal a tomar en cuenta. Un ejemplo, como dije 
antes, podemos verlo en la Caracas de los años '40 y '50 en 
donde algunos planes urbanísticos, como el Plan Monumental 
de Caracas y el Plan Regulador del 52 se ejecutaron apuntando 
a una Caracas desarrollada y con importantes aportes a nivel 
de infraestructura para el momento. 
A6 No sé qué querría decir eso; si es por "ciudad del 
automóvil", sí, pero no es la única en el planeta  
La "riqueza petrolera" no es tal riqueza, sino una gran cantidad 
de dinero disponible; mientras no se entienda esa diferencia no 
se puede hacer nada. Y como ese mito es parte de una cultura 
y la ciudad manifestación de la cultura, la imbricación entre el 
mito del "somos ricos" y el "Púyalo, que va en bajada" es letal.  
A3 N/A PDVSA La Estancia ha contribuido con este desenfoque que 
tenemos ahorita con la empresa petrolera... porque vamos a 
estar claros, yo cuando critico todo esto del petróleo no es que 
diga... no coño ¡el petróleo es cheverísimo, esa vaina da plata! 
Hay que vivir de él, hay que... ojala todos pudiéramos tener la 
fortuna de vivir un país petrolero, todos deberíamos saber, 
digamos, saber más de petróleo y vivir más del petróleo 
A2 esta ciudad producto de la dinámica y la sinergia del tema 
petrolero, de la renta, del extractivismo petrolero 
N/A 
W
RI
TE
RS
/J
O
U
RN
A
LI
ST
S W1 Creo que Caracas es parte de una historia confusa y rara, 
parte de la distorsión de una sociedad petrolera, llena de 
fisuras, llena de elementos que ni siquiera la riqueza 
petrolera pudo jamás administrar: la desigualdad, las 
migraciones campesinas, la diversas formas de resistencia 
política, la tradición cultural del caudillismo militar, etc. En 
fin…hay un zumbido esquemático en Quintero que me 
genera resistencias… ¿Se puede arropar bajo el término 
“ciudad del petróleo” toda la diversidad que ocurre en 
Caracas? Me temo, en nuestro imaginario, esa categoría 
remite a otra cosa. Pienso en Houston, no en Caracas. 
N/A 
P2 sin duda es un título que suena bien, pero que tendría una 
mayor resonancia en ciudades cuya principal fuente de 
ingreso es el petróleo. En Caracas, el comercio produce una 
gran fuente de sustento, al igual que en algún momento lo 
tuvo el entretenimiento o el hecho de que todos los 
tribunales y ministerios se encuentren en la capital. Sí tuviera 
que darle un nombre le daría el de la “ciudad de los 
anhelos”, porque casi se ha vuelto un deseo ir o llegar a 
Caracas para cumplir con algún proyecto personal, que va 
desde la mejora de la salud hasta la notoriedad en medios de 
comunicación. El punto de petróleo y de la distribución de 
la renta es sin embargo clave, siendo un país 
monoproductor es más fácil redistribuir renta que 
producirla. Y tal énfasis en la monoproducción del petróleo 
y en la quiebra programada de la producción nacional es un 
efecto evidente de los últimos 15 años de gobierno en el 
país. 
sin duda la política del bien común se ha perdido en Venezuela 
en los últimos 20 años. La creación de espacios urbanos ha 
sido errática y el mantenimiento de los existentes no pasa de 
un saludo a la bandera. Una salida en el marco de un plan 
político integrador y no separatista entre ciudadanos -de 
izquierda versus derecha, ricos versus pobres, del este versus 
del oeste, etc – podría ser la creación de un fondo de 
desarrollo cultural y patrimonial del 1 % del ingreso total del 
PIB. Con este presupuesto anual, sabiamente ejecutado –no 
politizado y sobre todo con la supervisión de la opinión 
pública de manera que no caiga en manos de la corrupción- 
podría lograrse un entorno que respondiera a patrones y 
flujogramas físicos de higiene, estética y funcionalidad. La 
empresa privada también debería apoyar estas iniciativa, al 
igual que los grandes nuevos socios en la extracción petrolera 
–y mineral en general- venezolana como lo son chinos, los 
rusos y los iraníes. 
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J1 Yo diría que absolutamente sí. Y lamentablemente sí. (…) 
Es una ciudad del petróleo, y una ciudad con una cultura del 
petróleo, que está en el estado y está en el ciudadano y es 
una de las grandes guerras digamos, de las  grandes batallas 
que tenemos que librar y que implica un nivel de radicalidad 
para transformar la ciudad que se cumpla. 
Yo creo que si no aprovechamos la riqueza petrolera para 
darle un vuelco a la ciudad, sencillamente estamos perdiendo 
 el tiempo y los recursos. Ahora si seguimos  utilizando la 
riqueza petrolera para mantener la estructura de la ciudad 
estamos perdiendo el tiempo. Esta ciudad necesita un vuelco 
radical, cada vez que yo menciono  esta palabra, según en qué 
contexto, puede ser entendido como... 
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Appendix three: Adverts 
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Appendix four: Ethics Approval 
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Appendix five: Sample of Participant Information Letter and Consent Form 
 
 
 
Documento de información para el participante 
Proyecto de investigación: State, Oil and Culture: Cultural Policy and Public Space in 
Caracas (Estado, cultura y petróleo: políticas culturales y espacio público en Caracas) 
Me gustaría invitarle a participar en un estudio de investigación. Antes de decidir si desea 
participar es importante que entienda por qué la investigación se está haciendo y lo que 
implicaría para usted. Por favor tómese el  tiempo para leer cuidadosamente la siguiente 
información, puede discutirlo con otras personas, si así lo desea. No dude en preguntar  si 
hay algo que no está claro o si desea obtener más información. 
¿Cuál es el propósito de este estudio?  
Este proyecto de investigación explorará la relación entre el estado, el petróleo, la cultura y 
espacio urbano en Venezuela, concentrándose principalmente en la ciudad de Caracas 
como caso de estudio. El espacio del Estado abarca mucho más que el territorio nacional, 
está constituido por un conjunto diverso de elementos, en un amplio rango de escalas, 
desde lo micro hasta lo global. El enfoque para el desarrollo de estos argumentos serán 
cómo estos elementos han dado forma a la relación del estado con la cultura, cómo la 
riqueza petrolera da forma a esta relación y cómo esto se manifiesta en el espacio urbano 
de la ciudad de Caracas. 
 
¿Por qué se solicita mi participación? 
Para este estudio se han escogido personas clave en altos cargos con poder de decisión en 
las políticas públicas urbanas y culturales que tienen incidencia directa en la ciudad de 
Caracas.  
 
¿Tengo que participar?  
La participación en este estudio es voluntaria, podrá retirarse en cualquier momento o 
etapa, negarse a responder preguntas que considere muy personales o invasivas sin 
repercusión alguna  
 
Es su decisión el querer participar o no. Si decide participar, se le solicitará que firme la 
planilla de consentimiento, y cuenta con la libertad de retirarse en cualquier momento y sin 
tener que dar explicaciones.  
 
¿Qué pasará si participo?  
• Usted será entrevistado por la investigadora 
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• Se estipula que la entrevista tenga una duración máxima de 90 minutos 
• Se estipula un solo encuentro con la investigadora, se acordará una segunda 
entrevista en caso que sea considerado necesario por ambas partes. 
• Previo  a la entrevista se entregará el presente documento de instrucciones al 
participante y la planilla de consentimiento para ser firmadas, en caso de aceptar. La 
metodología de la entrevista será estructurada y no estandarizada, grabada en 
audio.  
• La entrevista tendrá lugar en el lugar de conveniencia escogido por el entrevistado o 
la entrevistada. 
 
¿Qué debo hacer?  
La investigadora le formulará preguntas a las que usted podrá responder de la manera que 
considere más pertinente.  
 
¿Cuáles son las desventajas y riesgos de participar?  
Ninguno. 
 
¿Cuáles son los beneficios de participar? 
Contribuir al conocimiento de la realidad cultural y urbana de Venezuela, con valiosa 
información que no se encuentra debidamente documentada y que permitirá compartir este 
conocimiento en una plataforma internacional.  
 
¿Qué pasará si el estudio se suspende?  
En estos casos, toda información recolectada y data personal sera resguardada por la 
Universidad. 
 
¿Mi participación se mantendrá confidencial?  
• Sólo la investigadora, su supervisor y el comité de ética de City University London 
tendrán acceso a la información recopilada en este estudio, y será destruida luego 
de tres años.  
• La información personal recopilada y los archivos de audio de las entrevistas serán 
de uso exclusive para este estudio y estará resguardada por el Data Protection Act 
Data archiving/sharing 
 
¿Qué pasará con los resultados del estudio de investigación? 
Los resultados de este estudio serán analizados como parte de la tesis doctoral de la 
investigadora, pudiendo ser incluidos en artículos académicos a ser publicados en revistas 
arbitradas de prestigio internacional. Si así lo desea y lo comunica, el participante tundra 
derecho a recibir copias de los documentos y  publicaciones derivados de este estudio. Para 
este fin, el participante deberá facilitar una dirección de correo electrónico. 
¿Qué pasará si no quiero seguir formando parte del estudio?  
Usted posee toda  la libertad de retirarse del estudio sin tener que dar ninguna explicación.  
 
¿Y si tengo algún problema? 
Puede contactar a la investigadora al 04166204588 o al correo electrónico penelope.plaza-
azuaje.1@city.ac.uk. 
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Si usted tiene cualquier problema, preocupaciones o preguntas sobre este estudio, puede 
hablar con un miembro del equipo de investigación. Si siguen insatisfecho y desea quejarse 
formalmente, puede hacerlo a través del procedimiento de quejas de la Universidad. Para 
quejarse sobre el estudio, puede comunicarse al teléfono +0044(0)20 7040 3040. Usted 
puede solicitar hablar con el Secretario del Comité de Ética de Investigación del Senado e 
informarles que el nombre del proyecto es: State, Oil and Culture: Cultural Policy and Public 
Space in Caracas 
También puede escribir a:  
Anna Ramberg 
Secretary to Senate Research Ethics Committee  
Research Office, E214 
City University London 
Northampton Square 
London 
EC1V 0HB                                      
Email: Anna.Ramberg.1@city.ac.uk 
 
City University London posee pólizas de seguros que se aplican a este estudio. Si usted 
siente que ha sido lastimado o herido por participar en este estudio usted puede ser elegible 
para reclamar una indemnización. Esto no afecta sus derechos legales a pedir 
compensación. Si usted ha sido perjudicado debido a la negligencia de alguien, entonces es 
probable que tenga motivos para la acción legal. 
Quién ha autorizado este estudio? 
Este estudio has sido aprobado por el Comité de Ética en Investigación (Research Ethics 
Committee) de la City University London. 
 
Para mayor información 
Supervisor:  
Dave O’Brien 
Dave.Obrien.1@city.ac.uk 
Lecturer in Cultural and Creative Industries 
The Department of Culture and Creative Industries 
School of Arts and Social Sciences 
City University London 
 
Gracias por su tiempo y su disposición para leer este documento.  
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__________________________ 
 
Planilla de consentimiento 
Proyecto de investigación: 
State, Oil and Culture: Cultural Policy and Public Space in Caracas (Estado, cultura y 
petróleo: políticas culturales y espacio público en Caracas) 
 
1. Estoy de acuerdo en participar en el proyecto de investigación 
de City University London especificado anteriormente. Me han 
explicado el proyecto, he leído la planilla de información al 
participante, la que podré conservar para mis archivos.   
Comprendo que este estudio implicará:   
• Ser entrevistada/entrevistado por la investigadora.  
• Permitir que la entrevista sea grabada en audio.  
• Ofrecer mi disponibilidad en caso que se requiera una 
segunda entrevista.  
 
 
2. Esta información será archivada y procesada con los 
siguientes propósitos:  
Comprendo que cualquier información que yo provea será 
confidencial, y ninguna información que pueda llevar a la 
identificación de cualquier individuo será revelada en ningún 
reporte del proyecto, o a terceras partes. Ningún dato de 
información personal será publicado. Los datos de 
información personal no serán compartidos con ninguna 
organización.  
Comprendo que he autorizado que mi nombre, mi cargo o el 
nombre de mi lugar de trabajo sea usado en el reporte final 
del proyecto, y en futuras publicaciones.  
 
3. Entiendo que mi participación es voluntaria, que puedo decidir 
no participar parcial o totalmente en el proyecto, y que me 
puedo retirar en cualquier etapa del proyecto sin penalización 
o desventaja alguna. 
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4. Estoy de acuerdo con que City University London archive y 
procese esta información acerca de mí. Entiendo que esta 
información sera utilizada únicamente con los propósitos 
declarados en este documento y que mi consentimiento es 
condicional al cumplimiento por parte de la universidad con 
sus deberes y obligaciones según el Data Protection Act 
1998. 
 
5.  Acepto participar en el estudio anteriormente especificado. 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ ____________________________ _____________ 
Participante     Firma      Fecha 
 
 
Al completarse, 1 copia al participante; 1 copia para el archivo de la investigadora 
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